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*****SPRAMP SECTION 01 OF 04 CAIRO 06447

DEPT PASS SECDEF, JCS, USCINCENT MACBELL AFB, FL,
USCINCEUR VAHINGEN GE

TAGS: MILIT, MAR, EG, US
SUBJECT: GOE RESPONSE ON EGYPTIAN CONTINGENCY
SUPPORT/REPOSITIONING

REF: CAIRO 2017/2017412 JAN 83

1. (PENDING TEXT).

2. SUMMARY AND COMMENT: FORMAL EGYPTIAN RESPONSE TO U.S.-DRAFTED EGYPTIAN CONTINGENCY SUPPORT/REPOSITIONING PLAN CONVEYED TO AMBASSADOR MARCH 2 BY DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER/FOREIGN MINISTER KAMAL HASSAN ALI. REITERATES GOE WILLINGNESS TO GRANT TEMPORARY MILITARY FACILITIES, BUT SUBJECT TO THE FOLLOWING PRINCIPLES: 1) FACILITIES LIMITED SOLELY TO BAS BAHAS AREA, 2) NO PERMANENT AMERICAN MILITARY OR CIVILIAN PRESENCE, 3) NO COST TO EGYPT FOR CONSTRUCTION OF PERMANENT STRUCTURES, BUT FULL OWNERSHIP BY EGYPT OF SAME, 4) FULL EGYPTIAN RESPONSIBILITY FOR ADMINISTRATION, AND 5) PREPOSITIONING LIMITED TO BAS BAHAS AREA. THE GOE POSITION ALSO SPECIFIES THAT NO NUCLEAR OR CHEMICAL WEAPONS CAN BE PRE-POSITIONED AND THAT PRE-POSITIONED ITEMS MUST BE DISCLOSED TO, APPROVED BY AND SUBJECT TO REVIEW BY GOE. THE GOE POSITION ALSO APPROVES TEMPORARY USE OF FACILITIES AND NOTES SUCH USE MAY REQUIRE IMPROVEMENTS/DEVELOPMENT OF SAME. IN EXPLAINING

GOE POSITION, FOREIGN MINISTER SAID GOE INTENT WAS TO DISCOURAGE UNREALISTIC HOPES AND RETURN STRATEGIC COOPERATION FOCUS TO BAS BAHAS. HE EMPHASIZED IT WAS POLITICALLY IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE GOE TO CONCEIVE OF LARGE-SCALE U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE ELSEWHERE IN EGYPT AND MATERIALLY IMPOSSIBLE FOR GOE TO PROVIDE SUPPORT OUTLINED IN U.S. PLAN. AMBASSADOR REVIEWED HISTORY OF OUR STRATEGIC COOPERATION WHICH HAD ALWAYS ASSUMED COMMON INTERESTS AND BONDEN SHARING. HE POINTED OUT THAT BAS BAHAS COULD NOT MEET NEAR-TERM CONTINGENCY NEEDS, AND SUGGESTED THAT GOE NOT RESPOND TO PROPOSED PLAN AS "ALL OR NOTHING" BUT RATHER BE WILLING TO EXPLORE AREAS WHERE EGYPTIAN SUPPORT WAS POSSIBLE. AMBASSADOR SAID HE WAS CERTAIN WASHINGTON WOULD WANT TO STUDY GOE POSITION AND PROVIDE FURTHER RESPONSE. IN COURSE OF MEETING, FOREIGN MINISTER MADE CLEAR HFA HAD NO PROBLEM WITH RESUMPTION OF TALKS ON BAS BAHAS TECHNICAL ARRANGEMENTS.

3. THE OUTLINES OF THE GOE'S RESPONSE ON NEAR-TERM ECS WERE PREVIOUSLY INDICATED BY MOO (REFTEL). HOWEVER, THIS POSTURE AND THE INCREASED SPECIFICITY OF THE CONSTRAINTS DEFINED BY THE EGYPTIAN PRINCIPLES OBVIOUSLY RAISE SERIOUS QUESTIONS ABOUT THE EXTENT

ACTION (R,M)
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TO WHICH WE CAN CONTINUE TO PLAN ON EGYPT'S PLAYING A CENTRAL ROLE IN OUR STRATEGY FOR THE DEPLOYMENT OF FORCES IN THIS REGION. WE WILL BE ASSESSING THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THESE DEVELOPMENTS AND PROVIDING OUR RECOMMENDATIONS TO WASHINGTON AGENCIES. THE FOREIGN MINISTER LEAVES MARCH 8 FOR THE USA SHARIT. WE BELIEVE HE SHOULD BE PREPARED TO RESUME THE DISCUSSION WITH HIM AFTER HIS RETURN, WITH THE DEFENSE MINISTER, AND ULTIMATELY WITH PRESIDENT MUBARAK. IN THE MEANTIME, AS HE PREPARE OUR ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS WE WOULD WELCOME INITIAL WASHINGTON REACTIONS AND SUGGESTIONS AS TO PARTICULAR POINTS IT WOULD BE HELPFUL FOR US TO FOCUS ON. END SUMMARY AND COMMENT.

