

RG 330  
OASD - Atomic Energy  
→ ACT WORKING PAPERS, 1973-1980

Footnote

63, 67, 70

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SECDEF 29 JULY MEETING

**SYMMETRY AND REDUCTION**

POLICY STATEMENTS (DISTILLED):

- We are seeking Symmetry in the force posture of both sides.
- We are going to match, but not "mirror-image", the Soviets; our forces will not be less than, but will be equal to or greater than theirs.
- We will stress overall/essential equivalence; There is NO alternative.
- Reductions are a necessary ingredient in achieving equivalence.
- We should bring down throw-weight as well as numbers of the other side.
- There is to be essential equivalence in Central systems, including bombers; but also an overall balance with their non-central systems as well as ours, including the alliances of both sides.
- "Essential Equivalence" is to be in both perception and in programs, but need not necessarily be in every point.

THRUST OF GUIDANCE

- Give 'Nominal' attention to VPWG; give them "short answers", but put priorities on our own home work here in the building.
- Do not give CIA a projection of 1985 US Forces.
- Drive down VPWG throats the overall equivalence argument.
- Be more eclectic in our proposals.
- We will not play the game of non-central-systems compensation. ("The purpose of the working group is not to support Soviet propaganda").

TASKS

- Lay out a set of Soviet Programs and their implemantations; then lay out US programs to match; display these as a "curve".
- Start "playing around" with mobile systems.
- [Implicit: Get our FBS/Non-Central Systems data and analyses in order.]

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31 July 1974

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: 29 July Meeting of the SALT Policy Group

Secretary of Defense met with the Policy Group (listing attached) to discuss the current situation in SALT. Dr. Wade went through the prepared book (copy on file in the SALT Task Force). The Secretary queried him on details and provided guidance throughout the meeting.

The first item discussed was the VPWG work program. Relative to the paper on survivability of ICBMs, the Secretary said "we don't even know the right questions"; he gave the guidance (tongue-in-cheek), "Work 'survivability' very hard -- but, give nominal attention to it." He then said, "We in DoD do not need to devote our energies to studies not designed to do something," and went on to make reference to the widely held belief that "study groups are designed to keep the bureaucracies busy."

The Secretary said that "FBS is a good study." He made reference to Fred Wikner's map, and a sarcastic reference to how we should point out to the Soviets their "four thousand weapons directed toward the periphery." The Secretary does not want us to give the CIA a projection of our 1985 forces; "I wouldn't do that -- that's the way they do things over there. It's just a part of the propaganda machine. I think we should work on the problem of projecting strategic systems -- but it's not a bipolar case of what we are or what we are not if we fail to get an agreement." He made the point several times that "the systems are related to various negotiating strategies." He wound up by saying, explicitly, to tell the CIA "go screw themselves."

One of the Sec Def's strongest statements was:

"We have a simple policy, We are going to match them, but we are not going to mirror image them." The first premise to establish with the Soviets is that they are driving the arms race, our forces will be "not less than, equal to or greater than" theirs!

Schlesinger pointed out that the NSC staff keeps subdividing things which are interrelated. He reiterated that we cannot separate projections of force structure from the negotiating environment.

The Secretary said that the so-called "Basic Principles" negotiated between the United States and the USSR are (in Napoleon's words, in reference to "history") "A set of lies that have been agreed upon." He said that as soon as the agreement was made, the other side was given the O.K. to ignore the principles; "I can give you a list of 22 violations."

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Schlesinger then went on to say "there is no alternative but to stress overall equivalence"; we must have numbers, (the "key indices" of Dr. Wade's number 3 alternative). "These must remain the goal and the measurement. There is no backing-off, there is no other formula."

Schlesinger then said that we must turn the "detente" presentation around. We must apply equality to both sides. "If the Soviets want an unequal program, it is they who want to upset detente -- not the United States." The Secretary said that the issue is at what level will we match them. He said we should lay out a set of Soviet programs and implementations, and then lay out the US programs to match them. He said we are negotiating not only with the Russians, but we are negotiating with the NSC and we must "continue driving this argument down their throats." This is the only way to drive the program and to put it across, i.e., essential equivalence.

He said that reduction is a necessary ingredient, to give a pay-off to the Soviets. (I didn't grasp his meaning here.)

Schlesinger then told Dr. Wade, "Don't let them squeeze you into these assignments; let them give longer statements of tasks, then you give them short answers." Schlesinger said that the basic principle is that the US program is not an independent variable, it is a consequence. It is the complex result of the Soviet program [I noted that the Secretary of Defense and in particular the DepSecDef keep pushing reduction].

General Rowny, while agreeing with much of the above, brought up the point that despite what the delegation already had said, Secretary Kissinger has not brought up reductions. He pointed out that it was worthless to have the delegation bring up reductions, unless Kissinger does.

The Secretary and Deputy Secretary gave more credence to Jackson's influence with the Soviets than did General Rowny, but there seemed some consensus that Jackson's posture and statements may be less effective than we had expected -- although Clements kept driving at the point that whatever agreements are made they had to be bought on the Hill, where Jackson had influence.

