

JOINT STAFF ACTION PROCESSING FORM

#15

TO CJCS CLASSIFICATION ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ACTION NUMBER 07 JUN 1993 J-5A 02909-93

THRU *DJS w/ CF: VCSCS and JS* ORIG SUSPENSE

SUBJECT PROPOSED TALKING POINTS ON LATEST VIOLENCE IN MOGADISHU (U) ACTION APPROVAL SIGNATURE INFORMATION X

ACTION SUMMARY

1. (U) Purpose. To forward a talking paper (TAB) providing proposed points on latest violence in Mogadishu.
2. Discussion. As a result of latest violence in Somalia, UN has requested major US help. Joint Staff has serious reservations, believes complying would create even greater risks for entire process. Attached talking paper presents a broad outline of Joint Staff concerns and a brief strategy for responding to UN requests.
3. Recommendation. Use talking points as appropriate.

Attachment

CSCS A perspective to look at the disappointed UN requests for assistance in Somalia.

CSCS Paper - Powell / S-5

Office of the Secretary of Defense
 Chief, RDD, ESD, WHIS
 Date: *15 Jan 2017* Authority: EO 13526
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5 USC § 552

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 Date: JAN 15 2019

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COORDINATION/APPROVAL

OFFICE	NAME & DATE	EXT	OFFICE	NAME & DATE	EXT
J-5	<i>Dr. [Signature] 7 June 93</i>				
	<i>J-5 LTG BARRY R. McAFFREY, USA</i>				

ACTION OFFICER/DIV/PHONE Major Phil Davis, J-5/MEAF, 49413 AFRICA 5446

DATE PREPARED 7 JUN 93 CLASSIFICATION ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ Classified by Director, J-5 Declassify on OADR

7 June 1993

TALKING PAPER

SUBJECT: Strategy for Somalia (U)

- 1. Purpose. To provide Points for Latest Somali Crisis
- 2. Talking Points

- **US must take the long view on Somalia:** World is working deliberately toward eventual Somali self-rule. Process entails diminished US role and broader UN role; more emphasis on political reconstruction.

- The UN must expect to be tested as was UNITAF before it.

- **A major US response to Somali violence runs several risks:**

- It risks hurting UN credibility: Somalis doubt the UN's muscle. This is the UN's chance to show it is capable, but not if the US claims the headlines.

- It risks confusing the international consensus. In the global view, UN is in charge and following set stages toward self-rule. A major US action calls into question who is in charge and where process is headed.

- It risks enhancing the role of "spoilers." We do not want a situation in which anyone unhappy with the process can send it into a spin by single acts of violence. Some analysts argue the warlords are resorting to violence because they feel their power ebbing. We need to be steady in our reading of these outbursts.

- **What we can reasonably provide:**

- We can beef up the QRF a bit, more helicopter gunships.

- We can provide a few armored vehicles (LAV/M113) for key UNOSOM II personnel.

- We can provide other essential goods and services, if reimbursable, which draw upon a unique US capability, such as airlift.

- **We should not provide APCs and/or tanks with crews.** We are trying to reduce the US profile and build the UN's, not vice-versa.

- **Bottom Line:** The US military is carefully monitoring the situation and is coordinating needed equipment as rapidly as possible. The expeditious deployment of 4 AC-130 gunships and medivac aircraft for the present violence are examples.

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Prepared by COL Perry Baltimore, USA
 MEAF/J-5, 49406, AFRICA 5443

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