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SJS 2121/391-00

20 July 1993

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J-3(4), J-5(4)

SECRETARY, JOINT STAFF DIRECTIVE

on

REQUEST FOR COMMENT ON SOMALIA PAPER

1. The attached is referred to J-5 for DJS reply in collaboration with J-3.
2. The suspense for this action is 20 July 1993, unless an extension is coordinated with the Secretary, Joint Staff.

Joint Secretariat

DATE: 20 Jul  
 BY: AMT/20  
16/20  
4

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Office of the Secretary of Defense  
 Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS  
 Date: 14 Jan 2019 Authority: EO 13526 + 5 USC 552  
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 Date: JAN 14 2019

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16-M-1539

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**THE JOINT STAFF**  
**OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR**  
**WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-0300**

7/20

EA, J-5 (action)

EA, J-3 (collab)

CAPT Wells (Wiener's office) sent the attached Somalia gameplan to us for comments. It's hot enough that he called me at home last night at 2135 and positioned in NMCC for pickup this morning. Pls contact him or MERR counterparts in OSD to determine appropriate action and time for response. Thanks.

VR *[Signature]*

CAPT LIN WELLS, X78360

SA  
2/10  
Col Scott. DIS/EA

Tom,

There is the draft Somali paper.  
I'd appreciate any comments. I  
understand Perry Baltimore folks  
had been involved in earlier discussions,  
but had not seen this paper.

Thanks.

LW

Page determined to be Unclassified  
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS  
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5  
Date: JAN 14 2019

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## SOMALIA: GAME PLAN AND OPTIONS

### Background:

We went into Somalia in response to a catastrophic famine, met the objectives we set for ourselves, and then turned the operation over to the UN. We've locally succeeded in feeding the hungry, but the situation will not be solved finally until there is a restoration of political order. Building political order and limiting violence is the UN's job.

The UN reacted with violence to the attack on the Pakistanis. Aideed was stirred by the recognition that his grasp on Somalia's future was slipping. Whatever the fate of Aideed, the UN has a long list of tasks to accomplish:

- Rebuilding the minimum functions of government.
- Reestablishing a subsistence economy.
- Reducing the threat of violence to a point that a government can function and feed its people.

The following paragraphs examine two critical questions and provide alternative ways for the US to help Somalia get a grasp of its future.

### Main Policy Options/Courses of Action:

1) Declare the UN-led operation "too hard" and withdraw now. (Senator Byrd and a few other critics favor). We consider this as catastrophic for U.S. -UN relations and to the credibility and willingness of the UN to take on any serious peacekeeping operations in the future. This flies in the face of the President's and your initiatives for peacekeeping and peace enforcement. Strongly oppose.

2) Demand that the UN change the focus of the operation back to humanitarian assistance. (A widely-discussed 14 July New York Times editorial argues for this.) This has a superficial appeal but strikes us as completely unrealistic under the circumstances. First, food distribution continues both in Mogadishu and the hinterland. Second, UNOSOM is embroiled in a fight to death with Somalia's main warlord, a vicious and implacable foe. Either the UN breaks Aideed or he will, as vowed, break and chase out the UN. The other warlords and Somali leaders in and

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outside of Mogadishu are waiting and watching for this to play out. If Aideed and his organization survive, they will rebuild; other warlords will also then feel able to challenge the UN. We see no point in offering to remain in a UN operation that limits itself to "providing security" for food deliveries that the warlords are again free to steal. Strongly oppose.

3) Substantially increase the U.S. involvement/contribution to get things back on track. From the beginning of the Somalia operation, we have strongly resisted doing for the UN what we have felt it could and should do for itself: The original U.S. -led UNITAF operation was tightly constrained (limited in time, geographic scope, and mission) and we refused to alter those constraints. We declined delay our withdrawal and hand-off to the UN. We declined to provide the UN with heavy weapons (tanks, APCs, helicopters) that it asked for at the time of the hand-off. And of course we have held to a phasedown schedule that has worried the UN from the very beginning of the operation. These actions were not at all arbitrary; we have had, at each step, high level policy reviews and approvals confirming that the proposed U.S. contributions were appropriately robust to match an equally serious UN effort. We made it clear we were prepared to revisit particular decisions and to reverse course if the process ran into rough water; indeed, we have done that recently in sending in the AC-130s, sending the naval task force and Marines back, and providing APCs and tanks to some UNOSOM components. But we have not been willing to let the UN badger us into "mission creep" or into assuming from them the lead responsibilities for Somalia. We see no good reason to do that at this time; we should help the UN fix the problem, not fix it for them. We are willing to consider specific proposals, but oppose turning this back -- even temporarily -- into primarily a U. S. operation.

4) Stay the course. At present, we strongly favor this, and believe it the only acceptable main option. But we do feel there are major weaknesses in some aspects of current operations, and differing sub-operations worthy of consideration. We recommend focusing our efforts on these. Initial analysis/recommendations (not intended to predict or pre-empt information/recommendations which our Somalia assessment team may bring back from there next week) follow.

Critical question #1: How to deal with Aideed?

- The present MO seems to be to keep pounding his organization, one key point at a time, and if the UN kills or capture him in the process that's a bonus. Or to pick him off as he tries to move (covertly now)

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around Mog. (State and USUN report that while the UN conceptually would like to "arrest, detain, try and punish" Aideed, beyond that general concept there is no plan.)

