



POLICY

~~TOP SECRET~~

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-2000

13 MAY 1985

SECRET

(#1)

18 MAY 1985

In reply refer
to: I-85/35185

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Response to Congressional Request for SIOP
Information -- ACTION MEMORANDUM

The proposed (revised) letter (at Tab A) is submitted for your signature in response to a letter from Congressman Hamilton (at Tab B) which asked several questions regarding our strategic nuclear war plan -- the SIOP. The revised response conforms to your guidance (Tab C) to brief Congressman Hamilton rather than providing specific answers to his questions.

For this briefing, I propose that Ron Stivers, my Special Advisor for Nuclear Employment Policy Matters, and BGEN Joel McKean of OJCS's Plans and Policy Directorate make the presentation. OJCS concurs in this approach.

Recommend that you sign the letter at Tab A.

Fred C. Ikle
Fred C. Ikle

Attachments a/s

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: MAY 17 2018

COORDINATION:

Office of the Secretary of Defense
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS

Date: 17 May 2018 Authority: EO 13526 §552
Declassify: 17 May 2018 Deny in Full: 17 May 2018

Declassify in Part: X

Reason: 3.3(b)(5)

MDR: 17-M-0117-A1

Attached

OSD/LA

Attached

OJCS

Prepared by Col S. Huber, OASD/ISP/SFP, x49535

TAB A- See X34953

TAB B- 35023

COPY 1 OF 12 COPIES.

17-M-0117-A1

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5/26/85

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SEC DEF CONTR No. X35242

DATA AUTHORIZATION INPUT FORM

SECTION I - MISC CONTROL DATA

DATE RECEIVED: 13 MAY 1985 CONTROL NO. X35242/
 CTRL ITEMS REC'D: ORIG 1 RCY(S) 6 PG(S) 1 CY NO. 1 THRU 5 OF 12 CYS ENCLS 2
 CM REC'D: ORIG 1 RCY(S) 6 PG(S) 1 CY NO. 1 THRU 5 OF 12 CYS ENCLS
 REPLY TO: INTERIM REPLY: REF(S) 06888/08854, X35025, X5
 DESTRUCTION DATA: C9CMWI/C10CMWI 05/85; C2CMWI/C3CMWI/C4C

SECTION II - FILE & MICRO DATA

MICROFICHE: YES NO MF: 315607 FICHE NO. B IMAGE(S) T10
 FILE NO. 381 SDOP

SECTION III - ACTION

ACTION _____ FOR _____ S: _____ COORD W: _____
 SUSPENSE STATUS: _____
 COMMENTS: Unclass SD Sec
 Page determined to be Unclassified
 Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
 IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
 Date: MAY 17 2018

SECTION IV - DISTRIBUTION

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DSD		LA		MAS	
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PRO		RA		CSA	
USP		GC		ADD	
DUP		IG			
ISA		OTE			
ISP		PAE			
USR		SA			
D&S		SN		SGN	
C3I		SAF		SDR	<u>R, C2CMWI</u>
R&T		JCS		DSR	<u>R, C3CMWI</u>
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THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

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For this briefing, I propose that Mr. Frank Miller of our Strategic Forces Policy office and BGEN Joel McKean of OJCS's Plans and Policy office make the presentation. OJCS concurs in this approach.

Recommend that you sign the letter at Tab A.

Fred C. Ikle

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COORDINATION:

OSD/LA


OJCS

Prepared by Col S. Huber, OASD/ISP/SFP, x49535

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Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: MAY 17 2018

COORDINATION:

Col. [Signature]
OSD/LA

OJCS

Prepared by Col S. Huber, OASD/ISP/SFP, x49535

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THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-2000

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In reply refer
to: I-85/35185 SEC HAS SEEN

APR 30 1985

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25 APR 1985

WHT

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Response to Congressional Request for SIOP
Information -- ACTION MEMORANDUM

(U) The proposed letter (at Tab A) is submitted for your signature in response to the letter from Congressman Hamilton (at Tab B) which asked several questions regarding our strategic nuclear war plan -- the SIOP. These questions resulted from an article by Thomas Powers in the March 31, 1985, edition of the Washington Post (at Tab C).

The proposed response answers each of the questions but limits the information provided to a level that does not encourage Congressional oversight in the development of this or other sensitive military operations and contingency plans. We have modified slightly the proposed OJCS response (at Tab D); however, they have concurred in our changes.

Recommend that you sign the letter at Tab A.

Fred C. Ikle
Fred C. Ikle

Attachments a/s

COORDINATION:

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Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: MAY 17 2018

attached
OSD/LA

attached
OJCS

*See RADM brief his daily
in new general terms*

*I can visualize the
attached approach all
over the papers.*

Prepared by Col S. Huber, OASD/ISP/SFP, x49535

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X35023

Sec Def Cont No



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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: MAY 17 2018

Honorable Lee H. Hamilton
Chairman, Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

(U) In your letter of April 1, you refer to the article in the Washington Post of March 31, entitled "What's Worse Than the MX?" and pose a number of questions about strategic targeting that derive from the article.

(U) First, I should point out that the goal of our strategic nuclear war plan is to provide a viable nuclear deterrent. To this end, the objective of the U.S. strategic nuclear plan is to present a credible capability to prevent the Soviet Union from achieving its politico-military aims. Further, should deterrence fail, the plan is designed to make possible the earliest termination of hostilities on terms that best serve our national interest.

(U) Second, over the past year, several individuals of the Armed Services committees in both the House and the Senate have received briefings covering nuclear employment strategy and material relating to the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP).

