



INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

18 MAR 1982

In Reply Refer to: I-26258/81

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: El Salvador Military Strategy Assistance Team Report -- ACTION MEMORANDUM (U)

The Executive Summary of the El Salvador Military Strategy Assistance Team Report (Woerner Report) is at Tab A. The Implementation Concept of the report is at Tab B. They outline three courses of action or strategies which could be followed in El Salvador. The report recommends course of action three (the optimum) and this is supported by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The concept also provides estimated costs for implementation. Current funding will not permit us to do now everything which is recommended, but the concept is a good framework to guide us in allocating the security assistance resources available.

(U) Next under is a proposed letter from you to General Jones expressing your appreciation for the outstanding efforts of General Woerner and his team in providing the basis for future action in El Salvador.

*F. West*

FRANCIS J. WEST, JR.  
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
(INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS)

Attachments  
a/s

Office of the Secretary of Defense  
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS 50 USC 6552  
Date: 19 NOV 2018 Authority: EO 13526  
Declassify: X Deny in Full: \_\_\_\_\_  
Declassify in Part: \_\_\_\_\_  
Reason: \_\_\_\_\_  
MDR: 18 -M- 2206

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Date: NOV 19 2018

cc: Dr. Ikle

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220-84-0004 L. B. S.D.S. (M. 1)

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ANNEX A

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE EL SALVADOR  
MILITARY ASSISTANCE TEAM REPORT (WOERNER REPORT) (U)

1. (U) The national military strategy of El Salvador was developed in 9 weeks through the combined efforts of the El Salvador Military Strategy Assistance Team and the Salvadoran Armed Forces General Staff. Military objectives, consistent with the national purpose and interests, were identified and articulated, as were concepts for the attainment of the objectives. The requirements to man, organize, equip, train, and sustain the necessary military force were identified. Lastly, a concept for the implementation of the strategy was developed (see Annex B).

2. The strategy has two dimensions. The first is the preparation for the war by outlining the force structure and training required. It envisions creating 10 additional battalions (8 infantry and 2 quick reaction) for a force structure of 25 battalions; the improvements of command, control, and communications, intelligence system, combat service support system, and training base; modernizing the Air Force rotary- and fixed-wing inventory; and increasing the number of Navy patrol boats. The second dimension is the fighting of the war. Through a tactic of aggressive, small unit and rapid reinforcement day and night operations, the battle will be taken to the insurgents. Eight of the additional infantry battalions will be stationed in the most highly contested areas of the country. The strategy provides for coordinated efforts of interdiction and protection of electoral processes and the economic infrastructure.

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3. The strategy implementation concept in Annex B outlines materiel and training requirements that cannot be satisfied by El Salvador. A summary, by options, of the personnel requirements and costs is in Tab A to this Annex. The options are:
- a. Course of Action 1. Current situation, a defensive strategy forboding limited survival. The military will be forced to submit to the Communist strategy of the "protracted war," with time favoring the insurgents.
  - b. Course of Action 2. An offensive strategy to gain and maintain the initiative. It provides for partial control of the national territory and partial defense of the economic infrastructure.
  - c. Course of Action 3. Strategic victory by destroying the insurgents' will and capability to fight. It provides for the reestablishment of public order and creates the capability to defend the territory from internal or external aggression, (See Tab B to this annex.)
4. The Salvadoran high command has endorsed the strategy and is prepared to recruit and budget for four battalions prior to the March elections. To further support the strategy, they are prepared to provide a group of officer candidates for out-of-country training. This leadership will be vital to the fulfillment of the strategy.
5. The full report of the El Salvador Military Strategy Assistance Team summarizes the national military strategy; explains the rationale for its design; describes
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the environment within which it was developed, and places  
the strategy within the larger context of the national  
political, economic, and social arenas.