4. AMBASSADOR, ACCOMPANIED BY POL/MIL OFFICER HALL, MET WITH DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER AND FOREIGN MINISTER KAMAL HASSAN ALI AT LATTER'S REQUEST MARCH 2. ALI, WHO WAS JOINED ONLY BY HIS STAFF AIDE BA'UF GHONEIM, ASKED FOR THE MEETING TO CONVEY THE GOE'S FORMAL RESPONSE TO THE EGYPTIAN CONTINGENCY SUPPORT (ECS)/PREPOSITIONING PLAN DRAFTED BY THE BRANCH MISSION IN JANUARY (REFTEL).

5. REFERRING TO A THICK BRIEFING DOCUMENT, THE FOREIGN MINISTER BEGAN BY RELATING IN GREAT DETAIL THE AMERICAN FORCES TO BE INVOLVED IN THE CONTINGENCIES FOR WHICH WE WERE PLANNING (B-625, FIGHTERS, TRANSPORTS, AWACS, TANKERS, UP TO 220,000 TROOPS ETC.) AND THE EXTENSIVE EGYPTIAN FACILITIES AND SUPPORT REQUIRED (CAIRO INTL., AL NAZAH, CAIRO WEST, WADI GEM, ALEXANDRIA PORT, FUEL, FOODSTUFFS, LABOR ETC.) THESE "DEMANDS" CONTRADICTED THE INITIAL UNDERSTANDING BY

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EVEN THE RECENT RELATIVELY MINOR DEPLOYMENT TO ASHAN
HAD COST \$12 BILLION.

8. AMBASSADOR AGREED THAT DEFENSE WAS NOT CHEAP,
BUT NONETHELESS NECESSARY. POL/MIL OFFICER ASKED
WHETHER THE GOE HAD ESTIMATED THE COST TO EGYPT
WHICH WOULD HAVE RESULTED FROM A SUCCESSFUL COUP
IN SUDAN.

9. ALI REITERATED THE NEED FOR REALISTIC PLANNING
AND, TOWARDS THAT END, PROVIDED PRINCIPLES (PARA 12)
WHICH HE SAID WOULD GOVERN EGYPT'S STRATEGIC COOPERATION
WITH THE U.S.

10. AMBASSADOR SAID HE WOULD WANT TO REPORT THIS
INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON, AND HE FELT THAT THE USG
WOULD WANT TO MAKE A STUDIED RESPONSE. ALTHOUGH HE
DID NOT WANT TO ADDRESS POINTS AT A TECHNICAL
LEVEL, HE SAID HE FELT THE U.S. WOULD WANT IT TO
BE RECOGNIZED THAT STRATEGIC COOPERATION WAS NOT
SOLELY FOR U.S. PURPOSES, BUT REQUIRED BURDEN SHARING
ALBEIT RELATED TO THE PARTIES' ABILITIES TO PAY.
HE URGED THAT EGYPT NOT ADOPT AN "ALL OR NOTHING"
POSITION ON ECS.

11. IN URGING THAT U.S. FOCUS ITS EFFORTS ON BAS
BAMAS, ALI CONFIRMED THAT MFA HAD NO PROBLEMS
WITH RESUMPTION OF NEGOTIATIONS OF THE TECHNICAL
ARRANGEMENTS.

12. BEGIN TEXT: FIRST, EGYPT IS WILLING TO GRANT THE BT

DEPT PASS SECDEF, JCS, USCINCENT MCWILL AFB, FL,
USCINCEUR VAHTINGEN GE

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TAGS: MILI, MARR, EG, US

SUBJECT: GOE RESPONSE ON EGYPTIAN CONTINGENCY

ARRIVED AT BETWEEN THE LATE PRESIDENT SADAT AND
FORMER DEFENSE SECRETARY BROWN WHICH HAD LED TO
SADAT'S OFFER OF BAS BAMAS BECAUSE OF ITS STRATEGIC
LOCATION AND ITS DISTANCE FROM POPULATED AREAS,
THE FOREIGN MINISTER SAID. THAT OFFER AND EGYPT'S
SUBSEQUENT RECORD OF COOPERATION, E.G. IN THE
HOSTAGE RESCUE ATTEMPT, PROVED EGYPT'S WILLINGNESS
TO COOPERATE. HOWEVER, RECENT PROPOSALS REFLECTED
UNREALISTIC HOPES. LARGE AMERICAN MILITARY PRESENCES
NEAR POPULATED AREAS WERE OUT OF THE QUESTION.
SIMILARLY, EXTENSIVE USE OF EGYPTIAN CIVILIAN
FACILITIES, E.G. ALEXANDRIA PORT, WERE ECONOMICALLY
UNACCEPTABLE. IT WAS MUCH BETTER TO PLAN SOLELY
ON THE BASIS OF BAS BAMAS AND TO DO ALL NECESSARY
PREPOSITIONING THERE, ALI SAID.

