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THE ATLANTIC COMMAND
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HISTORICAL REPORT
OF
COMMANDER IN CHIEF ATLANTIC
CALENDAR YEAR 1973

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From: Commander in Chief Atlantic
To: Distribution List
Subj: Annual Historical Report of the Commander in Chief
Atlantic for Calendar Year 1973
Ref: (a) JCS SM-665-69 of 3 Oct 1969
Encl: (1) Annual Historical Report of CINCLANT for Calendar
Year 1973

1. Subject report is submitted in accordance with reference (a).
2. This document, as a whole, is classified SECRET. Individual parts have been marked with the appropriate declassification schedule, and individual pages have been classified separately according to the highest classification of their content.

A. H. ADAMS
Deputy Chief of Staff

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Date: 11 Jul 2019 Authority: EO 13526

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Declassify in Part: X

Reason: 3.3(b)(1)(B)(i)(a) + 6.2(h) + 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3); 10 U.S.C. § 424 + 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5), 10 U.S.C. § 1906

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ANNUAL HISTORICAL REPORT OF CINCLANT FOR CALENDAR YEAR 1973

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PART I

ADMINISTRATION

**1. CURRENT COMMANDER IN CHIEF, DEPUTY AND CHIEF OF STAFF AND
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF**

Admiral Ralph Wynne COUSINS, U. S. Navy, Commander in Chief Atlantic, assumed duty on 31 October 1972.

Vice Admiral Douglas Caulfield PLATE, U. S. Navy, Deputy and Chief of Staff, Commander in Chief Atlantic, assumed duty on 1 February 1973.

Major General Arthur Harvey ADAMS, U. S. Marine Corps, Deputy Chief of Staff, Commander in Chief Atlantic, assumed duty on 1 July 1972.

2. PERSONNEL ALLOWANCE

a. The personnel allowance for the CINCLANT Headquarters as of 30 December 1973 was as follows:

OFFICER	ENLISTED	CIVILIAN	TOTAL
171	145	43	359

This is a net decrease of forty-four military billets from 30 December 1972 and an increase of two civilian billets.

b. Effective 1 July 1973, JCS approved the establishment of the CINCLANT Airborne Command Post (ABNCP) JTD which resulted in a decrease of forty-four military positions on the CINCLANT Joint Staff. Military billets authorized for the ABNCP are as follows:

	USA	USM	USAF	USMC
OFFICER	11	11	09	02
ENLISTED	03	01	07	0

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c. Total billets authorized for the CINCLANT Joint Staff
for each of the armed services are as follows:

	<u>USA</u>	<u>USN</u>	<u>USAF</u>	<u>USMC</u>
OFFICER	29	101	28	13
ENLISTED	10	118	12	05
CIVILIANS		43		

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
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CURRENT STAFF ORGANIZATION CHART
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KEY CINCLANT STAFF PERSONNEL

31 DECEMBER 1973

Commander in Chief: ADM Ralph W. Cousins, USN/1120

Political Advisor: Ambassador Emory C. Swank, FSO-1

Aide and Executive Assistant: CAPT [REDACTED]

USN/1310

Aide and Flag Secretary: CDR [REDACTED] USN/6203

Deputy and Chief of Staff: VADM Douglas C. Plate, USN/1110

Inspector General: RADM Robert H. Gormley, USN/1310

U. S. Liaison Officer SACLANT: CAPT [REDACTED]

USN/1310

Protocol: LCDR [REDACTED] USN/1110

U. S. Representative Sea Spray: CAPT [REDACTED]

USN/1120

U. S. Awards Board: Mrs. Mildred R. Witt, GS-9

Public Affairs Officer: CAPT [REDACTED] USN/1650

Deputy Chief of Staff: MGEN Arthur H. Adams, USMC/08

Information Systems Officer: CAPT [REDACTED]

USN/1310

Legal Officer: CAPT [REDACTED] USN/2500

Ass't Chief of Staff, Intelligence: CAPT [REDACTED]

USN/1630

Ass't Chief of Staff, Operations: CAPT [REDACTED]

USN/1110

CINCLANT Airborne Command Post: CAPT [REDACTED]

USN/1310

Ass't Chief of Staff, Plans: CAPT [REDACTED]

USN/1310

Ass't Chief of Staff, Communications: CAPT [REDACTED]

USN/1100

Ass't Chief of Staff, Personnel/Administration CAPT [REDACTED]

USN/1310

Ass't Chief of Staff, Logistics Operations and Plans:

Capt [REDACTED] USN/1120

Ass't Chief of Staff, Supply: RADM John C. Shepard, SC,

USN/3100

Ass't Chief of Staff, Medicine: RADM Richard D. Neuman,

MC, USN/2100

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PART II

INTELLIGENCE

1. ~~(S)~~ INTELLIGENCE PLANS AND PROGRAMS BRANCH (U)

a. ~~(S)~~ Joint Plans Section (U)

(1) (U) Review and revision of operation plans and orders during the year was highlighted by a major review of contingency plans related to Cuba, which included preparation of a comprehensive estimate concerning Cuban military disposition and capabilities.

(2) (U) In response to other staff requirements, threat estimates were prepared concerning the Soviet threat in the Atlantic to support command requirements in the JSOP and also concerning Iceland and the Azores.

(3) (U) For Exercise HIGH HEELS 73, conducted concurrent with WINTER 73 in March 1973, preparation of scenario items and coordination of pre-exercise intelligence functions were executed by the staff representative to the Exercise Directorate Staff. Major benefit from the exercise for Intelligence Division personnel was overall review of procedures to be used in major crisis situations.

(4) (U) The CHINCLANT joint field training exercise, EXOTIC DANCER VI, conducted in April 1973, involved preparation of supporting intelligence automated data bases, inter-service coordination, and execution of intelligence tasks, including a major SIGINT (Signal Intelligence) input in support of exercise play. Major intelligence objectives to improve SIGINT play and procedures and continued efforts to refine air targeting procedures were achieved.

(5) ~~(S)~~ Responsibility for the intelligence aspects of ~~ALL TIME~~, a recurring procedural exercise related to SIOP (Single Integrated Operation Plan) execution, was assumed

~~CHIEF OF STAFF~~
~~JOINT CHIEF OF STAFF~~
~~CHIEF OF STAFF FOR SECURITY~~
~~CHIEF OF STAFF FOR SECURITY ORDER 11650~~
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by the Branch in June 1973. Intelligence input for each exercise includes preparation, coordination, and presentation of an appropriate scenario.

b. ~~487~~ Program Management Section (U)

(1) ~~487~~ Intelligence production management for both CINCLANT and CINCLANTFLT (Commander in Chief U. S. Atlantic Fleet) involved the tasking of CO FICLANT (Commanding Officer, Fleet Intelligence Center Atlantic); CINCARLANT (Commander in Chief U. S. Army Forces, Atlantic); and CINCAFALANT (Commander in Chief U. S. Air Force Forces, Atlantic). In line with this function, [REDACTED]

DIA 3.3(b)(1)
OSD 3.3(b)(1)

(2) ~~487~~ By CINCLANT message 282225Z September 1973, this command accepted intelligence production responsibility for the USCINCSO area for tactical target materials, emergency evacuation support folders, and conversion of automated intelligence data bases for Latin America so that the data would be usable with the remote terminal of WMCSS (World-wide Military Command and Control System). This action was also accepted as being a new memorandum of understanding between the two commands for intelligence production.

(3) ~~487~~ On 10-11 December 1973, a Branch representative attended an intelligence production conference at the United States Army Forces Command Intelligence Center, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, concerning the standardization of the format for the emergency evacuation study series. In addition, man-hour factors for each element of the study were determined.

(4) ~~487~~ Coordinated and reviewed General Defense Intelligence Program procedures and submission with activities responsible for various program elements under Program III of the Five-Year Defense Program, such as FICLANT, LANCOMINTWRCM (Atlantic Command Electronic Intelligence Center), Atlantic Command IDSS (Intelligence Data Handling System), and Atlantic Command Defense Special Security System. Reviewed similar submission of Army and Air Force components supporting the Atlantic Command. Also reviewed

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the CIRIS (Consolidated Intelligence Resources Information System) submission from subordinate activities. On 8 August 1973, reviewed and submitted resource requirements under Part II, Annex A, Joint Strategic Objectives Plan, FY-76-83, by program element.

(5) (U) On 10 January 1973, submitted the annual response to DIA on the Intelligence Career Development Program.

(6) (U) On 5-6 February 1973, representatives of CINCLANT (J2), PICLANT, and LANTCOMINTCEN were briefed by DIA representatives on the concept for a proposed IMIS (Intelligence Management Information System). On 2 October 1973, another conference was held to review a draft IMIS. On 6 December 1973, comments were consolidated from local representatives and forwarded to DIA.

(7) (U) On 21 May 1973, a conference was held to discuss the Intelligence Center Issue. Representatives from the TAC (Tactical Air Command), 480th RTG (Reconnaissance Technical Group), COMAROC (U. S. Continental Army Command), CONWIC (Continental Army Command Intelligence Center), and PICLANT attended. Representatives [REDACTED] on 22-25 May 1973, discussed the Center issue at the above commands. On 18-19 June 1973, representatives from the Branch attended a conference at DIA to prepare and finalize a report on the Intelligence Center Issue. The issue concerned the reduction of resources and manpower and the realignment of activities for intelligence production. The decision that particularly affected CINCLANT was the merger of PICLANT and PICER (SAC Intelligence Center Europe) at Norfolk, Virginia, effective 1 July 1974.

(8) (U) On 10 July 1973, submitted comments to DIA to be included in the Report to the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board.

(9) (U) Maintained records and disbursed Collection and Classification of Information funds, as directed.

(10) (U) Coordinated, edited, and submitted the Intelligence Division history to the Command Historian for inclusion in the annual command historical report to the JCS.

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2. (b) AIR AND TARGET INTELLIGENCE BRANCH (U)

a. (U) Produced Source Data cards for Revisions N and O to the SIOP (Single Integrated Operation Plan) for CINCPACFLT aircraft sorties; submitted data cards to the JSTPS (Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff) for inclusion in SIOP planning.

[REDACTED]

b. (U) Provided guidance and computer system support to CINCPACFLT during the generation of aircraft routes for Revisions N and O to the SIOP.

c. (U) Branch officers briefed targeting philosophy and procedures, within the framework of a general SIOP indoctrination program conducted by the Nuclear Operations Center, to personnel of deploying aircraft carriers requiring SIOP training.

[REDACTED]

d. (U) Reliability data were compiled, a target list with associated weapon requirements produced; and survivability factors reviewed for the CINCPACFLT Nuclear Weapons Requirements Study for the period 1974-1982.

e. (U) Branch officers and enlisted personnel provided assistance to the CINCPACFLT Nuclear Operations Center for Exercise HIGH HAWK '73 and Exercises AGLOW-STREAK, TARGO, and UNIFORM. They were responsible for Intelligence liaison and aircraft reconnaissance reporting during the exercises.

f. (U) Distribution of JCS planning charts to units in the Atlantic Fleet was updated.

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i. (U) Branch personnel attended the JSTPS Annual Orientation Briefing at Offutt Air Force Base, Omaha, Nebraska, 1-4 October 1973.

j. (U) The Branch provided command representation at the Supreme Allied Commander Europe Nuclear Targeting Coordination Conference at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, during the period 25-29 June 1973.

k. (U) In support of Annex C to CINCLANTFLT Operation Plan 2125, OPERATION HOMECOMING, the Branch Head provided coordination in the final development of intelligence debriefing plans. The Branch Head served as the Senior Intelligence Debriefing Coordinator at Philadelphia Naval Hospital during OPERATION HOMECOMING. The Strategic Target Analyst Officer served as an Intelligence debriefer at Portsmouth Naval Hospital.

l. (U) Branch ADP (Automated Data Processing) personnel modified existing computer software and designed new programs in compliance with recent changes in Source Data Card formats and requirements set forth by JSTPS.

m. (U) The Branch Head represented CINCLANT at a meeting with JSTPS, CNO, Naval Command System Support Activity, and CINCPAC representatives at Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska, on 19-20 April and again in Washington, D.C., 12-15 November 1973, to discuss the feasibility of developing a standardized STDP Planning Software System for CINCLANT and CINCPAC, and has continued to monitor and coordinate this project.

n. (U) The target list for CINCLANT OPLAN 2310 received one major revision as a result of a comprehensive review of the existing data base for air targeting in the LAWCOM area.

o. (D) In accordance with JGPs, a chapter entitled "Targeting" was prepared for the ACTOP (Atlantic Command Intelligence Operating Procedures), CG 90-4.

p. (C) CINCLANT was tasked with the responsibility for the maintenance of target intelligence and the production of ATIG's (Automated Tactical Target Graphics) for telecommunication, transportation, and ground force installations in the LAWCOM and USSEOUTHCOM areas of responsibility.

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a. (U) Conducted a review of the distribution of target materials produced for CINCLANT by FICLANT.

3. ~~4.5.7~~ INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT AND INDICATIONS BRANCH (U)

a. (U) General. The Intelligence Support and Indications Center features a location adjacent to the Atlantic Command Joint Operations Center, an all-source briefing room, and is collocated with the IDBS computer.

b. ~~4.5.7~~ CINCLANT Indications Center (U)

(1) (U) The CINCLANT Indications Center continued to fully participate in the Worldwide Indications System. Warning and support intelligence was provided to higher, adjacent, and subordinate commands on a 24-hour-a-day basis. Real-time analysis was provided by the Center in such functional areas as Soviet naval and air activity in the Atlantic and Indian Oceans and Caribbean Sea; Cuban naval, air, and ground activity; Haitian and Dominican Republic military-political activity, as well as in other areas of interest to this command.

(2) ~~4.5.7~~ The Maritime Panel continued to provide direct support to SSN's and SSBW's which included briefings and special support packages. In June 1973, the panel commenced an exhaustive revision of the PPID (Polaris/Poseidon Intelligence Digest), a unique and specialized publication tailored to the intelligence requirements of SSBW's. Additionally, the Maritime Panel continued production of periodic SIS's (Special Intelligence Summaries) for use by staff flag officers and other key personnel, special inputs to the CINCLANT DIS (Daily Intelligence Summary), and continued to provide analytical support to CINCLANT collection efforts as well as routine processing and evaluation of other finished intelligence to support CINCLANT planning and operations.