(U) Your specific questions about the SIOP are answered at the enclosure. You recognize, of course, the sensitivity of much of this information and the need to maintain proper safeguards on information associated with the SIOP.

Sincerely,

Enclosure
as stated

~~Classified by: 6889~~
~~Declassify on: OADR~~

~~Regraded CONFIDENTIAL~~
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Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: MAY 17 2018



ENCLOSURE (DETAILED ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS RAISED IN MR. HAMILTON'S LETTER).

1. I would like to know whether or not the Single Integrated Operational Plan does target cities in the Soviet Union or elsewhere?

(S) It remains U.S. policy not to attack civilian populations per se; therefore, residential structures are not specifically targeted in the SIOP. Depending on the SIOP option, collateral damage to urban areas can be kept low.



2.



3. Would striking the targets contained in the Single Integrated Operational Plan have the so-called "Nuclear Winter" effect?

(S) We cannot determine at this time, based on the scientific data available, if a small or even a large scale SIOP response would cause any impact to the climate--the so-called "nuclear winter" effect. Thus, we remain committed to maintaining a strong deterrent capability as the best means of preventing nuclear conflict.

~~Classified by: Director, I-2~~
~~Declassify on: OADR~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

JS Appeal 3.3(b)(5); OSD Appeal 3.3(b)(5)



~~TOP SECRET~~

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301


CM-1079-85
19 April 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Congressional Request for SIOP Information

1. (U) Congressman Hamilton has raised several questions on our strategic nuclear war plan--the SIOP. These questions were a direct result of Thomas Powers' article in the March 31, 1985 edition of the Washington Post.
2. (U) For your information, I am also in receipt of a request by Mr. Addabbo to provide a detailed SIOP briefing for the members and staffers of the House Appropriation Defense Subcommittee. This is a separate and distinct request that is unrelated to the Powers' article and will be handled under separate letter.
3. ~~(TS)~~ I recommend that we limit any information we provide to a level that does not encourage Congressional oversight in the development of this or other sensitive military operations and contingency plans.
4. (U) I have taken the liberty to enclose a proposed response to Mr. Hamilton. Your support for this approach will dictate the course of action we will pursue with any follow on requests.

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: MAY 17 2018


JOHN W. VESSEY, JR.
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

~~CLASSIFIED BY: CJS~~
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I-85/35183
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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL

Authority: EO 13526

Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS

Date: MAY 17 2018

Honorable Lee H. Hamilton
Chairman, Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

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~~(S)~~ Second, over the past year, key individuals of Armed Services committees in both the House and the Senate have received briefings covering nuclear employment strategy and material relating to the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP).

(U) Your specific questions about the SIOP are answered at the Enclosure. You recognize, of course, the sensitivity of much of this information and the need to maintain proper safeguards on information associated with the SIOP.

Sincerely,

Enclosure
as stated

~~CLASSIFIED BY: C100~~
~~DECLASSIFY BY: OADR~~

~~Replaced by...~~
~~when separated from...~~
~~Classified enclosure~~

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Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: MAY 17 2018

ENCLOSURE (DETAILED ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS RAISED IN MR.
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1. I would like to know whether or not the Single Integrated Operational Plan does target cities in the Soviet Union or elsewhere?

(S) It remains US policy not to attack civilian population per se, therefore, residential structures are not specifically targeted in the SIOP. Depending on the SIOP option, collateral damage to urban areas can be kept low.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

3. Would striking the targets contained in the Single Integrated Operational Plan have the so-called "Nuclear Winter" effect?

(S) The SIOP provides a range of options for employing strategic forces--from a small specific attack to large scale full SIOP response. Numerous unanswered questions concerning the nuclear winter phenomena remain, relating to its likelihood of occurring and its predictability. Our goal is to retain the deterrent value of the plan, thus preventing nuclear conflict.

~~CLASSIFIED BY: DIRECTOR, I-3~~
~~DECLASSIFY ON: OADR~~

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JS Appeal 3.3(b)(5); OSD Appeal 3.3(b)(5)

~~TOP SECRET~~

4. Is it true that fully carrying out our own Single Integrated Operational Plan threatens the survival of life on the planet?

(S) While there has been much speculation that the climatic consequences of a major nuclear war could "threaten the survival of life on the planet," there is no valid scientific evidence to support such speculation. We are, however, still examining the issue to put it on a firmer scientific basis. There would be, of course, major damage when executing the SIOP in response to a Soviet nuclear attack.

5. Does any committee of the Congress regularly receive a complete briefing on the Single Integrated Operational Plan?

(U) No. Historically, however, members of the Senate Armed Services Committee and House Armed Services Committee have been briefed on the SIOP. These briefings have generally been presented by the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff, a JCS agency, either in Washington or at the Strategic Air Command Headquarters in Omaha, NE.

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FEATURES/COLUMNISTS

What's Worse Than the MX?

WASHINGTON POST
31 MARCH 1985 Pg. K1

Civilian Leaders Accepting U.S. War Plans That Could Inadvertently Destroy Us

By Thomas Powers

THE AGONY OF THE MX is over, for the moment at any rate. On Thursday, the House voted to release \$1.6 billion for the purchase of 21 additional missiles after months of debate and acrimony. In the end, it was the president's argument of last resort that carried the day: How could his negotiators face the Soviets in Geneva without a briefing inventory of strategic hardware to bargain away?

But at what, precisely, is the Pentagon going to point these weapons, those "prompt hard-target killers," so defense officials call them? How do they fit into the Single Integrated Operational Plan — the top secret U.S. war plan that establishes targets for the roughly 10,000 warheads in the U.S. arsenal of strategic nuclear weapons?

