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UNITED STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF



COMMAND GROUP ROUTING

		THRU	TO	INITIAL	DATE
	CINC				
2	DCINC	✓	C/F		
1	CS-D	✓	C/F		
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	SEA				
J9 JS			C/F		
M10N21 DRS			C/F		

REMARKS:

- 1) MAKE COPIES FOR DCINC, CS-D
- 2) J3, J9, JS. Return original to CC-XO
- 2) FAX TO COMPONENT COMMANDERS WITH
"FOR INFO FROM GEN DOWNING" IN REMARKS

J5

[Signature]
 ROBERT L. A. LOSSIUS
 COLONEL, USA
 EXECUTIVE OFFICER

Page determined to be Unclassified
 Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
 IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
 Date: JAN 14 2019

16-M-1527

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THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-2400



REGIONAL
SECURITY AFFAIRS

I-93/07622

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THRU: PRINCIPAL DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(POLICY)

FROM: ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE/REGIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
Prepared by LTC Johnson, OASD(RSA) AFR, x79753

SUBJECT: Revised Somalia Policy Development -- DECISION MEMO

PURPOSE: ACTION-- To seek SECDEF approval of our approach (TAB 1) to next steps in Somalia.

Immediately under at TAB 1 is our Somalia Policy Development package, revised in accordance with your annotations on our original package (the revisions are in italics). A copy of the original package with your markup is at TAB 2. For your reference, TAB 3 contains the MFR of your briefing from the Somalia Assessment Team and the group discussion with the assembled senior experts.

We expect a Principals Meeting late this week, possibly preceded by another Deputies Meeting.

RECOMMENDATION: Approve the approach at TAB 1

Approve _____

Other _____

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COORDINATION: D&P _____
SO/LIC _____

COPY FURNISHED: CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

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PROBLEMS:

(C) Despite the significant progress made to date, recent events have revealed major problems in the UNOSOM II operation. The most significant overriding problem is the apparent division of opinion among troop-contributing nations about the proper UN strategy for success in Somalia. In short, major troop contributors such as Italy believe that the UN should focus less on using force, and more on negotiations, to address security problems. Moreover, many contributors feel they have not been consulted adequately on policy formulation, and this has exacerbated tensions within UNOSOM. Another key set of problems is obtaining adequate financial resources and staff to fully pursue the economic, political, and security elements of the UN strategy.

(C) Negotiations are, of course, the preferred course of action. Somalia is essentially a political problem which would be susceptible to resolution if all the principal parties were willing to settle their differences through good faith negotiations. The difficulty we face is that a key player, Mohamed Farrah Aideed, has not shown any inclination to achieve his objective through means other than intimidation and force, including the killing of U.S. and Pakistani UNOSOM forces. Thus, until we remove Aideed from the Somali operation, in one fashion or another, and prove to his lieutenants and others who might be tempted to follow his example that brute force will not achieve their aims, negotiations would at best be premature.

(C) In the short term, there is an urgent need to address the issue of security in south Mogadishu, particularly with reference to Aideed. In addition, little progress has been made in creating alternative Somali structures (police, military, judiciary) to replace UNOSOM forces. This remains a key problem, particularly since the security situation affects other efforts and has a direct impact upon the U.S. ability to withdraw its military assets from the region.

(C) The economic situation remains dire. While food is readily available virtually everywhere in the country, there is a shortage of money in circulation and many Somalis find it difficult to purchase basic necessities. Many steps must be taken, including the repair of infrastructure, creation of jobs, and establishment of a banking system, to restore a modicum of economic stability.

(U) Progress toward political reconciliation has been stalled by the deteriorating security situation in the capital. Progress is being made in the countryside, but a much greater effort must be devoted to pushing this along. In addition, the issue of raising revenues for local councils has been largely ignored. It is worth reiterating that while all three aspects of this strategy are mutually reinforcing, addressing the security situation probably is a prerequisite for significant progress on the political and economic fronts.