(3) ~~4.5.7~~ ROSIC NORVA (Fleet Ocean Surveillance Information Center, Norfolk) (U)

(a) ~~4.5.7~~ operating as an integral staff element, ROSIC NORVA continued to provide timely and pertinent information derived within the Atlantic Command area to CINCLANT/CINCLANTFLT, the OSIS (Ocean Surveillance Information System), appropriate commanders in the Atlantic Command, and to National Authorities as directed. The year is best described

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as a period when embryonic efforts in product-generation and intelligence support fully developed and reached a mature and efficient level. The FOSIC received, processed, analyzed, and correlated, on a timely basis, perishable ocean surveillance information collected by U. S. and friendly foreign surveillance, reconnaissance, and intelligence collection assets in the Atlantic Command area. Using a locally-keyed channel of the Fleet Broadcast, as well as other means when necessary, the FOSIC disseminated to appropriate U. S. operational commanders and Fleet units on a near real-time basis both raw sensor reports and analyzed tactical intelligence concerning Soviet and other Warsaw Pact surface, sub-surface, and air activity in the Atlantic Command area of responsibility.

(b) ~~REF~~ The FOSIC continued production of the daily LNIS (Atlantic Naval Intelligence Summary) for general Fleet consumption, the daily SUBINTSUM (Submarine Intelligence Summary) in support of Commander Submarine Forces, U. S. Atlantic Fleet units, and the AFM (Attache Support Message) for various Defense Attache Offices in order to enhance on-the-quid intelligence exchanges with their respective host nationals. FOSIC personnel continued to work in close coordination with Commander Task Force TWO FOUR, U. S. Second Fleet, Commander Oceanographic System Atlantic, and other collocated commands to provide the best possible all-source submarine data analysis and dissemination. Additionally, the FOSIC disseminated the results of its analysis of ocean surveillance information within the CINCLANT/CINCPACFLT staff by means of daily briefings and special studies and presentations.

(c) ~~REF~~ Notable qualitative improvements in FOSIC reporting began in March 1973 with the generation of a knowingly tailored message which reported Soviet Bloc/Chinese merchant shipping in port/en route COMUS. In June 1973, a system of confidence factors for contact positions for both periodic and aperiodic support messages was adopted. During the year, tailored reporting for specific Fleet activities became routine. All aircraft carrier and major combatant transits were so supported, as were submarine acoustic training, various research, development, test, and evaluation efforts, and major exercises such as SWIFT MOVE. Expanded reporting requirements were paralleled by the complete manning of FOSIC billets.

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(4) ~~REF~~ The Air Panel maintained a current all-source plot on all Soviet out-of-area flights and missile activity in the CINCLANT area. Information was provided frequently for the morning intelligence briefing and related daily messages. Threat briefings on Soviet/Bloc air and missile capabilities were given on an "as required" basis. The year was marked also by several significant occurrences, which included:

(a) ~~REF~~ Soviet flights over the North Atlantic Ocean and the Norwegian Sea showed a marked increase over the previous year. A total of 1151 Soviet aircraft operated out-of-area during 1973, an increase of 198 over the 1972 total. However, only 118 of these aircraft flew as far south as the GIUK (Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom) gap compared with 123 in 1972.

(b) ~~REF~~ On 4 January 1973, the first known TU-95/Bear Delta solo flight outside the Soviet-controlled area occurred during a flight from Cuba to the USSR. The Bear had deployed to Cuba in September 1972, and was stranded there as a result of damage sustained from unknown causes, possibly in a landing mishap at Jose Marti International Airport. As the Bear proceeded northward, it rendezvoused with two additional Tu-95's east of Newfoundland. The three aircraft returned to the USSR in formation. This flight also ended the longest continuous out-of-area deployment by a Bear to Cuba.

(c) ~~REF~~ A unique aspect of the Soviet Spring Exercise conducted over the Norwegian Sea, was the participation of LRA (Long Range Air) Bear Alpha free-ball bombers in coordinated flight operations with a Naval Bear Foxtrot (the ASW [anti-submarine warfare] variant of the Bear). These were the first noted instances of LRA Bears possibly working with the Naval Bear Foxtrot in ASW exercises.

(d) ~~REF~~ Soviet Naval Aviation Bear Delta aircraft conducted two deployments to Cuba, from 21 March to 5 April 1973 and from 20 to 28 July 1973. During the first visit, the two Bears flew a round robin reconnaissance mission along the eastern seaboard of the United States, probably in response to Exercise RHYTHM DANCER VI, which involved the U. S. carriers USS JOHN F. KENNEDY (CVA 63) and USS INDEPENDENCE (CVA 62). Two reconnaissance missions were

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flown from Cuba by the two Bears involved in the July 1973 deployment. These flights were unprecedented because they were reconnaissance missions by solo Bear Delta's over the Atlantic. This activity was possibly in conjunction with U. S. task groups operating in the Atlantic. The deployments were the eleventh and twelfth to Cuba since 1970.

(e) ~~(b)~~ Between 3 and 8 July 1973, the Soviets flew 14 sorties, eight TU-95/Bear D and six TU-16/Badgers, in reconnaissance of Exercise TRANSLANTEX-73. Another "first" occurred when intercept by AVA-8A, Harrier, fighters from the USS GUAM (LPH 9) was accomplished on these aircraft.

(f) ~~(b)~~ The year witnessed the first deployment of Soviet Bear Delta aircraft to Conakry, Guinea, on 11 July 1973. This flight was followed by three additional such flights on 26 September, 8 October, and 27 October 1973, with two Bears remaining in Guinea at the close of the year. In all but the last case, round robin reconnaissance missions were performed from Guinea, the primary target being U. S. shipping transiting the Atlantic to the Mediterranean.

(g) ~~(b)~~ On 21 September 1973, two ID-38/May ASW aircraft flew south over the Atlantic Ocean to an area west of the Hebrides. This was the first recorded occurrence of a flight by May aircraft beyond the GULF gap.

(h) ~~(b)~~ Soviet air reaction to NATO Exercise SWIFT MOVE, from 2 through 8 October 1973, was of lower intensity than during any previous similar NATO exercise since before 1969. On 4 October 1973, a mid-air collision occurred between a Soviet TU-16/Badger and an F4B/Phantom from the USS JOHN F. KENNEDY (CVA 67). The Phantom was slightly damaged and recovered on the carrier without further incident. Damage to the Badger was questionable. The aircraft appeared to be flying normally as it left the exercise area, but Soviet officials subsequently claimed an extensive and severe casualty.

4. ~~(b)~~ COLLECTION AND REQUIREMENTS BRANCH (U)

a. ~~(b)~~ The Collection and Requirements Branch acted as principal advisor to the ACDS for Intelligence on all matters pertaining to all-source intelligence requirements, collection, and reporting; prepared the Atlantic Fleet Intelligence Collection Plan; assisted in the formulation

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and review of EBI (Essential Elements of Information) for inclusion in operation plans and operation orders; prepared instructions regarding Intelligence collection and reporting by subordinates; managed the ICR (Intelligence Collection Requirement) program and prepared the ICR Registry. Additional responsibilities under Branch cognizance included responsibility for HUMINT (Human Intelligence) matters, and updating the AFMFICM (Atlantic Fleet Naval Forces Intelligence Collection Manual).

(1) ~~(S)~~ As manager of the ICR Program, this Branch held 103 ICR's for collection and 37 for information at the end of the year. Of these, three were initiated for levy upon CINCFLT resources. These are, for the most part, short term ICR's designed to obtain specific intelligence information to fill gaps in our holdings on ports and harbors. These are levied upon ships making routine port visits.

(2) (U) The USS THOMAS J. GATES (DER 326), and USS CALZETERRA (DER 390), which had been valuable additions to the tactical intelligence collection program, were decommissioned.

(3) ~~(S)~~ Photographic requirements were forwarded to DIA for validation and inclusion in the IROL (Tactical Reconnaissance Objectives List). Collection was then based on priority and availability of a suitable sensor. CINCFLT continued to periodically update the IROL which includes component and subordinate commanders' photographic requirements.

(4) ~~(S)~~ The Atlantic Fleet Combat Camera Group maintained a pool of KH-93A Retina Camera units and Mamiyaflex cameras for purposes of intelligence collection for all Atlantic Fleet ships. During the year the camera pool was discontinued and new procedures were established whereby each ship is authorized to procure its own photographic camera. This provides all deploying CINCFLT ships (especially those deploying on short notice) with a camera specifically identified for intelligence collection purposes.

(5) ~~(S)~~ The AFMFICM, which was reissued in May and June 1973, has been promulgated throughout the U. S. Atlantic Fleet as the basic requirements and guidance statement for intelligence collection against Soviet naval forces by the

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U. S. Atlantic Fleet. The AFMFICM serves to consolidate information found in diverse publications. Reporting chapters impose no new or different reporting instructions than those now existing in other directives. Instead, they digest and reiterate existing reporting requirements. In order to keep all CINCLANTFLT naval forces apprised of current requirements, the first change to the new revision is now in preparation.

5. (U) MAPS, CHARTS, AND GEODESY BRANCH

a. (U) Rear Admiral James B. Hildreth, Deputy Director, Defense Mapping Agency, visited the Atlantic Command on 18 and 19 April 1973 to brief members of the staff and component commands concerning the status of mapping and charting for the Atlantic Command.

b. (U) The Defense Mapping Agency began delivering Deployable Point Positioning Data Bases 15 May 1973 to VA (Attack Squadron) 42, Naval Air Station, Oceana. The U. S. Army Engineer Topographic Laboratory, Ft. Belvoir, Virginia loaned VA 42 one APPS (Analytical Photogrammetric Positioning System) for 90 days beginning in May 1973. Personnel who evaluated the APPS at VA 42 recommended that each CVA (attack aircraft carrier) and each Readiness Training Squadron be equipped with an APPS. The APPS was tested and evaluated by the Engineering Center. The system met the target positioning requirements of A6B and E-111 bombers. In November 1973, the DMARDC provided VA 42 with an APPS on a permanent basis.

c. (U) On 9 May 1973, the Defense Mapping Agency Hydrographic Center was requested to send Customer Liaison Teams to the Atlantic Fleet to bring to the operating forces information of value to all users of navigation charts and publications. The visits were made from October to November 1973 and proved to be highly successful. More visits are scheduled for CY-74.

d. (U) In August and September 1973, the Atlantic Command participated in the testing and evaluation of a prototype JOG-R (Joint Operations Graphic-Radar) and an Invasion and Escape Chart. The radar depiction method used for the prototype JOG-R was proposed by Atlantic Command personnel.

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a. (U) On 17 August 1973, the Defense Mapping Agency was requested to provide current mapping and charting products for Joint Exercise SOLID SHIELD 74. The project consisted of revising 19 1:50,000 scale map sheets, and production of four new JOG - Ground, JOG - Air, and JOG - Radar Charts. The products are to be delivered during February and March 1974.

b. (U) CINCLANTFLTINST C3881.2 was published on 7 November 1973, and replaced CINCLANTFLT Publication 51-3G. The new instruction establishes a map and chart allowance list for the Atlantic Fleet.

c. (U) The Branch Head attended the NATO Maps and Charts Working Party in Belgium during December 1973 as CINCPACFLT representative.

d. (U) On 9 August 1973, the Atlantic Command submitted CINCLANTFLT's, CINCPACFLT's, and CINCARLANT's annual Mapping, Charting, and Geodesy Area Requirements to the Defense Mapping Agency. The submission also required coordination with SECDEF, SOUTHCOM, and JCS.

e. (U) The Branch continued to accomplish routine MCAG support to the command.

6. (U) COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND DISCLOSURE BRANCH

a. (U) Counterintelligence

(1) (U) Reviewed and updated counterintelligence appendices to CINCLANT operation plans and reviewed subordinate counterintelligence planning.

(2) (U) Monitored counterintelligence activities and conducted command and staff briefings regarding specific counterintelligence activities.

(3) (U) Monitored compromises of classified information within the command and took action on incidents occurring in the Intelligence Division.

(4) (U) Conducted liaison with U. S. Coast Guard regarding PADIS (Prevention and Detection of Illegal Entry) into the United States.

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(5) (U) Coordinated and prepared intelligence related aspects of major review of nuclear weapons storage security.

(6) (U) Maintained liaison with other military and counterintelligence activities and with appropriate civilian agencies, including coordination of protective security services for a presidential visit and several major changes of command ceremonies.

(7) (U) Revised counterintelligence guidance in Atlantic Command Intelligence Operating Procedures

(8) (U) Provided staff supervision of information forwarded for the Department of Defense CONUS Port Security Study.

b. (U) Disclosure. Authorized, delegated, and monitored disclosures of classified military information to foreign nationals and maintained disclosure authorizations for foreign visitors.

7. (U) ADMINISTRATION

a. (U) Personnel - The FY-1974 Joint Table of Distribution was approved by JCS in February 1973. This document authorized the following personnel for joint billets in the Intelligence Division:

	<u>NAVY</u>	<u>ARMY</u>	<u>AIR FORCE</u>	<u>MC</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
OFFICERS	28	6	6	1	41
ENLISTED	32	4	2	1	39
CIVILIAN	17				17

b. (U) The allowance was modified twice during the year as follows:

(1) (U) One Naval Analyst officer billet was deleted as of 18 April 1973 in partial compensation for the establishment of the CINCPAC Inspector General's staff.

(2) (U) JCS 262054Z August 1973 authorized the creation of the Information System Security Officer billet and two assistants for FY-75 planning purposes. In order to establish the J203 billet in FY-74, compensation was offered.

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in the form of a Navy Warrant Officer billet. The compensation was accepted by JCS, and the Information System Security Officer billet was established.

(3) (U) The loss of two Navy officer billets and the gain of one GS changed the above totals to 39 officers and 18 civilians.

a. (U) Reserve Officer Utilization

(1) (U) The establishment of ROCGU (Reserve Operations Command Center Unit) 5-1 at the CINCLANTFLT headquarters is helping to fulfill the goal of having Navy mobilization billets filled by designees for their weekend drill periods. Of the sixteen intelligence officer billets in RCGU 5-1, all but four were filled by the end of the calendar year.

(2) (U) The Intelligence Division continued its full utilization of Reserves. Ten officers (5 Army and 5 Navy) and seven enlisted (Army) were accepted for ACDUTRA (Active Duty for Training) for EXOTIC DANCER VI, a joint field exercise. Additionally, fourteen officers (including one Army) performed ACDUTRA in staff intelligence billets during the year.

(3) (U) The Branch continued to process Reserve Intelligence Officer applications for ACDUTRA on the Intelligence Staff.

b. (C) IDHS/ADP (INTELLIGENCE DATA HANDLING SYSTEM/AUTOMATIC DATA PROCESSING) OPERATIONS AND SUPPORT BRANCH (U)

a. (U) IDHS Management. The Branch continued coordination, production, and submission of management resources data for the Atlantic Command IDHS within the guidelines of the DE-A-Navy IDHS Management Plan.

