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dummy load. As an initial step, the Joint Chiefs of Staff favored selling an LGB "designator" system (i.e., two-seat aircraft with rear-seat illuminators).

Mr. Ellsworth also had asked whether providing Shrikes and LGBs would (1) give South Korea a significant margin of tactical superiority and (2) escalate the arms race by sparking an action/reaction cycle. The JCS response read as follows:

1. Allowing South Korea to acquire LGBs and Shrikes was not so much a matter of achieving tactical superiority as of redressing a major imbalance in tactical aircraft vis-a-vis North Korea. The North Koreans had no means of countering LGBs, and the Soviets apparently lacked enough smart bombs to give them some.
2. Judging by the timing of past aircraft deliveries to the two Koreas, which had occurred independently of each other, no action/reaction cycle seemed likely. The Joint Chiefs of Staff looked upon North Korea's buildup as a deliberate, long-range effort to achieve superiority over the South.

In August 1975, Secretary Schlesinger approved release of LGBs and of the Maverick A, a TV-guided air-to-ground missile that could hit small targets moving as fast as 50 miles per hour.^{40/}

(U) In August 1975, the South Koreans revealed their own Five-Year Force Improvement Plan, which was aimed at creating enough strength to repel a North Korean attack without relying upon US support. Two months later, President Ford authorized (1) selling South Korea 18 F-4E as well as 60 F-5E/F aircraft and (2) determining whether the South Koreans were interested in acquiring eight of the 12 Hawk battalions that would be stationed there during FY 1979. He delayed a decision, though, about whether South Korean forces should be brought to the point where, with only US logistic support, they could stop a North Korean attack. In June 1976, the Koreans agreed in principle to accept eight Hawk battalions;

40/ Memo, ASD(ISA) to CJCS, 4 Feb 75, JCS 1776/948, C-GDS; Memo, DASD(ISA) to DepDir, DIA, 14 Feb 75, JCS 1776/948-1, C-GDS; JCSM-279-75 to SecDef, 2 Jul 75, JCS 1776/948-2, S-GDS; Record of Action, "Exception to the National Disclosure Policy--Korea," 2 Apr 76, S-XGDS; JMF 892/481 (4 Feb 75).

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