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THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE



WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

07 AUG 1982
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POLICY

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Namibia (U) -- INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

Based on a Presidential decision early in our Administration, the State Department has been engaged for a year-and-a-half in continuing negotiations on Namibia, with little or no NSC participation. The eventual outcome of these negotiations, however, will have broader implications, of concern to DoD as well. Hence, I met with Larry Eagleburger and Assistant Secretary Chet Crocker (our Namibia negotiator) to be brought up to date and to put down a marker on the DoD interest.

Crocker thinks there is a good chance that there could be a breakthrough in the negotiations this month, leading to agreement to introduce a "UN Transition Assistance Group" (UNTAG) of 5,000 to 10,000 men, that would lead to the next stage in the evolution of Namibian independence. A force of about seven battalions is contemplated, and four nations have already agreed to provide infantry battalions (Bangladesh, Sudan, Yugoslavia, and Panama). The US would be expected to provide initial airlift (and perhaps sealift) to move the UNTAG, plus substantial financial support for the operation. I have urged Crocker to tell the folks at the UN that their planning for UNTAG, and especially for the airlift phase, should be realistic and resource constrained; also that we do not plan to provide any other forms of support (such as equipment to "flesh out" UNTAG units). I think State took this advice on board.

Namibia

The State Department scenario for Namibia envisages that the South Africans will "organize" national elections after the UNTAG arrives; and UNTAG will supervise and monitor those elections. South African forces (up to 1500) will remain in Namibia through the elections. South Africans seem to accept that SWAPO-backed candidates would achieve a majority in the elections, but under the contemplated constitutional principles, whites would probably have a "blocking third" in the Constituent Assembly.

Our principal interest concerns the linkage to a withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. The settlement assumes that Angola will privately agree to, and in fact implement, a "parallel" draw-down of Cuban combat forces. There will be no formal, written agreement to this effect. Evidently, we are leaning on a weak reed here. However, South Africa is expected to insist

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on Cuban withdrawal as the price for their going along with a settlement and withdrawing their residual forces from Namibia. South Africa will still maintain control of Walvis Bay -- a useful card for the end game. The continued Cuban presence in Angola is harmful for US security interests (Soviet base in the South Atlantic, Cuban bridge to the Horn of Africa, etc.). Hence, we in DoD will have to take a keen interest in how the next phase of the Namibia negotiations unfolds. We will closely monitor this issue. Sometime in September, we might have to ask for an NSC review, or at least a SecState/SecDef review, of where we are going.


Fred C. Ikle

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