

JOINT STAFF ACTION PROCESSING FORM

#7

TO CJCS	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	ACTION NUMBER J5A 00283-93
THRU DJS ①/26	VCSCS	ORIG SUSPENS
SUBJECT RESULTS OF THE ADDIS ABABA SOMALI RECONCILIATION CONFERENCE (U)	ACTION	SJS SUSPENSE
	APPROVAL	J5SUSPENSE
	SIGNATURE	25 JAN 92
	XXX INFORMATION	

ACTION SUMMARY

1. (S) Purpose. To provide information to the CJCS regarding the Somali Reconciliation Conference held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia ~~(TAB) (attached)~~
2. (S) Discussion. Conference brought together 15 of the most influential clan groups. State is very impressed with the results of the conference. Among the notable accomplishments:
 - a. (S) All factions chose to remain beyond the official end of the conference (6 Jan).
 - b. (S) The factions agreed to basic structure for control of heavy weapons and troop encampment.
 - c. (S) The Somalis agreed to a date for a follow-on conference (15 Mar).
3. (U) Recommendation. No action recommended; for information only.

CJCS 14 APR 92 (Howell) / J-5

Office of the Secretary of Defense 5 U.S.C. § 552
 Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS +
 Date: 30 May 2019 Authority: EO 13526
 Declassify: _____ Deny in Full: _____
 Declassify in Part: X
 Reason: 1.4(c) + 3.3(b)(1)(b) + 3.3(d)
 MDR: 16 -M- 1525

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 Date: MAY 30 2019

Attachment

16-M-1525

COORDINATION/APPROVAL					
OFFICE	NAME & DATE	EXT	OFFICE	NAME & DATE	EXT
J5	<u>[Signature]</u> 25 Jan 93				
ACJCS	COY PROVIDED				
ACTION OFFICER/DIV/PHONE MAJ DAVIS, J5/MEAF, ext 49413, AFRICA 4783					
DATE PREPARED 25 Jan 92	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	Classified by <u>DJS</u> Declassify on <u>OADR</u>			

71

25 January 1993

INFORMATION PAPER

Subject: Results of the Addis Ababa Somali Reconciliation Conference (U)

- 1. (U) Purpose. To provide information to CJCS.
- 2. (U) Background. Following is a summary of the UN-hosted Somali Reconciliation Conference, held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 4-5 January 1993, along with results of the follow-on meetings that concluded 12 January 1993:

- (S) Conference convened on 4 Jan. The most significant result of the first meeting was that it was held at all. Fifteen Somali factions attended. These were believed to be the most influential factions [REDACTED]

- (S) UNSYG opened the conference and remained through its official end, departing on 6 Jan.

- (S) The fifteen Somali factions decided to remain beyond the official end of the conference, prompted by the Committee of the Horn of Africa Head, Lissane, and by Ethiopian President Meles (TAB B) to try and come to a meeting of the minds in regard to Somalia. The National Reconciliation Conference date was set for 15 March, but the issue of which minor clans would participate was a sticking point.

- (S) By 10 Jan an initial agreement (TAB C) had been worked out among the factions that included the following:

- (S) Disarmament and surrender of all heavy weapons by 1 March to a Ceasefire Monitoring Group.

- (S) Encampment of all militias of political movements by 1 March with the international community providing the necessary upkeep.

- (S) An immediate ceasefire between the warring parties and the disarming of bandits.

- (S) Creation of a Ceasefire Monitoring Group along with a return of stolen property and return of prisoners.

- (S) The problem with the agreement came when it wasn't ready for signature on 10 Jan (the UN agreed to draft and provide the agreement). By 11 Jan, Aideed had changed his mind and refused to sign (TAB D).

- (S) Ethiopian President Meles wouldn't give up as the meetings began to disintegrate. The major problem became the issue of participation in the 15 March conference (TAB E, E1).

OSD 33(b)(1)(6)

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- (S) Even though there appeared to be nothing to be gained by staying, the factions did, and continued to talk. Aideed's demands were at the basis of most of the problems (TAB F, F1).
 - (S) By 13 Jan, it was believed that all the meetings and proposed agreements were for naught as the question of who would participate in the 15 March conference continued to dominate the proceedings (TAB G). President Meles continued to press Aideed. The US did not believe the participation issue to be vital as compared to achieving a viable ceasefire and advised him accordingly through the American Ambassador.
 - (S) From Aideed to Ali Mahdi the participation issue (TAB H) is what threatens not just the agenda of the next meeting, but the 15 March meeting itself. While the original points are still acceptable and the 15 March meeting is still on schedule, the issue of participation remains unresolved.
 - (U) Finally, on 15 Jan the original agreement of 11 January (TAB C) was accepted by the 15 Somali factions. The National Reconciliation Conference on Somalia is scheduled for 15 March, even though a final agreement on participation was not reached.
3. (U) Discussion
- a. (S) General Baril, the UNSYG's military advisor, and Ambassador Kittani warn against UNITAF involvement with the encampment process (TAB I). Kittani opposes encampment, in general, preferring to see a concentration of arms not militias. Baril fears that encampment of Southern militias leaves them open to attack from Northern factions. He believes Northern militias would have to be simultaneously encamped by UNITAF or UNITAF must protect Southern encampments. Recent encampment experiences--Angola, Ethiopia, Cambodia--have not been encouraging.
 - b. (S) Kittani argues we must not feel obliged to do things simply because the factions at Addis asked.
 - c. (S) State is very impressed with the results on the conference, especially on the control of heavy weapons, encampment and setting the date for a follow-on conference.

