



INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY AFFAIRS

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ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

Fk (17)

05 MAR 1983

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Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: MAR 28 2019

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

THROUGH: UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY

SUBJECT: My Visit to Africa and Europe, February 17 - March 11, 1983 -- INFORMATION MEMORANDUM (U)

(S) Agenda included Senegal, Liberia, Nigeria, Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, Zaire, Burundi, Kenya, Sudan, Egypt and Germany. An operational requirement necessitated dropping Burundi. The Egyptian stop was related to counter-terrorism; the German stop involved the same subject, as well as debriefing EUCOM DCINC General Smith.

(S) Overall purpose of the trip was to examine status of U.S. security assistance programs in Africa, and to strengthen DoD ties there pursuant to those objectives which militated in favor of establishing a separate African region within ISA.

(S) The attached report addresses specific objectives, results and findings. The most far-reaching conclusion involves our security assistance programs and can be summarized as follows:

(S) With the exception of Chad and Somalia (which in large measure stimulates the threat to herself), our friends in Africa have no real external military threats to themselves. Some are threatened by externally generated subversion, but these threats are, or would be, containable were it not for circumstances described below.

(S) The greatest threat to the security of most of our friends (excepting Senegal and Cameroon) is their own military. Government and military exist in a kind of symbiotic relationship, with the military sustaining the government and the government striving mightily to keep the military content. The latter results in higher and higher levels of spending on equipment, usually purchased with money bought at the market (which Congress persists in construing as "aid"), almost entirely unrelated to any reasonable perception of any external military threat and, with a few small, shining exceptions, of no peripheral utility to the nation. The exceptions would be engineering equipment which can be used for nation-building, civic action programs.

330-85-0023, bx 24, Sudan (9m-9u1)

Classified by: DRASD/ISA
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Continuation of 330-85-0023

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(S) So governments incur higher and higher debt to keep up their end of the "relationship," the economy is degraded commensurately, attendant social inequities persist, the seedbeds of subversion are made increasingly fertile, with the result that a clever statistician could probably draw an exact equation between the levels of U.S. FMSCR and the prospects for the eventual internal collapse of its recipients.

(S) In short, at least in Africa, most security assistance constitutes a tragic contradiction: it virtually assures results contrary to what it seeks to accomplish. If this sounds overly dramatic, the debt figures in the attached report are instructive. Taking the most immediate example, Sudan, our largest security assistance recipient, also has one of the world's highest external debts: approximately \$8 billion, exceeding its entire annual GNP.


(S) This is only in part an argument for more MAP. The overriding requirement is for more economic assistance, less security assistance and, in the context of security assistance, more focus on the use of the military as a nation builder, in which role I believe African military establishments have a unique opportunity.

(S) Beyond all this, I believe our perceptions of the strategic importance of Africa are carried by intuition and popular wisdom rather than hard-headed analysis. Our paramount interests in Africa vis-a-vis the Soviets may go to denial, for economic reasons, rather than access or acquisition for strategic military purposes. We are working this, trying to get clear of the reactive attitude generated by the assumption that if the Soviets have some 41,000 people (including surrogates) there, it must be vital to us.

(S) Our paramount interest rests in keeping Africa from becoming a cockpit for East-West confrontation, and the work here is diplomatic rather than military. The DoD role must be to help wean African military establishments off a course that threatens to make the continent increasingly unstable and thus increasingly hospitable to Soviet opportunism.

(S) The Embassy reports on our visits have been uniformly positive.

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[NOEL C. KOCH]

Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense
International Security Affairs

Attachment
a/s

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Trip Report
Noel C. Koch, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary
(International Security Affairs) and
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
for African Affairs
February 16 - March 11, 1983

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SUBJECT: Wrap-Up; Africa Visits (U)

This trip had a number of specific objectives:

- 1) Assess and advance third country burden-sharing in Africa;
- 2) Obtain first-hand knowledge of security assistance programs in Africa;
- 3) Rejuvenate the C-130 program in Zaire by facilitating return of aircraft and spares now held in Italy pending payment of outstanding Zairian debts;
- 4) Assess status of F-5 program in Kenya in post-August 1 coup attempt circumstances;
- 5) Advance Port Sudan pre-positioning in the positive post-February 18 environment.
- 6) The Egyptian and German visits were related to counter-terrorism.

