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TAB B5 - (#)  
03 JUN 1982

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON D.C. 20301



INTERNATIONAL  
SECURITY AFFAIRS

In reply refer to:  
I-35325/82

- EVAC  
- PROPORTIONALITY

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY

SUBJECT: Paper for CPPG Meeting on Lebanon 2 p.m., June 3, 1982

(U) We have a fairly good Lebanon paper (attached) for the CPPG this afternoon. We did not get all we wanted, but have significantly changed the tone of the paper and brought to the fore that our strategic posture in the area is severely threatened by a large scale Israeli invasion of Lebanon and that negative incentives must have due consideration to get Israel to desist and withdraw. (Current Objectives and Policy/Plans pg. 4)

(U) We were unable to achieve the idea that as a deterrent we should now put Israel on notice that we are prepared to use specific negative sanctions. State and the NSC oppose this as unwise because the circumstances (e.g., a strong provocation) can not be predicted, we would not want to tie our hands to a specific response, particularly one we might not be able to stick to in some circumstances. They have accepted general wording which puts the Israelis on notice now of the effect on our strategic interests and consequently on US-Israeli relations.

(U) We also managed to put in the paper a stronger emphasis on ongoing deterrence as the first essential step in a Lebanon policy, although it does not have a specific section or a specific checklist of actions in the paper.

(U) On the whole, we believe the paper is a reasonable one. It makes the point of the heavy potential damage to our interests of an invasion (pgs 6-7), allows for use of an appropriate list of both positive and negative incentives (pgs 11-12), and is reasonably balanced in its approach to the issue. It also has a reasonable new approach to the Lebanon problem as an option if there is a large scale Israeli invasion.

(U) We suggest you make the following points at the CPPG meeting:

- Emphasize the importance of deterrence as first step, including the necessity for the President to underline to Begin the damage to our strategic posture, and hence US-Israeli relations, of any large scale invasion of Lebanon.
- That if such an invasion takes place we must be prepared to consider all forms of suasion to obtain Israeli withdrawal lest our strategic posture and security and arms relationships suffer long term damage making us less able to resist the Soviet (and other) threats to the area, particularly to the Gulf.

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- That if an invasion does take place, we should be prepared to examine new options for Lebanon and use the situation to take steps we might be now unable to take.

Attachment  
as

*King*

FRANCIS J. WEST, JR.  
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

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