B. (U) ISS (Intelligence Support System)

(1) (U) The ISS continued to fulfill its mission of providing ADP support to the CINCLANT Intelligence Division. The ISDS (Intelligence Support Display System), consisting of seven CDC (Control Data Corporation) 211 display units and 218 printer has been operational on a 24-hour seven day week basis. The only interference, other than remedial down-time, is the time used by system programmers for development and maintenance personnel for preventive maintenance.

(2) ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
The secure 1004 data link continued in operation, accommodating the exchange of data with the Naval Ocean Surveillance Information Center at Suitland, Maryland. The 1004 will be released during the fourth quarter of FY-1974 and replaced with the NMCCS and NEDN/NIDW (Naval Environmental Data Network/Naval Intelligence Data Network).

c. (U) ADP Systems

(1) (U) Operational

(a) (U) ICR Registry System

(b) (U) Strike Planning System

(c) (U) Ocean Surveillance System (that portion that processes sensitive intelligence information).

(d) (U) RSDS

(2) (U) In Development

(a) (U) Operational Intelligence Subsystem of Atlantic Command Integrated Command and Control and Management Information Systems Computer Program.

(b) (U) Minor modification of Ocean Surveillance System Computer Programs.

(c) (U) Conversion of the Strike Planning System to the new ISS hardware.

(d) (U) Development of an on-line near real-time system for processing intelligence data in the ISS is proceeding. Phase 2.0 was completed in December 1973 by the Naval Electronics Laboratory Center.

(e) (U) An EIS (Extended Instruction Set) which upgrades the Honeywell 6050 to a 6060 was completed in December 1973.

(f) (U) The CSC 8490 system is scheduled for release during the first quarter FY-1975.

(g) (U) In addition to the military allowance of three officers and thirteen enlisted, an increase of seven enlisted personnel are needed for operation of the new system on a 24-hour seven day week basis while processing sensitive information.

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9. (U) **INFORMATION SYSTEM SECURITY BRANCH.** The Information System Security Officer, as principal adviser to the Designated Approving Authority (Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Operations), is responsible for ensuring the application of ADP security measures as set forth in applicable directives. He translates policy from higher authority and directs the application of security measures to the CINCJANT WNETCS command and control computer system. Additionally, as adviser to the AGOS for Intelligence, he is responsible for ensuring the application of ADP security measures to the WNETCS-related IDHS computer system.

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PART III

OPERATIONS

1. 467 GENERAL (U)

a. (S) Commander in Chief Atlantic (CINCLANT) exercises direct operation command of the Polaris submarines on patrol in the Atlantic area, but carries out his remaining operational responsibilities through subordinate commanders.

b. (S) CINCLANT's component commanders for operations are: Commander in Chief, U. S. Army Forces Atlantic (CINCAFLANT), when activated; Commander in Chief, U. S. Atlantic Fleet (CTINCLANTFLT) and Commander in Chief, U. S. Air Force Forces Atlantic (CINCAFLANT), when activated.

c. (S) Army and Air Force component commanders for planning have been designated as follows: Commander in Chief, U. S. Army Forces Atlantic (CDR FORSCOM); and Commander in Chief, U. S. Air Force Forces Atlantic (COMTAC).

d. (S) Subordinate unified commanders under CINCLANT are Commander U. S. Forces Azores, Commander Iceland Defense Forces, and Commander Antilles Defense Command. The Commanding Officer, U. S. Naval Air Station, Bermuda acts as the Coordinating Authority, U. S. Forces Bermuda.

2. 467 STRATEGIC OPERATIONS (U)

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
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NAVY 3.3(b)(2)
OSD 3.3(b)(2)(5)(b)



*Patrols under SACEUR operational control were discontinued as of 30 June 1972.

c. (b) The following is a summary as of 31 December 1973 of the FBM Force posture, accounting for all 41 SSBN's constructed:

Deployed LANTELIT	22
Deployed PACELT	7
Poseidon Conversion	6
Polaris Overhaul	5
Poseidon Predeployment	
Training	1
TOTAL	41

d. (b) The SSBN's deployed from LANTELIT replenishment sites were being employed as follows as of 31 December 1973.

(1) (b) Seventeen SSBN's were assigned to CINCFLT and operated out of [REDACTED] Charleston, South Carolina.

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Navy 3.3(b)(2)

DOD Section 6.2(a)

OSD 3.3(b)(2)(S)(b) + Section 6.2(a)

(2) [REDACTED] Five SSBN's were assigned to USCINCEUR [REDACTED]

c. [REDACTED] The major events of the continuing FBM Weapon System Evaluation Program for 1973 are detailed below: (U)

(1) [REDACTED] POLARIS A2. The last operational test missile flight was conducted in September 1971. There will be no further flights in this system.

(2) [REDACTED] POLARIS A3. There were no Polaris A3 EOT's conducted in the Atlantic during 1973 nor are any scheduled to be conducted in the Atlantic in the future.

(3) [REDACTED] POSEIDON C3. The Reseildon Demonstration and Shakedown Operation (RASO) Program was continued during 1973. Five RASO launches were conducted; three flights were successful. The Poseidon C3 Operational Test Program was held in abeyance in March because of anomalous flight performance.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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3. ~~457~~ JOINT OPERATIONS AND EXERCISES (U)

a. ~~457~~ SIGNIFICANT MILITARY EXERCISES (U)

(1) ~~457~~ EXOTIC DANCER VI was a JCS-directed CINCLANT joint exercise. It exercised participating command elements and forces of the Atlantic Command in a realistic operational environment. The exercise was conducted during the period 2-10 April 1973. Forces were provided by USCINCPAC, CINCLANTFLT, CINCAFLANT, CINCARLANT, and the Service departments. EXOTIC DANCER has since been renamed SOLID SHIELD.

(2) ~~457~~ HIGH HEELS 73 was a JCS-directed exercise conducted in conjunction with NATO Exercise WENTEX 73. As a command post exercise, participating command elements and forces of the Atlantic Command were exercised under a general war environment. The exercise was conducted during the period 7-18 March 1973.

b. ~~457~~ OTHER JOINT/COMBINED/COMMAND POST EXERCISES OF SIGNIFICANCE. (U)

(1) ~~457~~ UNITAS XIV. A CINCLANT-sponsored exercise conducted in South American waters from 3 August - 12 December 1973, this was a combined ASW operation responsive to the desires of the participating South American countries. LANTCOM participated with 1 DLG, 2 DD/DE, 1 SS and 2 VP aircraft.

(2) ~~457~~ Exercise OPEN SESAME BLUE was a LIVE OAK-directed command post exercise with SEA SPRAY participation. Plans on reacting to situations developing in Berlin and its corridors were practiced. The exercise was conducted during the period 21-25 January 1973.

4. ~~457~~ COMMAND AND CONTROL (U)

a. (U) COMMAND CENTER/COMMAND SUPPORT CENTER (CC/CSC). Construction of the Command Center/Command Support Center was scheduled for completion in January 1974. The Center is manned by the CINCLANT Watch Officer, the CINCLANTFLT Watch Officer, Intelligence Watch Officer, and by the Communications Watch Officer on a 24-hour-a-day basis. It is planned to add the Antisubmarine Warfare Watch Officer and an ASW analyst to the watch when expansion of the CC/CSC is accomplished.

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b. (S) AIRBORNE COMMAND POST (ABNCP) (U)

(1) (S) INITIAL OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY. On 1 January 1973, with one complete battle staff team and one EC-135 aircraft, the CINCLANT Airborne Command Post attained initial operational capability.

(2) (S) TRAINING (U)

(a) (S) As additional battle staff team personnel reported on board, formal ground and airborne alert team training intensified, with emphasis being placed on emergency action message processing, message authentication, sealed authentication two-man control training and logistical reports. By 1 October five complete battle staff teams were on board and on 12 December 1973, all battle staff teams had been certified as being operationally ready to perform the mission of the Airborne Command Post.

(b) (S) In addition to formal ground and airborne training, several deployment training flights were conducted with an emergency command authority embarked. Orientation training was conducted at the National Emergency Airborne Command Post, Commander in Chief, Strategic Air Command Headquarters and the Commander in Chief, Europe Airborne Command Post.

(3) (S) FINAL OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY. With the acquisition of the third EC-135 aircraft in December 1973, and the certification of five battle staff teams, the CINCLANT Airborne Command Post reached final operational capability on 31 December 1973.

c. (S) REPORTS CONTROL. A new office J3A6 (Reports Control) was established 1 July 1973. This office was tasked to assist the CINCLANT Command Center in attaining desired information from Joint Reporting System (JRS) and Navy Reporting Systems. Reports Control coordinates changes to reporting instructions with CNO and CINCLANT, and monitors the CASREP and NAVFORSTAT systems for adequacy and validity.

5. (S) RECONNAISSANCE (U)

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JS 3.3(b)(1)
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b. (4) OPERATIONS. Reconnaissance operations conducted by Navy/Air Force units in JCS-designated sensitive areas were accomplished in accordance with monthly schedules submitted by CINCPACFLT and approved by higher authority.

(2) (4) Navy units conducted 121 flights broken down as follows:

USNAVEUR/LANTFLT	EC-121M	SIGINT	87
NAVAIRLANT	RA-5C	PHOTO	27
FMFLANT	RF-4B	PHOTO	7

(3) (4) Air Force reconnaissance/support effort was 372 flights as follows:

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SAC	U2	PHOTO	33
SAC	RC-135	SIGINT	253
SAC	RC-135	ELINT	47
CONAD	RC-121	PMDAR	39

J5 3.3(b)(1)

C. (b) SIGNIFICANT EVENTS (U)



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6. (U) ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES (U)

3.3(b)(1)
9

a. (U) BACKGROUND. In accordance with JCS MOP 139, staff meteorological support to CINCLANT is provided by the U. S. Navy. The CINCLANTFLM Director for Meteorology and Oceanography (M37), acting in an additional duty capacity, coordinates the military meteorological and oceanographic services to and requirements of the Atlantic Command, as well as the environmental quality control aspects of Atlantic Command operations. Environmental services are provided through appropriate component service agencies, especially the Naval Weather Service Command and Air Weather Service.

b. (U) EXOTIC DANCER VI. Planning for Joint Exercise EXOTIC DANCER VI included the preparation and filing of the "Final Environmental Impact Statement for Joint Exercise EXOTIC DANCER VI" (CINCLANT ltr Ser 168/M37 of 21 Feb 73). This statement and associated planning actions were developed as an extension of the program followed in Joint Exercise EXOTIC DANCER V held in 1972. Neither significant effect on the quality of the human environment nor substantial environmentally-based controversy were identified or developed as a result of the exercise. The exercise was conducted in keeping with the letter and spirit of the National Environmental Policy Act (PL 91-190).

7. (U) WAR GAMES (U)

a. (U) During 1973 the Joint War Gaming Branch was disestablished to provide manpower spaces for newly established JWD billets for a LANTCOM Inspector General Division, and operations Joint Reports and Operations Security staff billets. As a result, war game projects in

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their initial phases were cancelled early in 1973. All other branch projects were scheduled to be completed by July 1973.

b. ~~(S)~~ PROJECTS (U)

(1) ~~(S)~~ The ETERNAL EDGE gaming analysis of CINCLANT Contingency Operation Plan 2302 was briefed to O1 and the report distributed in May 1973.

(2) ~~(S)~~ The war gaming of CINCLANT Contingency Operation Plan 2310 was completed in May and a written report published in July 1973.

c. (U) GENERAL. In late June, the Joint War Gaming Branch records were transferred to M301 for two-year storage. By July 1973 all projects were completed and personnel transferred to other LANTCOM staff billets.

8. ~~(S)~~ ELECTRONIC WARFARE (EW) (U)

a. (U) In accordance with JCS Memorandum of Policy, Electronic Warfare has been integrated into all CINCLANT conducted exercises. During the planning and execution of EXOTIC DANCER VI, the Service coordination accomplished in this exercise far exceeded that of previous years. Increased exchange of staff officers between Services improved planning and created a greater awareness of Electronic Warfare in a joint environment. The ever-increasing awareness of Electronic Warfare during EXOTIC DANCER VI was quite prevalent in the large composition of assets by the subordinate Services. The exercise proved to be very successful in meeting LANTCOM's Electronic Warfare objectives.

b. (U) All appendices to applicable operation plans have been reviewed and updated.

c. (U) More Electronic Warfare support has been stressed on NATO operations. This is keeping within the guidelines and policy proposed by the Secretary of Defense.

d. ~~(S)~~ CINCLANT has updated S3430.3B on Electronic Warfare against Civil Broadcast.

9. ~~(S)~~ OPERATIONS SECURITY (OPSEC) (U)

a. (U) Two billets dedicated to OPSEC were established within the staff of the Commander in Chief Atlantic. These billets provide the first full-time OPSEC capability within the command and reflect the increased emphasis being placed on operations security.

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b. (U) OPSSEC surveys conducted or directed by the staff of the Commander in Chief Atlantic focused on portions of command and control communications systems, and selected aspects of the operations conducted by ASW patrol squadrons. The results of these surveys have helped to illuminate potential vulnerabilities in the operations examined, and have been useful in the identification of operational areas which require further examination.

c. (U) CINCLANT Instruction C3100.4B, Operations Security, was published for the guidance of component and subordinate commands in matters related to operations security.

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PART IV

LOGISTICS AND MANAGEMENT

1. EXERCISE EXOTIC DANCER VI. Exercise EXOTIC DANCER VI, a joint training exercise, was conducted by the Commander in Chief Atlantic during the period 2-9 April 1973. The exercise, involving 42,000 personnel from all Services, was conducted in the Camp Lejeune/Croatan National Forest/Fort Bragg/Cherry Point area. The actual logistic support required for this exercise plus significantly increased logistic play provided valuable training to all involved. Logistic play consisted of over 600 preplanned message injections, 764 casualties assessed, and 1500 pieces of equipment tagged as damaged or destroyed.

2. BASE DEVELOPMENT PLANNING

a. The Base Development Plan (BDP) which supports CINCLANT OPLAN 2360/62/71/73 was published in March 1973, and was approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in June 1973. The BDP's which support CINCLANT OPLANS 2310, 2325, and 2200 (Phase I) were completed in final draft form, and were pending publication at the end of 1973.

b. The automation of Base Development Planning procedures continued during the year. WMMCCS conversion of the CASTLE system was completed, and testing of the system began. The system was incorporated in the JOPS Interim Software as an optional standard, and was designated Module T54. In the future, the WMMCCS version of the system will be referred to as T54. At the end of the year, the system was actively being considered as a JCS worldwide standard for base development planning.

3. MUNITIONS. The ammunition sub-system to ALPS is now 50% completed. This sub-system will produce ammunition consumption requirements, prepositioned war reserve requirements, and time-phased ammunition requirements to support CINCLANT OPLANS.