1) Burden-Sharing

The French are suspicious of U.S. motives in their former colonies/protectorates. In Senegal I met with the French Ambassador and military and in Cameroon with the French military, and in both instances made clear that we saw our positions as complementary rather than competitive, and were quite content to play a supporting role.

As this issue is one which profoundly engages the interest of the Congress in all discussions of defense spending and, more directly, foreign assistance, we should more fully exploit the fact that in terms of total Western bloc security assistance to Africa, the U.S. ranks third behind France and England, with others very close to us. If the figures are worked as a percentage of GNP, total defense spending or similar indices, third country contributions would put us much farther down the list (Tab A). The impressiveness of this fact will be a function of how important one considers Africa to be in the global geo-strategic matrix. This is problematical inasmuch as we have yet to define it with precision, and events have not defined it for us. We are addressing this as rapidly as rigorous analysis permits.

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Another dimension of burden-sharing worth noting: the U.S. efforts do not produce results commensurate with the size of our investment, and pale alongside the accomplishments of other nations engaged in Africa. It is not difficult to speculate on the reasons for this; nations with colonial experience in Africa have the hang of the place, and there is no comparing places like Senegal or Cameroon with, say, Liberia. The most interesting case may be Zaire where France and Belgium have, respectively, the 31st and 21st Brigades, both excellent; we have, for purposes of comparison, the C-130 program, which is a tragic joke.

This is all to mix apples, oranges, and countries, conflicting historical experiences, etc., but one distinction shines through, and can probably not be stated without risking the racial overtone. Where African military elements shine, they are closely run by European officers and NCO's. The French are essentially integral to the Senegalese and Cameroonian military. We have no institutional means for performing a similar role with our clients.

2) Security Assistance Programs - Overall

Without knowing what were the expectations attending our on-going programs in Africa, it is difficult to say if results have been consistent with those expectations. But taking things as they stand now, we have no success stories to date, and none on the horizon.

a. Zaire owned seven C-130's, of which five are still operable. One of them - the President's - flies, all things considered a minor miracle in itself. Two are impounded in Italy for non-payment on a contract distinguished by the graft which shaped it. Two are hangared, many of the spares needed for repair also now hostage in Italy. These suffer from years of ignoring maintenance requirements, recommended flight practices (such as not flying full throttle from the time the engines are turned over until they are shut down); from wiring corroded by years of urinating on the floors of the aircraft, etc. (The remaining two aircraft crashed, both due to pilot error.)

In the past ten years (through FY 1982), Zaire has received \$126,715,000 in U.S. foreign military sales financing: \$115,328,000 FMS credits, \$3,004,000 MAP, \$8,383,000 IMET (for training of 455 students). Today, the country is striving, in one of its periodic fits of economic "reform," to keep the payments current on about \$104,000,000 worth of loans not yet fully paid. It stays one jump ahead of Brooke on a monthly basis. It has little to show for this in terms of enhanced military capability. Net to us: Zaire remains in the Western camp. But there may be a cost here, too. Mobutu is

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not regarded as one of the brighter stars in the African firmament and our association with him does not count for much among other African states nor, in the event of Mobutu's death, does it assure us a continuing role in Zaire.

b. Kenya had 14 F-5's, two of which have crashed. Of those remaining, one has been hangared since 1979, and is now being cannibalized. The program was limping up until August 1, 1982. At that time, Air Force personnel made a bloody coup attempt, which was put down by the Army, and which virtually eliminated the Kenyan Air Force. They are starting all over again, officered by Army personnel switched into blue, and recruiting a new Air Force. It will take them five plus years to get back to the barely acceptable levels of the pre-August 1 situation.

In the meantime, beleaguered by a failing economy and rising debt, Kenya is cutting costs wherever possible and sees its Air Force as one candidate for cuts. Thus, necessary spares and replacement parts are not obtained, and the aircraft fall further into disrepair. If this continues, by the time they have enough trained personnel for an Air Force, it will have no airplanes. To magnify this contradiction, Kenya desperately wants a new air defense radar warning system, preferably the expensive TPS-43 3-dimensional radars for long range air surveillance (and the recent U.S. air defense survey also recommends three more TPS-63 2-dimensional gap-filler radars). This will (would, if credits were available) cost them about \$43 million for just three TPS-43's and, if ordered today, be available in 1985, just in time for their newly constituted Air Force to have no planes to fly against the threat (if there is one, debatable) discovered by the TPS-43's.