Prepared by Somalia Working Group
MEAF J5 x49406 (AFRICA 4774)


Enclosures

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
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OSD 3.3(b)(1)(6)

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SPECIAL HANDLING
REQUIRED

~~CONFIDENTIAL SPECAT~~

COPY NUMBER 12

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INFO SERVICE CENTER

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INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT (E.G. FOOD, WATER, MONEY) FOR
ENCAMPED FORCES AND DEPENDENTS AND THE LONGER-TERM
QUESTION OF RETRAINING THEM.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE D12667

~~ENDS~~ HORN - EYES ONLY CJCS: SHEFFIELD//EYES ONLY SECDEF: SHERFIELD

THE FOLLOWING USLO MOGADISHU 00074, DATED JAN 12, 1993, SENT ACTION
SECSTATE WASHDC, USCINCENT MACDILL AFB FL AND AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA,
IS REPEATED FOR YOUR INFORMATION.
QUOTE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ MOGADISHU 00074

~~ENDS~~ HORN: S/S FOR HORN DISTRIBUTION

ADDIS ABABA FOR AMBASSADOR BASS FROM AMBASSADOR OAKLEY
STATE FOR UNDERSECRETARY WISNER FROM AMBASSADOR OAKLEY
AND SOMALI TASK FORCE

~~E.O. 12958: DECL. ORDN~~
TAGS: PREL. PINS, SO
SUBJECT: TFSOO1: SOMALI NATIONAL RECONCILIATION

REF: ADDIS ABABA 00162

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. RESULTS REPORTED REFFTEL ON CONTROL OF HEAVY WEAPONS,
ENCAMPMENT AND DATE FOR FOLLOW-ON CONFERENCE ARE VERY
IMPRESSIVE. MORE DETAILS ON BACKGROUND DYNAMICS AND
POSITIONS OF VARIOUS PARTICIPANTS WILL BE VALUABLE AS
EVENTS ON GROUND HERE EVOLVE. WE DO INDEED OWE MELES A
DEBT OF GRATITUDE. HIS SKILLFUL HANDLING HAS ENABLED AND
ENCOURAGED FRACTIOUS SOMALIS TO PRODUCE SIGNIFICANT
RESULTS, IN APPEARANCE AND TO A CONSIDERABLE DEGREE IN
REALITY THROUGH PROLONGED, INFORMAL SOMALI-STYLE PALAVER
FREE FROM DIRECT EXTERNAL INVOLVEMENT. IT IS NO ACCIDENT
THAT RESULTS WERE ACHIEVED AFTER DEPARTURE OF BOUTROS
GHAL, JONAH AND KITTANI.

3. WE WOULD HOPE THAT THE ISSUE OF PARTICIPATION AT THE
NEXT ROUND REMAINS UNRESOLVED FOR PRESENT. MANY OF THE
PARTIES/FRACTIONS AT PRESENT CONFERENCE ARE EITHER LOSING
INFLUENCE/BREAKING UP OR CHANGING LEADERSHIP, AS WELL AS
FEUDING OVER POWER AND OVER PAST POLITICAL CORRECTNESS
VIS-A-VIS SIAD BARRE. REGIONAL POLITICAL EVOLUTION OVER
THE PAST MONTH IN SOME SOMALI LOCALES (E.G. BAIDOA,
MERCA, BARDERA) HAS ALREADY PUSHED THE RECOGNIZED
POLITICAL-MILITARY PARTIES AND LEADERS INTO LESSER ROLES
AS OTHER GROUPS SUCH AS WOMEN, ELDERS AND EVEN
INTELLECTUALS BEGIN TO MOVE UP. REGIONALISM IS ALSO
GROWING AT EXPENSE OF SO CALLED NATIONAL PARTIES. MUCH
MORE OF THIS CAN BE EXPECTED BY MID-MARCH.

4. FOR STATE: WE NEED RAPID DIALOGUE WITH AND GUIDANCE
FROM WASHINGTON ON HOW TO TRY AND APPLY IN PRACTICE THESE
ADDIS ARMS CONTROL MEASURES DURING CURRENT UNITAF PHASE
AND HOW TO INCORPORATE THEM INTO UNOSOM II MISSION.
INTER ALIA THIS RAISES IMMEDIATE QUESTION OF

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JOINT STAFF V1
ACTION

(R.M.C)

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INFO SJS-N(1) NMCC:CWO(1) J3(3) J4(5) J5(1)
J6(9) J5-NEAF(1) SECDEF-N(1) SOJO(8)
USDP:SPECIAL HANDLING(13) USDA:P&L(1) ASD:PA(1)
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+DIA WASHINGTON DC

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
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PASS: NSA FOR ZKZK OO DLS DE (FOR NSOC).