6. A US commitment to this strategy will be approxi-  
mately \$300 million over a 5-year period, including \$165  
million for the short term. The requirements are extensive,  
and the Salvadoran absorption capacity precludes a massive  
one-time infusion. Neither the strategy nor this report  
offers a one-time quick-fix option for the United States to  
use in El Salvador.

7. **Conclusion.** The El Salvador national military  
strategy was developed bilaterally by the strategy  
team and the Salvadoran Armed Forces General Staff and  
was endorsed by the Salvadoran Armed Forces high command.  
It is a sound, pragmatic strategy that can be implemented  
by the Government of El Salvador if supported by the  
United States. It is recommended that the United States  
support Course of Action 3, Strategic Victory.

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TAB A TO ANNEX A

SUMMARY OF PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS AND APPROXIMATE COSTS,  
 EL SALVADOR ARMED FORCES (U)

<u>COURSE OF ACTION NO.1</u>	<u>COURSE OF ACTION NO.2</u>	<u>COURSE OF ACTION NO. 3</u>
<u>PERSONNEL</u>	<u>PERSONNEL</u>	<u>PERSONNEL</u>
69 FIELD GRADE OFFICERS 360 COMPANY GRADE OFFICERS 13,507 ENLISTED	192 FIELD GRADE OFFICERS 1,501 COMPANY GRADE OFFICERS 34,260 ENLISTED	212 FIELD GRADE OFFICERS 1,667 COMPANY GRADE OFFICERS 39,290 ENLISTED
<u>COST</u>	<u>COST</u>	<u>COST</u>
\$25,823,000*	\$181,807,000*	\$296,586,000*
<u>MATERIEL AND EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>MATERIEL AND EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>MATERIEL AND EQUIPMENT</u>
\$1,729,000/\$20,751,000**	\$6,371,000/\$76,449,000**	\$6,869,000/\$82,424,000**
<u>PERSONNEL</u>	<u>PERSONNEL</u>	<u>PERSONNEL</u>
\$6,432,000	\$13,600,000***	\$16,800,000***
<u>INSTALLATIONS</u>	<u>INSTALLATIONS</u>	<u>INSTALLATIONS</u>
\$1,000,000***	\$5,267,000	\$6,446,000
<u>TRAINING</u>	<u>TRAINING</u>	<u>TRAINING</u>

\*GOES BUDGET ONLY  
 \*\*GOES SALARIES MONTH/YEAR  
 \*\*\*MET ONLY

\*US PROVIDED MATERIEL ONLY  
 \*\*GOES SALARIES MONTH/YEAR  
 \*\*\*NEW INSTALLATIONS ONLY

\*US PROVIDED MATERIEL ONLY  
 \*\*GOES SALARIES MONTH/YEAR  
 \*\*\*NEW INSTALLATIONS ONLY

Refinement may require a follow-up DOD team to El Salvador to assist the Salvadoran Armed Forces in the development of detailed tables of organization and other authorization documents that will allow precise costing of materiel requirements to execute the victory strategy. (See Woerner Report enclosure pages detailing the Implementation Concept Courses of Action for each of the Services (pages 19-1 through 19-3, 20-1 through 20-2, 21-1 through 21-2, 22-1, and 23-1 through 23-5).)



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TAB B TO ANNEX A

SELECTED STRATEGY (OPTION THREE)  
FUNDING CONSIDERATIONS AND CONSTRAINTS (U)

