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
THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

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May 21, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT  
From: Alexander M. Haig, Jr.   
Subject: Middle East Policy Review

As we have discussed in the past, two central policy requirements remain constant if we are to counter aggressive Soviet intentions in the region: (1) we must maintain the U.S. as the sole outside power that can move the region toward peace; and (2) we must strengthen the perception that the U.S. is able and determined to protect its friends in the region. Over the past two years our policy has strengthened the U.S. posture in the region as a peacemaker in Lebanon, in securing Sinai withdrawal, and in maintaining the United States as the central force in the Arab-Israel peace process. In the meantime we have begun to restore the credibility of our military posture in the region through meeting the needs of our friends against odds in arms sales, and by strengthening our capabilities.

Now we must intensify our efforts to maintain our momentum. With the return of the Sinai the region now looks to us to deliver on the peace process. The ceasefire in Lebanon is marked by fragility and must be strengthened and the Iran-Iraq war threatens to alter the regional balance of power to the disadvantage of the U.S. and our friends. To meet these challenges we need to pursue an integrated diplomatic effort on all fronts. Careful management of our entire regional strategy will be necessary to ensure progress on individual elements.

Of all the near term threats to our policy, that of a major conflict in Lebanon is the most imminent. We must reinvigorate the ceasefire and go beyond it. Our purpose is to demonstrate to Israel that we can change the situation in Lebanon and that we can and will diminish the security threats to Israel by dealing with the problem of Lebanon in a context broader than a fragile ceasefire. We are proposing that Phil Habib suggest a new approach to Begin under which we would seek to develop coordinated action by the United States, France and Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. By pooling our resources and coordinating our actions we can work to

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strengthen the Central Lebanese Government, help preserve the ceasefire, reduce Syrian influence and lessen the PLO threat to Israel's security. Exactly how this would develop would depend on how the discussions evolved. Successful efforts in this direction could lead to a "contact group" and to an international conference which could provide the various factions in Lebanon with a mechanism and an excuse to work out a viable internal settlement. A program for achieving these objectives is attached at Tab A.

We will be unable to succeed in this effort or maintain its narrow focus on Lebanon if we cannot demonstrate in tandem that we are actively pursuing steps toward resolving the Palestinian problem. We, therefore, propose a major effort to promote the Camp David peace process this summer. This will require your personal involvement with Prime Minister Begin and President Mubarak to break the existing impasse over venue and demonstrate to both that we are serious. We would urge President Mubarak to attend the UN Special Session on Disarmament in New York, hold a bilateral meeting with you there, followed by a Mubarak-Begin bilateral. Begin would come to Washington thereafter to meet with you. We would propose to follow these summits with an extended Ministerial meeting in early July in Washington which I would attend. We would seek to lead the Ministers to a substantive agreement on autonomy which maximizes our ultimate chances for attaining West Bank Palestinian cooperation and moderate Arab acquiescence. Our suggested plan for the peace process is attached at Tab B.

Building on our initiatives in the peace process and Lebanon, we should be in position to further improve our overall strategic posture in the region provided we can also manage the threat imposed by Iran's success in the Iran-Iraq war. Our objective must be to bring an end to this conflict before Iran totally alters the balance of power in the region by forcing the breakup of Iraq, putting Iraq under a Syrian-Iranian condominium, or pushing a new regime in Iraq into the Soviet embrace. We must do this without generating the perpetual enmity of the Iranians or moving them closer to the Soviets. You have discussed this problem with King Hassan and he has indicated the possibility of a new Islamic Conference initiative backed by the UN Security Council. We propose to support such an initiative behind the scenes through a range of contacts, and possible early action in the Security Council, while undertaking with some urgency discreet measures with the Saudis and Gulf states which do not threaten Iran but which reassure them that we will protect them against possible Iranian threats. A plan is attached at Tab C.

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Each of these initiatives is interdependent and each depends on other factors as well. The 1983 foreign assistance budget will test our sensitivity to the problems of Egypt, Israel, Pakistan, Morocco, Tunisia, Jordan, North Yemen and Oman most of whom have essential roles to play if we are to succeed in our initiatives. In particular, we will be asking much from Israel both in terms of the Lebanon conflict and the peace process and we must seek to increase Israeli confidence in our relationship. It is for this reason we have proposed to move to reestablish the Memorandum of Understanding and intensify our strategic dialogue with Israel. To accomplish this objective we are proposing that you have an extensive substantive dialogue with Begin during his visit on our strategic relationship. In order to protect Mubarak from this focus with Begin we are suggesting a pause between your key substantive meetings with Mubarak and Begin. A notational scenario for accomplishing this and a proposed letter to Prime Minister Begin is attached at Tab D.