Astonishingly enough, Congress does not leave the answer to these questions. The cost, performance characteristics and testing needs for the MX have all been argued at exhausting lengths, but what we actually plan to do with the missiles in the event of war is taken entirely on faith.

There is no equivalent in Congress of the intelligence oversight committees for review of American war plans contained in the SIOP, and existing committees do not receive thorough, regular briefings on it.

Yet the scientific community is now in agreement that a climactic catastrophe — a "nuclear winter" caused by the smoke from burning cities — could result from carrying out these plans.

Representatives and senators I have talked to seem vaguely sure somebody must be briefed on these matters. One House member vigorously doubted whether congressmen can be trusted with secrets of such magnitude — as if a plan to obliterate the Soviet industrial infrastructure with several thousand nuclear warheads in the final stages of a nuclear war might be expected, unless revealed by some garrulous congressman, to come as a surprise.

This confidence that somebody has these matters well in hand is not limited to Congress. The whole national security establishment, from the president on down, seems to

Thomas Powers is author of the recent book "Thinking About the Next War," as well as of "The Men Who Kept the Secrets: Richard Helms and the CIA."

share it. But when you get particular, and look around for the people in charge, you find that no body, no agency or committee, no appointed or even self-appointed group in the White House, the Pentagon, or the Congress, has been asked to question the SIOP and its implications for the planet in rigorous detail on a regular and continuing basis.

Asked which members of Congress received briefings on the SIOP, the staff of the Joint Chiefs spent a week considering how to put it, and finally delivered the following written answer: "These individuals/committees in Congress with a strict need to know are briefed on the overall policy and approach for the planning and employment of nuclear forces, when appropriate."

This awkward statement tells us three things: First, there is no briefing of committees as a whole on SIOP.

Second, such briefings as occur deal only with "overall policy and approach" — windy strategizing — not details about what we plan to hit, when in the unfolding moments of a war we would hit it and what effect this would have on the earth's atmosphere, climate and agriculture. Third, although the SIOP is revised about twice a year, there is no regularly scheduled briefing on the revisions.

In practice, according to congressional staffers, the chairman of the House and Senate Armed Services and Appropriations committees are entitled to an annual briefing on the SIOP, and get it when they ask. But can an hour or so a year provide more than the most generalized notion of the nation's vastly complex nuclear war plans and targeting schemes? The answer seems self-evident.

Does this matter? Where nuclear weapons are concerned it is often hard to convince people that anything matters any longer. They know the weapons are too dangerous to use, we have too many, they cost a mint and don't make us safe, we can "destroy our world" umpteen times over, etc., etc.

The problem of getting a meaningful congressional reaction to the threat of nuclear winter is a case in

point.

When the first nuclear winter study was published in December 1983, the public response from the White House and the Pentagon was silence. A group of distinguished scientists had said, in effect, that execution of our own war plans — quite apart from anything the Russians might do in response — might threaten the planet we live on. But the people in charge of national security said nothing.

Their silence had a simple explanation: They didn't know the truth or falsity of claims that burning cities, ignited by nuclear war, could pump enough dark, sooty smoke into the upper atmosphere to envelop the Northern Hemisphere with an opaque shroud for a couple of months or more, blocking out the sun and radically cooling the land by as much as 40 degrees Centigrade.

They didn't know because nobody leveled in any stage of the war planning process had ever analyzed that possibility. Nobody had ever thought to add up all the smoke from burning just about every city in Russia on the same day, or to ask where the smoke would go or to wonder what it would do.

If the authors of the original nuclear winter study are right, we crossed a kind of fatal frontier back in 1954 or 1955, when the United States first acquired enough warheads to trigger a climactic catastrophe, and made plans to use them. Nobody would have been more honestly amazed by the awful result than the planners themselves.

The situation has not changed. The current SIOP includes thousands of targets in Soviet urban areas, according to many sources. These targets are all "military" in one sense or another, but they are surrounded by combustible cities all the same. Most U.S. warheads aimed at these targets are scheduled to detonate at the "optimum height of burst" — that is, in the air above the target — to maximize the spread of blast and thermal pulse.

MK...Pg. 2-F

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: MAY 17 2018

MX...Continued

The thermal pulse of a nuclear weapon is a flash of heat so intense that just about everything of organic origin over an area of many square miles bursts spontaneously into flame. Air bursts are not incidental to the war plan. Along with blast, they are the plan.

Execution of the "major nuclear option" in the SIOP would mean hundreds of pillars of smoke from firestorms in Soviet cities. And the message of the nuclear winter scientists is unmistakable: For our own safety, we ought to take Soviet cities out of the targeting plan. But the targeting fraternity knows that if we delete the cities, there is no plan left.

Defense Secretary Casper Weinberger's own 17-page report on nuclear winter, released on March 1, conceded the problem was a real one, but insisted that no change in American war plans was called for.

"The most basic elements of our policy remain sound," the report said. "... The United States must maintain a strong deterrent capability" — that is, the capacity to inflict a devastating society-threatening nuclear attack on the Soviet Union.

This is deterrence in its purest form.

However, an attack that avoided destroying cities on a planet-threatening scale would still be devastating enough to deter any sane national leader. No American official ever argued in the past that we needed a planet-threatening "doomsday machine" to deter the Russians from attack. Do we need one now, simply because we have built one inadvertently?

