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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

October 31, 1983

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WEINBERGER,  
MOD WOERNER AND MOD HESLITINE

DATE & PLACE: 1630 hours, 27 October 1983, and 0930 hours,  
28 October 1983, at le Chateau Montebello,  
Quebec, Canada

OTHER ATTENDEES: See Enclosure 1.

1. The first meeting was requested by Minister of Defense Heseltine to discuss GLCM deployments in the United Kingdom. The meeting was a follow-up to a one-on-one conversation Minister Heseltine had with Secretary Weinberger earlier in the day.

2. Mr. Heseltine began the meeting by reviewing the current political environment in the UK against which GLCM deployments are taking place. He noted that when Parliament went back in session after the elections there was an increased interest in GLCM deployment. He said he had expected to have a debate on these deployments earlier, but the election had put it off. However, in recent days the House of Commons leadership has clearly indicated that a debate is essential. The events in Grenada earlier in the week underscored the political need for such a debate. He said that the government was taken aback by U.S. actions in Grenada due to the lack of consultation with the UK. Criticism is being leveled against the government that the so-called special relationship between the U.S. and the UK has been damaged. The question is being asked if the joint agreement on GLCM use would really be binding in a time of crisis. All these events taken together make it absolutely essential that there be an opportunity for Parliamentary debate on the GLCM deployment.

3. Minister Heseltine said that the earliest date for such a debate would be Monday, 31 October, which is the day before the planned arrival of the GLCM missiles and warheads. The 1 November delivery date has been leaked, and he expects to have to answer questions concerning those deliveries on 1 November. Because of the leak, at the Parliamentary debate on Monday, if asked, he would have to acknowledge their impending arrival. Not to do so would create a political holocaust for him on Tuesday. However, to announce officially the 1 November date would ensure massive demonstrations. He underscored that, "like it or not," the Grenadan situation is absolutely linked to cruise missile deployments. The

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lack of communication between the U.S. and the UK on the Grenadan invasion is being seen as a lack of communication between the U.S. and the UK.

4. The result of all of the above is that the UK cannot allow the missiles and warheads to arrive on 1 November. Heseltine has absolutely no problem with the other planned deliveries for 1 November to include launch control centers and the TEL's, but the missiles and warheads must not arrive on 1 November. He plans to advise the Parliament on 31 October that the United Kingdom is totally committed to the deployment and to achieving operational status by the end of the year. The Parliament already knows equipment is arriving. He will advise the Parliament that he will tell them when the missiles and warheads have arrived. He requires a period of time between the debate on 31 October and the actual arrival of the missiles and warheads. Minister Heseltine, therefore, asked Secretary Weinberger to delay shipment of the missiles and warheads to the United Kingdom until 10 November and preferably 22 November, which would be the same time as the Pershing II-A arrival in Germany.

5. Minister Woerner said that if a gap was necessary it would be useful if the UK data was slipped to the 22nd which was the date for the Pershing deployments. Minister Woerner mentioned that an agreement has been made with the opposition in the Bundestag to begin debate on 21 November and end it on 22 November. SecDef noted that we had been led to believe that the debate would begin on the 21st and end on the 21st so that deliveries could begin that same day. Woerner responded that ending the debate on the 22nd had just been agreed upon. Woerner then noted that he would have no problem with an earlier date for UK deployment, but he would prefer the 22nd.

6. Secretary Weinberger responded by first noting that he would have to examine the technical problems of what a delay in the delivery would do to the 31 December IOC. He thought it might be possible to slip to the 10th of November, but he was less optimistic that a slip to the 22nd of November would permit us to make IOC. He then observed that each delay makes the next delay easier. Demonstrators will be there on the 22nd of November just as one could expect them to be there on the 1st of November. He remarked, however, that he understood the UK political problem and he thought that 10 November might work, but he would have to get a technical assessment.

7. Minister Woerner emphasized that both the UK and the FRG have made the decision to deploy and that is not reversible. However, in Germany the peace movement, the trade unions, and the opposition are all against deployment. He noted that the Government has difficult Parliamentary problem, but that it will prevail. He then reviewed the party politics which led to the 21-22 Bundestag debate. He also observed that the center of the opposition argument is that we are not taking INF negotiations seriously enough.

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8. MOD Heseltine underscored that the Europeans have been living with this problem for almost 8 years. He said there is a high chance that the peace movement will go berserk when the missiles finally arrive. Politically, he believes we have pulled off a near miracle in getting this far. He observed that the key political event is the arrival of the missiles and the warheads and not the IOC. He remarked that no one will believe that you can't achieve IOC of 31 December with a 22 November warhead arrival date. Woerner underscored that point, adding that the Russians will understand our resolve upon arrival of the missiles and not the meeting of an IOC. He also observed that simultaneous deployment would show common resolve between the FRG and the UK. IOC, he concluded, is not a political event. Mr. Perle disagreed, noting that we have repeatedly talked about a 31 December IOC date as a key event. Perle then expressed the concern that if we go to 22 November, we will miss this key IOC event. Secretary Weinberger added that the Soviets will see a first success of their propaganda efforts by this new delay. Heseltine responded that the Soviets have been absolutely destroyed by the success of our INF deployment efforts so far; there will be no Soviet success. As a final comment on this point, Richard Perle observed that one could expect the next rationale for delay to be based on the fact that the current round of negotiations will end in December and why not delay deployment until the end of the round.

9. In concluding, Secretary Weinberger said that he needed to talk to the U.S. technical people on the matter. He noted that he understood the problem and we would try to do what we could to help our Allies. Woerner reemphasized that the message to the Soviets is that we are going ahead. Heseltine then observed that all of the heavy equipment can continue to deploy on schedule. The only issue is the warhead and missile deployment. He noted that last week's demonstrations gave the peace movement a shot in the arm--Grenada didn't help his situation--and that he needed some time to "lower the temperature."

10. At 0930 hours, 28 October, the Secretary of Defense met with Minister Heseltine to continue the discussion on the GLCM deployments. After several minutes of discussion, Minister Woerner and his staff joined the meeting.

11. Secretary Weinberger began the meeting by stating he had been in touch with his technical staff in Washington on the impact of the IOC of delaying deployments. He said to delay to the 10th of November was risky; 15 November created an even higher risk, and that 22 November was unacceptable.

12. After some discussion of the various dates and their impact on UK domestic politics and the impact on meeting IOC, it was decided that the GLCM missiles and warheads could arrive in the UK on 15 November. It was further decided that the arrival should be at exactly 1330 hours, 15 November 1983. That same

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afternoon, following their arrival, Minister Haseltine will notify Parliament that the missiles and warheads are in the UK. Minister Woerner, upon reflection, indicated that 15 November was concurred in by the FRG and, in fact, it helped to set the stage for the debate and Pershing II arrival in FRG on 21-22 November.

13. Minister Haseltine expressed his appreciation to Secretary Weinberger for assisting in the matter for helping resolve the issue and on that note the meeting ended.



Colin L. Powell  
Major General, USA  
Senior Military Assistant  
to the Secretary of Defense

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