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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

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Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: NOV 02 2018

JCSM-256-82
17 November 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Report of the Defense Requirements Survey Team--
Lebanon (U)

1. In accordance with the Terms of Reference* for the Defense Requirements Survey Team--Lebanon, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed both the US-Eyes Only and Lebanon-Releasable versions of the survey team's report. The comments and recommendations of the Joint Staff, Services, and Defense agencies have been incorporated in the report.
2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the Lebanon-Releasable version of the report (Appendix B) be provided to the Government of Lebanon for use in Lebanese defense planning and the US-Eyes Only version (Appendix A) be used as a guide in structuring the US security assistance program for Lebanon.

Office of the Secretary of Defense
Chief, RDP, ESD, WHS

Date: 02 NOV 2018 Authority: EO 13526 + 5 U.S.C. § 552

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Reason: _____

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For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

JAMES E. DALTON
Lieutenant General, USAF
Director, Joint Staff

Attachments

Reference:

- * Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs), I-25990/82, 13 September 1982, "Activation of Survey of Defense Requirements Team--Lebanon"

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MEMORANDUM THRU CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Report of the Defense Requirement Survey Team-Lebanon (U)

1. (U) In accordance with the Terms of Reference, attached is the report of the Defense Requirements Survey Team - Lebanon. Discussed below are several key points, not appropriate for release to Lebanon, that I would like to highlight.

2. Capability of the Lebanese Army

a. Under normal conditions, an assessment such as this would be conducted with emphasis placed on the administrative and logistical infrastructure of the Lebanese Army (LA), the "total package" approach to equipment deliveries, and the absorptive capacity of the force. That has not been done in this case. Pre-survey orientations, discussions with Ambassador Draper and changes to the TOR during the survey, and post-survey discussions in Washington clearly indicated that the political imperatives were such that LA capabilities and requirements had to be assessed in relation to the US Government aim to bring about the total withdrawal of foreign forces from Lebanon by 1 January 1983 while at the same time not making substantive increases (hopefully decreases) in the MNF, yet provide a sufficiently credible military force in the Southern Region to satisfy Israel's concerns for a secure northern border.

b. The survey team's initial conclusions were that the LA could participate in Step 1, Phase II withdrawals but lacked sufficient forces to place credible units in either the Southern or Northern Region during the initial months of Step 2. Considering the present condition of the LA, Step 1 involvement was considered a moderate but essential risk. During Step 2, the team believed that some form of MNF should remain until Spring 1984, when a fifth brigade of the LA would be modernized, or until the entire security situation became clearer and indicated a diminished threat within the capability of the LA to cope.

[REDACTED]

c. [REDACTED] When it became apparent that Spring 1984 was too late for the deployment of a brigade to the Southern Region, the team looked for other options. The option now being recommended is to deploy the General Defense Brigade from the Mount Lebanon Region to the Southern Region at the beginning of Step 2, Phase II, understanding that this reduces the force in the initial disengagement area from four to three brigades.

This is considered a high risk option because:

- The degree and extent of future Israeli cooperation is speculative. Presently, they pass up no opportunity to intimidate the LA.
- The status of Hadaad's forces is unknown as is the willingness of the Israelis to exert their full influence to keep him under control. He continues to harass and obstruct UNIFIL forces when it suits his purpose.
- There is substantial uncertainty about the security in the region even after Israel withdraws and even if Hadaad ceases operations.
- Military facilities to support the force such as barracks, workshops, and storage facilities are virtually nonexistent.
- There is no direct support supply, maintenance or transportation organization to support the force.

d. [REDACTED] In addition to the increased risk posed by this option, it can be anticipated that the LA and probably the government will require considerable persuasion to put it into force.

- They are not yet confident of the security in the Beirut area, especially the southern suburbs.
- They are uncertain of the security situation in the Mount Lebanon Region after Syrian and Israeli forces withdraw, e.g., Druze vs Phalange in the Chouf.
- It means removing the most effective military force from the area of highest priority, in terms of domestic Lebanese political and economic affairs, into the area of least priority.

While from the standpoint of the LA it would be preferable to not deploy to the Southern Region at the beginning of Step 2, Phase II, and rely instead on UNIFIL or some form of MNF, there is no known threat that would preclude the deployment of a Brigade from the Mount Lebanon Region to the Southern Region. This is therefore a viable, albeit riskier option.

3. Impact of Occupying Forces on Military Planning.

a. A serious obstacle to effective planning and operations is the continued presence of both Syrian and Israeli military forces in Lebanon. They continue to interfere in the local political process and provide sustaining support, both materially and psychologically, to many dissident elements and several of the militias. They prevent any immediate comprehensive scheme for effectively reorganizing, manning, and equipping scattered elements of the LA that are situated within the geographic areas under their control. The Commander, LA is reluctant to bring these outlying forces in Tripoli, Ba'albek, Sidon, and elsewhere into LA controlled areas for fear of losing military equipment and facilities to either of the foreign occupying forces. In the past, both have demonstrated no reluctance in confiscating for themselves any LA property not tightly controlled by the Army. This reluctance inhibits efforts at retraining and cross leveling of scarce equipment.

b. At the national level there is also a perception that the GOL must avoid offending either of the occupying governments if any progress is to be made on eventual withdrawal. In the meantime, these foreign forces provide protection for the continued presence of elements that will have to be eliminated or whose activities will have to be drastically curtailed by Lebanese security forces when they regain control over all of the country. PLO forces continue to return to the Syrian dominated region of Lebanon while Israel has failed to fully restrain Hadaad's activities in the south, just to highlight two future security problems of major significance that will confront the LA. By their presence, these foreign forces continue to intimidate Lebanese policy makers and thereby slow movement toward the reestablishment of a strong central government. This problem, while lessened somewhat, will remain even after withdrawal. As long as the Army structure is based solely on an internal security mission, both Syria and Israel will be able to pressure and manipulate the Lebanese Government into actions that are not in its best interest. We may see, therefore, a move toward developing the LA into an actual deterrent force, particularly in the areas of air, tank and anti-tank systems.

4. As directed, the team focused primarily on the Army. Our Air Force and Navy representatives however, did an assessment of Air Force and Navy requirements, details of which are in the report. Clearly, the GOL must place highest priority on rebuilding the Army, especially in the immediate and near term. However, neither the Air Force nor Navy can be ignored and they should be modernized at the fastest rate the government can afford without denigrating Army programs.

There is not much that should be undertaken with the Navy until the President decides when he will close the illegal ports. When he does that, there will be an immediate requirement for naval patrol operations to prevent illegal entry of goods and people. The French build excellent craft of the size and capability suitable for the Lebanese Navy. In view of their stated interest in assisting the LA, their support of the Navy program should be explored.

6. (U) Finally, I would like to thank the Services for providing really top quality officers for the team. Without exception, every member was highly qualified, exceptionally motivated, and mission oriented. Also, I am grateful for the support provided to the team before, during and after the survey.

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