



INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

DEP SEC. 1143 8 SEP 1974

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Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WWS
Date: JUL 31 2018

In reply refer to:
I-24806/73

#2

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Study of Turkish Security Assistance Program
-- ACTION MEMORANDUM

(U) Attached is the study of the Turkish Security Assistance Program which was directed in your August 1973 PDM. The study was conducted by a Study Group chaired by ISA, with participation by the Joint Staff and PA&E.

The major conclusions of the study are:

- The Turkish Army, fully manned but equipped at current levels, is capable of stopping the enemy advance before it reaches the Turkish Straits.
- NATO air forces (Greece and Turkey plus USAF and USMC air augmentation) are in a relatively weak position at this time due to Turkey's lack of shelters, inadequate airbase defenses, War Reserve Munitions (WRM) shortages, and obsolete aircraft. Many of these shortcomings are already being overcome, however, and in 1980, there should be at least parity between the NATO and Warsaw Pact air forces in NATO's Southeastern Zone.
- The Turkish Navy should make no attempt to equal the capability of the Soviet Black Sea Fleet and should concentrate on its principal mission of defending the Turkish Straits.
- Turkey has the economic capability to increase significantly the funds that it devotes to military investment, although the increased costs of energy may restrict the availability of foreign exchange.

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- The most immediate problems facing Turkey are the shortage of WRM in all Services and the lack of aircraft shelters for tactical aircraft.

(S) The study recommends that during the period FY 76-80 the Security Assistance Program for Turkey include: (1) procurement of 36-days supply of WRM; (2) replacement of F-100 aircraft with 176 F-5Es; (3) improvement of Turkish anti-tank weapons (325 TOWs and 20,000 LAWs); (4) procurement of 156 Harpoon anti-ship missiles; and (5) improvement of Turkish communications facilities.

(S) The FY 76-80 program recommended by the study group will cost approximately \$1.1 billion in 1974 dollars, of which the United States would provide \$150 million in grant aid and \$725 million in FMS credit. The grant aid level is \$40 million greater than would be provided if the FY 75-79 POM program levels were extended through FY 80. The recommended FMS credit levels are \$30 million higher than in the FY 76-79 POM, extended through FY 80, since our analysis has shown that Turkey is capable of supporting FMS credit loans of at least \$150 million per year. Nevertheless, if the recommended levels of assistance are approved, the worldwide Security Assistance POM, FY 1976-80 (including Turkey) can be prepared to remain within the constraints of fiscal guidance contained in your FPGM of 25 February 1974.

(S) The recommended program assumes that Turkey will commit about 80% of its FY 76-80 modernization funds to support the cash requirements contained in our recommendation and to repay the FMS credits provided. Our analysis has indicated, however, that Turkey can afford to contribute more funds to its own defense. For example, Turkey should be able to increase the portion of its GNP devoted to defense from 4.3% to 5.0%, and the entire recommended program could be financed with Turkish funds. Such an increase is unlikely, however, and a more reasonable objective would be to seek to persuade the GOT to make more limited increases in their defense spending. As Turkish spending is increased, the United States could eliminate grant aid or reduce it to a level to assure influence only. Alternatively, the program could be stretched out to FY 82 to match the Turkish modernization program. The extension would reduce the annual cost of the program from \$223 million to \$150 million, and the cost to the United States could be reduced accordingly.

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(S) The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider the study valid only in terms of the methodologies and assumptions used in its preparation. They believe that the study should not be viewed as the single determinant for developing the Security Assistance Program for Turkey. The JCS would include the following additional items: (1) replacement of six mine-layers at a cost of approximately \$53 million rather than dependence on the Turkish Air Force to lay destructor mines along the Black Sea coast and (2) replacement of obsolescent amphibious shipping to support Turkish forces in Thrace at a cost of \$17 million rather than dependence on existing amphibious ships, commercial ships and ferries. The OSD members of the study group believe that these programs are not consistent with the concepts of force interdependence and specialization, and are not essential for Turkey.

- (U) I believe that the recommended program is both realistic and obtainable, and will meet Turkey's defense requirements during the period.
- (U) Further, I recommend that you approve the program outlined in the study as the basis for Security Assistance to Turkey during FY 76-80.
- (U) The ASD/PAAE concurs *following program dated*
- (U) The Joint Chiefs of Staff concur except as noted above and as footnoted throughout the study *28 Jan 76*

Approver: *W. P. Clement*

Disapprove: _____

Briefing Desired: Yes _____ No _____

28 Jan 76
Enclosure

James A. Jordan
James A. Jordan
Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense
International Security Affairs

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ADDENDUM

(U) - Full time study group members:

Major General William B. Caldwell, III
Colonel R. M. Carroll, USA
Captain J. L. O'Brien, USN
LTC J. M. Dougherty, USAF
Mr. J. C. F. Tillson, GS-13

Study Chairman
Team Chief
JCS Representative
Air Force Staff Representative
ASD/P&A Representative

The study group, under the Team Chief, Colonel Carroll, traveled to Germany and Turkey during the period 18 Nov - 14 Dec 1973 and discussed the study with Headquarters US European Command, the Joint US Military Mission Ankara and the US Embassy Ankara.

(U) - Major Study Assumptions:

Warsaw Pact mobilization would begin on D-30 and NATO mobilization would start on D-23;

No nuclear weapons are used;

Neither Warsaw Pact forces nor Turkish forces are constrained by lack of communications equipment or war reserve munitions; and

Turkish forces use individual replacement policies.

(U) - Study Methodologies:

The US Army's Theater Quick Game Model (TQGM) used to assess ground force capabilities.

The US Air Force TAC CONTENDER Computer model and a sortie generation method were used to analyze Turkish Air Force requirements.

Turkish Naval requirements were examined by conducting a subjective analysis of the missions assigned to the Turkish Navy.

(U) - A briefing is available on the study, its methodologies, conclusions and recommendations. If a briefing is desired, space has been provided on the forwarding memorandum to so indicate.

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