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WARNING: INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

REPORT CLASS ~~SECRET~~ ~~NOINTEL~~ ~~NOFORN~~ [REDACTED]

DIST: 14 JANUARY 1993

COUNTRY: SOMALIA/ETHIOPIA

SUBJ: FISSURES CAUSED BY LACK OF CONSENSUS AMONG FACTIONS
AT THE CONFERENCE ON SOMALIA; BREAKDOWN OF TALKS
BETWEEN THE SNF AND USC/AIDEED; DECISION OF THE
GROUP OF 11 TO FORM A UNIFIED MILITARY COMMAND

DOI: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

TEXT: 1. [REDACTED]
THE FAILURE OF THE 15-FACTION COALITION TO REACH A
CONSENSUS ON KEY ISSUES DURING THE SOMALIA CONFERENCE IN ADDIS ABABA,
ETHIOPIA, WAS CAUSING FISSURES AMONG AND POTENTIAL REALIGNMENTS OF
SEVERAL OF THE FACTIONS. AS AN EXAMPLE, [REDACTED]
THE SULIEMAN AND AYR SUBCLANS OF THE HAWIYA TRIBE HAD DESERTED THE
UNITED SOMALI CONGRESS FACTION OF GENERAL ((MOHAMED)) FARAH HASSAN
"AIDEED" AND HAD INDICATED TO SENIOR MAREHAN LEADERS THAT THEY WOULD
BE PREPARED TO ENTER INTO SEPRATE NEGOTIATIONS WITH THEM. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] DURING 4-13 JANUARY, WHILE THE SOMALIA
PEACE CONFERENCE WAS TAKING PLACE, LEADERS OF THE 40-PERSON
HAWIYA/HABR GEDIR/SAAD DELEGATION BACKING GENERAL AIDEED HAD
UNDERTAKEN SEPERATE, SECRET NEGOTIATIONS WITH SENIOR MAREHAN LEADERS
IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE A SEPARATE PEACE BETWEEN THE MAREHAN AND THE
HAWIYA/HABR GEDIR/SAAD. [REDACTED] COMMENT: [REDACTED]
JANUARY, DEBATE ON SEVERAL ISSUES, ONE BEING PARTY REPRESENTATION
BASED UPON DEMOGRAPHICS, WAS STILL UNDERWAY AMONG THE VARIOUS SOMALI
FACTIONS.)

2. [REDACTED] THE MAREHAN HAD BROKEN OFF DISCUSSIONS
WITH THE USC/AIDEED FACTION AFTER GENERAL AIDEED HAD OFFERED ONLY
USC/AIDEED FACTION SPOKESMAN ((MOHAMED)) HASSAN "AWALE" TO BE THE
POINT MAN FOR FURTHER TALKS. THE MAREHAN ALSO OBJECTED TO
HAWIYA/HABR GEDIR/SAAD TRIBAL ELDERS BEING INCLUDED IN THE TALKS.
[REDACTED] AIDEED ALLOWED ONLY REPRESENTATIVES FROM
THE HAWIYA/HABR GEDIR/SAAD, DUDUBLE AND SULUI SUBCLANS TO ATTEND THE

~~SECRET~~

~~NOFORN~~ [REDACTED] ~~NOINTEL~~

CIA 1.4(c), DCS 3.3(b)(1)(6), OSD 3.3(b)(1)(6)

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NOFORN [REDACTED] UNINTEL

PAGE:0004

TALKS AND HAD REFUSED THE SNF'S REQUEST THAT THE AYR AND SULEIMAN SUBCLANS BE INCLUDED. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] IN LATE DECEMBER 1992, AIDEED HAD AGREED TO INCLUDE THE SULEIMAN, AYR, DUDUBLE AND SULUL SUBCLANS OF THE HAWIYA TRIBE. IN THE END, THE SNF LEADERSHIP BELIEVED THAT THE TEN DAYS OF TALKS BETWEEN AIDEED, HIS SUPPORTERS AND THE SENIOR LEADERSHIP OF THE MAREHAN HAD FAILED COMPLETELY.

3. [REDACTED] AS A RESULT OF THE COLLAPSE OF BOTH OFFICIAL AND UNOFFICIAL TALKS WITH AIDEED, THE "GROUP OF 11" UNOFFICIAL COALITION OF FACTIONS OPPOSED TO AIDEED WERE CURRENTLY ATTEMPTING TO ARRANGE A UNIFIED MILITARY COMMAND REPRESENTING SOMALI FACTIONS FROM THE KENYAN BORDER TO DJIBOUTI IN ORDER TO RESIST AIDEED MILITARILY. [REDACTED] THE UNIFIED COMMAND WOULD POTENTIALLY POSSESS THE SUPPORT OF SEVENTY PERCENT OF THE SOMALI PEOPLE AND WOULD SPECIFICALLY PROPOSE DEMOCRACY BASED UPON THE PRINCIPLE OF "ONE-MAN, ONE-VOTE" AS THE ONLY MEANS TO GOVERN SOMALIA IN FUTURE. [REDACTED] COMMENT: THE UNITED NATIONS (UN) HAD MADE A TRAGIC TACTICAL ERROR THREE DAYS BEFORE WHEN IT HAD DECIDED TO INCLUDE ALL OF THE NEGOTIATING POINTS IN ONE DOCUMENT FOR THE SIGNATURE OF AIDEED AND THE OTHER SOMALI FACTION LEADERS. ON THE NIGHT OF 10 JANUARY, AIDEED, ALONG WITH THE HEADS OF OTHER DELEGATIONS, HAD BEEN READY TO SIGN A SEPARATE CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT. THE UN TOOK A FULL DAY TO PREPARE THE DOCUMENT AND, WHEN IT WAS PRESENTED TO AIDEED ON 11 JANUARY, THE CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT WAS INCORPORATED WITH ALL OTHER NEGOTIATION POINTS INTO ONE DOCUMENT, INCLUDING THE REPRESENTATION FOR THE 15 MARCH CONFERENCE. AT THAT POINT, AIDEED REFUSED TO SIGN.)

