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ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2400 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-2400

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INTERNATIONAL  
SECURITY AFFAIRS



MEMORANDUM FOR DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
 THROUGH UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (POLICY)  
 FROM: ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE/  
 INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS  
 Prepared by Bosnia Task Force/x40661  
 SUBJECT: Bosnia-Deputies' Committee Meeting (U)  
 INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

You are scheduled to meet with other Deputies in the White House Situation Room to discuss Bosnia from 1500 - 1630 on Wednesday, August 23.

The meeting is to follow up on last Friday's Deputies' Committee Meeting. It will review (1) the updated OSD paper on Implementing a Balkan Peace Settlement and (2) issues concerning arming and training the Bosnian Federation.

Attached:

- Tab A - Talking Points
- Tab B - Key Changes to OSD Paper and Recommended Focus for DC
- Tab C - The updated paper Implementing a Balkan Peace Settlement (*with changes shown in italics*)
- Tab D - Joint Staff paper on equipping and training of the Bosnian Federation

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 Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS  
 Date: 17 DEC 2018 Authority: EO 13526 + 5 USC 552  
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NSC DEPUTIES COMMITTEE MEETING ON BOSNIA

DATE: August 23, 1995  
LOCATION: WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM  
TIME: 3:00 - 4:30 p.m.

Agenda

- I. Policy Issues Relating to Military Implementation of a Peace Plan .....OSD/JCS
- II. Policy Issues Relating to Arming and Training Bosnian Government Forces .....OSD/JCS

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**Talking Points**  
**Deputies' Committee Meeting on the Former Yugoslavia**  
**23 August 1995**

*This is a revision of the OSD paper discussed at last Friday's DC. It reflects staff interaction among EUCOM, the Joint Staff and OSD.*

*Several new issues have been added which merit particular attention:*


- "Pattern of Deployment" (Issue #1) -- To do its job, must the force operate within Federation territory or must it operate throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina?
- "Federation Support" (Issue #5) -- How will we reconcile the impartial "peace implementation" mission with the inherently partial "Federation support" and "equip and train" missions?
- "Contingent Responses" (Issue #18) -- What happens if the peace breaks down?
- "Armaments/Builddown" (Issue #8) -- During the course of negotiations, what concepts can be pursued which would limit Bosnian Serb offensive capabilities? What would be the implications of an unlimited arms flow?
- "Mission Duration" (Issue #19) -- How long will the implementation process take? What would be the consequences if this projected schedule is not met?

*At the end of this meeting, the Deputies should forward this paper to the principals for their consideration.*

*With respect to arming and training the Bosnian Federation:*

- US leadership will be required to ensure that multilateral efforts are coordinated to achieve the desired end-state
- Accurately assessing how much is enough will be critical. What are the risks of an enduring US commitment?

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**"Implementing a Balkan Peace Settlement (U)"**

22 August 1995

**16) KEY CHANGES TO OSD PAPER SINCE LAST DC (17 August):**

- Assumptions concerning nature of peace plan itself added.
- Under "Specified Tasks", following items added:
  - Importance of rapid deployment
  - Enforce movement of units to designated areas.
- "Issues" added as follows:
  - "Pattern of Deployment"
  - "Federation Support"
  - "Zones of Separation"
  - "Armaments/Builddown"
  - "Contingent Responses"
  - "Mission Duration".

**16) RECOMMENDED FOCUS FOR 23 AUGUST DC:**

- To do its job, should the force be based and/or operate within Federation territory only or throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina? (Issue #1)
- ~~What size force will be needed to implement the peace and how can the size be limited without endangering the ability to do the mission? (Issue #2)~~
- How will we reconcile US participation in both the impartial "peace implementation" mission and the inherently partial "equip and train" mission? Can our commitment to "Federation Support" if the peace fails be reconciled with the "peace implementation" mission? (Issue #5)
- What will happen if the peace breaks down? (Issue #18)
- The parallel "equip and train" mission will apparently be the controlling factor in mission duration. How long will it take and what are the military, diplomatic and domestic political consequences of mission duration? (Issue #19)

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## Implementing a Balkan Peace Settlement (U)

(Changes to paper since 17 August DC shown in *bold italics* )

**Scenario:** (S) A peace plan for Bosnia-Herzegovina is accepted by all warring parties and includes a cessation of hostilities. There is international commitment to implement the provisions of the plan, including economic, diplomatic and military components. The principal military requirement is to create a stable environment during a limited period wherein the Bosnian Muslim-Croat Federation (the "Federation") is able to develop an effective self-defense relative to the Bosnian Serbs. To meet this requirement, two parallel programs are conducted *concurrently*: Multilateral *efforts* to provide equipment and training to the Federation forces; a NATO-*led* force to implement the plan.