The point to remember here is that American war plans — and no doubt Russian plans as well — call for attacks in the event of war on a scale that threatens disaster. The plans could be changed with relative ease, and the danger avoided, by reducing the number of targets in Soviet urban areas, and by switching from air bursts to ground bursts for those that remain.

The Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff at Offut Air Force Base near Omaha, Neb., which draws up the SIOP, can't elect to make a change of this sort on its own authority. The Pentagon has shown no sign of thinking such a step is necessary. Congress is completely excluded from the war-planning process. Thus we find ourselves in a curious situation — threatening ourselves with our own war plans, but

incapable of deciding to do anything about it.

Until 1960, plans for the use of nuclear weapons were adopted by each of the commands with control over nuclear weapons — the Strategic Air Command at Offut Air Force Base; the Navy; and the Atlantic, Pacific and European Commands. In theory, their separate plans were coordinated, but in fact they were drawn independently and then held in the tightest secrecy.

Gen. Curtis LeMay, commander of SAC from 1948 until 1957, was notorious in military circles for refusing to tell anybody what he intended to do in the event of war, or even when he intended to do it. There is a good deal of evidence that LeMay had privately concluded that the United States ought to "preempt" — that is, strike first — if war looked probable. But, at heart, LeMay's strategic approach was simply itself — hit 'em with everything we had. By 1957 that was plenty.

The planning searchy began to change in 1960 when President Eisenhower was persuaded it made no sense to let each of the services plan to win the war all by themselves. To end the problem of overlap and duplication in targeting, he created the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff (JSTPS) at Offut and asked it to draw up the first SIOP, which was approved that same December.

It called for a single, albeit coordinated, all-out attack — everything in "one flush." Overkill was the order of the day. According to George Rathjens, now a professor at MIT, one Soviet city the size of Hiroshima was targeted with four nuclear weapons with a total yield of seven megatons — more than 600 times the explosive force which destroyed Hiroshima.

In drawing up their plans, the targeters considered only the blast effects of nuclear weapons and worked within exaggerated guidelines calling for probabilities of kill high enough to justify SAC demands for more weaponry. The first SIOP also made little distinction between the Soviet Union proper and targets in Eastern Europe and China.

SAC's SIOP was rewritten after President Kennedy took office in 1961. Following guidelines laid down by Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, planners set up four "options" defined by the types of target included in each. Moscow

was "withheld" from initial attack plans; and Eastern Europe and China were no longer automatically included.

But for 10 years following approval of the second SIOP, the target planners at Offut were left in a kind of official limbo. New weapons entered the American strategic arsenal at a rapid rate throughout the 1960s, but no one told the JSTPS what to do with them. According to the physicist Richard Garwin, an Air Force adviser during that period, the target planners were reduced to reading the public speeches of the president and defense secretary for guidelines. "Hell," said a JSTPS officer in 1970, when MIRVed missiles aboard submarines rapidly increased the number of strategic warheads available for inclusion in the SIOP, "what are we going to do with all of those?"

The answer was to increase the number of Soviet targets on the National Strategic Target List, largely by refining and dividing existing targets. As the number of weapons and targets continued to grow, the "low" option in the SIOP — the minimal strike planned in advance, which was aimed at Soviet nuclear forces — grew right along with it. As late as 1974, the low option — what we planned to do instead of an all-out attack — called for hitting the Soviet Union with about 2,500 nuclear warheads.

In January 1974, President Nixon signed National Security Decision Memorandum (NSDM) 242, a five-page document adopting a new targeting strategy — called the "Schlesinger doctrine" after then-Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger, although Henry Kissinger was its true source. In essence, NSDM 242 recognized that accurate MIRVs made it possible to target an enemy's strategic weapons and vice versa. This demanded a new approach that would suggest American readiness to make a limited response to a limited attack.

There has been endless public argument over the wisdom of this change in doctrine, but one thing is certain: It ended the isolation of the JSTPS, and provided a renewed sense of direction for the war planners.

President Carter approved a second strategy document in August 1980, Presidential Directive 59, followed in October 1981 by Reagan's signature on National Security Deci-

MX...Pg. 3-7

MX...Continued

sion Directive 13. Each of these documents, none more than a few pages long, was forwarded to the Office of the Secretary of Defense where it was used in the preparation of a Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy (NUWEP) that went to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for further elaboration into a detailed guidance document intended for use by the JSTPS in writing a new nuclear war plan.

For obvious security reasons, not much has been published officially about the immensely complicated war-planning process. Many different types of weapons are involved: single and multi-warhead land-based missiles (the most accurate weapons in the U.S. strategic inventory), multi-warhead but not so accurate sea-launched missiles (SLBMs), and the various missiles and gravity bombs carried by manned bombers. Some are quick to reach their targets, some slow. Gravity bombs now have the largest explosive yield, SLBMs the smallest.

Executing the first SIOP in 1981 could have killed more than 400 million people. By 1977, the casualty estimate was down to 118 million. Part of the reason for the drop was Soviet civil defense measures, but most of it was the result of a change in approach — a kind of tentative backing away from Armageddon encouraged by improvement in the accuracy of reentry vehicles.

But this does not mean that U.S. targets plan to spare Soviet cities. Far from it. The current SIOP includes "limited nuclear options" of a few dozen or a few score warheads, the sort of attacks that might occur in the early stages of a nuclear war. But the major nuclear options involved in all-out attack would focus on so-called "recovery targets" — things such as factories or railroad yards, and institutions such as the Soviet economic planning agency Gosplan or the KGB.

