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1475-1

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: AUG 23 2018

Soviet Strategy To Derail US INF Deployment

An Intelligence Assessment

CIA 3.5(c)
OSD 3.5(c)

Office of the Secretary of Defense
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS
Date: 23 Aug 2018 Authority: EO 13526 + 3 USC § 552
Declassify: _____ Deny in Full: _____
Declassify in Part: X
Reason: 3.5(b)(1)(C) - 3.5(c)
MDR: 18 -M- 0674

~~Secret~~

EO 13526
February 1993

OW 18-M-0674

380-85-0023, b2, 20, 1, (Jan-Mar)



Directorate of
Intelligence

Secret
[Redacted]

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This assessment was prepared by [Redacted]
[Redacted] Office of Soviet Analysis,
with contributions from [Redacted]
[Redacted] SOVA, the Office of European
Analysis, the Arms Control Intelligence Staff, and
the Directorate of Operations. Comments and queries
are welcome and may be addressed to the Chief,
[Redacted] SOVA, [Redacted]

Secret
SOV 83-10025X
February 1983

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Soviet Strategy To Derail US INF Deployment

Key Judgments
*Information available
as of 1 February 1983
was used in this report.*

In attempting to forestall US deployments of intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) in Europe, scheduled to begin late this year, the Soviets will continue a complex strategy of inducements and threats designed to influence NATO governments, particularly West Germany before its March elections. With time growing short, their near-term objective evidently is to pressure NATO to delay the deployments and to move from its zero option proposal.

Moscow has begun an intensive effort to brief West European governments on the new Soviet proposal for a subcelling on missile launchers in Europe. The subcelling would result in substantial reductions in the number of Soviet medium-range ballistic missile launchers opposite NATO but would be linked to the number of French and British ballistic missile launchers and would preclude the deployment in Europe of US INF missiles. The Soviets have argued that their new proposal demonstrates "flexibility," in sharp contrast to US "intractability" in adhering to its zero option proposal. They also have hinted in vague terms to West European governments of certain "concessions" they might adopt at the INF negotiations in return for greater US flexibility.

At the same time, Moscow has warned NATO of the serious consequences should the US position remain unchanged in Geneva and the United States proceed with its deployments. Such consequences probably include: the lifting of their unilateral SS-20 moratorium, deployment of additional SS-20s in Europe, and the development of new cruise and ballistic missiles for deployment opposite NATO. Thus Moscow is trying to persuade the Europeans that their security would be better served by its proposal for a missile subcelling than by US INF deployments offset by corresponding Soviet counterdeployments.

Along with these diplomatic moves, the Soviets have actively promoted the European "peace movement" through aggressive propaganda and covert activities. They have focused their efforts primarily on those countries scheduled to base the new NATO missiles, with the chief emphasis on West Germany. Their campaign covers a whole spectrum of activities—from overt efforts to create a fear of nuclear war to covert measures, including forgeries and disinformation, to put NATO governments in the worst possible light.

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Should US deployments begin without "acceptable" progress in the talks, the Soviets probably would continue to negotiate, but on a different basis—the Soviet side then would offer to trade off its "new" systems in exchange for US INF systems. Nevertheless the Soviets probably hope that the situation will not deteriorate to the point where they would find it necessary to counter NATO's deployments with hundreds of their own missiles. Having acknowledged in Geneva that they expect NATO to proceed with its plans, they must have seriously contemplated a negotiated outcome in which NATO is allowed some level of deployment. Given their particular concern over the Pershing II, the Soviets might continue to call for a ban on it, while grudgingly accepting some level of GLCM deployment—albeit sharply reduced from the planned 464 launchers. In return, they probably would merely reiterate their missile subcelling proposal. In fact, they could insist that any US GLCM deployment (augmenting the French and British missile launchers) be offset by deployments of additional Soviet missile launchers. [REDACTED]

By late 1983 Moscow should be able to assess whether an INF agreement is possible. If it sees little prospect for one and is convinced that the NATO deployments will begin as scheduled in December 1983, it probably will begin implementing the military countermeasures foreshadowed last March by Brezhnev and more recently by Andropov. In his 21 December address, the new General Secretary pledged to deploy a new long-range cruise missile if Washington proceeds with cruise missile deployment. This response could be in the form of sea-launched cruise missile deployment off US shores as well as ground-launched cruise missile deployment opposite NATO. The Soviets also could choose to develop a new IRBM more capable than the SS-20 for deployment against Western Europe. [REDACTED]

Moscow almost certainly would accompany such military moves with a sharply increased effort in covert activities in the five INF-basing countries. It probably would feel less constrained than before in promoting demonstrations and supporting radical peace groups, including some which might engage in sabotage against NATO facilities. Moscow also will use propaganda, disinformation, and support to Communist party and front groups to increase the political pain of the governments in the INF-basing countries. It will hope that this, in turn, will cause those countries to bring pressure on the United States to accede to an agreement that caps NATO deployment at a low level and minimizes reductions in Soviet forces. [REDACTED]

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Nevertheless, the Soviets realize that their overt "peace" campaign in Western Europe has been their most effective tactic. They also recognize that the peace movement there has indigenous roots and has acquired a momentum of its own. They will do what they can to nurture it without appearing too heavyhanded. [REDACTED]

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The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

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NOTE FOR: The Honorable Paul Thayer
Deputy Secretary of Defense

FROM: Executive Assistant to the DDCI

Following up on breakfast last Friday, Mr. McMahon
asked me to send the attached paper to you. He also
checked with our people and was able to confirm that the

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Attachment:
Intelligence Assessment: Soviet Strategy
to Derail US INF Deployment

OSD 3.3 (b)(1)(C) + 3.5(c)
CIA 3.3 (b)(1)(C) + 3.5(c)

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