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OSD 33(b)(1)(G)

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NOFORN [REDACTED] UNINTEL

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ P1033

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ACTION: 771(01)

INFO: CHS(00) MK(00) P(01) S(00) S(01) SPX(00)
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===== 111151 AGW (TOTAL COPIES: 004)

INFO: SB(00) SNP(00) SP(00)
===== 111602Z STPS (TOTAL COPIES: 000)

ACTION SS-00

INFO	LOG-00	AF-01	AID-01	CA-02	CIAE-00	C-01	OASV-00
	EUR-01	FURE-01	HA-09	H-01	INMG-01	INRE-00	INR-01
	ID-19	L-03	ADS-00	NBA-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02
	OKB-01	PA-01	PM-02	PRG-01	P-01	SB-00	SNP-00
	SP-00	SSO-00	TRSE-00	T-01	USIE-00	RPE-00	/051W

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USLO MOGADISHU IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
AMEMBASSY DJIBOUTI
AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY ROHE
AMEMBASSY RIYADH
DIA WASHDC
SECDEF WASHDC
USCINCENT HADLI AFB FL
CJTF SOMALIA

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ADDIS ABABA 00182

TAGS: PREL, PGOV, FT, SO
SUBJECT: TFS001: ADDIS ABABA RECONCILIATION CONFERENCE

REF: USLO (C)HOMAS TELECON 1/11/93

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: THE PUBLIC MOOD AT THE GHION HOTEL MEETING
OF THE SOMALI FACTIONS IS NEGATIVE TODAY AFTER AIDED

AND OMAR JESS DEADLOCKED THE MEETING ON THE ISSUE OF
PARTICIPATION AT THE FOLLOW-ON RECONCILIATION
CONFERENCE. HOWEVER, PRESIDENT MELES TOLD AMBASSADOR
ON JANUARY 11 THAT SOMALI FACTIONS HAD REACHED
AGREEMENT ON A CEASEFIRE, ENCAMPMENT OF TROOPS, AND THE
AGENDA AND DATE OF A FOLLOW-ON RECONCILIATION
CONFERENCE. THE DEADLOCK ON PARTICIPATION IN THE
FOLLOW-ON CONFERENCE MAY BE RESOLVED BY A NEW PROPOSAL
FROM MELES. IF THE ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE ADDIS ABABA
CONFERENCE HOLD UP, WE AND THE UN OWE MELES A BIG DEBT
OF GRATITUDE. END SUMMARY.

3. ENBOFF REPORTS FROM THE GHION HOTEL MEETING SITE OF
THE SOMALI FACTIONS THAT THE MOOD IS NEGATIVE TODAY.
LAST NIGHT ALL EXPECTED THIS MORNING TO PRODUCE A
SIGNING CEREMONY WITH AN ALL-PARTIES AGREEMENT ON A
FOLLOW-ON RECONCILIATION CONFERENCE, AND A CEASEFIRE.
HOWEVER, AIDED AND OMAR JESS HAVE REFUSED TO SIGN ANY
DOCUMENT BECAUSE AIDED INSISTS ON, ACCORDING TO
ENBOFF, HAVING A MAJORITY OF DELEGATES AT ANY FOLLOW-ON
CONFERENCE.

4. FOLLOWING REF TELECON, AMBASSADOR ASKED TO MEET WITH
PRESIDENT MELES TO GET HIS READOUT ON EVENTS AT THE
GHION. THE PRESIDENT RECEIVED AMBASSADOR, ACCOMPANIED
BY DCM AT NOON ON JANUARY 11. PRESIDENTIAL CHIEF OF
STAFF FISSEHA TOOK PART IN A PORTION OF THE
CONVERSATION. MELES CONFIRMED THERE WAS A DEADLOCK ON
THE PARTICIPATION ISSUE, BUT SAID AGREEMENT HAD BEEN
ACHIEVED ON ALL OTHER FRONTS.

CEASEFIRE AND ENCAMPMENT

5. THE PRESIDENT SAID ALL PARTIES HAVE AGREED ON A
CEASEFIRE AND ENCAMPMENT OF TROOPS. THE ENCAMPMENT
WILL APPLIED TO ALL ARMED GROUPS IN SOMALIA, EXCEPT FOR
SOMALILAND. TROOPS WILL BE ENCAMPED IN AREAS WHERE
"THEY DO NOT ENDANGER THE PEACE." THEY WILL RETAIN
THEIR LIGHT WEAPONS, BUT HEAVY WEAPONS WILL BE TURNED
OVER TO THE "MONITORING AUTHORITY," WHICH WILL BE
DESIGNATED AS UN/UNITAF. ANY ARMED INDIVIDUALS OUTSIDE
OF DESIGNATED CAMPS WILL BE CONSIDERED RENEGADE AND
SUBJECT TO ACTION BY UN/UNITAF. AS THE PROCESS OF
STABILIZATION PROCEEDS, LIGHT WEAPONS WILL BE HANDED IN
IN RETURN FOR REHABILITATION ASSISTANCE TO FIGHTERS.
THE "MONITORING AUTHORITY" WILL DESIGNATE ENCAMPMENT
AREAS. A "LIAISON GROUP" FROM THE FACTIONS WILL
PROVIDE INPUT ON CAMP SITES.

6. THE ETHIOPIANS TRIED TO PERSUADE THE FACTIONS TO
AGREE TO ENCAMPMENT SITES OUTSIDE OF MAJOR CITIES,
FEARING OMAR JESS AND HIS ACTIONS IN KISHAYO. (THE
SSDF PRESSED THE TGE ON THIS POINT.) HOWEVER, THE SSDF
THEN BACKED AWAY FROM ITS POSITION WHEN IT BECAME CLEAR

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TO THEM THAT THEY WOULD HAVE TO REMOVE THEIR FIGHTERS FROM BOSASSO, LEAVING THE TOWN OPEN TO FUNDAMENTALIST FORCES.