These targets are mostly in cities. The SIOP does not target population "per se," as the Pentagon never tires of saying, but it does target things surrounded by people in cities. According to a new book soon to be published by William Arkin and Richard Fieldhouse, "Nuclear Battlefields," the National Strategic Target List includes about 2,300 targets of an economic-industrial nature in the Soviet Union — specific plants, power stations and the like — which are covered by roughly 1,500 "sprints."

A 1978 study of Soviet civil de-

fense planning by the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) suggested that a U.S. retaliatory strike during a major nuclear war would target 60 per cent of all Soviet cities over 25,000 in population. Moscow would be hit with up to 60 warheads, Leningrad with 40 or more, and the next eight largest cities in the Soviet Union with an average of 13 each.

The strategists' reason for executing attacks on this scale is simple: there would be no conventional "victory" in a nuclear war, neither side would be in a position to occupy the other, and once the shooting stopped both sides would be left willy-nilly to recover as they could. The first to recover an ability to wage general nuclear war would be in a position to dictate to the other, or so it is feared by the war planners.

The things that make a nation strong, and would allow it to recover, are mostly to be found in cities. As a result, the SIOP calls for society-crippling attacks on thousands of targets in Soviet cities.

This is a bleak fact, made even bleaker by the nearly universal belief among American military men and civilian defense officials that any nuclear war would tend to go the limit. The Russians go a step further. They say explicitly that they do not believe any nuclear war can be limited, and would respond accordingly to a limited attack.

Both sides have been investing heavily in communications infrastructure in recent years, thereby ensuring that the last aspect of modern society to collapse in a nuclear war would be the ability to carry on the war to the end. Thus, we might summarize the history of the last 40 years in the following way: first we invented a weapon of city-destroying potential, then we built thousands of them, found ways to deliver the first salvo in minutes rather than hours, stimped on conventional weaponry that might have let us put off using nuclear weapons and trumpeted our plans to annihilate our opponent, all but insisting he do the same.

Now we are told by many sober and reputable scientists that what we have come to think of as war may be more than the planet can handle. Skeptics have been invited to do their worst, but have been unable to fault the science. Many unknowns remain, of course, but no one, now and probably for years to come, can say with real assurance that carrying out our own war plans

will not threaten human survival. Since this is the case, should we stick with the plan? Should we carry them out in the event of war?

Who is to answer these questions? With the arguable exception of Jimmy Carter, no American president has ever acquired more than passing knowledge of how to plan to use nuclear weapons in war. Eisenhower got an hour's briefing on the first SIOP, Kennedy roughly the same on the second. Johnson was impatient of the subject and Nixon no better.

In his volume of memoirs, "On Watch," Elmo Zumwalt describes a meeting of the National Security Council in January 1974, shortly after Nixon signed NSDD 242. It was clear, he says, that the president had no idea what his new strategy meant. Carter took a chess interest in strategic matters and played a role in command post exercises to familiarize himself with authorization procedures and the like, but he remains an exception.

This should not be surprising: the SIOP is essentially a five-foot shelf of computerized data — technical, abstract, highly particular, and dull. Even the category 10 SIOP briefing book used at the White House level is a couple of inches thick. No President has the time or expert knowledge to pass judgement on a plan so complex. He must depend on his advisers. Their record is not good.

Responsibility for drawing up war plans has been passed down the chain of command to the field grade officers who write the SIOP, men of great technical competence and devotion to duty, but no authority to decide where Mother Nature has drawn the line past which we must not go.

Procedures for oversight and review — such as they are — stick to the narrow military goals common to war plans. No body has ever been established to consider the full implications of carrying out our own war plans, and Weinberger's report to the Congress — stressing deterrence pure and simple — makes it clear that he, for one, does not see the need for any such regular and continuing review.

This leaves Congress. It will be argued that the SIOP is too complex for congressional oversight, that it is too secret to describe even in executive session, that authority for war planning resides in the president as commander-in-chief, and that it is un-

MX...Pg. 4-F

Joseph Kraft

WASHINGTON POST 31 March 1985 Pg. K7

The Case for Caution in the Mideast

The latest flurry of diplomacy in the Middle East teaches a fundamental lesson. Devising plans for making peace in the area comes easy and goes easy.

The hard thing—the thing that counts—is to find partners prepared to negotiate with each other. Hence the sagacity of the cautious approach evinced by President Reagan and Secretary of State George Shultz.

A five-point accord between King Hussein of Jordan and Yasser Arafat of the Palestine Liberation Organization kicked off the most recent bout of diplomatic groping. The text, released on Feb. 11, spoke of giving up "land in exchange for peace as cited in the United Nations resolutions, including Security Council resolutions." That was an allusion to Security Council resolutions 242 and 238, which spell out Israel's right to exist. Thus, by implication, Arafat accepted one condition: the United States had made a prerequisite for promoting a new round of negotiations.

Even so, the actual wording included several elements that required explanation. It spoke of conducting "peace negotiations" within the framework of an international conference that would bring together Russia, the PLO and Syria among others. But Israel refuses to deal with the PLO. The United States, besides insisting that the PLO first recognize Israel's right to exist, nurses suspicions about making any deal conditional on approval by Syria and Russia.

Before these questions could even be probed, however, Arab leaders—and their triffles in this country—were talking up the five-point statement. King Fahd of Saudi Arabia, on a state visit here, spoke of it as a "breakthrough" that offered a "last chance" for peace in the area. President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt said negotiations could first be conducted between the United States and a joint delegation of Jordanians and Palestinians who were not associated with the PLO.