UN OBJECTIVES:

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TASKS TO BE COMPLETED:

A) HUMANITARIAN/ECONOMIC (U). The humanitarian and economic objectives of relief and rehabilitation are to lead to basic Somali self-sufficiency. Emergency relief is essentially over and feeding centers will stop operation by mid-August. Now is the time to get on with economic development. NGOs who have fled because of the security situation must return. There is no plan for economic development. One may be published in the upcoming SYG report. A strategy with timetables must be clearly established by 15 September 93. Such a strategy would identify plans for creating conditions conducive to private investment, livestock export and agricultural production. It would remove constraints relating to reliable financial services, communications, roads, ports, utilities, transports and markets. It would identify plans to create jobs through economic growth, particularly in agricultural and livestock sectors. Donors are needed to provide funds for essential services until Somali resource-generating mechanisms are re-established. Small project funds should be established to create jobs in regions which achieve a satisfactory level of political reconciliation and disarmament. UNOSOM must also prepare a plan of action for the resettlement of Somali refugees and displaced persons.

B) MILITARY/SECURITY (✓). The international effort in Somalia has provided a secure environment to allow completion of emergency relief. While the countryside is now generally stable, south Mogadishu is nearly paralyzed in the confrontation with Aideed. Aideed has always been the one warlord with whom armed conflict was inevitable. The current crisis started because his power base was successfully being marginalized by UNOSOM. By attacking the Pakistani patrol he hoped to cow the UN as he so successfully did before UNITAF arrived. He miscalculated the UN's resolve and now is an outlaw. Initially removing Aideed will likely increase the level of violence directed against UNOSOM, but will lead to stability in south Mogadishu and force any replacement of Aideed to deal with UNOSOM from a weakened position. Hopefully, the pragmatic Somalis will turn away from their support for non-traditional warlords/leaders and seek cooperation with the UN.

(✓) Not dealing with Aideed could have dire consequences for UNOSOM. The longer Aideed remains at large the stronger he will get. He may begin to receive support from other nations, such as Iraq, who would relish a UN/US failure. UNOSOM would be weakened and other warlords could be tempted to challenge its authority.

X (✓) We are currently studying several options for dealing with Aideed. First he could be snatched, from the streets of Mogadishu or one of his meeting places, by UNOSOM forces or the QRF. This option could involve considerable violence and casualties on both sides. Second, his own people could be influenced to remove him from the scene. These options should be pursued in tandem. Third, a simultaneous cordon and search operation could be undertaken specifically targeting Aideed controlled sections of the

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city. This would be an expansion of current UN operations in Mogadishu. The Italian version of this option suggests that all of Mogadishu be done simultaneously, rather than as a follow on to clearing out the Aideed sections first. At no time should the UN be seen as going soft on Aideed.

(1) Resolving this problem and restoring security will require better coordination with all coalition members at all levels. The UN must immediately begin consultations among donor countries in New York and in Mogadishu to establish a common approach to this problem and gain consensus for immediate action.

(2) In particular, UNOSOM II must work toward comprehensive disarmament to reduce the local capacity for unwarranted violence and must better establish local police forces to handle residual threats to public peace. Disarmament is essential to the success of UNOSOM. The majority of the population, outside of Mogadishu, have offered to disarm but they want some sort of assurance that they will be safe from well armed bandits. The assurance they seek could be provided in several forms. They could be under the protection of UN forces or they could be protected by their own police forces. The latter is optimum because it permits UNOSOM to disengage. For the Somali police to be effective, however, crew served weapons must have been removed and the police must be as well armed as the bandits. Once this equality has been reached, the Somali police can gradually remove the small arms from the general population. Disarmament is a multitiered process that must be started by UNOSOM by removing the large weapons of destruction and leveling the playing field so that the police can do a credible follow-on job.

(3) Disarming the Aideed faction has begun and should be completed by September 93. Disarming the main militias should follow in the fall. UNOSOM must, in conjunction with Somali police, establish a consistent weapons control policy throughout the country. Implementation of this policy can begin in regions where militias are disarmed; the process should be completed by the spring of 94.

X (4) Additional efforts to set up a police force must begin immediately. UNOSOM must: 1) devise a structure that emphasizes a professional, neutral orientation for the force and 2) identify donors who can fund, equip, organize, and train the force. There are now approximately 4,000 Somali police, with a UN goal of 10,000 by October 93, and 28,000 by May 94. Immediate resources are required for this critical action. Disarmament of major militias and establishment of Somali police forces in the major population centers should permit the withdrawal of the US QRF within three to six months.

(5) Once the population is sufficiently disarmed (May 94) and the local police are on the beat, UNOSOM should begin a major push to establish a security force nationwide (December 94). This force would be able to provide domestic peace and guard borders.

