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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA



4 JUN 1982

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

SUBJECT: U.S.-Japan Security Relationship (U)

(S) National Security Study Directive #6-82 calls for a review of economic subjects and for subsequent effects on United States-Japanese security and foreign policy issues.

(S) I am concerned that the order of this study is reversed, i.e. that our security treaty with Japan, which is the linchpin of our relationship, needs to be considered prior to developing courses of action which respond to politically-sensitive interest groups. Indeed, one of the problems we have faced in trying to persuade the Japanese to do significantly more for defense, which should be a major issue in U.S.-Japan relations, is that in this Administration, as in the last, only Defense has consistently raised the defense issue seriously with the GOJ. The President did not raise the defense issue during his meetings in Washington last May, or in Cancun in July, with Prime Minister Suzuki, nor did the Vice President during his meetings in Japan last month. Suzuki and the Japanese anti-defense advocates were pleased that defense was not raised. They were led to believe that they can have the U.S. continue to pay Japan's way. Allowing our allies this degree of largesse is a major issue in the Congress and is an undue burden on American taxpayers and our overworked military establishment.

(S) Early in the Administration, the Secretary of State laid down the guideline of discussing defense with our allies candidly in private on the basis of roles and missions. I told the Senate Armed Services Committee on March 4, 1981 that a rational division of labor under which our NATO allies and Japan would be asked to join us in contributing more to the common defense would be a major thrust of the Administration's defense policy.

(S) Prime Minister Suzuki acknowledged the goal of Japanese self-defense out to 1000 miles. Japan's forces are inadequate for this mission. The problem is that Suzuki does not at present

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have the political will to increase defense spending to the levels necessary (a step-by-step increase from about 0.9 percent of GNP to about 1.8 percent) to achieve the required defense capability within this decade. Despite increasingly favorable public opinion and obvious Japanese capability to fund such a modest defense buildup, Suzuki does not feel compelled to act when the only U.S. pressure comes from the Department of Defense. Without encouragement from the top level of the U.S. Government, he maintains that Japan cannot afford increased defense spending and that the public will not support him if he tries. Both claims are excuses rather than reality. Last year Japan increased military spending by eight percent (four percent without inflation). Japan needs to increase by over ten percent a year in real terms.

(S) Accordingly, I recommend that the attached policy be formally endorsed as U.S. national security policy vis-a-vis Japan, and that all appropriate Departments of the U.S. Government be notified that their relations with Japan should be structured to support, or at least not conflict with, our essential security relationship. Further, I recommend that in future meetings between the President and Japan's Prime Minister the President be encouraged to support increased Japanese defense efforts as a major topic of discussion.

Saps

*P.S. Of course the persuasion has to be done
quickly, privately with Japanese officials, but
firmly!*

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U.S.-JAPAN SECURITY POLICY

I. ~~(S)~~ UNITED STATES OBJECTIVES

A. Our most fundamental objective vis-a-vis Japan is to maintain Japan's Western orientation.

B. We also seek to have Japan obtain real capability as soon as possible (but at least within this decade) to defend its territory.

C. A more equitable Japanese contribution to burden sharing for regional security is necessary.

II. ~~(S)~~ PROBLEM AREAS INVOLVING U.S.-JAPAN SECURITY RELATIONS

A. U.S. Forces are thinly stretched across the Western Pacific and Indian Oceans at the same time the Soviets have and are continuing to increase significantly their capabilities in their Far Eastern military districts.

B. Japan's Self-Defense Forces cannot defend Japanese territory, seas, or skies.

C. There have been negative perceptions in the U.S. of Japan's "free ride" on U.S. largesse and more recently in Japan of U.S. interference in Japan's internal budgetary matters.

III. ~~(S)~~ U.S. SECURITY POLICY: U.S.-JAPAN RATIONAL DIVISION OF LABOR

A. We should seek agreement on achieving a credible, more equitable, and constitutionally acceptable sharing of defense responsibilities in the security area within the 1980s. A four part plan is outlined as follows:

1. In the Northwest Pacific: U.S. provides the nuclear umbrella and offensive projection forces as necessary: Japan provides effective, sustained conventional capability to defend its territory and ocean areas to a distance of 1000 miles from Japan (i.e. west of Guam and north of the Philippines) against the Soviet threat.

2. In the ROK: U.S. provides the nuclear umbrella, projection forces as necessary, and assists the ROK in the defense of its territory. Japan provides economic assistance to the ROK, and logistic support and bases for the U.S. units engaged in ROK defense.

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3. In South Asia: U.S. provides the nuclear umbrella, projection forces as necessary, and SLOC protection forces in remote areas, e.g., Indian Ocean; Japan provides bases in Japan for the use of U.S. forces, a generous cost sharing program for U.S. forces in Japan, and Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) to strategically important areas.

4. In the area of defense technology: U.S. provides Japan with the latest weapons systems for license production or purchase by Japan; Japan continues the policy of nonexport of weapons. Both sides cooperate to share defense technology.

B. In order to encourage Japan to make maximum efforts to achieve the required level of capability within this decade, Japan's 1983-1987 defense program presently under formulation should be a major subject of discussion between the President and Prime Minister Suzuki during their bilateral meetings.

C. Suzuki and other Japanese need to be told privately that over ten percent a year real growth is needed for Japan's self-defense. U.S. officials will not tell the U.S. Congress and public that Japan's efforts are satisfactory when they are not.

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