Prime Minister Shimon Peres of Israel then entered the picture. He is determined to be flexible—in part to show that Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon can have a negotiating payoff, in part to please the United States, which is sitting on an economic aid program; and in part to demonstrate to the Israeli public that he is more inclined to bring peace than his coalition partner—and rival—Foreign Minister Yitzhak Shamir. Peres, while refusing to negotiate with the PLO, indicated

MX...Continued

cautious. Similar arguments were made in opposition to Congressional oversight of the intelligence community. But the proper work of Congressional overseers would not be to approve the SIOP, much less to write it. Their job would be both simpler and more difficult — to insist on knowing what is in the SIOP, to consider the full implications of carrying it out, and to satisfy themselves that U.S. war plans do not threaten our own security. They would serve, in effect, as a kind of circuit breaker. A prolonged failure to convince a Congressional War Plans Oversight Committee that the plans made sense would suggest something had gone seriously wrong.

Thinking about nuclear war is no fun. No one wants to look it in the eye. There is a temptation — as strong among officials as it is for the rest of us — to grant that a major nuclear war would be a terrible event and let it go at that. Congress has been content to fund the hardware, and let others decide what to do with it. Thus the buck has gone around, stopping nowhere. Almost absent-mindedly, we have planned a disaster. Perhaps now would be a good time to ask, with more energy than has been our custom, if our plans represent something we really want to do.

approval for the Mubarak package.

Thus encouraged, Mubarak, in a state visit here, crowded on support for the idea of a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. When President Reagan and Secretary of State George Shultz pointed out there were unanswered questions, Mubarak, in a press conference, expressed disappointment and said the United States was being "defeatist" about the Middle East.

Good reasons for skepticism were then underlined by events. The PLO began backsliding from the Feb. 11 accord. Leading members specifically denied the PLO was ready to accept Israel, or to exchange "land for peace."

King Hussein said in an interview that any delegation would have to "include the PLO." His foreign minister, Tahir al-Masri, repeated that condition during a visit to Washington, and added that Jordan and the PLO had

CAUTION...Pg. 6-F

4-F

CHICAGO TRIBUNE

30 Mar 85 Pg. 5

Soviets go off limits regularly

By Alice Siebert

Chicago Tribune

DON'T—Soviet military scouts make hundreds of reconnaissance missions into West Germany each year, dozens of them into restricted areas, German officials say.

"If we in the West reacted in the same way the Soviet guard at Ludwigsburg did, there would be ... hundreds of dead Soviet officers," a West German secret service official wrote in the mass-circulation newspaper Bild this week.

Last Sunday, at Ludwigsburg, East Germany, a Soviet sentry shot and killed U.S. Army Maj. Arthur Nicholson as he photographed military equipment. The Soviets said the area was restricted, but the United States said it was not.

Nicholson's body was flown to the U.S. Friday for burial Saturday in Arlington National Cemetery. About 400 people attended a memorial service for him Thursday at a military chapel in West Berlin.

Nicholson was attached to the U.S. military liaison mission in Potsdam, East Germany. The Soviets have three such missions in West Germany. The missions have existed since 1947 under an agreement between the Soviets and Western allies.

Soviet military teams made 2,477 intelligence-gathering sorties into West Germany last year, and in 98 cases they were caught in restricted military areas, the official said. So far this year there have been 400 such trips, 11 into restricted areas.

Soldiers of the three Western powers—the U.S., Britain and France—and those of the West German Bundeswehr are under strict orders not to use force when stopping a Soviet vehicle in a military area, even if the occupants

SOVIETS...Pg. 6-F

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date:

MAY 17 2018



POLICY

~~TOP SECRET~~

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-2000

In reply refer
to: I-85/35185

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Response to Congressional Request for SIOP
Information -- ACTION MEMORANDUM

(u) The proposed letter (at Tab A) is submitted for your signature in response to the letter from Congressman Hamilton (at Tab B) which asked several questions regarding our strategic nuclear war plan -- the SIOP. These questions resulted from an article by Thomas Powers in the March 31, 1985, edition of the Washington Post (at Tab C).

(~~TOP SECRET~~) The proposed response answers each of the questions but limits the information provided to a level that does not encourage Congressional oversight in the development of this or other sensitive military operations and contingency plans. We have modified slightly the proposed OJCS response (at Tab D); however, they have concurred in our changes.

Recommend that you sign the letter at Tab A.

Fred C. Ikle

Attachments a/s

COORDINATION:

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: MAY 17 2018

OSD/LA

OJCS

24 April 1985

Prepared by Col S. Huber, OASD/ISP/SFP, x49535

~~TOP SECRET~~



THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-2000

POLICY

In reply refer
to: I-85/35185

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

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Recommend that you sign the letter at Tab A.

Fred C. Ikle

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: MAY 17 2018

Attachments a/s

COORDINATION:


OSD/LA

OJCS

Prepared by Col S. Huber, OASD/ISP/SFP, x49535





POLICY

~~TOP SECRET~~

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-2000

26 Apr 85 16 40

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

In reply refer
to: I-85/35185

25 APR 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Response to Congressional Request for SIOP
Information -- ACTION MEMORANDUM

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Recommend that you sign the letter at Tab A.

Fred C. Ikle
Fred C. Ikle

Attachments a/s

COORDINATION:

attached
OSD/LA

attached
OJCS

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: MAY 17 2018

Prepared by Col S. Huber, OASD/ISP/SFP, x49535

COPY 2 OF 12 COPIES

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NO REVISION REQUIRED BY

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26 APR 65 16 43

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE



THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-2000

In reply refer
to: I-85/35185

25 APR 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

**SUBJECT: Response to Congressional Request for SIOP
Information -- ACTION MEMORANDUM**

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Recommend that you sign the letter at Tab A.