**Assumptions:** (S)

- *The peace plan includes the following provisions:*
  - *A cessation of hostilities.*
  - *Mutually recognized borders between the warring parties.*
  - *A joint commission to facilitate implementing and maintaining the provisions of the agreement.*
  - *At the appropriate time, forces of all sides move to designated areas.*
  - *The arms embargo is lifted for all of the former Yugoslavia and no disarmament by the warring parties is required.*
  - *The parties will not interfere with the activities of the PIF or the activities of humanitarian assistance organizations.*
- Public and Congressional support for the plan has been achieved.
- All parties to the conflict agree to the settlement and the peace plan; both NATO and the UN Security Council endorse it by resolution as a NATO-*led*, non-blue helmeted, operation.
- Croatia continues its support for and cooperation with the Federation.
- Border monitors on the Bosnia-Serbia border are withdrawn.
- There will be no UN involvement in military decision making for the operation.
- UNPROFOR's mission is completed *and its withdrawal is authorized.*
- *UK, FR and perhaps other elements of UNPROFOR transition to the NATO-*led* peace implementation force.*
- UNCRO (*reduced*) & UNPREDEP operations continue under UN control.
- Humanitarian assistance operations underway continue and are adequate.
- US ground forces will be committed to the peace implementation force.
- Federation forces, once armed and trained, have to defend their country.

**Mission:** (S) On order, CINCSOUTH assumes operational control of designated NATO and non-NATO forces and conducts operations to enforce the terms of the peace agreement in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

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**Specified Tasks:** (S) *Tasks continue to be identified as the planning process matures. Tasks below represent a starting point and continue to be refined. As long as the peace plan is substantially observed and only isolated violations occur, the Peace Implementation Force ("PIF") will:*

- *Deploy into the area as rapidly as possible to stabilize the situation, using existing FR/UK/NL RRF capabilities already in place to reduce the time needed to generate a credible military capability,*
- *Deter and respond to violations of the cease-fire,*
- *Monitor and enforce compliance by all parties with the peace agreement,*
- *Enforce movement of recalcitrant units to agreed positions, if necessary,*
- *Interact with the commission established in the peace plan,*
- *Ensure its own self defense and freedom of movement,*
- *Facilitate the provision of humanitarian aid in Bosnia-Herzegovina and be prepared to secure convoys, and*
- *Employ NATO air power in support of peace enforcement operations and in defense of peace implementation forces.*

**Parallel Functions:** (S) *The following functions will be performed by entities other than the PIF:*

- *Equipping & Training:* Multilateral forces will provide equipment and related training to Federation forces to improve their ability to defend against outside aggression. This function could be conducted principally outside Bosnia-Herzegovina, would be accomplished as rapidly as possible to permit early withdrawal of the PIF, *and may be in the context of efforts to limit growth of the external threat to the Federation.*
- *Air Support:* Deny Flight operations will continue throughout the PIF's mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina. These forces will provide no-fly zone enforcement, close air support, suppression of enemy air defenses, and possibly strike operations to support the PIF (along the lines agreed in London in July).
- *UNPROFOR Withdrawal:* The UN will organize and conduct the withdrawal of those UNPROFOR forces not transitioning to the PIF.
- *Other Support:* Humanitarian assistance, human rights monitoring, and economic reconstruction efforts will proceed in parallel with the implementation of the plan.

**Desired End State:** (S) *The mission of the PIF will be complete when the terms of the peace plan have been implemented by all parties and the Federation has enhanced its self-defense capability relative to the Bosnian Serbs.*

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**Issues:** (S) The following issues should be resolved in the interagency as development of the peace plan and planning for its execution continue:

- (1) **Pattern of Deployment:** Discussions during development of the PIF concept have posited that the PIF might be stationed only on Federation territory as opposed to stationing throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina. Such stationing could detract from the perception of impartiality needed to carry out the PIF mission. Further, PIF deployment should initially focus on those areas most likely to be contentious during plan implementation.
- (2) **Mission/Force Calculus:** SACEUR, who will execute the mission, is refining the forces he will need to do the job, seeking to develop a force sufficient to do the tasks assigned based on mission analysis. *The expected degree of cooperation by the warring parties will be important in determining force requirements.*
- (3) **Initiation:** Deployment of the PIF should be ordered as promptly as feasible upon all parties' acceptance of the peace plan and issuance of the necessary mandates.
- (4) **UNPROFOR Withdrawal:** The UN-organized withdrawal of those elements of UNPROFOR which will not transition to the PIF while the other elements of the PIF are deploying into the region will represent a considerable logistic effort and will tax the logistic infrastructure in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia and Serbia.
- (5) **Federation Support:** *The degree to which NATO will protect the Federation from Bosnian Serb aggression and the PIF's role in that mission requires resolution, as does NATO's response in the event that Croatian support for the plan and/or the Federation is withdrawn.*
- (6) **Transition Period:** The most vulnerable period with the greatest potential for a breakdown of the cease-fire will be during the simultaneous movement of NATO, UN and warring parties to transition to the peace agreement. Quick transition to the PIF will minimize the risk of early violation of the peace plan. Issues include enhanced authority for the UNPROFOR commander's use of airpower in advance of turnover, prompt withdrawal of those elements of UNPROFOR least capable of self-defense, rapid and clear transfer of authority to the PIF commander, explicit definition of PIF tasks and those assigned to UNPF during the transition, C2 relationships between the PIF and UNCRO/UNPREDEP, and rapid deployment of the US element of the PIF.

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- (7) **Zones of Separation:** *Implementation of the peace plan could involve the establishment of demilitarized zones (DMZs) along the border between the Federation and the Bosnian Serbs to reduce the likelihood of cross-border attacks. The size and location of these zones and the PIF responsibilities for them must be determined.*
- (8) **Armaments/Builddown:** *Federation self-defense capabilities vis-a-vis the Bosnian Serbs could be more quickly enhanced if the flow of arms to the Bosnian Serbs were constrained either as part of or an adjunct to the agreement. During the course of the negotiations, concepts which can help limit Bosnian Serb offensive capabilities should be pursued.*
- (9) **Continuation of Air Support:** An additional period of NATO Deny Flight support to the Federation after departure of the PIF could be needed to provide additional support to the Federation while its self-defense capabilities are being upgraded.
- (10) **Force Recruitment:** Forces beyond those currently in the RRF and other NATO elements of UNPROFOR and those contributed by the US may be needed for the operation. A diplomatic effort to solicit additional forces may be needed.
- (11) **Force Composition:** US/NATO policy must be formulated with respect to (a) *which UNPROFOR forces should transition to the PIF*, (b) Russian participation in the PIF, (c) Islamic nation participation in the PIF, and (d) Radical Islamic entities' support to Federation forces.
- (12) **Mandate:** For the PIF to work, both UNSC and NAC must support the mission with the appropriate mandate(s) (including Chapter VII ROE) and provide authority to the PIF as necessary for it to carry out its mission as a NATO-led (vice UN) operation with rules of engagement appropriate to its mission.
- (13) **Status of Forces:** Given recent experiences in deploying the RRF, early attention should be given to completing comprehensive Status of Forces Agreements for the PIF.
- (14) **Financing:** Mission cost and financing arrangements must be determined. As this will be a NATO rather than a UN operation, the same questions will arise as have arisen during the staffing of OPLAN 40104. Within the US, a decision will be needed to seek new appropriations from the Congress. A timeline for financial decisions will be needed.

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- (15) **Sequencing:** The sequence of events within the USG, within the Contact Group, at NATO, at the UN and within the US, NATO, and UN military chains of command required to execute the plan remains to be developed.
- (16) **Congressional Consultation:** A legislative plan must be developed for Congressional consultations/approvals and/or legal processes that will be needed and the steps which should be taken to avoid having these processes inordinately delay necessary military steps.
- (17) **Participation Criteria:** The USG should set the same criteria for participation in this mission as were set for OPLANs 40103 and 40104. (Exclusively NATO C3, demonstrated peace in place, robust ROE, etc.)
- (18) **Contingent Responses:** *In the event of a systematic breakdown of the peace and the return of wide-scale war, the PIF will:*
- *If the breakdown is precipitated by Federation forces' aggression, the PIF will defend itself and withdraw from Bosnia-Herzegovina. Deny Flight air support and equipping and training the Federation forces will cease.*
  - *If the breakdown is precipitated by Bosnian Serb forces' aggression, the PIF will assist the Federation in its defense, with support from Deny Flight air assets. NATO air will also be prepared to conduct wider attacks consistent with the London agreement. Equipping and training Federation forces will continue.*
  - *If the breakdown is due to the actions of both parties or the situation is ambiguous, further policy direction will be provided.*
- (19) **Mission Duration:** *The duration of the PIF mission will be determined by both the time needed for it to perform its peace implementation tasks and the time it takes other forces to accomplish the equipping and training functions described above. The "equip and train" function will probably be the controlling factor for PIF withdrawal. Withdrawal itself could take several months.*
- (20) **Follow-on Activities:** Consideration should be given now to developing the concept for a much smaller UN or regionally-organized peacekeeping force that would monitor continuing compliance with the peace agreement following withdrawal of the PIF.