The 50th Air Cavalry Brigade had 32 Hughes 500's. Two of these have been destroyed due to pilot error. Thirty are operable, but this is a term of art which involves assumptions: it does not mean all thirty can be flown at any given time. I was told four could, with certainty, be flown.

c. Somalia will take in-country delivery of the three TPS-43's in late CY 1983, at a cost of \$37 million. Her fighter air inventory, as best we know, consists of four fighter squadrons equipped with 29 Chinese F-6/Farmers, and 10 MiG-21/Fishbeds, with no other means of countering an air threat. (Reportedly, appropriate air-to-air weaponry doesn't exist for the few Chinese F-6s operating, and usually only one of the MiG-21's are operable.) The decision to provide this system is an eloquent example of security assistance reasoning toward Africa. Since program inception in 1980, we have

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provided \$85 million in FMS credits for Somalia through early FY 1983, and we have a Congress which, like Somalia's neighbors, sees Somalia itself as the greatest threat to peace on the Horn, and therefore frowns on the provision of lethal hardware. So, since the money "had" to be spent, pressures were exerted by the USG to spend the bulk of the money on something that, taken by itself, has no military utility whatever; i.e., spend it on expensive, difficult to maintain, radars.

d. Sudan is our biggest security assistance recipient in sub-Saharan Africa. With a \$100 million budget last year, we embarked her on an F-5 program. She has two F-5F's. This year she is thus far cut to \$25 million, and has no means of continuing the F-5 program without a hefty supplemental. So her military is leery, wondering whether the debt she has incurred will have simply purchased white elephants.

In these examples, we have put people on programs not demonstrably necessary, and not sustainable without reliably increasing amounts of financial assistance--which criterion is impossible to meet in the current fiscal and political climate.

e. The Liberian Army is a semi-organized mob which holds its government's feet to the fire for better housing, clothes and food, and had better get it. Its military utility is virtually nil, which is fine because the threat to Liberia is virtually nil. But the point, in short, is that our security assistance to Liberia is directed to buying off a mob.

I am uncertain of the legitimacy of all we were shown in Liberia. The barracks program is going well under our TAFT. On the other hand, a schedule conflict made it necessary for me to send a separate delegation to Tubman Academy, billed as the centerpiece of their military restoration process, and while some came back impressed, others insisted they had been shown a Potemkin operation and adduced good evidence in support of their conviction.

Liberia's geo-strategic value to us is arguable; what is palpable is that Liberia is perceived as an American fiefdom, and is therefore a belwether by which the efficacy of relations with the United States is measured. Failure is not an option here. Although, as noted above, we cannot integrate U.S. military into the Liberian military and thus inflict professionalism on them, we can, with a larger U.S. military presence, exert a constructive influence. The importance of this cannot be overstated.

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The recent move by the Liberian Minister of Defense to require soldiers to leave their weapons in the armories was considered a radical step forward. Theretofore, the soldiers had carried their weapons with them, thus facilitating the intimidation of, and extortion from, the civilian population. Chief of State Doe has promised to restore civilian rule by 1985, and efforts to draw up a Constitution are well along. But the military discovered its power in the overthrow of Tolbert and, unless disciplined and professionalized in advance of the turnover, will be reluctant to effect a turnover, Doe or no. This will open the door to adventures by such people as his Marxist Foreign Minister, and my alleged friend, Fahnbulleh.

We will be sending an enhancement TDY, pending acceptance by the Congress of a permanently increased mission. There is opposition to this on the Hill.

3) Zaire-Italian C-130 Contract Dispute

My initial efforts to resolve the Zairian C-130 impasse are reported in the attached cable (Tab B). Since then, we have had follow-on discussion with Siai-Marchetti reps, and indications that Mobutu is looking for a compromise attended by some face-saving arrangement. His former Air Force Chief, Kikunda, is at the center of charges of corruption in the Italian contract; Kikunda is closely identified with Mobutu (and may have been only temporarily sacked), and Mobutu wants (a) absolution, or (b) the blame shifted to the Italians.

We left the President with the clear understanding that our effort to assist both parties toward a resolution of the problem would not be repeated and, if allowed to fail, would leave him with no choice but to sacrifice the planes, or pay for them out of his own budget. (Or his own pocket, which is very deep, indeed.) We also made it clear that this issue was complicating our dealings with Congress and diluting the positive perceptions of his reforms.