The Secretary made what I thought was an important point to Dr. Wade, saying that we must be "more eclectic." He said that Wade's alternatives A, B and C really are all part of our proposal. He did pass one piece of guidance, which (if accepted by JCS -- there was no reaction from Brown, Rowny or Georgi) will be helpful; be sure that we do not first go down to a specific spot; instead, we move dynamically, i.e., we bring throw-weight down by time phases as well as numbers, getting the other side to phase out the SS-9 (or whatever the current throw-weight problems are). He then went back to the "eclectic" pitch, pointing out that "your IV is an essential ingredient to all the others. Each of A, B and C fit in with IV, and we ought to talk relative to the total, including bombers."

Schlesinger then went on to say, "This is our theology; there will be an essential equivalence of the central systems. We will discuss non-central

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-2-

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systems -- but, after the central systems have been agreed to. We are prepared to discuss non-central systems, but there will be an overall application between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The alliance system of the United States will not be treated separately from the Allies. We are prepared to balance our alliance related system with their alliance related system, but we are not going to confuse our non-central system with the central system."

At this point Joel Resnick questioned the need for sequential agreement. Schlesinger backed off from his previous statements, to say we do not need sequential agreements, if we can agree "in principle." He said we will not play their game of non-central systems compensation. "We paid for non-central systems three times in SALT I." He did say (and here I sense a considerable difference between his approach and General Rowny's) that "we will not go back to the Jerry Smith proposal to do things section-by-section." He said we should settle on a gross number, maybe 25 or 26 hundred, including the bombers.

The Secretary of Defense then gave a historical discourse on just why we previously have not wanted to talk about non-central systems; his rationale was primarily based on our belief in no compensation. He then began to get quite exercised, relative to public statements by Kissinger, and said, "You can assure the fellows on the VPWG that the purpose of the working group is not to support Soviet propaganda."

He said "Our priority energies should be devoted to homework here in the building; use your play time for the VPWG papers." He went on to again reaffirm "We are seeking symmetry in the force postures. It is the Soviet's aggressive position and their programs that are threatening symmetries. The Secretary said he supposed that "we should start playing around with mobile systems." (There was a general murmur of assent). He said we should explain this by telling the Soviets "they are driving us -- we will be glad to knock it off if they are reasonable."

General Brown made his only statement at the meeting by coming out with a suggestion of carrying out the Minuteman Air-Mobile shoot, using the C-5. Schlesinger cautioned him in being careful of what cities we plan to fly over, noting that we must be very cautious of public reaction. He recounted how the rail-mobile Minuteman was "killed", when the models were shown to the Congress and the then-Congressman Mel Laird asked what city the models were depicted beside, and was told "Chicago." The project was "dead" from that minute on!

Schlesinger went on to make a very important modifying statement, saying, "the point is not that we have "essential equivalence" [I think he meant here in the technical military sense] at every point in time, but that the perception of equivalence always must be there. We do not need to be meticulous in throw-weight equivalence, as long as we have programs that are balanced. He then made a long discourse on the current major differences between the actual numbers of US and Soviet systems and how both the analysts and the general public talked about them.

The Secretary went on to say that, "on our own we should work up this parallel structure." He said that we must tell the Soviets that, "we are

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-3-

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running a three legged race. Every time they move their leg we move ours." In talking again about the parallel structure that we should develop, he said "we should show this curve to the Soviets, and tell them that they can pick any point on the curve of the structure; that we will match it."

At this point Clements got into the act, speaking at some length to point out that "Our first problem is with Henry:

1. He does not believe that we can or will match the USSR in a three legged race.
2. He does not believe in reduction."

Rowny again interjected himself, to point out that we have two new factors to deal with:

- (1) We have the advantage of a 1985 date, and
- (2) The realization, by Henry (relative to the Russians) that he cannot get what he wants by the way that he wants to get it.

Toward the end of the meeting, Amos Jordan attempted to ask what we should do in the event the US public would not support our approach. Schlesinger cut him off rapidly, as did Clements, essentially saying, "They will! Its been demonstrated! They've got to.

However, the point was made, with no disagreement, that "the Soviets now are willing to test the US system and whether we will indeed match them."

Bill Beecher made the final point at the session by saying that the only thing that we can do is to go for symmetry and reductions. If the American public senses that the Russians don't want these, then the public will be behind us.

Retrospect: Note that no statement made by Marty Hoffman, Kaufman, Andy Marshall, and the "back benchers."

There was participation by question and comment (though not sufficiently substantive to record) by Don Cotter and Ellsworth.

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-4-  
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DOD SALT POLICY GUIDANCE COMMITTEE

29 July 1974, Secretary's Dining Room

ATTENDEES

Secretary of Defense Schlesinger  
Deputy Secretary of Defense Clements  
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen George S. Brown  
Doctor Wade (Executive Secretary)

Ambassador Ellsworth, ASD(ISA)  
Mr. Jordan, DASD(ISA)  
Mr. Cotter, ASD(AE)  
Mr. Andrew Marshall, Director of Net Assessment  
Mr. Bill Beecher, OASD(PA)  
Mr. Hoffman, General Counsel  
Mr. Kaufmann, Consultant to the Secretary  
Lt General Rowny, OJCS  
Maj General Wickham, OSD

BG William Georgi, OJCS, J-5  
Dr. Harry Sauerwein, OASD-I  
Mr. Joel Resnick, OASD-PA&E  
Mr. T. K. Jones, DDR&E  
Col Donald S. Marshall, SALT Task Force  
LTC Howard Graves, OSD

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