6. AMBASSADOR RESPONDED BY REVIEWING THE HISTORY
OF U.S.-EGYPTIAN STRATEGIC COOPERATION. HE NOTED
THAT PRESIDENT SADAT HAD ORIGINALLY ARTICULATED
THE NEED FOR THE U.S. AND EGYPT TO PREPARE TO MEET
REGIONAL THREATS. IT HAD BEEN A BASIC PREMISE OF
OUR EFFORT THAT WE WERE PURSUING COMMON INTERESTS
IN DEFENDING THE GULF/SOUTHWEST ASIA AREA AND THAT
THE BURDEN WOULD BE SHARED. PRESIDENT MUBARAK HAD
REAFFIRMED SADAT'S POLICY, AND U.S. MILITARY PLANNING
HAD PROCEEDED ACCORDINGLY TO TRANSLATE THIS CONCEPT
INTO SPECIFIC THREAT SCENARIOS AND WHAT WOULD BE
REQUIRED TO MEET THEM. ECS WAS AN EFFORT TO DEFINE
ACCEPTABLE WAYS WHEREBY EGYPT MIGHT PROVIDE ITS
FAIR SHARE. LONG-TERM PLANNING CONTINUED TO FOCUS
ON BAS BAMAS, BUT WE ALSO HAD A PROBLEM OF PREPARING
FOR THE NEAR-TERM. THAT PLANNING AND SOME ADVANCE
PREPARATION COULD NOT BE POSTPONED UNTIL A CONTINGENCY
BECAUSE BY THEN THE BATTLE WOULD BE LOST. POLOFF
POINTED OUT THAT U.S. PLANNING HAD BEEN BASED ON A HORSE-
CASE SCENARIO. BUNCH DOCUMENT HAD NOT BEEN INTENDED
AS A FINAL AND FIRM DEMAND, BUT RATHER AS A BASIS
FOR CONTINUING DISCUSSION. U.S. PLANNERS CERTAINLY
INTENDED TO TAKE EGYPTIAN CAPABILITIES AND CONSTRAINTS
ONTO CONSIDERATION.

7. ALI AGREED THAT PLANNING WAS NECESSARY, BUT
EMPHASIZED THE NEED FOR THE PLANNING TO BE REALISTIC.
U.S. PROPOSAL FAR EXCEEDED EGYPT'S MATERIAL CAPABILITY
AND WHAT WAS POSSIBLE POLITICALLY. CURRENT DEPLOYMENTS
OF EGYPTIAN TROOPS TOWARDS THE EAST, WEST AND SOUTH,
FAR FROM THE DELTA AND NILE VALLEY, ONLY MEANT
ADDITIONAL EXPENSE IN PROVIDING U.S. WITH SUPPORT
IT REQUIRED. ALI SAID CONFIDENTIALLY THAT HED HAD
ESTIMATED ECS WOULD COST EGYPT \$3 TO \$4 BILLION.

ACTION (R,N)
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TO ADMINISTER THEM.

7. ANY KIND OF STORAGE OF EQUIPMENTS OR MATERIALS UNDER ANY SHAPE OR FORM SHOULD BE LIMITED ONLY TO THE "BENNICE" (HAS DAMAS) AREA, AFTER THE AREA HAS BEEN TOTALLY PREPARED AND EQUIPPED FOR THIS PURPOSE. ALL COSTS PERTAINING TO THESE WORKS ARE TO BORN BY THE U.S. GOVERNMENT.

THE FIRM UNDERSTANDING IN THIS REGARD IS AS FOLLOWS:

A. THAT THESE STORES WOULD NOT CONTAIN IN ANY WAY, NUCLEAR OR CHEMICAL WEAPON SYSTEM, NUCLEAR MATERIAL, OR ANY OTHER PROHIBITED MATERIALS, FALLING WITHIN INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS SIGNED BY EGYPT, AND/OR THE U.S.A.

B. THAT ALL STORED MATERIALS, WEAPON SYSTEMS, OR ANY OTHER OBJECTS, UNDER ANY FORM OR SHAPE, SHOULD BE KNOWN TO THE EGYPTIAN SIDE. WHO WOULD HAVE TO GIVE ITS PRIOR APPROVAL, AND WOULD ALSO BE SUBJECT TO EGYPTIAN REVIEW, LAWS AND REGULATIONS.

THIRD, AMERICAN PLANES AND SHIPS WILL BE ALLOWED AS PERMITTED BY EGYPT, TO CALL UPON EGYPTIAN AIR AND SEA FACILITIES ON TEMPORARY BASIS.