So what is taking place now is an elaborate minuet touching on images and avarice. I expect an agreement; I don't necessarily expect to know how it is achieved, but we have changed the chemistry of the situation.

4) Pre-positioning in Sudan

I met with President Nimeiri for more than an hour, and Port Sudan was the principal topic of conversation. He was concerned

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for the instrument by which an agreement might be codified, and the "appearance" resulting from U.S. elements attending the pre-position site. I said we were extremely flexible as to the instrument, and an exchange of a confidential letter of agreement would suffice, but that an American presence was essential. He indicated some accommodation was required on the latter point, as this would create internal difficulties for him, as well as external. I closed off this part of the conversation at that point, as it seemed to be moving toward an impasse, and said that as our Ambassador and his Cabinet Secretary were negotiating, we ought not to prejudice their talks in our conversation. The President agreed.

The following evening, Ambassador Kontos, accompanied by DAS of State Jim Bishop, and two DoD Africa Region representatives (Col. Glenn Lazarus and Vince Kern) met with Dr. Baha, plowed the same ground, and came back with a tentative, verbal agreement which, both caveats notwithstanding, I believe will shortly produce a letter of agreement.

(A point of interest, President Nimeiri expressed dismay toward the Egyptians for what he saw as a craven attempt to disown their own fraternal assistance in the events leading to February 18. Related to the same point, throughout our trip, African leaders expressed deep interest in these events and, with few exceptions and varying degrees of boldness, gave us the same message: You must eliminate Qadhafi.)

Conclusion:

My overall impression of security assistance toward Africa is as follows:

Few of our friends there face serious external threats--serious in the sense that they could be overrun, their governments removed, or significant portions of their populations put at risk for extended periods. Exceptions are Chad, where our assistance is minimal and covert and needs to be increased; and Somalia, which is arguably the agent of its own jeopardy. Some (Kenya, to hear her leadership tell it) face the danger of externally supported subversion. This is better defended against by social and economic stability than by military hardware, the acquisition of which contravenes the development of social and economic stability.

To generalize, the greatest threats to the security of our friends in Africa are internal, are rooted in economic deprivation

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
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and social inequities (some of the consequences of tribal rivalries can be included here), and are manifested in their military elements, which are the armed, more or less organized entities capable of threatening the nation. Liberia is the paradigm here; Kenya has an incipient threat of the same character; Somalia and Sudan may also. Zaire's military is checked and balanced by its best forces being controlled by other nations.

To control the military and have their support, governments must provide for them. To provide for them is to incur debts depriving the public sector, exacerbating economic difficulties and fertilizing the roots of discontent which the military, whose expectations are pegged always to the most recent infusion of money, medals, and hardware, will be increasingly capable of exploiting. So we are, in effect, subsidizing a downward spiral of circular causation, the cumulative effect of which runs counter to our objectives.

I suggest we consider our security assistance programs to all lesser developed countries with this in mind.



NOEL C. KOCH
Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense
International Security Affairs

Attachment
Tabs A and B

Office of the Secretary of Defense *5 USC 5552*
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHIS
Date: 28 MAR 2019 Authority: EO 13526
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TAB 'A

Military Assistance to Sub-Saharan
Africa, 1981 - Mid-1982 (\$US millions)

	<u>Agreements</u>	<u>Deliveries</u>	<u>Military Advisors/ Technicians (Mid-82)</u>
France	252.6	454.8	2,467 (in 12 countries, incl. 126 in Zaire)
UK	222.8	176.2	229 (40 in Nigeria; 85-100 at battalion level in Zimbabwe)
US*	206.7	143.6	100*
W. Germany	37.6	368.0	34 (technicians in Lesotho, Nigeria, Somalia and Zaire)
Portugal	132.2	32.5	-
Italy	49.2	102.7	20 (maint. technicians/ police advisors)
Canada	52.9	38.5	2 (Ghana Staff College)
Egypt	44.5	18.1	25 (15 in Somalia advisory group; 10 in Sudan)
Spain	29.5	13.5	40 (25-35 in Equatorial Guinea)
Switzerland	29.6	2.8	-
Israel	4.6	54.6	?
Brazil	10.7	10.0	-
S. Korea	10.1	13.1	-
Belgium	5.4	12.5	130 (mostly in Zaire)
Saudi Arabia	3.6	13.6	-
Morocco	-	-	120 (mostly security specialists in Equatorial Guinea)

* Does not include IMET.

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