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FOREIGN POLICY GROUP MEETING ON BOSNIA

June 21, 1995

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Authority: EO 13526

Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS

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I. Support for UNPROFOR and the RRF. While the mission of the Rapid Reaction Force and its ultimate effectiveness remain unclear, it is the only game in town for keeping UNPROFOR in place. Our own analysis remains that UNPROFOR withdrawal would leave us with options that are far worse than those associated with continued UNPROFOR presence. Last week's events enabled us to decouple political support for the RRF from the issue of funding, perhaps even providing an opportunity to "break the mold" whereby all UNPROFOR operations have been funded on an assessed basis. Even if we gain Allied agreement for a voluntary fund or some other mechanism, however, we face an uphill battle in securing Congressional support and funding for a U.S. contribution for the RRF. (A memorandum with options and recommendations will be provided to the President shortly.) Issues for discussion:

- Beyond our Allies' political judgment that they need the RRF to justify continuing their UNPROFOR presence, what does the RRF buy us? What is it really capable of doing militarily in Bosnia? Will its command and control arrangements permit it to perform effectively?
- What should be our contribution to the RRF? How much political capital will we need to convince Allies to "break the mold" of assessed UN funding for the RRF and accept a voluntary fund? Can this be parlayed into a reform of all UNPROFOR funding?
- What is our strategy for dealing with the Hill? Will Allied agreement to a voluntary fund be sufficient to secure some modest Congressional funding? Or should we confine our contribution to equipment and services so as to avoid the need to obtain a Congressional appropriation?

II. Next Steps on the Diplomatic Track. The last round of Frasure-Milosevic talks made no progress on mutual recognition, and Ambassador Frasure believes he has gone as far as he can go. Contact Group members have agreed on Carl Bildt as mediator on their behalf. With the hostages all released, the French are itching to reestablish direct talks with the Pale Serbs. They appear to have enlisted other Contact Group members in support of this plan, and propose that Carl Bildt go to Pale during his current swing through the region to discuss terms for renewed peace talks. This could create strains with the Bosnian Government and undercut our efforts to play the Milosevic card; on the other hand, chances for any diplomatic progress could disappear if we simply wait for the Bosnian Serbs to "accept" the Contact Group plan as the "starting point" for negotiations. Issues for discussion:

- Should we continue to put all of our diplomatic eggs in the Contact Group basket with Bildt as the single mediator, or do we want to keep open a uniquely U.S. channel to Milosevic?

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- Should Bildt continue the strategy of increasing the isolation of Pale, or should we take advantage of having a new mediator to reopen direct contact with the Bosnian Serbs? If so, on what basis? Should we engage Pale without Bosnian Government support?

If Bildt makes no more progress toward a mutual recognition package to increase isolation of Pale, should we modify our insistence on the Bosnian Serbs' "accepting" the Contact Group plan as the starting point for negotiation? Should we terminate the limited sanctions relief for Serbia when the 75-day suspension period expires on July 5?

III. What are our long-term strategic options? Our current near-term strategy is based on keeping UNPROFOR in place as a stabilizing element while we attempt to isolate Pale until they accept the Contact Group Plan as the basis for a negotiated settlement. We need to explore what our options are if this path proves barren, both in terms of a new negotiating strategy, and our plans should negotiations fail. Issues for discussion:

- Under what circumstances should we reconsider our policy of dealing with Milosevic while maintaining the isolation of the Pale Serbs as a negotiating strategy? What conditions should trigger such a decision? What requirements should we impose on the Pale Serbs? How would we deal with the Bosnian Government?
- This may be our last chance to reopen the Contact Group discussions from a position of relative strength with UNPROFOR still in place. Should we be willing to reopen the Contact Group plan map, e.g. to trade the eastern enclaves for a more viable consolidated Bosnian territorial area in central Bosnia, while preserving the 51:49 ratio? Is there any further scope for adjusting the draft constitutional arrangements to encourage Bosnian Serb acceptance?
- If UNPROFOR is forced to withdraw, what should our post-withdrawal strategy for Bosnia consist of? Lift, arm and train? Lift and strike? Would we avoid being drawn into the conflict by refraining from a commitment to air strikes? Or would provision of arms and training make us sufficiently responsible for the consequences of lift to the point that we would be forced to defend Bosnia anyway?
- If UNPROFOR withdraws and Russia blocks lifting of the arms embargo at the UN, would we lift the embargo in conjunction with other willing allies without UNSC authorization? Would we do so unilaterally in those circumstances?
- Is there a point at which we would shift our position and encourage UNPROFOR to withdraw?
- Is there an UNPROFOR extraction scenario that requires less time and fewer troops than OPLAN 40104?

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