		<u>1</u>
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1. (U) <u>Funding Summary</u>		<u>4</u>
a. (U) Short-term equipment requirement--	\$150,039,000	<u>5</u>
b. (U) Training requirement (in-and out-of-	\$ 20,000,000	<u>6</u>
country)		<u>7</u>
2. (U) <u>Considerations</u>		<u>8</u>
a. (U) How fast can the Government of El Salvador accept,		<u>9</u>
distribute, maintain, sustain, and repair this equipment,		<u>10</u>
if provided?		<u>11</u>
b. (U) How fast can the US Government provide equipment,		<u>12</u>
training to complement use, and funds to sustain project.		<u>13</u>
3. (U) <u>Discussion</u>		<u>14</u>
a. (U) The \$150 million for equipment and the \$20 million		<u>15</u>
for training should be used as a base to provide a		<u>16</u>
paradigm to work within a fluid combat situation toward		<u>17</u>
stability. This drive toward stability through military		<u>18</u>
action should be strong enough to secure sufficient time		<u>19</u>
for the Government of El Salvador to institute social and		<u>20</u>
political changes that will undermine the insurgency.		<u>21</u>
b. (U) Given the lack of sophistication of Salvadoran		<u>22</u>
military and governmental logistics and support, the best		<u>23</u>
course of action, based on the US team's recommendations,		<u>24</u>
might be to phase in Salvadoran requirements in a systematic		<u>25</u>
approach using a concept of concurrent operational and		<u>26</u>
support enhancement.		<u>27</u>
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c. If, after further Service refinement of specific program costs, it is determined that all of the outlined goals cannot be met under the dollar figure selected in the paradigm, then the options are either to delay equipment and training schedules or to increase the dollar figure. Thus, it is imperative to adopt a nonbinding perspective when using these figures; i.e., funding amounts are ESTIMATES not goals. This way, responsiveness to actual dynamic, Salvadoran requirements will increase, and artificial funding levels will not result in unrealistic promises of success.

4. The figures below constitute a base planning level for short-term action in El Salvador (from the present time until December 1982).

<u>EQUIPMENT COSTS</u>	(Approximate) <u>\$150,039,000</u>	
Command/Control (Exhibit A)	\$ 5,047,000*	
Intelligence	113,000	
Public & Judicial Order	111,831,000	
Deny External Support	29,761,000	
Protect Economic Infrastructure	1,000,000	
Improve Tactical Training (School Items)	387,000	
Public Relations Program and Civic Action	**	

\* This figure does not include the estimated \$1.6 million required to establish a basic communications network employing privacy equipment ("secure communications").

\*\* An additional \$2 million, approximately, may be required to support civic action related programs but requires further review.

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<u>TRAINING COSTS</u>	<u>\$20,000,000</u>	<u>1</u>
Out-of-country (Exhibit B)		<u>2</u>
Officer	(\$5,000,000)(3.5 in Panama)	<u>3</u>
Infantry Battalion	(\$13,000,000)	<u>4</u>
(less equipment)		<u>5</u>
In-country program	\$2,000,000	<u>6</u>
<u>Total Estimated Planning Costs</u>	<u>\$170,039,000</u>	<u>7</u>
5. (U) <u>Funding</u>		<u>8</u>
a. (S) Foreign military sales credit (FMSCR) program		<u>9</u>
for FY 1982 has less than \$15 million remaining,		<u>10</u>
assuming FY 1982 levels are maintained by Congress.		<u>11</u>
b. (U) <u>Possible Presidential Actions</u>		<u>12</u>
(1) (S) Invoking Section 506(a) of the Foreign		<u>13</u>
Assistance Act (FAA) 1961, as amended, would yield		<u>14</u>
up to \$75 million, of which a portion is already		<u>15</u>
fenced for use in Honduras.		<u>16</u>
(2) (S) Invoking Section 610(a) of the FAA 1961, as		<u>17</u>
amended, could increase INET funds for El Salvador		<u>18</u>
by between \$5-9 million, depending on status of		<u>19</u>
appropriations and whether FY 1981 or FY 1982 levels		<u>20</u>
are used for calculation. This action requires		<u>21</u>
Congressional notification.		<u>22</u>
c. (S) Other funding must come either from reprogramming		<u>23</u>
of existing sources, which will probably be insufficient		<u>24</u>
for requirements, or from additional appropriations.		<u>25</u>
The latter may be difficult to obtain but are		<u>26</u>
essential to support this program.		<u>27</u>
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