

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: MAY 21 2019



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THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

7 JUL 1983

In Reply Refer To:
I-20150/83

#10

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

THROUGH THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Concerns Pertaining to NSSD 13-82, National Space Strategy (U)

(U) Attached is the latest memorandum from Judge Clark concerning NSSD 13-82 Studies (Tab A). This memorandum has heightened our concern about the possible adverse repercussions of the whole "national space strategy" development effort.

(U) Our initial concerns were based on the NSSD 13-82 supposition that major organizational and program problems existed with regard to DoD and DCI space activities and that these problems must be solved by making major organizational and resource allocation changes. As you may remember, after lengthy interagency discussions, only minor modifications were made to the study directive and all Agencies were directed to proceed with the studies.

(U) We completed the DoD organizational and program strategy studies which you transmitted to Judge Clark on May 31, 1983. As pointed out in your transmittal letter (Tab B), the program strategies were developed independently of the normal DoD resource allocation process and are not in balance with overall defense requirements. The results of the separate organizational study concerning space reconnaissance activities were sent jointly by you and the DCI to Judge Clark.

(U) The following points are made by Judge Clark, explicitly or by implication:

a. The National Space Strategy will produce major new program and organizational realignment. The "imminent" decision to establish a Unified Space Command will be reflected in the National Space Strategy.

b. DoD does not sufficiently recognize the unique attributes of space systems and has significantly underfunded space programs in relation to their importance to national security.

c. DoD does not recognize the significance of the Soviet space threat and is not responding to the Soviet challenge.

d. The National Intelligence process historically underestimates the pace of the Soviet space program investments.

e. The pace of U.S. military and intelligence space spending will average only 2% increase per year over the FYDP period, vs. the expected Soviet growth rate of 10% per year.

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f. The President's Strategic Defense Initiative and the National Space Strategy are of equal importance and the two efforts are closely interrelated.

The response to Judge Clark proposed for your signature (Tab C) deals with these matters and indicates, to the extent necessary, our disagreement.

(S) We have strong reasons to believe that the specific recommendations listed below (underlined) will be offered to the President as part of the national space strategy. Our comments, based on DoD study results, are adjoined:

a. Establish a Unified Space Command. Comment - The JCS recently concluded in their NSSD 13-82 review of the issue that an evolutionary approach to establishing a Unified/Specified Space Command is best. The JCS wants to ensure that the implications, both positive and negative, of such a major change to the Unified/Specified Command structure will be well thought out prior to their decision and recommendation to the SecDef.

b. Direct pursuit of a new national initiative--a permanently manned space station--at the earliest possible date. Comment - The immediate pursuit by NASA of a permanently manned station will be a very expensive enterprise of the Apollo class. NASA estimates that development costs for an early to mid 1990s IOC would be from \$9 to \$18 billion (FY 1984 dollars) depending upon the architecture. Based on past major programs such as the Shuttle, one should multiply by three. The DoD and Intelligence Community have found no national security advantage to a space station. A concern does exist that the cost of a space station will be such that DoD will be forced to participate with significant cost sharing at the expense of programs supporting DoD needs.

c. Construction of a fifth Shuttle Orbiter. Comment - The existing four Shuttle Orbiter fleet is adequate to support the scheduled satellite launches. As stated in the National Space Policy, first priority is to make the Shuttle fully operational and cost effective. With the DoD and DCI having committed its operational satellites to Shuttle launching, the means necessary to meet the National policy objective must be established and supported. Simply buying a fifth orbiter does not do that.

d. Direct major budgetary increases in [REDACTED]
Comment - With the significant funding that DoD is applying to [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] recognizes the necessary competition, and the resulting technology is expected to reflect this balance when the plan is reviewed by the SIG(DP) this October.

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e. Direct increased funding for space intelligence programs. Comment - Directed increased funding for space intelligence programs would probably be at the expense of other NFIP programs, currently balanced to meet overall intelligence priorities. An increase in the NFIP would almost inevitably be at the expense of Defense.

~~Let~~ Above and beyond the specific concerns, the general philosophy underlying the NSC activity aimed at the development of the national space strategy represents a direct challenge to the authority of the Secretary of Defense in matters affecting internal organization and allocation of resources. This general philosophy is quite apparent from the informal discussions with the NSC Staff and also from the general tone and thrusts of Judge Clark's June 20th memorandum. It can be briefly summarized as follows:

Neither the Secretary of Defense, nor the Director of Central Intelligence fully appreciate the urgent necessity to devote more resources to the space program. The space program is so important that it should not be required to compete for funds with other defense programs. "Fenced" funding is required and the way to ensure that space funding is "fenced" is to establish a separate entity for space.

~~Let~~ This philosophy, if allowed to prevail, may result in options presented to the President including an arbitrary 4, 8 or 12% annual real growth rate for all military, national intelligence and NASA space programs. The "options" almost certainly will include the establishment of a Unified Space Command and possibly the transfer of some national reconnaissance functions. No studies by any agency of the Government support such recommendations and we urge you to be prepared to deny your concurrence whenever presented.

(U) Recommend that you sign the attached memorandum to Judge Clark.

Richard V. Stilwell
Richard V. Stilwell
General, USA (Ret.)
Deputy

Attachments

Coordination:

Concurrence attached
USD(R&E)

Per attached, C&CS has noted
C&CS
and organizational portion
revised per his guidance.
✓

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RELL
Richard G. Seiwell
General, USA (Ret.)
Deputy

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Date: MAY 21 2019

Attachments

Coordination:

[Signature] 13 JUL 1983
USD(R&E)

CJCS

CJCS has noted
[Signature] 16 JUL 1983
DJS

Office of the Secretary of Defense 5 USC 552
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS
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Reason: _____
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