**Principals' Committee Action:** (S) Recommend that the *Principals'* Committee:

- Confirm the principles contained in this paper.
- Approve the above mission statement.
- *Confirm the list of issues.*
- *Confirm initiation of US planning and support prompt initiation of NATO planning for the mission.*

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### **Multilateral Equipping and Training of the Bosnian Federation (U)**

**Scenario:** (S) A peace plan for Bosnia-Herzegovina is accepted by all warring parties and includes a cessation of hostilities. There is international commitment to implement the provisions of the plan, including economic, diplomatic and military components. The principal military requirement is to create a stable environment during a limited period wherein the Bosnian Muslim-Croat Federation (the "Federation") is able to develop an effective self-defense relative to the Bosnian Serbs. To meet this requirement, two parallel programs are conducted concurrently: multilateral effort to provide equipment and training to the Federation forces; a NATO-led force to implement the peace plan.

#### **Assumptions:** (S)

- Public and Congressional support for the plan has been achieved.
- The arms embargo is lifted for all of the former Yugoslavia.
- Legal requirements for provision of equipment have been met.
- Overt operation.
- Bosnian Federation requests assistance.
- Croatia continues its support for and cooperation with the Federation.
- Croatia will grant access through its territory to Bosnia.
- "No-Fly" Zone will continue to be enforced.
- BSA will retain its offensive capability.
- Bosnian Federation Army can disengage to equip and train.
- Adequate training facilities and logistics are available.

**Mission:** (S) On order, USCINCEUR assumes operational control of a multi-national force from designated NATO and non-NATO nations and conducts operations to equip and train selected elements of the Bosnian Federation Army to enhance its capability to defend the territorial integrity of the Bosnian Federation.

#### **Intent:** (S)

- Multi-national effort, US led.
- Enhance Federation Army existing core capabilities and units.
- Develop Federation Army capability to sustain training program.
- Counter-balance Bosnian Serb Army (BSA) strengths.
- Focus on defensive tasks at the company and battalion levels and on brigade and higher staff operations.
- Begin as promptly as feasible upon all parties' acceptance of the peace plan and issuance of the necessary mandates.
- Move concurrently on same timeline as peace implementation plan.

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**Specified Tasks:** (S)

- USCINCEUR assume operational control of a multi-national force for the mission.
- Assess Federation Army capabilities and needs.
- In coordination with the Federation Army, plan their equipping and training.
- Form a multi-national training and equipping team to execute the mission.
- Facilitate the provision of equipment to the Federation Army by donor nations.
- Assist the Federation Army to execute the plan.
- Ensure the self-defense and freedom of movement of the training and equipping team.

**Framework:** (S)

- Equip/train would not be conducted by NATO Peace Implementation Force.
- Multilateral equip/train effort would be under US leadership.
- Training conducted primarily outside the Bosnian Federation. Other alternatives include Croatia, other European locations, or US.
- Equipment would be US, former Warsaw Pact, or a mix.

**Concept of Operations:** (S) This would be a five-phase operation with phases overlapping:

- Phase I -- Assessment. Assess the doctrine, organization, equipment and training status. Prepare legal basis for defense activities and provision of equipment. Determine equipment and training required; assess availability of equipment and training.
- Phase II -- Establish the support structure. Position equipment, organize training teams, and establish training facilities.
- Phase III -- Equip.
- Phase IV -- Train. Integrate leaders and equipment into units, complete individual training, and conduct unit training.
- Phase V -- Sustainment. Provide logistical support during all phases and provide foundation for Federation logistic support system.

**Desired End State:** (S) Bosnian Federation Army has the capability of defending the territorial integrity of the Bosnian Federation against Bosnian Serb aggression without external combat support within nine months of mission start.

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**Issues:** (S) The following issues should be discussed in the interagency before proceeding with further planning for execution of multilateral security assistance:

(1) **Legal.** There are significant domestic and international legal issues that must be resolved by interagency coordination. The primary domestic legal consideration is determining the legal status of the Bosnian Federation and the legal authority for providing US assistance. A legislative strategy must be developed for Congressional consultations. International legal concerns include SOFAs, for both the training site country and B-H, and the status of trainers and training sites under the Law of Armed Conflict.

What limitations is Congress likely to place on US participation in this effort? How much time will be required to establish a comprehensive SOFA for training in Croatia, a NATO member country, possible Middle East nations?