7. THE PRESIDENT SAID JESS NEARLY DEADLOCKED THE TALKS ON THE ENCAMPMENT SCHEME, BUT THE TGE MADE USE OF THE SKILLS OF THE ETHIOPIAN VICE MINISTER OF HEALTH WHO COMES FROM THE SAME OGADENI "SUB-SUB CLAN" AS JESS. (JESS IS AN ETHIOPIAN OGADENI BY BIRTH.)
FOLLOW-ON CONFERENCE

8. THE FACTIONS HAVE AGREED ON A FOLLOW-ON CONFERENCE AGENDA. THE FACTIONS HAVE AGREED TO CHANGE THE DATE FOR THE FOLLOW-ON CONFERENCE TO MARCH 15 IN ADDIS ABABA "TO ACCOMMODATE THE ETHIOPIAN GOVERNMENT." IN FACT, MELES SAID HE ASKED FOR MARCH 15 TO mollify ADEED WHO FEELS HE IS MAKING ALL THE CONCESSIONS, AND WANTED THE SATISFACTION OF NOT AGREEING TO THE APRIL DATE SUGGESTED BY THE UN.

9. HOWEVER, THE PRESIDENT CONFIRMED THAT ADEED AND OMAR JESS HAVE DEADLOCKED THE MEETING ON THE ISSUE OF PARTICIPATION AT THE FOLLOW-ON CONFERENCE. MELES SAID ADEED BELIEVES A BUNCH OF "FICTITIOUS GROUPS" ARE GANGING UP AGAINST HIM DURING THE CURRENT MEETING. HE WANTS PRIORITY AT THE NEXT CONFERENCE ON THE FOLLOWING LINES:

A) GROUPS THAT TOPPLED SIAD BARRE;
B) GROUPS THAT ASSISTED IN THAT PROCESS;
AND C) GROUPS FORMED AFTER THE FALL OF SIAD BARRE.

10. THIS APPROACH IS ANATHEMA TO THE SNF AND TO ALI MAHDI. THE PRESIDENT SAID HE WILL TRY TO BREAK THE DEADLOCK BY PROPOSING THE FOLLOW-ON CONFERENCE HAVE A "CORE FOUR" GROUP WHOSE INTERESTS MUST BE MET MUCH LIKE THE PERM FIVE'S ARE IN THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL. THE "CORE FOUR" WOULD BE THE SNA, SSDF, SNF, AND ALI MAHDI. ALL OTHER GROUPS WOULD MAKE UP A SECOND LEVEL. THE CORE FOUR WOULD HAVE TO AGREE TO ALL DECISIONS. THE SECOND LEVEL COULD NOT BLOCK CONSENSUS BY THE CORE GROUP. THIS WILL ENSURE THAT ADEED WILL NOT BE FACED WITH HIS WORST FEAR: A DJIBOUTI III CONFERENCE.

THE NORTH

11. THE PRESIDENT RAISED THE STONING TO DEATH OF WOMEN ACCUSED OF PROSTITUTION IN SOMALILAND. HE VIEWED IT AS AN OMINOUS POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT INDICATING THAT THE FUNDAMENTALISTS MIGHT USE THE POLITICAL RESHUFFLING TAKING PLACE IN THE NORTH AS AN OPPORTUNITY TO VIE FOR POWER. MELES SAID A FUNDAMENTALIST ALLIANCE WITH THE ISSAKS WOULD PRECIPITATE A CIVIL WAR IN THE NORTH. HE SUGGESTED THAT UNITAF OR UNOSOM MOVE QUICKLY TO GET

FORCES INTO SOMALILAND, BECAUSE "THINGS ARE MOVING THE WRONG WAY THERE." THE AMBASSADOR BRIEFED MELES ON USG ATTEMPTS TO GET UNOSOM TO MOVE INTO THE NORTH SOONER RATHER THAN LATER.

ETHIOPIAN ASSISTANCE TO FACTIONS

12. THE AMBASSADOR NOTED THERE WERE PERSISTENT RUMORS AMONG SOMALIS THAT ETHIOPIA WAS ASSISTING ONE OR THE OTHER FACTIONS WITH ARMS. IN PARTICULAR, THERE WAS A CLAIM THAT THE TGE MILITARY COMMANDER IN GILADE WAS PASSING OVER MILITARY SUPPLIES TO THE SSDF, WHICH THAT ORGANIZATION HAD ACQUIRED DURING THE MENGISTU ERA. MELES SAID HE WOULD BE INFORMED OF ANY SUCH ACTION AND THERE WAS NO TRUTH TO THE ASSERTION. OMAR JESS HAD RAISED THE SAME RUMOR WITH HIM. "IF WE WERE GOING TO HELP ANYBODY, IT WOULD HAVE BEEN SIAD BARRE," THE PRESIDENT SAID. MELES SAID THE SIAD BARRE REGIME HAD PROVIDED HIS MOVEMENT WITH TREMENDOUS HELP DURING ITS OWN STRUGGLE WITH MENGISTU, WHILE THE SSDF, SNF AND USC HAD RECEIVED COVERT ASSISTANCE FROM THE DERG. GRATITUDE ASIDE, "WE WON'T SACRIFICE OUR FUTURE FOR THE SAKE OF OUR PAST." THE TGE WAS NOT PROVIDING ASSISTANCE TO ANY FACTION IN SOMALIA.
COMMENT

13. IF MELES CAN GET ADEED AND JESS TO AGREE TO A FORMULA FOR REPRESENTATION AT THE FOLLOW-ON CONFERENCE, HE WILL HAVE DONE TREMENDOUS WORK WITH THE SOMALIS. THE CEASEFIRE/ENCAMPMENT/DISARMAMENT AGREEMENT GIVES UNITAF AND UNOSOM II A GREAT LEG UP ON STABILIZING THE ACTIVITIES OF THE ARMED GROUPS. WE WILL OWE MELES A GREAT DEBT OF GRATITUDE IF HE PULLS THIS OFF.

