

~~SECRET~~

27 JAN 1981 14 54

#16

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: JUL 12 2018

UNITED STATES ARMY
THE CHIEF OF STAFF

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

OOE
DONE
23/3

27 JAN 1981

CP-BW.
Let's get this
into decision
making format
get our discussion.

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Rapid Reinforcement of Europe (U)

1. On 6 December 1980, Secretary Brown forwarded a memorandum that stressed that improving our ability to reinforce NATO rapidly remains an important objective. We also understand the US Government's commitment to the Allies to provide three additional division sets of prepositioned equipment by 1982. However, we find that the current funding profile will not accomplish this until much later. Since the basic goal of the Long Term Defense Program is to provide NATO with a 10 US Division D-Day force by 1982, we have analyzed alternatives to provide more D-Day capability in the Central Region at the earliest future date. To avoid embarrassment to the United States, the fact that the prepositioned equipment program cannot be accomplished by 1982 should be addressed with the Alliance at the earliest possible date and an interim solution should be proposed.

2. Our analysis shows that even after taking equipment away from CONUS units to fill the prepositioned sets, large shortages remain in division sets 1-4 through 1984-85. Adding two additional sets by 1982 creates more hollow CONUS units, increases the requirement for early airlift (see inclosure), and adds to the total prepositioned equipment shortfall. In sum, we are creating a situation in which there are a greater number of units with insufficient equipment to deploy anywhere except Europe - and insufficient airlift to get them to Europe before the war starts.

3. We have studied alternatives aimed at achieving a 10 Division D-Day force. Analysis shows that the 10 division D-Day capability could be provided best and at the earliest date by a combination of division sets 1-4 and fast sealift for two divisions as an interim measure. This solution would require the following immediate actions to make it workable as quickly as possible:

- a. Accelerated funding to procure shortages to fill division sets 1-4.
- b. Acquire the SL-7s and accelerate conversion into 1982.
- c. Increase the Army airlift allocation by requiring the other services to reduce their early lift requirement by additional prepositioned equipment or by other means.

WHS 400

1/27/81

~~CLASSIFIED BY: [redacted]~~

~~SECRET~~

SEC DEF CONTR No. 12581

~~REVIEW ON: [redacted]~~

330-83-0104, 6x19, 7

18-M-1040

~~SECRET~~

27 JAN 1981

DAMO-OD-RRN

SUBJECT: Rapid Reinforcement of Europe (U)

d. Fund procurement for essential support unit prepositioned equipment and 30 days of balanced war reserves for the 10 division D-Day force.

4. ~~(S)~~ Filling division sets 1-4 and substituting fast sealift for sets 5 and 6 would keep our HNS negotiations viable and would maintain US credibility, especially in view of the 4 February 1981 meeting of the German Federal Security Council. The Council is expected to reach a decision which could result in a proposal to provide 90,000 German Army reservists in the form of equipment holding units. Indications are that this force will be offered with the proviso that the US guarantee a 10 division force by 1982.

5. ~~(S)~~ The underlying intent of the LTDP is to provide greater combat capability early on. Our inability to provide equipment for prepositioning in the near term warrants immediate consultation with the Alliance to gain acceptance of our recommendations for fast sealift for two divisions as an interim near term reinforcement enhancement and to stress that our long term goals have not changed.

6. (U) This issue requires early resolution and consultation with our Allies as to the solution we select.

1 Incl
as



E. C. MEYER
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff

CF:
Secretary of the Army

Office of the Secretary of Defense
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS
Date: 12 Jul 2018 Authority: EO 13526 + S USC & S52
Declassify: X Deny in Full: _____
Declassify in Part: _____
Reason: _____
MDR: 18 -M- 1040

2

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: JUL 12 2018

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: JUL 12 2018

AIRLIFT SUMMARY
(S/T in First 10 Days of NATO Reinforcement)

1. ~~(S)~~ Airlift availability for FY 82 and 86 based on data from the on-going Joint Congressionally Mandated Mobility Study. Current figures derived from recent TPFDD.

Total Capability in first 10 days:	Current ^{1/} 52,465	82 ^{2/} 61,000	86 ^{3/} 90,000
First 10 day appropriation of total lift:	% S/T	% S/T	% S/T
Army	30 15,740	29 17,690	25 22,500
Air Force		68 41,480	63 56,700
Navy		3 1,830	3 2,700
USMC		0	9 8,100

2. ~~(S)~~ Service Airlift Requirements in FY 82.

	DS 1-4 NAP*	DS 1-4 NAP & SHORTAGES	DS 1-6 NAP	DS 1-6 NAP & SHORTAGES
Army POMCUS Units	7,700	54,600	14,200	113,600
Non-POMCUS (4102P) Units	12,560	12,560	12,560	12,560
Accompanying Supplies	1,885	1,885	2,737	2,737
Army Sub-total	22,145	69,045	29,497	128,897
Army Airlift Deficit	(4,455)	(51,355)	(11,807)	(111,207)
Other Services Req't				
Air Force	80,073	80,073	80,073	80,073
Navy	6,401	6,401	6,401	6,401
USMC	28,216	28,216	28,216	28,216
TOTAL Req't	136,835	183,735	144,187	243,587
TOTAL Airlift Deficit	(75,835)	(122,735)	(83,187)	(182,587)

1_/ UTE Rate (on M+10): C141 A - 11.1, C5 - 9.7, CRAF - 10.0
CRAF MOD: None

2_/ UTE Rate (on M+10): C141 B - 11.1, C5 - 9.7, CRAF - 10.0
CRAF MOD: None

3_/ UTE Rate (on M+10): C141 - 12.5, C5 - 12.5, CRAF - 10.0
CRAF MOD: 53 Aircraft

* NAP = Equipment Not Authorized for Prepositioning that a unit must bring.

~~SECRET~~