(2) **Funding.**

**Funding requirement.** Assessment of equipment and training requirements must establish overall funding requirement. At a minimum, funding must include training, equipment, spares, consumables, maintenance, and sustainment. Funding must also be found for building a Federation air defense capability and for any No-Fly Zone operations past initial equip and train timeline.

**Funding sources.** Funding sources must be identified to include US, regional organizations, and bilateral. Within USG, must consider all existing legal authorities: security assistance (FMS, EDA, drawdown), supplemental appropriation, etc. If drawdown, what is the potential impact on readiness? If new appropriations are necessary, how long will Congressional approval take? Will Congress be willing to apply the \$100 million proposed in the Senate bill? Will they establish a formal Security Assistance funding level? Internationally, can a "Gulf" account be established? What is the best means to acquire third country contributions/ procurements/grants? Can solicitation of international funding begin now as a signal of US commitment?

(3) **Equipment availability.**

**Availability.** Equipment necessary to establish balance of power must be available, sustainable, maintainable. Equipment must be available for transport into region within timeline established. Issues requiring further definition during assessment phase:

What type of equipment: former Warsaw Pact, NATO, US, mixed? Current estimate indicates former Warsaw Pact equipment is the best option because of relative cost and availability, and it presently forms the basis of Federation

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equipment inventory. Would departing UNPF units be willing to leave some equipment behind? Are spare parts and consumables available? Is stock (US and other contributing nations) sufficient to meet requirement and timeline? Can equipment be maintained and sustained by Bosnian Federation forces? What international linkages and leverages are involved with sustaining particular types of equipment? What is effect of linkages on long-term stability?

**(4) Command and Control.**

Establishing US command authority for equip and train operations for Bosnian Federation. US leadership must be established to ensure multinational efforts are coordinated to achieve the desired end state. Mission will be tasked to CINCEUR, and most likely delegated to USAREUR for detailed planning, coordination, and execution. Efforts by the international community to equip and train warring factions could easily result in small "arms race" establishing an imbalance of power thereby destabilizing the region. How will other nations be integrated into effort? Will others accept US leadership? Can the US prevent/limit participation by potentially disruptive nations (e.g. Iran)? How will unity of effort be achieved to avoid multiple, uncoordinated equip/train efforts? Can UN/EU/NATO/OSCE establish international authority for unity of effort?

**(5) Operational.**

Multinational air support. There are two scenarios to consider. If there is a peace agreement, then what air support should be provided the Federation during the equip/train program? Should the air support be extended beyond the program for some limited period? If there is no agreement, then what air support should be provided and for how long? Under both conditions, where are NFZ operations continued: over Federation, over Federation and SRBH, or over all of Former Yugoslavia? Should NFZ include fixed wing, helicopters, active SAM sites?

Federation air defense. Should we assist the Bosnian Federation in establishing air defense to counterbalance Bosnian Serbs? Is air defense capability provided the Federation from the outset of the equip/train program? How should establishment of Federation air defense be coordinated so as to minimize potential threat to Deny Flight? What capability should the Federation possess: guns, missiles, a mix?

Defensive force. The arms embargo will be lifted for all of the former Yugoslavia. Establishment of numerical limits and zonal sub-limits (DMZs, areas of restricted maneuvering/operations) may be required for all warring parties to achieve and maintain a balance of power. Such limits could include heavy equipment (tanks, APCs, aircraft, naval vessels), and force structure

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(active and reserve). Decisions required: What are the limits necessary for Federation self-defense? At what point does a strong defensive force become a possible offensive threat to regional stability? How many tanks, mortars, aircraft, ships? Who determines limits: warring parties via peace plan, EU, CSCE, NATO, or US? Who develops initial stabilization measures (measures of transparency, constraint, reinforce confidence, monitoring compliance/evaluation)? Who maintains measures: EU, CSCE, NATO?

(6) **Risk of enduring US commitment.** Direct US ties to the Bosnian Federation Army may result in long term commitment. Failure of Bosnian Army may be US failure. Must establish exit strategy which disengages US from maintaining the Bosnian Federation. What is the exit strategy? Is it based on time or the capability of Bosnian Federation forces to counter threat?

Deputies' Committee Action: (S) Recommend the Deputies' Committee:

- Confirm the assumptions, mission, and specified tasks to meet the arming and training requirements while the two parallel programs (Arm & Train and implementation of the peace plan) are conducted.
- Recommend Principals approve the above mission statement.
- Conduct preliminary discussion of and assign staffing responsibility for these issues, and possibly others which are identified.
- Direct State/OSD/JCS to initiate US planning and push for prompt initiation of multilateral involvement, to include hosting an international conference in Washington to solicit multi-national support.
- Authorize Joint Staff to coordinate and conduct an in-country assessment of Federation capability and needs.

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