4. NATO INFRASTRUCTURE

a. Acting in behalf of Chief of Staff Air Force (CSAF), CINCLANT submitted three Air Force MILCOM projects for Keflavik, Iceland, to SACLANT for inclusion in the NATO Common Infrastructure Program Slice XXV (1974). These marked the first time that any construction projects at Naval Station

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Keflavik had been submitted for common funding by NATO. These submissions also laid the groundwork for the programming of several additional Air Force MILCON projects for Slice XXVI (1975). The three projects submitted for Slice XXV (from FY-74 MILCON program) were: (1) Aircraft Maintenance Shop; (2) Weapons Release Systems Shop; and (3) Parachute and Dinghy Shop. Slice XXV was scheduled for initial screening by the NATO International Staff in March 1974.

b. Another "first" in the NATO Infrastructure area was CINCLANT's first prefinanced infrastructure project. Sponsored by CINCLANTFLT, this project was programmed for funding under FY-73 Navy MILCON program and for subsequent recoupment of U. S. funds pending its approval for inclusion in Slice XXV. The project called for construction of an ASW (Antisubmarine Warfare) Tactical Support Center (TSC) at Lajes Field, Azores. This submission initiated programming for several new project proposals for Slice XXVI which will require prefinancing, including some in Iceland from the FY-73 Air Force MILCON program.

5. JOINT OPERATIONAL PLANNING SYSTEM (JOPS) INTERIM SOFTWARE (JIS). The cooperative effort, known as JIS, of the unified commands and the OJCS to convert and enhance existing automated planning systems in order to perform JOPS planning continued. CINCLANT is providing the transportation simulation modules of the Automated Logistic Planning System (ALPS) as the Transportation Feasibility Estimator (TRE) portion of JIS. Conversion is nearly complete. Formal testing of the entire JIS is scheduled for late summer 1974. By 1 October 1974, JIS is expected to have been tested and formally adopted as JOPS Volume III, the automated system originally envisioned to support JOPS Planning at the unified and specified commands.

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PART V

PLANS

1. (U) GENERAL

a. CINCLANT develops and maintains mid- and long-range basic war plans, contingency plans, special plans, and studies. These plans and studies are prepared in accordance with directives from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or as may be required by the political/military situation within the area of responsibility of the Atlantic Command. Experience gained in exercises and the results of actual operations also provide the basis for updating and maintaining currency of CINCLANT plans.

b. Reported in this section are the most significant operational planning activities undertaken during the period covered by this report.

c. Throughout the year, LANTCOM Operation Plans were reviewed, revised and refined to reflect latest JCS force allocation, mission, and new planning requirements. Primary emphasis was placed upon refinement of existing plans to reflect format changes in accordance with the Joint Operational Planning System (JOPS).

2. ~~407~~ OPERATION PLANNING (U)

a. ~~407~~ General War Plan, CINCLANT OPLAN 2200. A major revision of this plan in JOPS format was nearing completion at the end of 1973. The planned promulgation date is June 1974. Appendix 1 (Nuclear Operations) and Appendix 5 (Unconventional Warfare Operations) were also undergoing major changes in 1973 and should be published and distributed separately during the same period.

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COMBINED FORCES
OPERATIONS AND SUPPORT GROUP
SUBORDINATE TO COMINT
JOINT STAFF CHIEF OF STAFF
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b. ~~(S)~~ Caribbean Contingency Planning (less Cuba) (U)

(1) ~~(S)~~ OPLAN 2150. This Caribbean Surveillance Plan is being rewritten as COMPLAN 2150. Publication is expected in March 1974.



(b) (U) A new Appendix 5 to Annex C to CIRCLANT OPLAN 2360/62/71/73 was completed in 1973 and submitted for final review.

(3) ~~(S)~~ COMPLAN 2345. This plan provides for international maritime protection in the Caribbean and adjacent sea areas. It is currently being revised, incorporating Change 2 which consists of several JCS informal comments and a number of accumulated routine administrative changes. The plan is now undergoing administrative review with publication anticipated in August 1974.

c. ~~(S)~~ Cuba Contingency Planning (U)

(1) ~~(S)~~ OPLAN 2309. A major revision of this plan was completed in 1973. With a new plan identification number of 2310, the proposed plan was under final review at the end of the year.

(2) (U) OPLAN 2308. This plan was reviewed without change.

(3) ~~(S)~~ OPLAN 2348. Development of this plan was initiated by publication of a planning directive on 31 August 1973. This plan will provide a range of clearly defined response options for a deteriorating situation with Cuba, and it will replace OPLANS 2308, 2309, 2325 and 2326. Plan development is continuing.

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(4) (S) OPLAN 2325. This plan has undergone major revision and is formatted in accordance with JOPS. It remains in administrative review and is expected to be promulgated by June 1974. Annex Y (Unconventional Warfare) to OPLAN 2325 was deferred for republication as Appendix 5 to Annex C during Calendar Year 1973, pending CINCLANT approval and publication of basic OPLAN in JOPS format.

(5) (S) OPLAN 2380. Volume I to JSCP FY-74 authorizes CINCLANT the option of restructuring OPLAN 2380 from its complete operation plan format to a COMPLAN. CINCLANT approval was received in May 1973 for the conversion. However, action to revise this plan during the year was deferred and will be undertaken during 1974.

(6) (U) Annex Y (Unconventional Warfare) to CINCLANT OPLAN 2326 was republished on 26 June 1973 as Appendix 5 to Annex C. JCS approval pending. During the interim, holders of the plan are to retain both Annex Y and Appendix 5 to Annex C.

d. (S) Other Contingency Planning (U)

(1) (S) Emergency and Evacuation Plans (U)

(a) (U) Emergency and Evacuation Plan 2100. This plan has been revised into the concept plan format and will be published as CINCLANT COMPLAN 2100 in the second quarter of CY-74.

(b) (S) CINCLANT Planning Directive 2102. This plan, which supports JCS COMPLAN 0100 - Evacuation of U.S. Nationals from Countries in Africa South of the Sahara - was published on 15 January 1973 and approved by the JCS on 26 February 1973.

(2) (S) CINCLANT COMPLAN 2302. This concept plan which provides for the reinforcement and defense of Iceland was published on 21 December 1973 and replaces CINCLANT Contingency Plan 2302.

(3) (U) Civil Disturbances (GARDEN PLOT). Because of changes to the DA Civil Disturbance Plan, new Civil Disturbance annexes were prepared for both CINCLANT and CINCLANTFLT OPORD 2000.

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(4) (U) Civil Affairs. Revisions of Civil Affairs annexes in CINCLANT and CINCLANTFLT OPORD 2000, CINCLANT and CINCLANTFLT OPLAN 2200, and CINCLANT OPLAN's 2325, 2326, and Exercise OPLAN 2073 were made during the year.

(5) (S) CINCLANT Planning Directive 2103. This plan, which supports JCS 0200 - Disaster Relief Operations in Africa South of the Sahara - was published on 9 January 1973 and approved by the JCS on 26 February 1973.

(6) (S) CONPLAN 2346. This plan provides for augmentation of Iceland Radar Coverage and was approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 10 October 1973. This JCS approval and a minor Change No. 1 were forwarded to COMUSCEDEFOR and CINCONAD for preparation and submission of supporting plans which are due in early 1974.

e. (S) Special Plans (Cover and Deception). A Cover and Deception Appendix (Appendix 7 to Annex C) to CINCLANT OPORD 2000 was published 12 October 1973 containing general guidance for LANTCOM Cover and Deception Operations. The Appendix will serve as a reference for future revisions and publication of Appendices to OPLAN's 2309 and 2325, and such other plans that are determined to require specific C & D guidance. Review of C & D requirements for OPLAN's and CONPLAN's will be undertaken in 1974.

f. (S) Psychological Operations (U)

(1) (U) A Department of Defense/United States Information Agency cooperation agreement designated a USIA Advisor to the Atlantic Command, a position which has long been established but vacant. This assignment is an expansion of the duties of the USIA Advisor to the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Center for Military Assistance, Fort Bragg, North Carolina.

(2) (S) The concept of conducting airborne radio and television operations using assets of the 193rd Tactical Electronic Warfare Group (Project Coronet Solo) is being refined. New television transmitters were tested and installed in the aircraft; however, antenna problems still preclude Coronet Solo from being an effective TV system. It is anticipated that the system will be operational in late 1974.

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3. (U) STRATEGIC POLICY PLANNING

a. ~~JSOP FY-76-83~~. Force requirements for the Atlantic Command recommended for inclusion in JSOP FY-76-83 were developed from the force goals and supporting rationale submitted by service component commanders. They can be found in CINCLANT (TS) Letter 3010 Ser J531/000116 of 14 July 1973.

b. CINCLANT also coordinated with adjacent CINC's in the preparation of force objectives for Volume II Book 7 (Free World Forces) to JSOP 76-83 for those countries bordering the Atlantic Command area.

c. Comments and recommendations were submitted on Volume I (Strategy) and on the Communications-Electronics Objectives Annex, Command and Control Objectives Annex, and the Map, Chart, and Geodetic Objectives Annex.

4. (U) MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM. CINCLANT has been tasked to coordinate with USCINCEUR and USCINCSO on Military Assistance matters which affect the LANTCOM area. Comments and recommendations regarding programs of interest to CINCLANT are made directly to the CINC responsible for the administration of the Military Assistance Program of the country involved.

5. ~~407~~ MISCELLANEOUS (U)

a. (U) Comments and recommendations were submitted on the Joint Research and Development Objective Document for FY-1976-1993 (JRDOD 75-93).

b. ~~407~~ On 21 August 1973 the Commander, Antilles Defense Command's area of responsibility was enlarged to include the entire Bahamas nation. The status of Cuba was further defined by specifically excluding it from COMANTDEFPCOM's area assignment, and limiting COMANTDEFPCOM's responsibility to an area outside the sensitive area surrounding Cuba.

c. ~~407~~ A Bahamas Security Survey Team was formed in late August 1973 with the primary mission of determining the reasonable security requirements of the Government of the Commonwealth of the Bahamas (GCOS) in the areas of coastal

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surveillance, search and rescue, and aids to sea navigation. A related but secondary mission of the team was to survey sea pollution in the Bahamas area and to determine the GCOB requirements for a minimum coastal and harbor pollution control program. The team was composed of five U.S. military officers (two of whom were U.S. Coast Guard) and one Foreign Service Officer. The team chief, a U.S. Navy Captain, was provided from the CINCLANT Plans Division.

d. (U) On 25 June 1973 the Government of Iceland (GOI) invoked Article VII of the U.S. - Iceland Defense Agreement of 1951 which calls for a review by NATO of the necessity for continued use of Iceland by the Iceland Defense Force (IDF) in the defense of NATO, and provides for a unilateral abrogation of the agreement six months after invoking this article. On 12 September 1973, the North Atlantic Council performed its review and reported to Iceland that it considered the continued use of Iceland by the IDF essential to the defense of NATO. On 4 October 1973 formal negotiations between the U.S. and Iceland commenced. A second meeting was held on 12 November 1973 and additional meetings will be held in 1974 until an agreed position is reached regarding the IDF. To date the single agreed position is that the IDF has to be modified (in "Icelandic" this means reduced). The U.S. is striving to maintain the capability to perform all the present missions of the IDF with a reduced number of personnel.

e. (U) Strategic Papers. During the course of the year, strategic studies were made in various areas, primarily for the purpose of contributing to the development of CINCLANT position papers.

f. (U) Command Briefings. Over 96 Command Briefings, covering the mission, organization, and operations of the Atlantic Command were presented to dignitaries visiting the Atlantic Command during 1973 and to the student bodies of the Senior Service Colleges.

g. (U) Speech Preparations. Three speeches were prepared or updated for CINCLANT's and other Flag/General Officers' use in addressing war college student bodies and other audiences.

h. (OF) Disaster Relief. CINCLANT forces conducted disaster relief operations in Iceland during March and April, 1973.

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i. (U) CINCLANT Instruction S5320.1B. Following the annual approval of the JUWTF A JMP by JCS, the 1973 update of the JUWTF A JMA was promulgated as CINCLANT Instruction S5320.1B on 23 July 1973.

j. (U) CINCLANT Instruction S4420.1. A document which reflects the total material requirements for the Joint Unconventional Warfare Task Force Atlantic (JUWTF A) upon activation for operations was developed and promulgated as CINCLANT Instruction S4420.1 on 15 November 1973.

k. (S) CINCLANT Staff Instruction S3490.1B. Guidance on Cover and Deception Organization was published 25 October 1973 describing staff procedures to review, plan, implement, conduct, control and evaluate C & D operations. The organization has proven effective and was of particular value in CINCLANTFLT planning related to Project CAESAR Operations.

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PART VI
COMMUNICATIONS

1. (U) GENERAL INFORMATION. The CINCLANT Communications-Electronics Plans and Strategic Operations Branch, J62, was reorganized during July 1973 and is structured as follows:

a. J62 - Deputy for Communications-Electronics Plans and Strategic Operations (USAF-06)

CURRENT C-E PLANS AND POLICY SECTION

b. J621 - Current C-E Plans and Policy Officer (USMC-05)

c. J621A - Assistant Current C-E Plans and Policy Officer (USA-04)

STRATEGIC OPERATIONS, PLANS AND PROGRAMS SECTION

d. J622 - Strategic Operations, Plans and Programs Officer (USAF-05)

e. J622A - Surface/Subsurface Systems and Special Projects Officer (USM-04)

f. J622B - Airborne Systems and Special Projects Officer (USAF-04)

COMMUNICATIONS OPERATIONS AND STATUS SECTION

g. J623 - Communications Operations and Status Officer (USA-05)

h. J623A - Communications Status and Restoration Engineer Officer (GS-11)

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OPERATIONS AND REQUIREMENTS SECTION

- i. J611A - Joint Operations and Requirements Officer
(USN-04)

JOINT READINESS AND INSPECTION SECTION

- j. J611B - Joint Readiness and Inspection Officer
(USN-04)

ENGINEERING SUPPORT SECTION

- k. J612A - Engineering Support Officer (GS-12)

2. (U) PERSONNEL CHANGE. Captain [REDACTED] USN, relieved Captain Gordon R. NAGLER, USN, as ACOS for Communications on 19 July 1973. Captain NAGLER was promoted to Rear Admiral and transferred to the office of the Chief of Naval Operations. Colonel Telford S. EGGLESTON, USAF, relieved Colonel John H. PARROTT, Jr., USAF as Deputy for Communications-Electronics Plans and Strategic Operations on 1 November 1973. Colonel PARROTT retired on 31 October 1973.

