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INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

Office of the Secretary of Defense
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: DPC Meeting Overview - INFORMATION MEMORANDUM (U)

The meeting takes place against a somber backdrop. Europe's effort to disassociate itself from the U.S. at a time of Soviet-American strategic confrontation has the Alliance in unprecedented disarray. Europeans assert they must distance themselves from U.S. Mid Eastern policy to meet their economic needs and define their identity. Only reluctant tribute is paid by some European spokesmen to the need for a continued defense relationship with the U.S. The oil crisis becomes more acute by the day, due in no small part to craven behavior on the part of many European governments. Moreover, the original U.S. conception of a unified - and unifying - Atlantic Declaration of Principles has foundered, largely because of French intransigence abetted by a curiously unhelpful British attitude. Even division of the effort into a U.S.-EC-9 paper and a North Atlantic Council declaration has had rocky going, with our Allies so far unwilling to treat political issues in either document. The emotional and substantive value of the declarations has been eroded by bickering. Dr. Kissinger is now weighing the alternatives on how to proceed from here, but it is evident that this key undertaking of the Year of Europe cannot be consummated by the time of the Ministerials. The failure so far to reach agreement on Atlantic relations will contribute to an uneasy and uncertain atmosphere at the DPC.

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As a result of these and other important differences, the Administration posture toward the Allies continues one of strong and firm dissatisfaction. Secretary Kissinger is expected to take a markedly firm line with the Allies in the North Atlantic Council. Though your Defense colleagues are less involved in these political disagreements, and may expect to discount their relevance to defense issues, your participation at the DPC (coming three days before Dr. Kissinger's NAC statement) should reflect the Administration's current disenchantment with European undermining of the political environment that sustains our security relationship.

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The meeting should offer a good opportunity to review the lessons tentatively drawn from the Mid East conflict. The Allies expect to

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participate in such a discussion. Also it provides a vehicle for suggesting ways in which the Alliance might profit from this experience to improve its security. A briefing on the Mid East experience is available for you to give. The Mid East discussion would most appropriately come during the initial two-hour restricted session which has been scheduled at U.S. request.

✓ The formal agenda for the meetings, of course, includes more specific and traditional items, e.g., force plans and force improvements, specialization, burdensharing, infrastructure, MBFR. In some of these areas progress has not come up to our expectations. However, we have succeeded in getting the Allies to focus on some specific areas that demanded attention, and out of this effort has come real, if limited, progress. Further progress will depend significantly on your speaking personally to the issues where necessary.

✓ Regarding force improvements, we will now be able to shelter under NATO financing 70% of our rapid reactor (M+3) aircraft. We have general agreement on anti-armor modernization and have made a start toward rationalizing NATO war reserve stock criteria with a view to achieving balanced holdings of at least 30 days. Specialization is moving slowly. Despite objections from military personnel who see specialization as a threat to balanced national forces, there is greater appreciation now of its potential, particularly in the logistics field.

✓ After two years of studies and negotiations, the NATO Military Authorities have recommended the establishment of a separate air headquarters to centralize the command and control of Central Region aircraft. The retention, rather than the merger, of the subordinate ATAF's and the probable retention of Brunssum as the AFCENT site attests to the conservatism of NATO institutions. If NATO forms the new headquarters from existing manpower, AAFCE should become predominant over the ATAF's as we desire.

✓ The burdensharing question will probably be in flux right up to the last minute. The implications of Jackson-Nunn appear to be sinking in, and there is some possibility of a broad but formal Ministerial undertaking to satisfy its demands. A briefing is available for you to give. Your personal intervention on this matter will underline its political importance and your personal commitment to its solution.

✓ MBFR is moving as well as could be expected; in fact, considering the centrifugal forces at play, NATO is to be congratulated for the overall cohesion and patience demonstrated in working out an agreed negotiating position.

✓ Action on the 1974-78 force plans will constitute a formal commitment by each nation of its forces planned for CY 1974. There are no surprises here.


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However, the projected level of defense efforts over the five-year period is cause for concern. The substantial real increases in European defense spending over the past three years are expected to taper off rather sharply. Defense effort as a percentage of GNP will probably decline for a number of Allied nations. These are bad signs, and you should take every opportunity to jack up our Allies on this critical issue.

Regarding the question of the present conventional balance, we are making modest progress toward bringing NATO collectively closer to the U.S. assessment. For example, due largely to the U.S. balance briefings and your discussions with Ministers, the Military Committee has embarked on a study of NATO-Pact conventional capabilities that will take account of all NATO forces (whether formally committed or not in the NATO DPQ) that might reasonably be brought to bear during a conflict in Central Europe.

We hope that the Ministers will agree to work toward a 10-30% reduction in NATO Headquarters during the next years, but objections may be raised because of MBFR considerations, among others.



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