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C) POLITICAL ~~(S)~~. UNOSOM is promoting political reconciliation and the re-establishment of constitutions and civil administration, but must more actively involve Somalis in this process. Efforts are beginning to bear fruit. Dozens of district councils have been established, but only vague guidelines for moving from local councils to governments have been developed. Guidelines and timetables are needed for the restoration of political constitutions. District councils must lead to the establishment of regional councils and eventually a Transitional National Council. Duties, responsibilities, authorities and accountability of the councils must be delineated. UNOSOM policy decisions must also be communicated clearly to the field. UNOSOM should establish a goal of October 93 for establishment of all district councils, and February 94 for regional councils. Regional organizations must become active in the re-establishment of Somali society. UNOSOM must properly staff its zone offices. A judicial/penal system must be developed. A Transitional National Council should be formed once regional councils are widely established, and should operate until a national government is created through free elections by the summer of 95.

FINANCIAL/PERSONNEL CONSTRAINTS:

~~(S)~~ An important caveat to the above recommendations is that many of them assume adequate funding. We are still seeking the most recent data from the United Nations, but it is clear that the UN currently lacks adequate resources to accomplish its political and economic objectives in Somalia. Already there have been complaints that almost all of the resources in Somalia have been dedicated to the security problem, at the expense of economic and political efforts. Yet even to address the security situation, significantly more funding will be required. For example, the current estimate for establishing a nationwide police force is about \$50 million. The UN had budgeted \$9 million. There is no money currently available to accomplish this task.

~~(S)~~ The UN must address this issue if UNOSOM is to have an opportunity to succeed. The UN should immediately prepare detailed estimates of the costs of achieving its three-pronged strategy in Somalia and should undertake a broad-based campaign to raise the requisite resources. If it proves impossible to obtain adequate funding, UN objectives must be scaled back.

~~(S)~~ The UN must identify a full staff for its humanitarian and political division in Mogadishu and the regions. Staffing is now woefully inadequate. UNOSOM must mount a worldwide program to recruit the required employees. The UN should also launch a special effort to recruit professional Somalis. A special effort must be made to increase the staff and expand the activities of the UN's public relations efforts, both in New York and in Mogadishu.

~~(S)~~ Finally the UNSC should recognize that developments on the ground or a lack of resources may require a reassessment of UNOSOM objectives. It is also important that the UNOSOM supporters and

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the Somali people understand that the UN's abilities and resources are not limitless.

II. CREATION OF A SOMALIA CORE GROUP:

(U) The peacekeeping operation in Somalia is perceived by participants and outsiders alike as an American-led and American-run activity. This should come as no surprise. The Secretary General's special representative and one of his senior assistants are American. Two of the four most senior officers in force command are Americans. Finally, there remains a residue of American control from the UNITAF operation, which was under our leadership. It is in the interest of the US and the UN to increase the involvement, real and perceived, of other countries in Operation Continue Hope. This could be accomplished by creating a consultative mechanism (possibly along the lines of the core group which guides policy on Cambodia) to help guide policy and "internationalize" the UNOSOM operation.

(U) The Cambodian Core Group evolved into an ad hoc support group following the Paris Conference on Cambodia. It consists of the perm five, Thailand, Australia, Indonesia, Canada, Japan and Germany. (Some major troop contributors such as Bulgaria, Pakistan and India are not included in the core group.) The Group has been particularly important in mobilizing support for the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), soliciting rapid response to UNTAC requests for material assistance, intervening to accelerate the process of soliciting assistance from donor countries, firmly supporting the Security Council's resolutions imposing sanctions on the Khmer Rouge, and stiffening the resolve of the three other Cambodian factions to stick with the specific provisions of the Paris accords (the timetable for the election, the drafting of the constitution, and the formation of the new government). The Core Group has also been essential in sustaining attention to the reconstruction and redevelopment needs of Cambodia, and actively soliciting contributions from various donors to the development fund created by the Paris Accords. It extended the Secretary General's political capacity beyond anything his office would normally have permitted, and gave the Security Council a concrete presence on the ground. In so doing, the core group gave the United States a mechanism to share the burdens of Cambodia; and it gave the international community a sense of partnership and a forum for consultations. The absence of such a forum lies at the heart of the French, Italian and other complaints that they are carrying burdens without the opportunity to consult at the political level.