We believe we must seize the initiative in the region along the lines we have suggested. We cannot predict with any certainty our prospects for success in these related efforts, nevertheless, we believe it is imperative that the United States be seen as making a sincere effort to resolve these regional problems. It would be helpful to discuss these issues thoroughly in anticipation of European interest in your views on the Middle East. Therefore, I suggest that the NSC review these proposals urgently and that we reach decisions on them before your departure for Europe.

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PROGRAM FOR LEBANON

Week of May 24

-- Personal message from the Secretary to Begin indicating need for in-depth discussions of Lebanon and proposing Habib trip.

-- The Secretary's speech in Chicago highlighting our concern about the Lebanon problem and the need for renewed efforts to resolve its problems.

Week of June 6

-- Habib discussions with Begin on the coordinated action concept, core security requirements, and the linkage of Lebanon with other regional problems.

-- Depending on Israeli reactions, discussions with the Saudis, Kuwaitis, Lebanese and French regarding coordinated action with objective of developing a joint plan before Begin's visit to the U.S.

Mid-June

-- Implement agreed coordinated action with French, Saudis and Kuwaitis.

Week of June 20

-- Begin's meetings with the President, Secretary and Habib reviewing progress and emphasizing opportunities.

-- Sarkis visit - have him come to Washington for meeting with President.

After July 23 (End of Ramadan)

-- Further meetings with Saudis, Kuwaitis and French to review progress and consider next steps.

August or September (After Lebanese Presidential election)

- Coordination of actions with new Lebanese President.
- Possible International Conference on Lebanon.

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Tab B

PLAN FOR THE PEACE PROCESS

Week of May 24

-- Message to President Mubarak urging attendance at SSOD for meetings with Begin and the President. Parallel message to Begin.

-- The Secretary's speech in Chicago highlighting the importance of moving urgently on the peace process.

Week of May 31

-- Bilateral Working Group meetings in Israel and Egypt.

Week of June 13

-- Discussions through our Ambassadors with Israelis and Egyptians on agendas for the Summits in Washington.

Week of June 20

-- President's meetings with Begin and Mubarak to urge the acceleration of the autonomy negotiations and propose an extended Ministerial in Washington in early July.

Week of June 27

-- Fairbanks shuttle to prepare the ground for the extended Ministerial.

Week of July 11

-- Extended Ministerial in Washington chaired by the Secretary (perhaps lasting several weeks) to hammer out a substantive agreement.

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Tab C

PLAN FOR IRAQ-IRAN WAR

Week of May 24

--After the Moroccans report back on their consultations with key Islamic countries, Ambassador Kirkpatrick takes soundings regarding a possible UN resolution to discourage Iranian invasion of Iraq and to support Islamic mediation effort, to be followed by contact in key UNSC capitals.

-- Encouragement through our embassies in Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and other Islamic countries of support for the Islamic group mediation efforts led by President Toure and of essential Islamic support for UNSC efforts.

-- Discussions with Egypt, Jordan, and Gulf governments to encourage mediation and strengthen their confidence in our support for their security.

Week of May 31

-- Preparation for possible Security Council meeting based upon Ambassador Kirkpatrick's findings and Moroccan soundings with Islamic states.

-- Consultations with key European and Islamic countries to obtain backing for efforts in the UN, and essential non-aligned sponsorship.

Early June (After Possible UNSC Meeting)

-- Follow on talks with Saudis, Turks, Pakistanis, and Moroccans to determine next steps in support of mediation supported by UNSC, either through OIC, UN Secretary General, or both.

-- Further discussions with Europeans on how West should respond to various contingencies, including Iranian invasion.

Subsequent Weeks

-- Ongoing contacts on both mediation and response to contingencies, tailored to suit the evolving situation.

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Tab D-1

NOTIONAL SCENARIO FOR MEETINGS

WITH BEGIN AND MUBARAK

Following is outline scenario for our effort to get Begin and Mubarak together here in the U.S. next month:

- June 15 - Begin arrives in New York
- June 17 - Brief meeting in afternoon with Begin. Substantive early evening meeting with Mubarak on peace process
- June 18 - Begin addresses the Special Session on Disarmament (SSOD).  
- Begin-Mubarak bilaterals.
- June 21 - Begin visits Washington for a morning meeting and working lunch on a range of issues but with emphasis on the MOU and related defense trade matters.

This scenario, by putting distance between the Begin-Mubarak meeting in New York and your meeting with Begin in Washington, reduces the risk that Mubarak will be associated inadvertently with our pursuit of strategic cooperation with Israel. At the same time, you will have served as the catalyst for a badly needed face-to-face meeting between the two leaders.

If you approve this scenario, we will tell Begin openly that we are trying to bring about a meeting with Mubarak, which he has signalled he would welcome, but will state frankly that there is no guarantee that we will succeed. After thorough consideration, we have concluded that the best way to bring Mubarak into our thinking is to ask Roy Atherton to meet with him one-on-one for an equally frank discussion.

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