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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

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CK-548-84
6 January 1984

LEBANON

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Lebanese Armed Forces - Request for Analysis and Recommendations (U)

1. (S) Reference your memorandum of 9 December 1983, subject as above, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have conducted an analysis of the most recent plan to expand the LAF to a fully mechanized force of 10 brigades. The analysis included consideration of the threat, force structure, equipment requirements, absorption capability, supportability, funding and third country support. Additionally, the Joint Chiefs of Staff examined the concept of using the buildup of the LAF as a means of establishing the basis for reducing MNF presence and for withdrawal of the MNF at the earliest possible time. The Services concerned are assessing the impact on readiness which would result from provision of the equipment. Initial indicators are that APC and Howitzer request can be satisfied through acceleration of depot overhaul programs. In order to effect expedited delivery, a large portion of the tanks and APC's will have to be drawn, in some combination, from US Army Europe and Army National Guard units. Moreover, some of the equipment would have to be provided in an "as is, where is" condition.

2. (U) Analysis

a. (S) Threat. The 1982 report (Bartlett Report), on which the current Lebanese Armed Forces Modernization Plan (LAMP) was based, held as a primary assumption that the LAF would have to contend only with weak factional forces left in the wake of an Israeli and Syrian withdrawal. This assumption is no longer valid. Complete withdrawal of Israeli and Syrian forces has not occurred and Muslim militias have acquired substantial combat capability, principally from Syria. The threat to the establishment of GOL authority throughout the Greater Beirut area consists of well-armed

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and entrenched Muslim factions, many of which have strong ties to Syria. This threat will continue even if Syrian forces withdraw. The threat of terrorist attacks has also increased significantly.

b. (S) Force Structure and Equipment. The Bartlett Report did not attempt to evaluate the appropriateness of the traditional LAF seven brigade structure. Rather, LAMF was designed to build a force capable of establishing and maintaining GOL authority throughout Lebanon in a relatively permissive environment. Since that plan was developed, there have been several adjustments of it as the LAF developed a clearer concept of what would be required to accomplish its mission. The current requirement for a fully mechanized force of 10 brigades is a realistic estimate of the forces needed to meet the near and mid-term goals of controlling Greater Beirut and extending GOL authority into Tripoli and Southern Lebanon. Enclosure A is the LAF concept of deployment of the 10 Brigade Force. The heavy emphasis on armor and mechanized infantry is an appropriate response to the armor and artillery capabilities of the opposing forces.

c. (S) Absorption Capability. The LAF is capable of absorbing the equipment requested for the 10 Brigade Force in the next four months. Enclosure A is the current estimate of LAF absorbability. Deliveries of equipment at this rate will require additional technical and training assistance.

d. (S) Supportability. The present LAF logistic system is adequate to support a 10 brigade force operating in the Greater Beirut area. It will become a limiting factor when brigades are deployed in Tripoli and Southern Lebanon. US training teams now in place will alleviate some of these shortcomings, but a complete logistics system will not be in place for three years.

e. (S) Funding: Implementation of the New Tannous Plan will add an estimated \$577.3M to previously projected modernization requirements of \$685.0M in 1984. Such expenditures will nearly exhaust known GOL official reserves, and may upset the delicate Lebanese economy. The LAF will have difficulty in expanding to 10 brigades without massive assistance in the form of grants or soft loans. The GOL may have other sources of funds, but since US equipment is preferred by the LAF, it will seek US support before tapping these. If normal FMS procedures are to be followed, funding to support accelerated delivery schedules must be received by 13 January 1984.

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f. (U) Third Country Support. France has undertaken to provide 10 armed helicopters, 10 tanks and 90 APCs, and some ammunition and an open credit line. French credits made available now exceed \$145.1M. Italy has offered, but not delivered, 80 APCs and has offered a \$35M to \$50M line of credit. Jordan has already contributed 20 tanks and is committed for 20 more. In the near term, this level of support will not change significantly.


g. (S) Establishment of GOL Control. Although the LAF has demonstrated its ability to assimilate sophisticated equipment and to fight well on the battlefield, it requires further upgrading to give it the capability to extend GOL authority throughout the greater Beirut area. Of course, the proposed 10 Brigade Force will not enable the Gemayel government to forego political negotiations. The equipment and deployment plan is not in any sense a substitute for, or an alternative to, negotiations for obtaining the withdrawal of Israeli and Syrian forces from Lebanon. It does, however, provide a realistic means of establishing GOL control in Southern Lebanon, a prerequisite for Israeli withdrawal. Upgrading LAF capability to control Greater Beirut will have the important effect of reducing the requirement for the MNF presence. According to the projected delivery, absorbability and training schedules, the LAF should be able to assume control of MNF positions by late February or early March 1984. This transition could be accomplished as part of Phase I of the LAF operational concept.

3. (S) Based on the above, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend the following:

a. That the equipment and deployment plan be accepted as the basis for planning the Lebanon Security Assistance Program.

b. That our objective be to deliver equipment in a schedule which is in accordance with the LAF capability to absorb it (Enclosure A). This schedule, of course, is contingent on the availability of funds and may be offset, in some instances by an evaluation of readiness impact.

c. That another review be undertaken in six months to confirm the validity of the 10 brigade force structure.


JOHN W. VESSEY, JR.
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

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Enclosure A: LAF Ability to Absorb Equipment

	<u>Tanks</u>	<u>APCs</u>	<u>Artillery</u>
December	34	50	0
January	0	56	0
February	0	45	54
March	69	96	0
April	34	0	16
May	N/A	N/A	N/A
TOTAL	137	247	72

Office of the Secretary of Defense
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS

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