THIS MIGHT NECESSITATE CERTAIN IMPROVEMENTS AND DEVELOPMENTS ON THESE FACILITIES IN ORDER TO UPLIFT THEIR EFFICIENCY TO SERVE AMERICAN NEEDS. BT

SECRET SECTION 03 OF 04 CAIRO 00447

CHDS

DEPT PASS SECDEF, JCS, USCINCENT MACDILL AFB, FL,
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CLASS: SECRET

TAGS: MILI, HARR, EG, NS

SUBJECT: GDE RESPONSE ON EGYPTIAN CONTINGENCY

U.S.A., TEMPORARY MILITARY FACILITIES, IN ORDER TO FACILITATE ACCESS TO THE REGION IN DEFENSE OF AN ARAB OR MUSLIM STATE, HOWEVER, THESE FACILITIES ARE SUBJECT TO THE FIRM UNDERSTANDING THAT THEY ARE OFFERED AFTER EGYPT'S CONSENT TO A FORMAL REQUEST FROM A THREATENED ARAB OR MUSLIM STATE, AND THE LATTER'S DEMAND FOR AN AMERICAN MILITARY HELP, TO REPEL A FOREIGN POWER, FROM ATTACKING ITS TERRITORY.

THESE FACILITIES WOULD BE GRANTED ON A TEMPORARY BASIS AND FOR A FIXED PERIOD OF TIME TO BE AGREED UPON BY THE TWO PARTIES.

SECOND, FACILITIES ARE TO BE EXTENDED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE FOLLOWING PRINCIPLES:

1. EGYPTIAN FACILITIES RENDERED TO THE U.S.A. WILL BE LIMITED SOLELY TO THE HAS DAMAS AREA, WHERE THAT AREA WILL BE DEVELOPED, IN ORDER TO SERVE DIFFERENT CONTINGENCIES AS WOULD BE AGREED UPON BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES.

2. ANY AMERICAN TEMPORARY PRESENCE SHOULD COMPLY WITH THE CONTENTS AND CONDITIONS STIPULATED IN THE LETTER OF LATE PRESIDENT SABAT TO THE AMERICAN ADMINISTRATION.

3. THESE ARRANGEMENTS PRECLUDE ANY PERMANENT MILITARY OR CIVILIAN AMERICAN PRESENCE IN ANY EGYPTIAN MILITARY BASE, UNDER ANY FORM.

4. EGYPT WILL NOT BEAR THE COSTS OF ANY CONSTRUCTION OR PROJECTS TO BE BUILT ON ITS TERRITORY, OR THE COST OF ANY DEVELOPMENT IN THE EXISTING ONES, FOR THE SAKE OF RENDERING FACILITIES TO THE AMERICAN FORCES.

5. THESE CONSTRUCTIONS WOULD BE TOTALLY OWNED BY THE EGYPTIAN GOVERNMENT FROM THE MOMENT OF LAYING FOUNDATIONS. ALL THESE CONSTRUCTIONS OR WORKS WILL BE EXECUTED BY EGYPTIAN CONTRACTING COMPANIES, AS LONG AS, THEY ARE ABLE TO ACCOMPLISH THE WORKS, AND AT THE EXPENSE OF THE AMERICAN SIDE. THIS ARRANGEMENT WOULD ALSO APPLY TO ANY DEVELOPMENTS IN ALREADY EXISTING EGYPTIAN BUILDING OR STRUCTURES.

6. ADMINISTRATION OF ALL THESE FACILITIES WILL BE THE SOLE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE EGYPTIAN SIDE, WHO ASSIGNS EGYPTIAN CITIZENS, MILITARY OR CIVILIANS

ACTION (R,N)
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TAGS: NILL, HARR, EG, US

SUBJECT: DOE RESPONSE ON EGYPTIAN CONTINGENCY

CONCLUSION

1. FACILITIES EXTENDED BY EGYPT TO THE U.S.A. DOES (RIG)
NOT UNDER ANY FORM VIOLATE THE SOVEREIGNTY
OF EGYPT ON ALL ITS TERRITORY, AND ITS RIGHT TO
EXECUTE EGYPTIAN LAWS AND REGULATIONS.

2. THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT WILL BEAR ALL THE
EXPENSES PERTAINING TO THE CONSTRUCTION, RUNNING
AND MAINTENANCE OF THE NECESSARY INSTALLATIONS,
TO BE AGREED UPON BETWEEN THE TWO GOVERNMENTS
IN HAS BAHAS WITH THE UNDERSTANDING THAT THESE
INSTALLATIONS WILL BE OWNED BY EGYPT AND ADMIN-
ISTERED BY EGYPTIAN PERSONNEL. END TEXT. ATTENTION BY

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