14. HOGAISHU - MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. BAAS

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CJCS - EYES ONLY SHEFFIELD; SECDEF - EYES ONLY SHEFFIELD

~~ENDIS HORN~~

THE FOLLOWING ADDIS ABABA 00244, DATED 13 JAN 93, SENT ACTION
SECSTATE WASHDC AND MOGADISHU AND INFO CIAHQ, KHARTOUM, DJIBOUTI,
NAIROBI, USOM NEW YORK, LONDON, PARIS, ROME, RIYADH, OJA WASHDC,
USCINCENT MACDILL AFB FL, AND CJTF SOMALIA IS BEING REPEATED FOR
YOUR INFORMATION.
QUOTE:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ADDIS ABABA 00244

~~ENDIS HORN~~: S/S FOR HORN DISTRIBUTION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TAGS: PREL, PGDV, ET, SO
SUBJECT: TFS001: ADDIS ABABA RECONCILIATION CONFERENCE.

REF: A) ADDIS ABABA 0210; B) ADDIS ABABA 0162;
C) MOGADISHU 074

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. AMBASSADOR PHONED MINISTER OF EXTERNAL ECONOMIC
COOPERATION (AND ETHNIC SOMALI) ABDULMAJID JANUARY 13 TO
ASK WHETHER AGREEMENT HAD BEEN REACHED IN THE ON-GOING
NEGOTIATIONS. ABDULMAJID SAID THAT ALTHOUGH THEY HAD
WORKED UNTIL MIDNIGHT, UNFORTUNATELY THE TALKS HAD
BROKEN DOWN OVER THE ISSUE OF PARTICIPATION. PRESIDENT
MELES HAD CONVINCED THE THREE LEADERS OF THE NON-AIDEEED
"CORE FOUR" GROUPS TO ACCEPT HIS PLAN FOR PARTICIPATION
(REF 8), BUT ALI MAHDI HAD NOT BEEN ABLE TO CONVINCHE HIS
ALLIES, MAINLY THREE SMALL GROUPS WHOSE LEADERS,
ACCORDING TO ABDULMAJID, WERE NOT EVEN RESIDENT IN
SOMALIA AND HADN'T BEEN FOR YEARS. (THE GROUPS ARE THE
USP AND SDA FROM THE NORTH AND GENERAL ADEN GEBEO'S
SPM.) ALTHOUGH THESE GROUPS WERE OF LITTLE OR NO
IMPORTANCE, ALI MAHDI DID NOT WISH TO GO AGAINST THEIR
WISHES, SINCE THE ALLIANCES HAD BEEN FORMED TO BE ABLE
TO OUVOTE AIDEEED AND HE WANTED TO KEEP THEM ON HIS SIDE.

3. UNFORTUNATELY, THIS MEANT THAT THE WHOLE PACKAGE WAS
NOT AGREED, INCLUDING THE CEASE-FIRE AND DATES AND
AGENDA FOR THE NEXT CONFERENCE. AMBASSADOR ASKED IF
THERE WAS ANY SUBSTANTIVE PROBLEM WITH THESE OTHER
AGREEMENTS, OR WAS IT JUST THAT NOTHING WAS AGREED UNTIL
EVERYTHING WAS AGREED. ABDULMAJID SAID IT WAS THE
LATTER: EVERYONE STILL ACCEPTED THE TERMS OF THE
CEASE-FIRE AND CONFERENCE AGREEMENTS, BUT WOULD NOT SIGN
ON UNTIL THE ISSUE OF PARTICIPANTS WAS RESOLVED. IN
FACT, OTHER AGREEMENTS HAD ALSO BEEN REACHED, FOR
EXAMPLE ON THE PARTICIPATION IN THE CONFERENCE OF
WOMEN'S GROUPS AND TRIBAL ELDERS.

4. THE ETHIOPIAN SIDE HAD TOLD THE SOMALIS THAT THEY
HAD GONE AS FAR AS THEY COULD WITH THIS, AND THE
DELEGATES MIGHT AS WELL GO HOME. NEVERTHELESS, NO ONE
HAD LEFT, AND HORN OF AFRICA CHAIRMAN LISSANE WAS
HOLDING ANOTHER MEETING THIS MORNING. (COMMENT, WE
USED SUCH BRINKSMANSHIP SUCCESSFULLY WITH THE ETHIOPIANS
IN LAST YEAR'S ENCAMPMENT NEGOTIATIONS; PERHAPS IT WILL
WORK WITH THE SOMALIS TOO.)