Fred C. Ikle

Attachments a/s

COORDINATION:

attached
OSD/LA

attached
OJCS

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: MAY 17 2018

Prepared by Col S. Huber, OASD/ISP/SFP, x49535

COPY 3 OF 12 COPIES.

54/640B
X35023



~~TOP SECRET~~

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

Honorable Lee H. Hamilton
Chairman, Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

(U) In your letter of April 1, you refer to the article in the Washington Post of March 31, entitled "What's Worse Than the MX?" and pose a number of questions about strategic targeting which derive from the article.

(U) First, I should point out that the goal of our strategic nuclear war plan is to provide a viable nuclear deterrent. To this end, the objective of the US strategic nuclear plan is to present a credible capability to prevent the Soviet Union from achieving its politico-military aims. Further, should deterrence fail, the plan is designed to make possible the earliest termination of hostilities on terms that best serve our national interest.

(U) Second, over the past year, several individuals of the Armed Services committees in both the House and the Senate have received briefings covering nuclear employment strategy and material relating to the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP).

(U) Your specific questions about the SIOP are answered at the Enclosure. You recognize, of course, the sensitivity of much of this information and the need to maintain proper safeguards on information associated with the SIOP.

Sincerely,

Enclosure
as stated

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: MAY 17 2018

SEC DEF CONTR No. X35023

~~CLASSIFIED BY: CIGC~~
~~DECLASSIFY ON: OADR~~

~~Regarded CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification~~
~~Classified enclosure~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

ENCLOSURE (DETAILED ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS RAISED IN MR. HAMILTON'S LETTER.)

1. I would like to know whether or not the Single Integrated Operational Plan does target cities in the Soviet Union or elsewhere?

(S) It remains US policy not to attack civilian population per se; therefore, residential structures are not specifically targeted in the SIOP. Depending on the SIOP option, collateral damage to urban areas can be kept low.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

3. Would striking the targets contained in the Single Integrated Operational Plan have the so-called "Nuclear Winter" effect?

(S) We cannot determine at this time, based on the scientific data available, if a small or even a large scale SIOP response would cause any impact to the climate--the so-called "nuclear winter" effect. Thus, we remain committed to maintaining a strong deterrent capability as the best means of preventing nuclear conflict.

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: MAY 17 2018

CLASSIFIED BY: DIRECTOR, J-3
DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

~~TOP SECRET~~

JS Appeal 3.3(b)(5); OSD Appeal 3.3(b)(5)

~~TOP SECRET~~

4. Is it true that fully carrying out our own Single Integrated Operational Plan threatens the survival of life on the planet?

~~(S)~~ While there has been much speculation regarding "nuclear winter," ~~and as stated in the response to the preceding question,~~ we cannot at this time determine the impact that a nuclear exchange might have on the climate. Our policy, therefore, is to seek to prevent such a war from occurring through deterrence. Should deterrence fail, however, our force and deployment planning is designed to reduce unintended destruction and to allow us to terminate the conflict at the lowest possible level. In this regard, as our recent report on "nuclear winter" indicated, we will continue our emphasis on reducing the number of weapons in our stockpile and their total yield, as well as our emphasis on developing and deploying more accurate systems.

5. Does any committee of the Congress regularly receive a complete briefing on the Single Integrated Operational Plan?

(U) No. Historically, however, members of the Senate Armed Services Committee and House Armed Services Committee have been briefed on the SIOP and related material. These briefings have generally been presented by the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff, a JCS agency, either in Washington or at the Strategic Air Command Headquarters in Omaha, NE.

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: MAY 17 2018

~~TOP SECRET~~

OSD Control Number 35023, 54/640

Signed _____

SON _____

Pack _____

No Pack 1 _____

Signers 1 _____

Pass Copies To:

Information Copies To:

Special Instructions:

- PROVIDE NOTE TO USA(P)
- CLOSE CASE

8
DO Initials

27 May 13
Date

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: MAY 17 2018

F

DATA AUTHORIZATION INPUT FORM

SECTION I - MISC CONTROL DATA

DATE RECEIVED: 04 26 85 CONTROL NO. X35023
 CTRL ITEMS REC'D: ORIG 1 RCY(S) 3 PG(S) 1 CY NO. 1 THRU 1 OF 1 CYS ENCLS 1
 CM REC'D: ORIG 1 RCY(S) 3 PG(S) 1 CY NO. 1 THRU 4 OF 12 CYS ENCLS
 REPLY TO: U06888 INTERIM REPLY: REF(S) X34953
 DESTRUCTION DATA: 7RWI, C234 CMNI 5/85

SECTION II - FILE & MICRO DATA

MICROFICHE: YES NO MF: 315 602 FICHE NO. B IMAGE(S) T5 T9
 FILE NO. 315 602

SECTION III - ACTION

ACTION FOR S: COORD W:
 SUSPENSE STATUS: "CLOSE CASE"
 COMMENTS: SAF OBE VIA SD/ASN 52.

