

EXTRA

#1

~~Secret~~

CIA Section 6.2(d)
OSD Section 6.2(d)

NIE 36.5-81

LIBYA: AIMS
AND VULNERABILITIES

Information available as of 25 January 1981 was
used in the preparation of this Estimate.

Office of the Secretary of Defense
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS
Date: 20 SEP 2019 Authority: EO 13526 + 5 U.S.C. § 552
Declassify: _____ Deny in Full: _____
Declassify in Part: X
Reason: 6.2(d)
MDR: 19 -M- 0003

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: SEP 20 2019

19-M-0003

~~Secret~~

330-88-0143, b x 1, Libya

[REDACTED]

KEY JUDGMENTS

Libyan leader Qadhafi's quest for world status springs from both his own personality and a unique, often militant view of Arab nationalism and Islam. This perspective and Qadhafi's recent success in Chad ensure that his aggressive policies will pose a growing challenge to US and Western interests in the Middle East and Africa.


The relative economic well-being of the Libyan public, combined with Qadhafi's vigorous program of internal security, work to protect him and provide wide scope for his foreign adventures. Although popular discontent with Qadhafi is growing, domestic and exile opposition to his regime is poorly organized and ineffective. He retains almost complete control of the military. If Qadhafi becomes bogged down in Chad—and especially if France, Egypt, and other African states support an anti-Libyan resistance—disillusionment in the Libyan military could combine with domestic unhappiness to mount a serious—perhaps definitive—challenge to his rule.

Libya's opposition to any Arab accommodation with Israel, Qadhafi's ungenerous and unreliable approach to dispensing aid, and his intrigues against moderate governments have led to Libya's near ostracism in the Arab world. Moreover, involvement in Chad represents his first large-scale military intervention in Sub-Saharan affairs. It is likely to spur more adventurism against already deeply alarmed neighboring states, even though the increasing burden of maintaining forces in Chad will become a growing liability.

Libya's most serious potential weapon against the United States is not its 10-percent share of the US crude and product import market but its critical share of light, low-sulfur crude, on which most US east coast refineries are seriously dependent. A prolonged cutoff of Libyan crude would tighten gasoline supplies and boost prices in the United States and could lead to short-term shortages until constrained refineries offset the shortfall.

The American community in Libya—more than 2,000 persons—is vulnerable to Libyan retaliation, including arbitrary arrest, if Qadhafi feels threatened by the United States. Tripoli's threats to defend its unilaterally claimed air and territorial waters jurisdiction in the Mediterranean, coupled with its improved military capabilities, could result in a clash with US naval vessels or military aircraft.


CIA Section 6.2(d)
OSD Section 6.2(d)



Soviet objectives are served by Qadhafi's anti-Western policies and destabilization of African regimes. Additionally, the Soviets gain substantial hard currency earnings from massive arms sales to Libya.

Qadhafi's relations with Moscow—particularly regarding arms purchases—have become progressively broadened in recent years, and could result ultimately in his signing a treaty of friendship and cooperation and/or granting port access to the USSR.

CIA Section 6.2(d)
OSD Section 6.2(d)



Unclassified
62999 1-41

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: SEP 20 2019