3. ~~407~~ COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS AND IMPROVEMENTS (U)

a. (U) Following testing and refinement of WHITE PINNACLE Fast Reaction Communications Exercises procedures defined during 1972, CINCLANT Instruction C2000.4 was published during 1973. The purpose of this document was to consolidate and promulgate current communications procedures for handling the various types of fast reaction messages and their exercise versions. This document covers WHITE/RED ROCKET messages, OPREP-3 Event/Incident Reports and WHITE PINNACLE Exercise messages.

b. ~~407~~ TACAMO: As a result of a JCS decision, the LANT TACAMO airborne operation posture was returned to 100% from 50%. In support of the increased airborne mission, one PAC TACAMO EC-130 aircraft was transferred to LANT. This additional aircraft provided LANT TACAMO its full complement of eight aircraft; however, for the next year one EC-130 aircraft is continuously scheduled to be undergoing the TACAMO IV B modifications to improve mission electronics capabilities, including installation of a higher power VLF transmitter and its antenna system.

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c. ~~457~~ MEECN (Minimum Essential Emergency Communications Network): The detailed MEECN Technical Test and Evaluation Program implemented last year was revised for 1973 and expanded to include all WWABWCP (Worldwide Airborne Command Post) communications media. Also, the quarterly MEECN Polo Hat Exercise was expanded to include participation by the CINCLANT ABWCP. The initial test of the MEECN anti-jam VERDIN System was conducted on 27 March 1973. A ~~LAWES SACMO~~ aircraft which was airborne near Patuxent River NAS, MD, transmitted a VERDIN test message that was successfully copied using the VERDIN WRR-7 receivers at ground installations at Newport Beach, California, and Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. This successful test appears to have ushered in a new era in command and control of SIOP (SINGLE INTEGRATED OPERATIONAL PLAN) forces in a stressed environment using VERDIN anti-jam compression techniques.

d. ~~457~~ CINCLANT ABWCP (Airborne Command Post): During IOC (Initial Operational Capability), 1 Jan 73 - 31 Dec 73, Communications Operations for the CINCLANT ABWCP were directed towards proficiency and familiarization training of the CINCLANT ABWCP Battle Staffs and Communications personnel. Additionally, communications plans and programs were developed and implemented to support the ABWCP FOC (Final Operational Capability) effective as of 1 Jan 74. Funding was provided and a contract let with the AT&T Co. to provide a CINCLANT ABWCP dedicated UHF network which will serve as its primary communications system with access to AUTOVON, AUTOTEL, JCS Automatic Conferencing Arranger and dedicated line to the Alternate National Military Command Center. The network is leased at an annual cost of 1.1 million dollars; will be entered through Ground Entry Stations to be located at Norfolk, Virginia, Charleston, South Carolina, Ellisville, Florida and Pensacola, Florida; and is scheduled to become operational in December 1974. In December 1973, the CINCLANT ABWCP received its second and third EC-135 aircraft giving a total complement of two P models and one H model. The two additional aircraft provided the resources required by CINCLANT to assume a continuous alert posture scheduled to be implemented at FOC.

4. ~~457~~ COMMUNICATIONS TRAINING EXERCISES AND SIGNIFICANT TESTS (U)

a. ~~457~~ The "ALOUD" Series (U)

(1) ~~457~~ ALOUD PAPA, a joint communications exercise, was conducted 21 - 24 Mar 73 in the vicinity of Onslow Beach/Camp Lejeune/Fort Bragg, North Carolina, with an overall objective of improving communications reliability in a joint environment. Communication areas of interest consisted of the establishment, operation, and maintenance of high frequency voice

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and teletype circuits, testing tactical satellite communication facilities for a voice command and control net, and testing NGWS (Naval Gunfire Support) and airspace control circuitry.

(2) ~~4C~~ ALOUD QUEBEC was held 10 April 1973 at Camp Lejeune, N.C. as part of the hot wash up for Exercise EXOTIC DANCER VI. Communications electronics project officers representing the major exercise participants reviewed C-E support provided for EXDAN VI and presented lessons learned for consideration in future joint exercises.

(3) ~~4C~~ ALOUD ROMEO was a communications conference held on 25 - 26 April 1973 at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. XVIII Airborne Corps C-E hosted the meeting chaired by SECOND-EAT communications personnel. Agenda items dealt with major-lessons learned from the previous ALOUD PAPA and EXDAN VI exercise with particular emphasis on improvement of joint coordination and overall improvement of command and control communications.

(4) ~~4C~~ ALOUD SIERRA was a communications exercise conducted from home stations of participating forces during the period 26 - 29 November 1973. The exercise involved communications personnel and equipments required to exercise joint high frequency communications and tactical satellite communications as required to support Commander Joint Task Force ONE TWO and Commander US Forces BLUE in a simulated contingency operation.

b. ~~4C~~ EXOTIC DANCER VI: This annual JCS-coordinated joint exercise was conducted 25 March - 19 April 1973 in the vicinity of Onslow Beach, Catherine Lake and Goldsboro, N.C. The communications-electronics portion of the exercise was designed to test and improve communications required to support a joint contingency operation. Analysis of communications reports from exercise participants indicated, with few exceptions, all communication objectives for the exercise were adequately accomplished. New procedures and equipments used for the first time included EFW, Parkhill Secure Voice Equipment, AN/TSC-60 HF Radio Equipment and a four-channel UHF Airborne Relay System. These new facilities overcame some of the difficulties experienced in past exercises with traffic management, uncovered key command and control nets, equipment compatibility, and lack of a reliable UHF command and control channel between ship and shore locations.

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PART VII

CRYPTOLOGY

1. 467 SURVEY OF COMOCRANSYSLANT COMMUNICATIONS (U)

~~467~~ The survey, suspended in September 1972, was re-opened by COMOCRANSYSLANT in December 1972. A three-member survey team from NAVCOMSTA (LANT COC (Atlantic COMSEAC Operations Center)) Norfolk conducted interviews and observed all facets of communications at OCEANSYSLANT Headquarters and NAVFAC Cape Hatteras during December 1972 and January 1973. The COMSEAC Survey Interim Report issued by LANT COC on 7 February 1973 indicated no inherent security hazards of a significant nature. Those minor procedural problems noted, as well as additional comments and recommendations, were addressed in the final report issued 28 June 1973.

2. 467 SI COMMUNICATIONS IMPROVEMENT (U)

~~467~~ The CINCLANT/CINCLANTFLT Defense Special Security Communications Center (operated by MSGD NORVA) became a dual-homed tributary station in the DSSCS (Defense Special Security Communications System) in January 1973, with the installation of two Mode I DSSCS High Speed Terminal Configurations. One is terminated with ASC Ft. Detrick, Maryland (NDML 111D, 300 Bauds) and the other with ASC Andrews AFB, Maryland (NDML 115A, 150 Bauds). These circuits were activated on 5 January 1973 and 26 January 1973 respectively. During 1973, the DSSCS Communications Center processed the following number of messages via these two circuits:

Send: 11,711 messages of 1,648,748 groups.

Receive: 174,095 messages of 65,342,803 groups.

3. 467 CARIBBEAN SURVEILLANCE OPERATIONS (U)

a. ~~467~~ On 6 January 1973 the cryptologic Direct Support Element assigned to USS KRETCHMER (DER 329) deactivated and transferred to USS THOMAS J. GARY (DER 326) where it reactivated at 070001Z January 1973, while both ships were performing surveillance duties off the port of Cienfuegos, Cuba. The surveillance effort, and associated cryptologic activities, began in late November 1972 with the arrival in the Caribbean of a Soviet task group consisting of Kresta I 293, Kanin 290, AO Kursk, and a Foxtrot class submarine. KRETCHMER's and then GARY's Direct Support Element was manned

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by LANTFLT cryptologic direct support personnel from Naval Security Group Activity, Homestead, Florida; Assistant Commander Naval Security Group, Fort Meade, Maryland; Naval Communications Station, Norfolk, Virginia; Naval Security Group Detachment, Norfolk, Virginia; and Naval Security Group Activity, Charleston, South Carolina. GARY maintained station off Cienfuegos, with a short diversion to Key West for fuel and supplies (17 - 20 January 1973), until relieved by USS CALCATERRA (DER 390) on 28 January 1973.

b. (S) After relieving GARY of surveillance station off Cienfuegos on 28 January 1973, CALCATERRA, with a crypto-logic Direct Support Element assigned, maintained station until 4 February 1973, departing at that time for a brief fuel stop at Key West. CALCATERRA then resumed surveillance station off Mariel harbor on 6 February, subsequently escorting the Soviet units as they sortied from Mariel, entered the Gulf of Mexico, finally transited the Florida Straits, and entered the western Atlantic enroute North Fleet. CALCATERRA terminated surveillance operations 21 February 1973.

c. (S) USS THOMAS J. GARY (DER 326) was assigned to conduct surveillance of a Soviet naval task group as it approached and operated in Caribbean waters and made a number of Cuban port calls during the summer of 1973. A Direct Support Element was assigned to GARY to provide SIGINT early warning and direct tactical support to the commanding officer. This Direct Support Element activated 26 July 1973 as GARY sortied from Key West, Florida, to intercept the Russian task group, composed of Kresta II 289, Ruman 559, AD Kuzak, and an Echo II class submarine, and deactivated 10 August 1973 as GARY was relieved of surveillance duties by USS RICHARD E. KRAUS (DD 849).

d. (S) The deployment of KRAUS for surveillance purposes with a Direct Support Element assigned and an OIGS (Operational Intelligence Collection System) van embarked marked the initial employment of this new equipment in the LANT area. The Direct Support Element assigned to KRAUS activated 8 August 1973 as KRAUS proceeded enroute surveillance duties from Charleston, South Carolina, and deactivated 8 September as the ship returned to Charleston.

4. ~~(S)~~ CLASSIC OUTBOARD (U)

(S) Project CLASSIC OUTBOARD is a GNO-sponsored program for a special shipboard signal acquisition and direction finding system capable of intercepting special signals in the .1 to 32 MHz range and with an RDF (Radio Direction Finding) capability of signals from .1 to 256 MHz. Preproduction models of the equipment were installed in newly-constructed SSSE's (Ship Signals Exploitation Spaces) on board USS JOSEPHUS

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DANIELS (DEG 27) and USS MITSCHER (DDG 35) to undergo formal TECH and OPEVAL'S (Technical and Operational Evaluations) in order to obtain service test approval and eventual procurement. DANIELS and MITSCHER deployed to the Mediterranean in January 1973, participating in BYSTANDER and GRANDSTAND operations, Exercise NATIONAL WEEK XV, and SILVER FOX operations. MITSCHER returned from the Mediterranean in June 1973 and DANIELS in July. CINCLANTFLT cryptologic direct support personnel were assigned to both ships for the entire deployment. Although the performance of the CLASSIC OUTBOARD system in the Mediterranean, while operationally and technically impressive, did not meet all stated specifications, further TECH and OPEVAL conducted by MITSCHER in the VACAPES area in October and December 1973 resulted in the system meeting all CNO design and performance criteria and specifications. Service approval of the CLASSIC OUTBOARD system was pending at years end, and was subsequently formally granted by CNO in first quarter CY-1974.

5. (S) SECURITY VULNERABILITY OF SENSITIVE U. S. PORTS (U)

(S) CNO tasked COMNAVSECGRU with conducting COMSEC/ELSEC (SIGSEC) surveys of the ports of Panama City and Pensacola, Florida, and Pascagoula, Mississippi. These surveys were conducted by a SIGSEC team assigned temporary additional duty from COMNAVSECGRU, utilizing a mobile monitoring van. The surveys were conducted in two phases. Phase I included visits to commands and DOD-sponsored activities within a 50-mile radius of each of the three ports to gather an up-to-date data base and make a general assessment of potential communications, non-communications and other electro-magnetic vulnerabilities. Phase II, supported by CINCLANTFLT, consisted of signal monitoring and initial analysis from selected locations in the port area. On-site collection of data was conducted from 17 through 26 January, 5 January through 2 February, and 5 through 8 March. In all surveys, a complete electromagnetic profile or full-canvassing of military activities for potential vulnerabilities was not possible because of time and equipment limitations. These survey reports thus represent only a token sampling of DOD activity and electromagnetic emissions within a 50-mile radius of the areas involved. As was done in previous port studies, the portable equipment used in the COMSEC/SIGSEC mobile van was borrowed from the Naval Investigative Service and was used for monitoring communications (including microwave), and electromagnetic emissions in the VHF/UHF frequency range for hearability and identification purposes. It was apparent from the sampling of information contained in the final reports that a wealth of high interest signals intelligence could be collected by merchant vessels in or near the port areas of Pensacola and Panama City. The Naval Coastal Systems Laboratory, Tyndall Air Force Base, and Eglin Air Force Base conduct operations which involve unique elec-

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tromagnetic emissions not found elsewhere in the Navy or Air Force. Of particular significance is the heavy commitment to the development, testing and evaluation of electronic warfare countermeasures at Eglin AFB. This activity requires signal radiation from simulated Soviet air defense systems and air-borne electronic countermeasures equipment. The port of Pensacola, which is located near the center of military activity in the area, is not currently being used by Communist shipping; however, plans are being made to improve the ship handling capacity of the port. COMNAVSECMBU stated that the final signals vulnerability report would support the position that Communist shipping should be denied access to the port of Panama City for reasons of national security.

6. (U) OPERATION HOMECOMING

During the period 20 February 1973 to 16 April 1973, the Facilities branch of NS provided equipment and technical support to Operation HOMECOMING for the debriefing of returning Prisoners of War at Portsmouth Naval Hospital.

7. (S) EXERCISE EXOTIC DANCER VI (U)

a. (S) A joint telephone monitoring team commenced operations 20 March 1973 at CINCLANTFLT Headquarters. A daily input summarizing EXDAN VI related information as gleaned from telephone conversations was produced. Items of tactical intelligence value which affected the exercise were reported to the Joint Exercise Cryptologic Support Group for forwarding to Commander, Joint Task Force 122 as SPOT reports.

b. (S) Cryptologic direct support teams for EXDAN VI augmented or activated on board USS JOHN F. KENNEDY (CVA 67), USS NEWPORT NEWS (CA 148), USS MOUNT WHITNEY (LCC 20) and USS RIDDLE (DLG 34).

c. (S) The final COMSECBM Posture Report submitted by CJTF 122/COMSECBMFT lauded circuit operators for significant improvements. Circuit discipline increased from poor at the outset of the exercise to excellent upon completion of Phase I. It was stated in the final report, however, that intelligence was being revealed in the text of messages throughout the exercise, despite improvements made by circuit operators. Particularly noteworthy achievements included the increased use of authentication and improved circuit discipline, including READBACK reporting. Additionally, the prompt and positive manner in which afloat commands acted upon recommendations contained in CJTF 122's daily summaries was commendable. As stated by COMSECBMFT: "The EXDAN VI COMSECB effort is considered to have achieved a major goal as a training tool for the operator. It did little if anything to stop message draf-

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ters, personnel, or 'actuals' who used communications circuits as they would a telephone, from disclosing information of intelligence value. Lack of COMUSMACV derived tactical intelligence from CJTF 120/121 impeded the ability of CJTF 122 to assess accurately the COMUSMACV posture of the joint task force. The exercise demonstrated clearly the urgent need for additional secure voice equipment, particularly HF.