(U) It should be possible to form a somewhat similar core group for Somalia; if so, we believe it could play a number of useful functions, generally along the lines which have applied in Cambodia. It should be of manageable size, have a strong international -- including African -- coloration, and include several key contributors of troops and money. Its precise membership should be developed in consultation with the United Nations, but one approach might be: the 5 PermReps of the Security

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Council, two from the European Community, two from the Organization of African Unity (including one representative of the Horn of Africa subgroup of the OAU), one each from the Arab League and Organization of the Islamic Conference, and two from Asia (Japan? India?). The core group should be in New York, to emphasize its relationship to UN Headquarters and the Secretary General. In time it might also be present on the ground in Mogadishu, after member nations have established diplomatic representation there.

(C) The core group's main purpose would be to foster a cohesive common approach to all important aspects of the UN's planning and operational efforts in Somalia. While this is mainly a matter of psychology, the practical payoff of developing a cohesive international team approach should be considerable, as would be the side effects of less bickering and carrying of dissent to the media.

(C) It will not be practical to include in the core group all nations that contribute significant numbers of troops. For this reason, we should recommend that a Somalia troop contributors meeting -- now being conducted on an ad hoc basis by Kofi Annan in New York -- be institutionalized and conducted in Mogadishu as well. This group could be connected as an adjunct to the core group, and serve as a source for input on the phasing (in and out) of forces, definition of support requirements, and suggestions for specific improvements in military planning and operations.

(C) It will probably not be practical to include a substantial number of African nations in the core group proper. But we do wish to help increase the level of African involvement and contribution to the Somalia operation, as well as to head off a chorus of criticism about the current direction of events. Thus, we should also consider recommending immediate establishment of a group of African states, again as an adjunct to the core group, to provide policy advice and assistance to the UN in negotiating with the Somali factions and in devising a new system of government for the country. Presumably, their views would be made known through the OAU/Horn of Africa members of the core group.

(C) We should push hard to sell this idea even though we know it would not solve all of our problems. Properly adapted to the circumstances of the Somalia intervention, the core group would be a major step forward in addressing at least the diplomatic and political aspects, and likely to yield a number of practical suggestions on the military and economic fronts as well. It would also give the world a clear signal that this is an international responsibility and not simply an American one. We therefore propose it be pursued vigorously. We should send to the UN for this purpose a senior diplomat who would be able to engage the Secretary General personally and obtain his agreement; this implies, at a minimum, an Under Secretary level mission.

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III. U.S. ENDGAME:

1. Help make sure that UNOSOM II Chapter VII is a UN success.
In order to accomplish this, we must continue to provide strong diplomatic and financial support -- and military support in the short term -- while taking steps to demonstrate that the UN is in charge. The following should be initiated immediately:

- The U.S. should assist in developing a comprehensive UN plan linking the three humanitarian, security and political components of the overall strategy.

- The UN should begin replacing U.S. senior level staff in UNOSOM with personnel of other participating countries. The U.S. should be prepared to provide both the UN and UNOSOM staffs with mid-grade and technical personnel and press other participating nations to do the same.

- UNOSOM needs to launch an aggressive public information campaign. The U.S. should support with PSYOP advisors, technical assistance, and equipment.

- UNOSOM must identify necessary costs for completion of its mission and immediately begin working to ensure adequate financing is available.

2. Reduce U.S. troop commitments as soon as possible.

A key step is to withdraw the U.S. ORF. The PDD calls for this to occur by late summer. The current situation on the ground makes this unlikely. However, following the UN strategy outlined above, the ORF can withdraw within six months. Four events must occur: 1) the Aided problem is resolved; 2) the major factions are disarmed; 3) a credible police force is established in major population centers; and (4) effective replacement reaction elements are in place.

Gradually reduce the number of U.S. logistics and support personnel (to 1400 by January 94). To do this, we must accelerate the transition of support functions to civilian contractors (this also requires a more secure environment), and assist in developing Somali support infrastructure. As other nations assume prominent roles in UNOSOM II we will transfer support functions when appropriate.

3. End Game for the U.S.

The U.S. can disengage militarily from Somalia within a reasonable time frame (ORF in six months; logistics forces to 1,400 by January 94 and out by 95) IF the UN takes forceful steps to address the security situation. Strong U.S. support is required to ensure that this occurs.

Even after the U.S. military involvement has concluded, continued U.S. diplomatic and financial support will be needed to sustain

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