5. AMBASSADOR SAID THAT HE HAD JUST RECEIVED A REPORT
FROM AMBASSADOR OAKLEY (REF C) WHICH SUGGESTED THAT IN
FACT THE BEST PLAN MIGHT BE TO LEAVE THE ISSUE OF
PARTICIPATION OPEN, SINCE THE SITUATION WAS CHANGING
DAILY ON THE GROUND. COULD THE TGE PERHAPS GET THE
SOMALIS TO AGREE TO BEGIN IMPLEMENTING THE OTHER
AGREEMENTS, WITH THE UNDERSTANDING THAT THE ISSUE OF
PARTICIPATION WOULD BE REVISITED BETWEEN NOW AND MARCH
15? ABDULMAJID SAID THAT MADE A LOT OF SENSE, AND HE
WOULD PASS THE IDEA ALONG. AMBASSADOR SAID HE WAS ALSO
AVAILABLE TO MEET WITH ANY SOMALI LEADER AND STRESS THE
IMPORTANCE WE ATTACH TO AN AGREEMENT IF THE TGE THOUGHT
IT WOULD BE USEFUL. ABDULMAJID SAID HE THOUGHT IT WOULD
BE, AND THE TGE WOULD BE BACK IN TOUCH.

6. COMMENT, UNFORTUNATELY, ABDULMAJID LEAVES IN TWO
HOURS FOR ECONOMIC MEETINGS IN PARIS AND OTHER EUROPEAN
CAPITALS, SO HE MAY NOT HAVE TIME TO DO WHAT HE SAID HE
WOULD. IN ANY EVENT, AMBASSADOR IS TRYING TO REACH
PRESIDENT MELES TO PASS THE SAME MESSAGE, AND WE ALSO
HAVE CALLS IN TO LISSANE AND VICE MINISTER OF HEALTH
(AND ETHNIC SOMALI) ABDIADEN. THE FACT THAT ALL SEEM TO
CURRENTLY BE UNAVAILABLE IMPLIES THAT TALKS ARE INDEED
CONTINUING.

7. MOGADISHU - MINIMIZE CONSIDERED,
BAAS UNQUOTE LATER BY

JOINT STAFF V1
ACTION

INFO SJS-N(1) CJCS(1) NMCC:CMO(1) J3(3) J4(1)
J5(1) J6(1) J5-MEAF(1) SECDEF-N(1) SDIO(7)
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+CNO WASHINGTON DC
+DIA WASHINGTON DC

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DO WITH SUCH AN IDEA, AND THAT ALL FIFTEEN GROUPS SHOULD
AGREE. HE ADDED THAT ECA HELICOPTERS WOULD NOT BE AVAILABLE
FOR ANY SUCH CEREMONY, AND UN PLANES WOULD NOT TAKE ANY
LEADERS HOME WHO SIGNED SUCH A PARTIAL AGREEMENT.
COMMENT: THIS LATTER POINT WILL BE MOST PERSUASIVE TO
OUR SOMALI FRIENDS.)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 STATE 011231

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ EYES ONLY CIA FOR SHEFFIELD//SECDEF FOR SHEFFIELD

THE FOLLOWING AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 00255, DATED JAN 13, 1993, SENT
ACTION SECSTATE WASHDC AND USIC MOGADISHU INFO AMEMBASSY CAIRO,
AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM, AMEMBASSY DJIBOUTI, AMEMBASSY NAIROBI, USMISSION
USUN NEW YORK, AMEMBASSY LONDON, AMEMBASSY PARIS, AMEMBASSY ROME,
AMEMBASSY RIYADH, DIA WASHDC, USCINCENT MACDILL AFB FL AND CJTF
SOMALIA. IS REPEATED FOR YOUR INFORMATION.
QUOTE

5. AMBASSADOR ASKED IF THERE WAS ANYTHING ELSE THAT WE
COULD DO TO HELP RESOLVE THE IMPASSE. MELES SAID THAT
HE THOUGHT IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF AMBASSADOR TALKED TO
ALI MANDI TO SEE IF HE COULD GET HIM TO BE MORE
FLEXIBLE. AMBASSADOR SAID HE WOULD -- IT SEEMED TO BE
IN ALI MANDI'S OWN INTEREST, AS WELL AS THAT OF THE USG
AND OTHER INTERESTED PARTIES, TO HAVE THE CEASE-FIRE
IMPLEMENTED AND GET TO A POLITICAL COMPETITION.
(AMBASSADOR HAS NOW MET WITH ALI MANDI -- SFTEL.)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ADDIS ABABA 00255

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ EYES ONLY CIA FOR HORN DISTRIBUTION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ TAGS: PREL, PGDV, ET, SO
SUBJECT: TFSOOL: ADDIS ABABA RECONCILIATION CONFERENCE.

6. WHEN AMBASSADOR SUGGESTED THAT PERHAPS IT WAS BEST
TO LEAVE THE ISSUE OF PARTICIPATION OPEN FOR NOW SINCE
THE SITUATION WAS CHANGING ON THE GROUND IN SOMALIA (REF
C), THE PRESIDENT SAID AIDEED WOULD NOT AGREE.
AMBASSADOR SAID THAT AT A MINIMUM, PARTICIPATION SHOULD
BE LEFT OPEN, SO THAT NEW GROUPS (WOMEN, ELDERS) THAT
FORMED IN SOMALIA WERE NOT EXCLUDED. INTERESTINGLY,
MELES SAID THAT WHILE THAT WAS A GOOD IDEA, ANOTHER
POSSIBILITY WAS FOR THE RECONCILIATION CONFERENCE TO
AGREE TO HOLD "SWAP" REGIONAL ELECTIONS IN SOMALIA AT
THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE TIME TO BE ABLE TO JUDGE WHAT
SUPPORT VARIOUS GROUPS HAD. THIS WOULD ALSO HELP IN
DIVIDING UP THE SPOILS (EG. CABINET POSITIONS), EVEN AN
80-PERSON CABINET HAD NOT SUCCESSFULLY MANAGED THIS
PROBLEM IN ALI MANDI'S INTERIM GOVERNMENT, BECAUSE
EVERYONE COULD CLAIM THEY WERE IMPORTANT.

