



INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

12

Folder "NATO 320 2(x-1928) (28 Apr 73), Box 75, 330-78-000,

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

26 APR 1973

In reply refer to: I-22620/73

12 #11

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL Authority: EO 13526 Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS Date: SEP 07 2018

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: MBFR: NSDM 211 and JCS Views - ACTION MEMORANDUM

In NSDM 211 (Tab A) the President approved a version of the US MBFR approach paper that was considered at the NSC meeting on MBFR and directed that it be provided (with supporting annexes) to the Allies before the end of April. The VPWG accordingly prepared the paper and annexes (Tab B) which will be sent to NATO today or tomorrow for immediate circulation. A 2 May NAC meeting has been scheduled for Ambassador Rumsfeld to discuss the US approach.

NSDM 211

The NSDM 211 approach paper (and annexes) concur in important aspects with the course you have advanced:

- It supports a careful, limited initial approach to MBFR, with the question of proceeding further to be decided later.
- Stationed force reductions are emphasized, and there is an implied emphasis on US-Soviet reductions. Indigenous force reductions are labeled as disadvantageous to NATO.
- There is a clear emphasis on ground forces.
- Although the mixed package involving nuclear elements is characterized as an acceptable initial outcome, it is cast in a different status from the other two reduction approaches. The point is made that it does not reduce US manpower and thus can be considered as a possible additional feature of the other approaches at an appropriate stage.
- The importance of constraints is highlighted, and pre-reduction constraints are an objective.
- Negotiated verification measures are proposed for consideration.

Office of the Secretary of Defense
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS
Date: 07 SEP 2018 Authority: EO 13526 + 5 U.S.C. § 552
Declassify: X Deny in Full:
Declassify in Part:
Reason:
MDR: 18-M-1999

WJ
WJ

1928

18-M-1999

54/385²¹

~~SECRET~~

(S) The paper, however, does differ in some respects from your proposals:

- Indigenous forces are included as a second reduction stage in the common ceiling approach. But this is mitigated by the explicit statement that the US considers indigenous reductions disadvantageous, although we are prepared to consider them if the Allies wish.
- The paper does not emphasize the advantages we see in the common ceiling approach as compared to the US-USSR percentage/parity approach. The latter approach is presented more favorably than we would have preferred.
- All three approaches are described as acceptable to the US, and no preference is indicated among them. However, as stated above, the mixed package is clearly cast as less of a contender than the other two.
- A force limitation agreement is described as disadvantageous. But it is not clear that this extends to the kind of informal understanding we have proposed.

(S) Of course, final US positions on an MBR reduction approach will be taken only after we have consulted with our Allies on the US paper. Thus, we will have a further opportunity to shape the US position in a manner consistent with your views.

JCS Views

(S) The JCS have written to you (Tab C) reaffirming positions that differ from the NSDM 211 decisions and requesting that you support these positions and transmit them to Henry Kissinger. They propose that:

1. The indigenous common ceiling (which follows the stationed force common ceiling in the first reduction approach) should not be presented to the Allies.
2. The US should state that US reductions should not exceed 19,000 men.
3. Presentation of the US-USSR percentage/parity approach should "show clearly its principal disadvantages, i.e., it reduces more US and less Soviet forces" than would the common ceiling.
4. The mixed package should be presented only as a follow-on and not as an initial approach.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: SEP 07 2018

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: SEP 07 2018

3

(S) Points 1 and 4 reflect DOD positions developed for the 12 April NSC meeting. But, as described above, the NSDM 211 decisions do go some way to meeting them: thus, indigenous reductions are labeled disadvantageous, and the mixed package is treated differently -- and less positively -- than the other approaches. As for Point 2, the 19,000 limit proposed by the JCS would not even permit us to take our share of the French reduction in the stationed common ceiling (our cut would be about 23,000), let alone absorbing the British reduction as we considered. It is simply too little to help us with Congress. As I said in an earlier memorandum, I believe we should press the stationed common ceiling toward a US-USSR outcome and be prepared to consider having the US take most if not all of the Western reduction (34,000). Finally, I have some sympathy with Point 3, but believe it is a matter for the follow-on discussions of reduction approaches in NATO.


Action

(S) The JCS memorandum does not explicitly renege NSDM 211 or oppose sending NATO the US approach paper and annexes, which they played a full role in developing. And, in fact, the JCS do not oppose guidance to US NATO on presentation of the NSDM 211 decisions and papers as they stand. Rather, the memorandum seems to have been drafted to reaffirm their views for the record and for consideration in subsequent decisions on the final US position on an MBFR reduction approach.

(S) I believe that the points they make should be considered in settling on a preferred US reduction approach and therefore recommend that you transmit them to Henry Kissinger making this point, and so inform the Chairman, JCS. At the same time, I do not believe it advisable for you personally to subscribe to them, given the observations above, and because this is not the best time or vehicle for you to communicate your own views on decisions concerning the final US position. The attached memoranda for your signature are drawn along the preceding lines.

Recommendation:

(U) That you sign the attached memoranda to Henry Kissinger (Tab D) and the Chairman, JCS (Tab E). No further coordination is required.


Lawrence S. Eagleburger
Acting Assistant Secretary

Attachments
Tabs A-E a/s

Prepared by R. Bartholomew, X-71385