

FROM SITE 5A J08 NMCC
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(TUE) MAR 14 2006 14:15/ST. 14:14/NO. 01002000/11 P 2

Office of the Secretary of Defense
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS

Date: 22 May 2009 Authority: EO 13526

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Reason: 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6)

MDR: 16 -M- 2520

THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2006 MAR 14 PM 5: 57

March 14, 2006

#11

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Robert B. Zoellick *RZ*

RE: Sudan-Darfur

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Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: MAY 22 2019

Last week we were able to prod some useful actions on Darfur.

African Union Movement Towards UN Peacekeeping

Last Friday, the AU decided both to try to strengthen its military mission in Darfur and to transition to a UN operation. We want the AU forces to provide the core of a larger UN mission, which the AU seems willing to do.

The AU acted in the face of opposition from the Government of Sudan (GOS) and some Arab members. Even the GOS, however, moved to accept the possibility of a UN operation if it is connected to the peace accord being negotiated in Abuja.

We will now work with the UN and the AU to press ahead with UN preparation and UN Security Council action. There will be debates over timing, strength of the mandate, size of the forces, connection to a peace accord, and other topics, but we will focus on action as soon as possible. Your efforts to encourage countries to contribute troops is of great help. It will be far better if we can press the GOS to accept the UN force, because others will balk if the UN in effect has to invade Sudan.

Moving Forward the Abuja Peace Negotiations on Darfur

When in Europe, I met Salim Salim, the former Tanzanian Prime Minister who is the AU mediator of the Darfur peace talks in Abuja. With our and the EU's backing, Salim now intends to offer draft texts on both an enhanced humanitarian ceasefire and a comprehensive peace agreement. I believe the GOS is ready to negotiate seriously and wants an accord (although they will be tough in moving off certain positions). Indeed, the GOS shared with us a draft proposal prepared by the Government of National Unity (both North and South), and is seeking our help to reach closure.

The greatest challenge may be to get the factionalized (and in-fighting) rebel groups to negotiate. But if Salim reaches fair positions, the United States, the EU, and the AU may need to press the GOS and the rebels to agree. We have a team helping in Abuja, and we will buttress it if Salim makes a closing drive for a deal.

16-M-2520

OSD#75599-06

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Sudan

14 March 06

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Our strong support for the Abuja negotiations can also help lessen GOS resistance to the UN military operation. I spoke to both GOS Vice Presidents -- Kiir from the South and Taha from Khartoum -- about what they need to do and how we might be able to help.

Even if an agreement is reached, however, we will need to work with the AU to follow up with an all-Darfur conference to bring in tribes and people who may not feel associated with the rebels or the government. This reconciliation process will also be important for the effective implementation of any agreement on the ground.

NATO Support for the AU Military Mission (AMIS)

I also met with NATO Secretary General de Hoop Scheffer to discuss whether and how NATO can support the AMIS operation before the UN force takes the field. In general, based on our inter-agency discussions, we have been focused on "robust planning and support" capabilities that could make the AMIS operation considerably more effective.

De Hoop Scheffer needs a request from the AU or Kofi Annan. We are working on the latter. The UN, the AU, and NATO will likely falter if the GOS actively resists, so we will work to overcome GOS opposition, though this will be challenging.

De Hoop Scheffer visits you on March 20.

Other Steps

President Bashir of Sudan wrote you on February 22, explaining his commitment to the Abuja negotiations and requesting our support. We have drafted a reply that builds on the past week's events and my meetings with Vice Presidents Kiir and Taha. Your reply can be a significant step in pulling Bashir along, because there are elements in Khartoum who agitate for confrontation.

As we consider our public messages, we need to strike the balance between pressing for serious action and explicitly threatening Western intervention. The latter message is seized upon by the more brutal Islamists in Sudan to rally against "colonialism, U.S. aggression, and NATO." We are starting to get intelligence reports of Islamic radical threats to humanitarian NGO workers. We will be best positioned if we can keep attention focused on the need to stop outrages in Darfur, not Western forces.

Finally, Javier Solana helped me apply the pressure on the AU and Sudan last week. Our cooperation with the various EU participants has been excellent, and we are working closely with Norway and Canada, too.

cc: The Vice President
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
National Security Advisor

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SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
CABLE DIVISION

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WASHFAX DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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2006 MAR 14 PM 2:25

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(Officer name) (Office symbol) (Phone number) (Room number)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION Zoellick/Bush Memo: Sudan-Darfur

<u>TO: (Agency)</u>	<u>DELIVER TO: (Person/Office)</u>	<u>Phone no.</u>	<u>Room no.</u>
<u>White House</u>	<u>The President</u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>
<u>White House</u>	<u>The Vice President</u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>
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<u>DoD</u>	<u>The Secretary of Defense</u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>
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FOR: CLEARANCE ☐ INFORMATION ☒ PER REQUEST ☐ COMMENT ☐

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Susan M. Elliott

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TO SECDEF

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Summit