REF: A1 ADDIS ABABA 0244; B1 ADDIS ABABA 0182;
C1 MOGADISHU 024

7. AMBASSADOR TOLD MELES THAT AMBASSADOR OAKLEY HAD
BT
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 STATE 011231
SPECAT

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ EYES ONLY CIA FOR [REDACTED] /SECDEF FOR SHEFFIELD

2. FOLLOWING CONVERSATION WITH MINISTER ABDULMAJID (REF
A), AMBASSADOR TALKED TWICE WITH PRESIDENT MELES BY
PHONE. MELES ESSENTIALLY CONFIRMED WHAT ABDULMAJID HAD
SAID: THE TALKS ARE NEAR BREAKDOWN BECAUSE OF AN
INABILITY TO AGREE ON THE PARTICIPATION IN THE MARCH 15
MEETING. AIDEED FEELS HE HAS GIVEN UP A GREAT DEAL ON
THE ISSUES OF CEASE-FIRE AND DISARMAMENT (WE TEND TO
AGREE) AND CANNOT SIGN AN AGREEMENT UNLESS THE
PARTICIPATION ISSUE IS RESOLVED SATISFACTORILY (IE, SO
THAT HE KNOWS HE CANNOT BE OUTVOTED). ALI MANDI, ON THE
OTHER HAND, BOWED TO THE PRESSURE OF SEVERAL OF HIS
SMALL ALLIED PARTIES AND INSISTS THAT ALL MUST BE
ALLOWED TO PARTICIPATE AS EQUALS, WITH NO SPECIAL
ALLOWANCE FOR A CORE FOUR.

REQUESTED THAT MELES SEND LISSANE AND HAILE FROM THE
HORN OF AFRICA COMMITTEE TO MOGADISHU AFTER THE
CONCLUSION OF THE TALKS HERE TO HAVE AN EXCHANGE OF
VIEWS ON NEXT STEPS. GIVEN THAT THEY HAD BEEN INVOLVED
IN THE TALKS AND THAT AMBASSADOR OAKLEY WAS DEEPLY
INVOLVED IN INTERNAL SOMALI ISSUES, THIS SEEMED TO MAKE
GOOD SENSE. AMBASSADOR SAID. MELES DID NOT DISAGREE,
BUT SAID THAT HE HAD BEEN THINKING OF INVITING
AMBASSADOR OAKLEY TO COME TO ADDIS ABABA FOR A BROAD
EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON THE ISSUES AFTER THE CONFERENCE.
(THIS WOULD BE WITH MELES, NOT LISSANE.) AMBASSADOR
SAID THAT WOULD ALSO SERVE THE PURPOSE, BUT HE DID NOT
KNOW WHETHER OAKLEY WOULD WISH TO LEAVE MOGADISHU AT
THIS CRITICAL JUNCTURE. HE WOULD HOWEVER ASK.
(COMMENT: WITH SOME CAREFUL PREPLANNING TO TAKE
ADVANTAGE OF U.S. AIR FORCE PLANES, A VISIT MIGHT
PERHAPS BE ARRANGED SO THAT OAKLEY ARRIVED IN THE
MORNING AND LEFT IN THE AFTERNOON, LEAVING FOUR OR FIVE
HOURS FOR TALKS.) PLEASE ADVISE.

3. EVEN MORE DISTURBING IS THAT MELES SAID THAT ALI
MANDI AND HIS ALLIES (THE ELEVEN) ARE PLANNING TO SIGN
THE AGREEMENTS ALREADY REACHED, WITHOUT AIDEED AND HIS
FRIENDS. MELES SAID THAT APPARENTLY UN SECRETARY
GENERAL BOUTROS GHALI HAS GIVEN HIS AGREEMENT FOR THIS,
AND DR. KAPONGO, POLITICAL ADVISOR TO KITTANI, IS
PREPARING TO SET UP AN APPROPRIATE CEREMONY. (COMMENT:
SIGNING A CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT WITHOUT ONE OF THE
PRINCIPAL -- AND MOST DANGEROUS -- PARTIES IS CLEARLY
ABSURD. THIS IS ALSO A FURTHER EXAMPLE OF ETHIOPIAN
DISTRUST OF EGYPTIANS, WHO THEY BELIEVE SUPPORT ALI
MANDI.)

8. MOGADISHU - MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.

4. AMBASSADOR SAID THAT HE WOULD ATTEMPT TO CONTACT
KAPONGO AND URGE HIM NOT TO ENCOURAGE SUCH AN ACTION,
AND ASK WASHINGTON AND NEW YORK TO DO THE SAME.
(FOLLOWING THE DRAFTING OF THE ABOVE, AMBASSADOR TALKED
TO KAPONGO, WHO SAYS THE STORY IS COMPLETELY
INACCURATE. IN FACT, HE HAD JUST MET WITH THE ELEVEN
PARTIES TO TELL THEM THAT THE UN WOULD HAVE NOTHING TO

BAAS
UNQUOTE XANTER BT

JOINT STAFF V1
ACTION J6(9) (R.H.C.)
INFO SJS-N(1) CJCS(1) NMCC:CMO(1) J3(3) J4(5) J5(1)
J5-MAF(1) SECDEF-N(1) SDJO(8)
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