• UN lawyers are examining specific charges on which he could be tried. The location and composition of a court have not been decided, nor has an appeal process been established. Lack of a plan may partly explain the UN reluctance to move decisively on Aideed (other probable factors: reluctance to accept the high casualties on both sides of a general military sweep thorough the sections of town held by Aideed's supporters, and fear of failure).

**Alternative Options:**

① Cool/reduce UN effort to destroy Aideed. Emphasize nation building activities but stop pursuing him as a special target. Retaliate only if provoked.

-- It is too late to back off. In fact, we think the situation has developed or regressed beyond this policy option. Hatreds are now too high on both sides for this to work. But this issue can also be reviewed.

② Correct the perception that the UN has no general strategy and is obsessed with Aideed.

-- get UNOSOM leadership (and the media) out into the countryside, the marketplaces, to see what is going on, to be seen, and to balance the reporting from Mogadishu.

-- step up UNOSOM PsyOp, Public Affairs activities; get more and better people onto UNOSOM staff on an urgent basis; expand print and broadcast capabilities.

-- encourage PAOs who are non-Americans as spokesman.

-- begin a UN media blitz to get out its message here and in capitals of other key force contributors; as needed, the USG could provide public affairs specialists to work behind the scenes with the UN.

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③ Encourage the UN to accelerate the general disarmament of Mogadishu. Once the armored vehicles from the U.S. have arrived and all UNOSOM contingents are in place (mid-August), this process could be implemented with more assurance of success. If successful, it would disarm Aideed as well as the other Mogadishu warlords, and avoid the impression that we are solely concerned with and biased against Aideed.


④ Enlist the help of other warlords (especially Ali Mahdi) to complete the job of crushing Aideed. The political repercussions of this kind of tilt seem to us to far outweigh any advantages; in any case, we expect Ali Mahdi will be moving on his own to eradicate lingering pockets of Aideed supporters once he feels they are weak enough. A next test of the UN could well be from Ali Mahdi himself, especially if we enlist him as an ally against Aideed.

**Conclusion:** Of these alternatives, a mixture of the political and public affairs options make good sense. The UN must get on with the job of building a new political arrangement for Somalia and this arrangement will not work if it does not receive psyops support. Similarly, disarmament is vitally important. We are not inclined to encourage the enlistment of other warlords on the sound principle that "he who lies down with dogs gets up with fleas." In a word, the right way to deal with Aideed is to keep up the pressure on him and his group and take on the job of a minimum rebuilding of Somalia.

**Critical question #2: How to strengthen the UN's overall strategy and performance?**

John Howe (UNSYG Special Representative in Somalia) recently outlined the process as a two year plan ending in March 1995. The plan uses a pyramid approach (Fig 1) establishing democratic institutions at the local level (District Councils) each of which will contribute members to respective Regional Councils; three members from each of the regional Councils will be selected to participate in the Transitional National Council (TNC).

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Fig 1

The UN continues to consult with Somalis at the local level and expects 40 District Councils to be inaugurated formally by the end of July. Somalis have nearly completed drafting the charter for guiding Somalia during the two year transition. Other UN-sponsored Somali committees, already in operation are designed to help Somalia complete a peaceful reconciliation process within the time frames announced by the UN.

In parallel, the UN, in cooperation with voluntary agencies is working to revive the rudiments of a functioning administration. The UN has targeted agriculture, health and basic services like the restoration of water, as well as essential public works (the parts and main supply routes) It is also working to revive the judiciary, the police and the prison system.

But there are key weaknesses in application such as the UN delay in reviving the Somali police force/courts system. The UN has not followed up vigorously to build on efforts started by the U.S. under UNITAF, nor to take advantage of long-standing offers from Germany, the Netherlands and Italy to help with the police. Top-level U.S. pressure on the Secretary General is needed to get moving on the police issue.

Another key weakness lies in getting the UN's message out to the Somali people and to the international community. The public affairs aspects of this endeavor have not been well-handled and need to be immediately improved in the field, in New York and here in Washington as briefly cited above. The UN needs to get out the word; for example it could convene a high profile conference to focus on progress being made in political reconciliation and national reconstruction. This would give emphasis to the political, economic and social tracks, and de-emphasize the excessive attention now being paid to the security track.



**Summary:** We recommend against changing the basic policy approach. We do recommend changes in the rate of implementation and in communicating policy and progress to the concerned public.

A "balanced" approach just recommended by the Joint Staff (TAB 2) seems generally on track, and will be reviewed shortly by the Deputies Committee.

\* \* \* \* \* **SUMMARY** \* \* \* \* \*

**Measures to Deal with the Aided Problem**

- for now, de-emphasize the search for Aided; continue to take deliberate steps to dismantle his organization, response to provocations, arrest him if he presents himself as a target of opportunity
- speed up general measures to pacify Mog; round up all heavy weapons; urge UN to stand up armed Mogadishu police; then disarm Mog (police in the lead)
- give practical attention to gaining intelligence about Aided and his and his organization, especially their sources of financial and logistic support; move quietly against those sources.

**Measures to Improve the UN's Overall Performance**

- more emphasis, now on political reconciliation; consider acceleration through another national conference
- urgent standing up of police and courts
- much better Public Affairs/PsyOps efforts in Somalia, NYC, here
- fuller consultations among key contributors; stop acrimonious public debate

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- consider requests for additional U.S. force contributions case by case; predisposition to approve if (a) would "make a difference," (b) have high probability of success, and (c) not get U.S. out in front of UN

- press UN to firm up and share plans for trial of Aided if captures

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