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 Authority: EO 13526
 Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
 Date: MAY 17 2018

SECTION IV - DISTRIBUTION

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ADC	C7WI, C18CMNI	ADM		DIA	
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DSD		LA	C7WI	MAS	
EAD		MIL		MAD	
ES		PA		ESR	
PRO		RA		CSA	
USP	C5WI	GC		ADD	C7WI
DUP		IG			
ISA		OTE			
ISP	C6WI	PAE			
USR		SA			RWI, C18CMNI
D&S		SN		SGN	C2WI
C3I		SAF		SDR	C2WI, C20CMNI
R&T		JCS	C3WI	DSR	RWI, C3CMNI
COM		DJS		LIB	



~~TOP SECRET~~

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-2000

POLICY

In reply refer
to: I-85/35185

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Response to Congressional Request for SIOP
Information -- ACTION MEMORANDUM

(u) The proposed letter (at Tab A) is submitted for your signature in response to the letter from Congressman Hamilton (at Tab B) which asked several questions regarding our strategic nuclear war plan -- the SIOP. These questions resulted from an article by Thomas Powers in the March 31, 1985, edition of the Washington Post (at Tab C).

(S) The proposed response answers each of the questions but limits the information provided to a level that does not encourage Congressional oversight in the development of this or other sensitive military operations and contingency plans. We have modified slightly the proposed OJCS response (at Tab D); however, they have concurred in our changes.

Recommend that you sign the letter at Tab A.

Fred C. Ikle

Attachments a/s

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: MAY 17 2018

COORDINATION:

OSD/LA



OJCS

24 April 1985

Prepared by Col S. Huber, OASD/ISP/SFP, x49535

~~TOP SECRET~~



THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-2000

POLICY

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to: I-85/35185

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Fred C. Ikle

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: MAY 17 2018

Attachments a/s

COORDINATION:


OSD/LA

OJCS

Prepared by Col S. Huber, OASD/ISP/SFP, x49535

[REDACTED]



~~TOP SECRET~~

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20381


CM-1079-85
19 April 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Congressional Request for SIOP Information

1. (U) Congressman Hamilton has raised several questions on our strategic nuclear war plan--the SIOP. These questions were a direct result of Thomas Powers' article in the March 31, 1985 edition of the Washington Post.
2. (U) For your information, I am also in receipt of a request by Mr. Addabbo to provide a detailed SIOP briefing for the members and staffers of the House Appropriation Defense Subcommittee. This is a separate and distinct request that is unrelated to the Powers' article and will be handled under separate letter.
3. ~~(S)~~ I recommend that we limit any information we provide to a level that does not encourage Congressional oversight in the development of this or other sensitive military operations and contingency plans.
4. (U) I have taken the liberty to enclose a proposed response to Mr. Hamilton. Your support for this approach will dictate the course of action we will pursue with any follow on requests.

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: MAY 17 2018


JOHN W. VESSEY, JR.
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

~~CLASSIFIED BY: 0100~~
~~DECLASSIFY ON: OADR~~

COPY NO. 1

~~TOP SECRET~~

I-85/3578.
Sec Def Cont Nr. X3495

~~TOP SECRET~~



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: MAY 17 2018

Honorable Lee H. Hamilton
Chairman, Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

(U) In your letter of April 1, you refer to the article in the Washington Post of March 31, entitled "What's Worse Than the MX?" and pose a number of questions about strategic targeting which derive from the article.

(U) First, I should point out that the goal of our strategic nuclear war plan is to provide a viable nuclear deterrent. To this end, the objective of the US strategic nuclear plan is to present a credible capability to prevent the Soviet Union from achieving its politico-military aims. Further, the plan's objective is to make possible the earliest termination of hostilities on terms that best serve our national interest.

(U) Second, over the past year, key individuals of Armed Services committees in both the House and the Senate have received briefings covering nuclear employment strategy and material relating to the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP).

(U) Your specific questions about the SIOP are answered at the Enclosure. You recognize, of course, the sensitivity of much of this information and the need to maintain proper safeguards on information associated with the SIOP.

Sincerely,

Enclosure
as stated

~~DECLASSIFIED BY: 6133~~
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DECLASSIFIED IN PART
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: MAY 17 2018

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HAMILTON'S LETTER.)

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elsewhere?

(S) It remains US policy not to attack civilian population
per se, therefore, residential structures are not
specifically targeted in the SIOP. Depending on the SIOP
option, collateral damage to urban areas can be kept low.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

3. Would striking the targets contained in the Single
Integrated Operational Plan have the so-called "Nuclear
Winter" effect?

(S) The SIOP provides a range of options for employing
strategic forces--from a small specific attack to large
scale full SIOP response. Numerous unanswered questions
concerning the nuclear winter phenomena remain, relating to
its likelihood of occurring and its predictability. Our
goal is to retain the deterrent value of the plan, thus
preventing nuclear conflict.

~~CLASSIFIED BY: DIRECTOR, I-2~~
~~DECLASSIFY ON: OADR~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

JS Appeal 3.3(b)(5); OSD Appeal 3.3(b)(5)

~~TOP SECRET~~

4. Is it true that fully carrying out our own Single Integrated Operational Plan threatens the survival of life on the planet?

(S) While there has been much speculation that the climatic consequences of a major nuclear war could "threaten the survival of life on the planet," there is no valid scientific evidence to support such speculation. We are, however, still examining the issue to put it on a firmer scientific basis. There would be, of course, major damage when executing the SIOP in response to a Soviet nuclear attack.

5. Does any committee of the Congress regularly receive a complete briefing on the Single Integrated Operational Plan?

(U) No. Historically, however, members of the Senate Armed Services Committee and House Armed Services Committee have been briefed on the SIOP. These briefings have generally been presented by the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff, a JCS agency, either in Washington or at the Strategic Air Command Headquarters in Omaha, NE.

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Authority: EO 13526
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~~TOP SECRET~~