6. ~~407~~ During EXDAM VI, from 27 March through 8 April 1973, the DSSCS Communications Center operated additional SI communications circuits to CJTF-122 and COMUSMACV (i.e. CTRS 8 and 9 respectively). Both real-world and exercise traffic was passed via these circuits. Concurrent with EXDAM VI, channel 14 (WMM) of the WESTLANT OPINTEL Broadcast was also keyed, while unrelated to the exercise per se, it provided an excellent scenario for a test keying directly from an intelligence dissemination point and remote from the Broadcast Keying Station. Message volumes were as follows:

Channel 8 (27 March - 04 April 1973):

Send: 488

Receive: 274

Channel 9 (04 - 08 April 1973):

Send: 50

Receive: 247

Broadcast Channel 14 (24 March - 05 April 1973):

First Run Messages: 697

Bartons: 2646

Services Received: 35

MEG's: 88

8. (U) USS INTREPID (CVS 11)

Upon the return of USS INTREPID (CVS 11) to Quonset Point, Rhode Island, from the Mediterranean on 4 May 1973, the Direct Support Element on board INTREPID deactivated and disestablished in anticipation of the decommissioning of the ship. CINCLANTFLT cryptologic direct support personnel were assigned to INTREPID for the ship's entire Mediterranean cruise, dating from late November 1972.

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9. ~~(S)~~ SURVEILLANCE SQUADRON (U)

~~(S)~~ Commander Destroyer Squadron FOURTEEN was designated as Surface Surveillance Manager by COMSECONDWLF on 1 June 1973, relieving COMDESSRON EIGHTEEN of all intelligence management functions.

10. ~~(S)~~ NORCLANTEX (U)

a. ~~(S)~~ COMCINCPACFLT TWO, tasked by COMASWORLANT to conduct overall planning and execution of at-sea operations for ISCS (Interim Sea Control Ship) evaluation involving USS GUAM (LPH 9), requested COMSEC Direct Support during this operation, with the COMSEC team to be embarked in GUAM. NORCLANTEX (Northern Atlantic ISCS Evaluation) served as the major vehicle for this evaluation. The request stated that the major concern was the security of the uncovered SWIP Net which handles large quantities of EW/NAV and SSSC Contact reporting information. Selective monitoring of these and other tactical nets was requested with a maximum of two operator positions manned at any one time. CINCLANTFLT tasked NAVCOMSTA (LANE GOC) Norfolk with providing personnel assets in support of the exercise.

b. (U) A COMSEC team consisting of one officer/four operators embarked in GUAM to conduct selective monitoring of uncovered nets and advise the supported commander on the overall security of the various nets.

c. (U) This exercise terminated on 3 May 1973 with no formal report required. Informal daily summaries were provided to the supported commander by the embarked Direct Support Element.

11. ~~(S)~~ LANTRHADEX 3-73 (U)

~~(S)~~ SIGSEC support to LANTRHADEX 3-73 was provided from CINCLANTFLT resources with NAVCOMSTA Norfolk coordinating the effort. Support to BLUE forces consisted of two Direct Support Elements assigned to USS BELKNAP and USS NEWPORT NEWS. COMBORG was provided two personnel to support air operations. Ashore support was provided by HFDF locating information on both ORANGE and BLUE forces with tipoffs provided by LANE GOC. During the at-sea phases, COMBLUE cryptologic Direct Support Elements monitored and analyzed force communications and reported significant losses/disclosures of information of tactical intelligence value to the OFC via "SIGSEC Spot Reports." Pre-exercise training included threat briefings, Technical Guidance Unit visits, SIGSEC briefings, indoctrination/training in proper use of authentication, MUJO, and

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BROADWINDOW. Specific instructions for monitoring and exploitation of opposition communications as well as SIGSEC reporting criteria and format were promulgated by COMBOLUS/COMORANGE at a later date. This exercise terminated as scheduled on 7 June 1973.

12. (U) EXERCISE UNITAS XIV

UNITAS XIV, the latest in a series of ASW exercises conducted with various South American nations under the cognizance of USCOMSOLANT, was conducted from 28 July 1973 to 12 December 1973. The primary objective of the COMSEC support provided to the exercise was to further the familiarisation and training that has been accomplished in previous exercises in the UNITAS series. A COMSEC team composed of one E6 from LANT COC and one E7 from Roosevelt Roads, Puerto Rico, provided briefings to the staff/flagship and other ships in company. The exercise phases were conducted while circumnavigating the South American continent in a counterclockwise direction. A COMSEC End-of-Trip Report was prepared by LANT COC enumerating the specific support provided by the COMSEC team embarked.

13. (S) EXERCISE LANTCORTEX 1-73 (U)

(S) Exercise LANTCORTEX 1-73, with COMASWGRU FOUR (embarked USS GUAM (LPH 9)) as COMBOLUS and COMSEC as COMORANGE, was an integrated escort exercise with major objectives of protection available to HVU's (High Value Units), optimum operating procedures for the escorts, and equipment required by the integrated ASW forces in carrying out their tasks. Signal security (SIGSEC) support consisted of a Direct Support Element assigned to USS GUAM. The team consisted of COMSEC personnel augmented by three ELENT specialists from CINCLANTFLT to provide support on the use of acoustic and electromagnetic deception devices. HFDF tipoff support was provided by NAVCOMMSTA (LANT CSC) Norfolk. A final Project Analysis Report was produced by LANT CSC, with particular emphasis being placed on utilization and effectiveness of the changing call sign system being used in the exercise.

14. (S) EXERCISES SEACOMEX/TRANSLANTEX (U)

(S) COMCRUDESFLOT TWO embarked in USS GUAM (LPH 9) to conduct Exercise SEACOMEX during transit from Norfolk to Lisbon, Portugal, and Exercise TRANSLANTEX on the return transit to Norfolk, with a short operating period in the Norwegian Sea. Direct Support Elements were assigned to COMCRUDESFLOT TWO on board GUAM from 4 June 1973 to 18 July 1973 and to USS WAINWRIGHT (DLG 28) (for TRANSLANTEX only) from 28 June 1973 to 15 July 1973. The Troop Message Center on board GUAM was con-

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verted to a temporary SSES with the advice of and a great deal of assistance from maintenance personnel of NAVSECGRUDET NORFOLK. SHACOMEX and TRANSLANTEX were designed to test GUAM in her role as Interim Sea Control Ship accompanied by escorts and, in the case of TRANSLANTEX, working with units of the Royal Navy. The assigned Direct Support Elements provided SIGINT direct support to the operational commander in the form of early warning of Soviet air reconnaissance activity and Naval reaction directed against the exercise forces. Upon completion of the exercise, COMCNOUSWEST TWO submitted an evaluation to CINCLANTFLT on the Sea Control Ship Signals Exploitation Space regarding the cryptologic support requirements for space, location, equipment, manning, interfaces, etc.

15. ~~(S)~~ LOSS OF SURVEILLANCE ASSETS (S)

~~(S)~~ As a result of continuing reductions in Navy operating forces, the three DER's (USS KRETCHMER (DER 329), USS CALCATERRA (DER 390), and USS THOMAS J. GARY (DER 326)) dedicated to Atlantic Fleet surveillance operations were removed from active service and decommissioned during 1973, GARY being the last to go, completing her last surveillance duties in August 1973. With this reduction in assets, responsibility for reconnaissance efforts devolved on four destroyer types, the plan being to equip each with a SIGINT-capable van and cryptologic Direct Support Element for actual surveillance operations. The four ships selected were USS KRAUS (DD 849), USS BONHOMME (DD 851), USS SANSHIELD (DD 857), and USS SWIFTLINK (DD 867). At year's end, only KRAUS had actually been used in a surveillance role, with an OICB van embarked.

16. ~~(S)~~ PROJECT SEARCHLIGHT (U)

~~(S)~~ In late August, 1973, procedures were arranged with NOVIC (Naval Ocean Surveillance Information Center) to upgrade the NWOW priority of certain targets in specified areas of the Western Atlantic during periods when the President was residing in Key Biscayne. NOVIC then provided this information to the Coast Guard and the Secret Service under the code name "Project SEARCHLIGHT."

17. ~~(S)~~ EXERCISE SWIFT MOVE (U)

a. ~~(S)~~ Exercise SWIFT MOVE, a medium scale NATO LIVEX in the TRIP TIDE series, was conducted 1-8 October 1973 in the Eastern Atlantic, North and Norwegian Sea areas. COMSEALANTFLT-LANT/COMUSCODEFLT, embarked in USS NEWPORT NEWS (CA 148), COMCARLISLE/COMCARSHU SIX, embarked in USS JOHN F. KENNEDY (CVA 67), and DESEROW 32 participated. The permanent Direct Support Elements on board NEWPORT NEWS and KENNEDY were augmented for this exercise by LANTFLT cryptologic direct support

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personnel drawn from Naval Security Group Activity, Edzell, Scotland; Assistant Commander Naval Security Group, Fort Meade, Maryland; and Atlantic COMSEC Operations Center (NCS Norfolk). USS NEW (DD 818), with Hut ALFA (a CINCUSNAVEUR resource) embarked, was manned for direct service SI communications by CINCUSNAVEUR personnel. CINCLANTFLT provided one senior analyst to NEW.

b. (5) The CVA carrier task force operated in the central North Sea and Baltic approaches 1-3 October, while an ASW task force (OTC embarked in HMS HARRIER) operated in the Shetland-Norwegian Gap during the same period. The combined task force then proceeded northward into the Norwegian Sea 3-5 October, for a final three days of simulated air/surface warfare against opposing forces off the coast of northern Norway in an area approximately 200 NM west and northwest of the Lofoten Islands (6-8 October). Soviet reaction to SWIFT MOVE was considerably less extensive than that accorded the larger-scale, NATO Exercise STRONG EXPRESS (14-28 September 1972). The reaction consisted principally of routine sporadic surveillance of major NATO participants NEWPORT NEWS and KENNEDY, while KENNEDY was the target of highest interest and was held in continuous close surveillance by surface units with almost daily air reconnaissance during the entire exercise.

c. (5) Naval Security Group Activity Edzell was commanded by COMUSCOMINT at the completion of the exercises as follows: "I TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO COMMEND YOU AND YOUR PERSONNEL, ON THE SPHERE SIGINT SUPPORT PROVIDED THROUGHOUT THIS EXTENSIVE FLIGHT OPERATION. . . . IN SHORT, YOUR COMMANDER'S PROFESSIONALISM AND INTELLIGENT ANALYSIS OF FLIGHT INFORMATION WHICH SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS ARE TRULY COMMENDABLE. WELL DONE. VADM J. G. FINNEGAN" (COMUSCOMINT 081451Z OCT 73 (SI)).

18. (5) MIDEAST WAR (U)

a. (5) Upon completion of Exercise SWIFT MOVE, USS JOHN F. KENNEDY (CVA 67) left a scheduled port call in Edinburgh, Scotland, on 13 October 1973 and was deployed to a holding area west of the Straits of Gibraltar. At the request of CINCUSNAVEUR, CINCLANTFLT augmented KENNEDY's Direct Support Element with five personnel from Naval Security Group Activity, Edzell, Scotland. These personnel stayed with KENNEDY as she entered the Mediterranean Sea in reaction to the worsening Middle Eastern situation and disembarked 20 November 1973 as KENNEDY cutchopped the Mediterranean enroute Norfolk.

b. (5) In a further response to the Middle Eastern conflict, USS IWO JIMA (LPH 2) was deployed from Norfolk to the Mediterranean approximately a month ahead of schedule. At the request of the operational commander, IWO JIMA was manned by LANTFLT cryptologic direct support personnel for Special

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Intelligence direct service communications, activating 16 October 1973. The LANTFLT personnel were eventually replaced by CINCUSNAVEUR personnel and returned to Norfolk in early December.

c. (6) To meet an urgent requirement for additional COMDEASTFOR Special Intelligence Direct Support capability, one QUIC (Quick Intelligence Capability) van from CINCUSNAVEUR assets was airshipped to Bahrain Island for installation in USS MCCANNLESS (DE 1084). One maintenance and three communications personnel were also "loaned" to COMDEASTFOR to help man this van, departing Norfolk 1 November 1973. The communications personnel returned to CONUS 11 December 1973; the maintenance technician (and the van) remained with MIDEASTFOR through the end of the year.

19. (S) TRANSFER OF INTELLIGENCE RESOURCES (U)

(S) PBD (Program Budget Decision) 286, dated 14 December 1973, directed the movement of Army and Navy intelligence resources from Program 3 (Intelligence and Communications) to Program 2 (General Purpose Forces). This PBD is to be implemented in Fiscal Year 1975. In the Atlantic Fleet, the cryptologic direct support personnel of the Marine Second Radio Battalion and the Naval Security Group are affected. The Naval Security Group personnel include those permanently assigned to ships and staffs and those prepositioned at Security Group activities in the LANT area who are used on a TAD basis to provide direct cryptologic support to aircraft, ships and embarked commanders. An important benefit derived from this transfer is the enhancing of the Navy's control over these resources, although NSA/CSS retains its statutory responsibilities for overall SIGINT management. Navy recommendations for cryptologic resource levels will be coordinated with DIA/NSA prior to submission to OASD (I). All SIGINT Direct Support RDRs will continue to be contained in the Program 3 CCP (Consolidated Cryptologic Program).

20. (S) ELINT TECHNICAL GUIDANCE (U)

a. (S) During the period 1 Jan 1973 to 31 Dec 1973 technical guidance in ESM (Electronic Warfare Support Measures) and ELINT collection procedures was provided by the Norfolk ELINT TGU (Technical Guidance Unit) to 103 units of the Atlantic Fleet (74 in TGU spaces and 29 on board the units) with a combined audience of 185 officers and 426 enlisted personnel. ELINT specialists were assigned to designated ships on a temporary basis to assist in ELINT collection, and recognition kits were distributed to Atlantic Fleet units to improve their electronic warfare readiness posture. ESM/ELINT technical guidance was also provided to Atlantic Fleet units

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by NAVCOMMSTA Newport, Rhode Island and NAVSECGRUACT Charleston, South Carolina.

b. (6) During the period 1 January 1973 to 31 December 1973, assistance was provided to Coast Guard MSG on 54 occasions in support of Coast Guard inspections of Soviet Bloc or suspected Soviet Charter merchant vessels to determine the existence of any electronic surveillance equipment. With the exception of one inspection which was conducted in New Orleans, Louisiana, all have taken place in the Hampton Roads area. Message reports concerning the results of these inspections are submitted to Commander, Naval Intelligence Command and Director, Naval Investigative Service. There has been no surveillance equipment detected to date.

c. (6) On 30 May 1973, the first joint ELINT instruction between CINCLANTFLT and CINCUSNAVEUR was signed and published. With the exception of VQ-2, this directive is applicable to all Fleet ships and aircraft squadrons under the operational control of CINCLANTFLT and CINCUSNAVEUR possessing an ESM capability and, additionally, cancels CINCLANTFLT Instruction C3430:4D and the NAVSECGRUACT Naples, Italy ESM/ELINT improvement guide. In general, the instruction provides for standardized ELINT intercept, logging, and recording procedures for all units; however, electrical and hard copy reporting are necessarily different depending upon their area of operation. Also included in the instruction are the various services offered by the ELINT Technical Guidance Units located at Norfolk, Charleston, Newport and Naples; detailed directions on obtaining these services are included therein. Utilisation of this new instruction will enable the Fleet to produce more comprehensive ELINT reports and, at the same time, eliminate minor problem areas with respect to collection and reporting procedures that have been experienced in the past.

21. (U) DSSCS MESSAGE HANDLING

Total message volumes for all circuits terminated in the DSSCS Communications Center, for 1973, are as follows:

CIRCUIT	TOTAL MSGS SENT	TOTAL GPS SENT	TOTAL MSGS RECVD	TOTAL GPS RECVD
ASC FT. DODRICK	10,067	1,528,322	99,416	36,761,392
ASC ANDREWS AFB	1,644	120,426	74,679	28,581,411
NORTHWEST	10,838	1,772,231	29,153	8,171,528

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CIRCUIT	TOTAL MSGS SENT	TOTAL GPS SENT	TOTAL MSGS RECVD	TOTAL GPS RECVD
ZICOM ALFA	15,142	309,290	5,258	115,936
ZICOM BRAVO	R/O	R/O	10,391	216,260
TOTAL:	37,691	3,730,209	218,897	73,846,527

Total messages sent/received: 256,588

Total groups sent/received: 77,576,736

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PART VIII

INFORMATION SYSTEMS

1. WMSCS (WORLDWIDE MILITARY COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM) NEW STANDARD COMPUTER INSTALLATION

a. In response to direction from higher authority, the position of LDN (Local Data Base Manager) was established in the Information Systems Office.¹ The LDN is responsible for all command and control data base structures, validity, responsiveness, and accessibility.

b. Installation of the CINCLANT GSS/L (General Staff Support/Large) WMSCS computer was completed on 9 February 1973 and the acceptance test was completed (with a 98.38% system availability rate) on 9 March 1973.²

c. Both the CINCLANT GSS/L and the CINCLANT IDHS (Intelligence Data Handling System) GSS/M (General Staff Support/Medium) computers were upgraded during October 1973 by the installation of the EIS (Extended Instruction Set) and EAS (Extended Addressing System) hardware modifications.

2. TWIDS (Threat Warning Information Display System)

The TWIDS hardware components were installed in the CINCLANT Command Center during November 1973.

3. COOP (Continuity of Operations Plan)

On 15 February 1973, staff responsibility for the preparation and maintenance of the COOP was transferred from the Information Systems Office (022) to the Assistant Chief of Staff Operations (J3).

¹CINCLANT/CINCLANTFLT/CINCWESTLANTSTAFFNOTE 5500 of 9 April 1973

²CINCLANT ltr ser 022T2/415 of 25 Apr 1973

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PART IX
PUBLIC AFFAIRS

1. MAJOR NEWS EVENTS

a. Southeast Asia Support Ended

(1) On 16 February 1973, it was announced that an eight-ship LANTERN carrier task force scheduled to depart the East Coast for duty in SEASIA would not be so deployed. This action marked the beginning of phased-down military augmentation in that area.

(2) The return of HM-12 personnel from ENDSCOOP mine sweeping operations in the Western Pacific was announced on 27 July 1973. The helicopters returned to Norfolk, Virginia 1 September 1973 on board USS INCHON (LPH 12).

b. Exercise EXOTIC DANCER VI

(1) A Joint Information Bureau (JIB) was established at CINCLANT Headquarters in Norfolk, Virginia, to handle the Public Affairs aspects of Joint Exercise EXOTIC DANCER VI. This was a JCS-directed exercise conducted during the period 15 March through 8 April 1973 in the Camp Lejeune training area of North Carolina.

(2) Subordinate JIBS were set up at the following locations:

- (a) Afloat (USS NEWPORT NEWS)
- (b) CINCAFLANT, Seymour Johnson AFB, N.C.
- (c) CINCARLANT, Fort Bragg, N.C.
- (d) Camp Lejeune, N.C.

(3) An advance cadre (ADVCOM) from JIBCLANT (CINCLANT Headquarters in Norfolk, Virginia) arrived at Camp Lejeune 21 March 1973 to organize preparations for Information Bureau operations in the exercise area. Staff members reported on subsequent days, building toward complete staffing on 27 March, when the Director arrived. SUB-JIB Lejeune conducted full-scale operations from D-5 through D+E. All TAD was terminated

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on D+4. SUB-JIB Lejeune operated as JIBBLANT's principal representative in the field for the duration of the Public Affairs operation.

(4) Major projects included honoring media requests to observe special events and visit units; transportation and billeting for approximately 27 media including three from Washington, D.C. and four from the southern coastal areas, who joined media from the local regions immediately surrounding the exercise area of operations; preparation of one DOD news film release; 12 radio and TV releases, one television show, and 12 press releases with eight photos.

(5) D-Day activities included a press conference by Admiral Ralph W. COUSINS, USN, CINCLANT, held at the Town House Motor Lodge in Jacksonville, N.C., and a planeside conference with Assistant Secretary of Defense William P. CLEMENTS.

(6) Information was also released on an Army helicopter crash which took the lives of the pilot and co-pilot.

c. October War in the Mideast

(1) During hostilities in the Mideast in October 1973, and a massive resupply operation (named MITTLE CRASS), aimed at replacing Israeli war losses with American military equipment, CINCLANT and its subordinates maintained a DOD-wide "no comment" posture.

(2) Local media carried pictures of Israeli ships and aircraft departing the Tidewater Area with supplies. Newsmen were, however, denied access to military facilities and received no confirmations or other facts on any aspect of U.S. involvement from CINCLANT subordinate commands. Only the statements issued by DOD spokesman at the seat of Government were reiterated to the media as SITREPSS, covering such subjects as the size of the U.S. Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean, resupply mission support, and overall American involvement.

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PART X

POL (PETROLEUM OIL LUBRICANTS) SUPPORT CAPABILITY

1. (U) OPERATION PLANS. Review and update of the petroleum appendix to the logistic annex of the OPLANS listed below was completed during calendar year 1973. The POL appendices were revised to conform to the requirements of the JOPS (Joint Operational Planning System):

CINCLANT OPLAN's 2200, 2325

In addition, the planning phase for OPLAN 2348 began.

2. (U) JOINT EXERCISES. During exercises HIGH HUMS and EXOTIC DANCER VI, the Joint Petroleum Office provided a Logistic Readiness Center watch officer. As a result, petroleum logistics play was greatly expanded.

3. MSP TO NSP CONVERSIONS. The U. S. Navy propulsion fuel conversion of the two MRC POL depots within LNATCOM commenced. Actual Navy distillate storage at the two depots will be as follows:

a. ~~(C)~~ NAS Bermuda Annex--113,400 BBLS

b. ~~(C)~~ NAVSTA Roosevelt Roads, P. R.--130,300 BBLS

4. (U) CINCLANT FUEL ISSUES. Issues from CINCLANT logistical areas for calendar year 1973 are listed below [all quantities are in M BBLS (42 gallons/barrel)]. The second line in the table indicates the percent increase or decrease over CY-1972 issues.

115/145	JP-4	JP-5	MOGAS	DIESEL	NSFO	ND	KRO
198.8	1320.5	720.4	106.8	946.6	559.8	460.5	3.0
-37%	-58	-58	-34%	-58	-70%	+76%	-41%

NOTE THAT THESE ISSUES DO NOT INCLUDE ISSUES MADE FROM CONUS OR EASTLANT DEPOTS NOR FROM UNDERRAFT REPLENISHMENT SHIPS.

5. (U) INVENTORY MANAGEMENT PLAN. Review and comment was made on the initial IMP (Inventory Management Plan) issued under DBA

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[REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]
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integrated management of bulk POL. The IMP contains PWRS (Pre-Positioned War Reserve Stock), POS (Peacetime Operating Stock), Storage, and PWRR (Pre-Positioned War Reserve Requirements) levels assigned by depot and base for each Service.

6. ~~407 FUEL CRISSES.~~ The beginnings of the fuel shortage were felt by mid-year and became acute on 17 October with the Arab oil embargo. CINCLANTFLT PWRS levels for JP-5 were entered. Lajes Field, Azores was extensively used as a refueling stop for NICKEL GRASS SDD aircraft involved in the resupply of Israel. USAF assigned PWRS levels were breached. One JP-4 tanker destined for the CINCPUR area was diverted by JCS action to resupply Lajes. Through close coordination with MSC (Military Sealift Command) tanker division, DFSC (Defense Fuel Supply Center) cargo division, MAC (Military Airlift Command), and CINCLANT JPO (Joint Petroleum Office) stock levels at Lajes were maintained. Price of fuel rose rapidly during the year further compounding fuel problems. Representative of the increases are a 32% rise in the standard price of JP-5, a 21% increase in JP-4, and a 27% jump in the price of NSF. Additional price increases are projected for early calendar year 1974.

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PART XI

INSPECTIONS

1. ESTABLISHMENT AND STAFFING OF INSPECTOR GENERAL'S OFFICE

a. JCS Memo SM-90-73 of 26 February 1973 directed that Commanders of the Unified Commands establish an office of Inspector General on their staffs to be operational by 16 April 1973. It further stipulated that the Inspector General would be a flag or general officer, the billet filled by "dual hatted" officers, where appropriate.

b. On 24 June 1973, Rear Admiral Robert H. GORMLEY, USN, reported to the CINCLANTFLT Staff as Inspector General, and was assigned additional duty to CINCLANT. Thus, the requirement of the JCS Charter [JCS Memo SM90-73] was fulfilled.

c. The interpretation of the spirit and intent of the JCS Charter by RADM GORMLEY, as approved by CINCLANT, has been defined by the I. G. billet description contained in the current Joint Table of Distribution. It is quoted as follows:

"The mission of the Inspector General is to assist the Commander in maintaining effective command and control, high standards of joint operational readiness, and an effective OPSEC program and, through a formal inspection program and informal visits on subordinate commands, to provide reports and evaluations on matters relating to command and control, joint operational readiness, and OPSEC programs, as required by the commander or higher authority through the commander."

d. Immediate measures to staff the office of the Inspector General commenced on his arrival in June 1973. The joint billet staffing, which integrates staff members assigned to either CINCLANT or CINCLANTFLT, and further assigns them to additional duty on the opposite staff and the staffs of COMWESTLANT and CONOCLEANLANT, was ultimately authorized as follows:

<u>Billet</u>	<u>Service/Grade</u>	<u>Staff Assignment</u>
Inspector General	USN/O-8	FLEET
Deputy Inspector General	USN/O-6	FLEET

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Ass't for Command and Control	USAF/0-6	LANT
Ass't for Operational Security	Army/0-5	LANT
Ass't for Air	Navy/0-5	FLEET
Ass't for Submarines	Navy/0-5	FLEET
Inspection Coordinator	USMC/0-4	LANT
Administrative Assistant	Navy/0-3	FLEET
Writer	Navy/E-7	FLEET
Office Supervisor	Navy/E-6	LANT
Administrative Supervisor	USMC/E-5	LANT
Clerical Assistant (2)	Navy/E-4	FLEET
Secretary	Civilian/GS-4	LANT

2. DIRECTIVES

a. As previously stated, the Charter for the Office of the CINCLANT Inspector General is JCS Memo 88-98-73 of 26 February 1973.

b. In August 1973, CINCLANT transmitted a message which announced to all subordinates within the Atlantic Command that an Inspector General's Office had been established. Briefly, it stated that "...the I. G.'s office would operate within the Atlantic Command by monitoring and periodic inspection of operational areas essential to mission performance...providing the Commander in Chief with an additional means to accomplish assigned missions...through a program of scheduled inspections, no-notice inspections and investigations..." This was to be accomplished specifically within those areas of interest described in the I. G. billet description above, as directed by the JCS.

3. ORIENTATION VISITS/BRIEFINGS

a. Throughout the remainder of 1973, the Inspector General received joint operations briefings and conducted orientation visits to familiarize himself with the Atlantic Command and apprise the Commander of the status of his forces.

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b. Visits included Commander in Chief Strategic Air Command (CINCSAC), Commander in Chief U. S. Army Forces Atlantic (CINCAFLANT), Commander in Chief U. S. Readiness Command (USCINCPRED), Commander in Chief U. S. Air Force Forces Atlantic (CINCAFLANT) and Commander Joint Unconventional Warfare Task Force Atlantic (COMJUWTF).

4. **SPECIAL PURPOSE (JOINT) INVESTIGATION.** A special purpose inspection of the Command Center, CINCLANT/CINCLANTFLT was conducted.

5. **SUMMARY.** In CY-73, the I.G. office under CINCLANT was established, the billets to carry out the JCS Charter authorized, the announcement was made to the Atlantic Command that the Office was established, the precedent was established to conduct no-notice and short-notice inspections and the Commander was apprised of the status of his forces from reports by the Inspector General which resulted from the orientation visits and the investigations conducted.

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PART XII
PROTOCOL

1. SPECIAL EVENTS AND VISITS

- a. 1 Feb 73: General John C. MEYER, USAF, Director, Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff (JSTPS) visited CINCLANT Headquarters to present the JSTPS "Peg Point" briefing to CINCLANT selected subordinate commanders and the Joint Staff.
- b. 7 Feb 73: Lieutenant General Leo F. BREWSTER, USA, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Manpower and Reserve Affairs visited CINCLANT Headquarters to present a briefing on the Proposed New Military Retirement System to all Hampton Roads flag and general Officers.
- c. 13 Feb 73: General Walter T. KERWIN, Jr., USA, Commander U.S. Continental Army Command (COMAROC) visited CINCLANT Headquarters for briefings and discussions.
- d. 15 Feb 73: General Bruce PALMER, Jr., USA, Commander-in Chief Readiness Command (USCINCRED) visited CINCLANT Headquarters for briefings and calls in connection with his recently assumed duties.
- e. 7-9 Apr 73: The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Defense College, including Rear Admiral Ward MURRAY, USN, Acting Commandant, Dr. L.G.M. JAQUET, Deputy Commandant, 12 other staff members, and 55 students, visited the Norfolk area for orientation briefings and tours. Included in the itinerary was a tour of Colonial Williamsburg, Virginia.
- f. 15-17 Apr 73: The U. S. Army War College, comprised of 65 faculty members and students, visited the Norfolk area for orientation briefings and tours. Included in the itinerary was a tour of the USS INDEPENDENCE (CVA 62).
- g. 27 Apr 73: An Industrial College of the Armed Forces (ICAF) Study Group, comprised of Major General Edward A. McCOUGH, III, USAF, Deputy Commandant ICAF, two faculty members, and 17 students, visited CINCLANT Headquarters for familiarisation with command and control missions, functions and systems.

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b. 15-17 Apr 73: The Brazilian Armed Forces General Staff (MFA), comprised of General Duarte CANDAL Fonseca, Chief, MFA, General DARIO Lazaro, Deputy Chief for Army, Admiral OSERIO DE ABREU Pereira, Deputy Chief for Navy, Brigadier SANTOS Machado De Carvalho, Deputy Chief for Air Force and 23 staff officers visited the Norfolk area for briefings and tours.

i. 19-21 Jun 73: The Brazilian National War College, comprised of 13 staff members and 76 students, visited CINCLANT Headquarters and selected military and civilian installations in the Tidewater area to receive briefings and orientation tours. Included in the itinerary were visits to the Armed Forces Staff College, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Headquarters, Old Dominion University in Norfolk and the Norfolk Model Redevelopment Agency.

j. 24-26 Jun 73: Admiral Chonian KUCHIRAN, Royal Thai Navy (RTN), Deputy Chief of Staff, Supreme Command, Thai Armed Forces, Military of Defense, accompanied by Lieutenant General Hirun KHUNORAVACHO, RTN, Adjutant General, Supreme Command visited the Norfolk area for briefings and discussions at CINCLANT Headquarters and selected subordinate commands.

k. 2 Jul 73: The Honorable Frederick IRVING, U. S. Ambassador to Iceland, visited CINCLANT Headquarters for discussions with CINCLANT and selected staff officers.

l. 11 Jul 73: Lieutenant General Phillip B. DAVIDSON, Jr., USA, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (Resources and Management) and five staff members visited CINCLANT Headquarters for calls and discussions on intelligence related matters.

m. 24-25 Jul 73: Capitaine de Frégate Didier RATSIRAKA, Malagasy Foreign Minister, visited CINCLANT Headquarters for briefings, calls and tours. He was accompanied by Ambassador Henri RAHARILAHONOA, Malagasy Ambassador to the United States, Dr. Claude RATSIMAMANDRY, Director for Bilateral Relations, Malagasy Republic, and Mr. Harmon CONN, Director, Office of Central Affairs, Department of State.

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n. 10 Sep 73: Mr. Sigurdur GIZURARSON, Special Assistant to the Icelandic Foreign Minister, visited CINCLANT Headquarters for briefings and discussions. Mr. GIZURARSON was accompanied by His Excellency Haraldur KROYER, Icelandic Ambassador to the United States, Mr. Doyle MARTIN, Deputy Chief of the United States Mission to Iceland, and Mr. Philip E. BARRINGTON, Director, Foreign-Military-Rights Affairs, Office Deputy Assistant Secretary (Inter-American Foreign Trade Disclosure and Military Rights Affairs) International Security Affairs, Department of Defense.

o. 27-28 Sep 73: General Ryukai MAKAMURA, Chairman, Joint Staff Council, Japan Defense Agency visited CINCLANT Headquarters and selected commands in the Norfolk area for briefings, discussions and tours. The itinerary included a visit to NASA.

p. 4-7 Oct 73: The Royal College of Defense Studies, comprised of 13 senior civilian and military representatives from various nations of the British Commonwealth, visited CINCLANT Headquarters and several other military and civilian sites in the Tidewater area for orientation briefings and tours. The itinerary included visits to the MacArthur Memorial in Norfolk and to Colonial Williamsburg, Virginia.

q. 8-10 Oct 73: Major General G.W.D. CROMPTON, United Kingdom Army, Chief of Staff, LIVE OAK, Brigadier General R. HODGINS-DENNETT, British Army, Deputy Chief of Staff, LIVE OAK, and seven staff members visited the Norfolk area for briefings, discussions, and tours. Included in the itinerary was a visit to Colonial Williamsburg.

r. 15-16 Oct 73: The Sixteenth Senior Seminar in Foreign Policy, comprised of 30 faculty and student members in civilian and military units in the Norfolk area for orientation briefings and tours. The itinerary included visits to the USS CONNIE (LPD 11) and the USS BIRDLIN (DLG 34).

s. 17-18 Oct 73: The NATO Defense College, including Lieutenant General E. H. WOLFS, Danish Army, Commandant, Brigadier General V. RAMBONI, Italian Air Force, Deputy Commandant, Rear Admiral E. HOEDT, German Navy, Deputy Commandant, and 71 staff members and students visited the Norfolk area for orientation briefings and tours.

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t. 23 Oct 73: General Robert J. DIXON, USAF, Commander, Tactical Air Command and Commander in Chief Air Force Forces Atlantic (CINCAFLANT), visited CINCLANT Headquarters for briefings and discussions in connection with his newly assumed duties.

u. 29 Oct 73: His Excellency Joao Mail. THIMIDO, Portuguese Ambassador to the United States, visited CINCLANT Headquarters for briefings and discussions.

v. 6-9 Nov 73: The Canadian Forces Staff College, including Commodore William P. HAYES, Commandant, and 155 students representing ten countries, visited CINCLANT Headquarters and selected subordinate commands for orientation briefings and tours.

w. 8-9 Nov 73: The Ecuadorian National War College, comprised of eight leaders in the Ecuadorian Government, visited CINCLANT headquarters and selected subordinate commands for orientation briefings and tours. Included in the itinerary was a visit to the USS DANLAW (DLG 21).

x. 20 Nov 73: General William E. DePUY, USA, Commander, United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, visited CINCLANT Headquarters for briefings and discussions.

y. 12 Dec 73: Admiral Armin KIMMERMANN, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Armed Forces, Federal Republic of Germany, visited the Norfolk area for briefings, discussions and tours. Included in the itinerary was a visit to the USS HAMPTON (SSH 663).

z. 19 Dec 73: Ambassador Stuart W. SCOTT, Ambassador Designate to Portugal, visited CINCLANT Headquarters for briefings and calls in connection with his forthcoming assignment.

2. NEW YORK PRESIDENTIAL VISIT

a. President and Mrs. Richard M. NIXON visited Norfolk on 19 May 1973 for an Armed Forces Day celebration. The ceremony took place at pier 12, Norfolk Naval Station, aboard the USS INDEPENDENCE (CVA 62) and included a Presidential address and a fly-over of F4 and F6 aircraft.

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3. JOINT EXERCISE EXOTIC DANCER VI

a. A CINCCLANT Joint Visitors Bureau, comprised of the CINCCLANT Protocol Office augmented by subordinate LAMTCOM commands, was established during the latter phases of Joint Exercise EXOTIC DANCER VI at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina in order to provide observers with a coordinated program designed to demonstrate the effectiveness of joint operations. Included among the approximately 500 observers accommodated were representatives of Congress, the State Department, all branches of the Department of Defense, as well as observers from NATO nations.

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PART XIII

SUBORDINATE UNIFIED COMMANDS

1. ANTILLES DEFENSE COMMAND (ANTDEFCOM)

a. Headquarters. Commander Antilles Defense Command (COMANTDEFCOM), with headquarters at U. S. Naval Station, Roosevelt Roads, Puerto Rico, is a subordinate unified commander under CINCLANT.

b. Commander. Rear Admiral James D. RAMAGE, USN is Commander Caribbean Sea Frontier (COMCARIBSEAFRON) and serves additional duty as COMANTDEFCOM and as Commandant Tenth Naval District (COMTEN). RADM RAMAGE assumed duty on 1 June 1973.

c. Joint Manpower Program. The JMP for ANTDIFCOPM as approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) resulted in the following manpower authorization:

	<u>Officer</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>	<u>Totals</u>
ARMY	1	0	1
NAVY	2	1	3
AIR FORCE	2	0	2
Totals	5	1	6

2. ICELAND DEFENSE FORCE (ICEDIFOR)

a. Headquarters. Commander Iceland Defense Force (COMICEDIFOR), with headquarters at U. S. Naval Station, Keflavik, Iceland, is a subordinate unified commander under CINCLANT.

b. Commander. Rear Admiral Samuel M. COOLLEY, Jr., USN is COMICEDIFOR and serves additional duty as Commander Fleet Air Keflavik (COMFAIRKEF). RADM COOLLEY assumed duty on 25 May 1973.

c. Joint Manpower Program. The JMP for ICEDIFOR as approved by the JCS resulted in the following manpower authorization:

	<u>Officer</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>	<u>U. S. Civilian</u>	<u>Foreign National</u>	<u>Totals</u>
ARMY	2	0	0	0	2
NAVY	14	22	5	2	44
AIR FORCE	8	5	0	0	13
Totals	24	27	6	2	59

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3. U. S. FORCES AZORES (USFORAZ)

a. Headquarters. Commander U. S. Forces Azores (COMUSFORAZ), with Headquarters at Terceira, Azores, is a subordinate unified commander under CINCLANT.

b. Commander. Brigadier General William P. COMSTOCK, USAF, is COMUSFORAZ and serves additional duty as Commander 1695th Air Base Wing. BG WM COMSTOCK assumed duty in July 1973.

c. Joint Manpower Program. The JMP for USFORAZ as approved by the JCS resulted in the following manpower authorization which is a reduction of 4 billets from the previous year:

	<u>Officer</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>	<u>U. S. Civilian</u>	<u>Foreign National</u>	<u>Totals</u>
ARMY	1	0	0	0	1
NAVY	3	5	4	1	13
AIR FORCE	5	3	0	0	8
Totals	9	8	4	1	22

4. JOINT UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE TASK FORCE ATLANTIC (JUWTA)

a. Headquarters and Activation. Commander Joint Unconventional Warfare Task Force ATLANTIC (COMJUWTA), with headquarters at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, is activated for planning and will be activated for operations as ordered by CINCPAC or higher command authority.

b. Commander. Brigadier General Michael D. HEMLE, USA, Commandant General U. S. Army John F. Kennedy Center for Military Assistance (CG USA/JFKCM) and serves additional duty as COMJUWTA. BG MD HEMLE assumed duty on 30 April 1973.

c. Joint Manpower Program. The JMP for JUWTA as approved by the JCS resulted in the following manpower authorization which reflects an increase of one billet (civilian) over the previous year:

	<u>Officer</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>	<u>U. S. Civilian</u>	<u>Totals</u>
ARMY	3	1	1	5
NAVY	1	0	0	1
AIR FORCE	1	1	0	2
Totals	5	2	1	8

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d. Augmentation requirements for the activation of JUWTFPA in contingencies short of mobilization are pre-mulated annually on approval by JCS of the JUWTFPA JMP.

5. JOINT TASK FORCE 112

a. Headquarters. Commander of Joint Task Force 112 (CJTF 112) is normally assigned to Commander Second Fleet (COMSECONDFLT) with headquarters in the CINCLANTFLT Compound, Norfolk, Virginia (or in an assigned flagship when activated for contingency operations in the Caribbean).

b. Commander. Vice Admiral John G. FINNERAN, USN is Commandant. VADM FINNERAN reported for duty in February 1973.

c. Joint Manpower Program. There is no JMP for CJTF 112. Augmentation requirements are found in CINCLANT OPORD 2000.

6. JOINT AIR RECONNAISSANCE CONTROL CENTER (JARCC)

a. Headquarters. Commander Joint Air Reconnaissance Control Center (COMJARCC), with headquarters at Key West, Florida, commands a separate staff activity under CINCLANT.

b. Commander. Rear Admiral John H. MAURER, USN, is Commander Key West Force (COMKEYWESTFOR) and serves additional duty as COMJARCC. RADM MAURER assumed duty on 16 August 1971.

c. Joint Manpower Program. The JMP for JARCC as approved by the JCS resulted in the following manpower authorization:

	<u>Officer</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>	<u>Totals</u>
NAVY	5	19	24
AIR FORCE	2	13	15
MARINE CORPS	2	2	4
Totals	9	34	43

7. ATLANTIC COMMAND ELECTRONIC INTELLIGENCE CENTER (COMATCENELINTCEN) (SEE APPENDIX II)

a. Headquarters. Commander Atlantic Command Electronic Intelligence Center (COMATCENELINTCEN), with headquarters in the CINCLANTFLT Compound, Norfolk Virginia, commands a separate staff activity under CINCLANT.

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b. Commander. Commander [REDACTED] USM, is
COMLANDCOMINTCEN. CDR [REDACTED] reported for duty on 11
December 1970.

c. Joint Manpower Program. The JMP for LANTCOMINTCEN
as approved by the JCS resulted in the following manpower
authorisation:

	<u>Officer</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>	<u>U. S. Civilian</u>	<u>Totals</u>
ARMY	1	4	0	5
NAVY	2	13	1	16
AIR FORCE	2	10	0	12
MARINE CORPS	1	2	0	3
Totals	<u>6</u>	<u>29</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>36</u>

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APPENDIX I
DELIVERY OF U. S. NAVY AIRCRAFT TO ISRAEL
DURING CRISIS IN OCTOBER 1973
(NICKEL GRASS) (U)

A. ~~(S)~~ GENERAL (U)

1. ~~(S)~~ This report is a brief summary of the delivery of U. S. Navy A-4 aircraft from the United States to Israel during the Israeli-Arab crisis in October 1973. The original document directing this delivery was JCS msg 151700Z Oct 73 to the Chief of Naval Operations, with CINCLANT (Commander in Chief Atlantic) as an information addressee.

2. ~~(S)~~ The project for the support of Israel was assigned the project code 9RD for the control of logistical operations. In addition to project code 9RD, this project was assigned the unclassified nickname NICKEL GRASS. (JCS msg 171948Z Oct 73 refers).

3. ~~(S)~~ During the period of this operation, 50 A-4 type aircraft were shipped or flown to Israel, 12 by surface ships from the Naval Station, NORVA (Norfolk, Virginia), and 38 by carrying from Naval Air Station NORVA. The principal staging area for aircraft ferried was the Air Base Lajes, Lajes, Azores, under command of Commander U. S. Forces Azores, a subordinate unified commander under CINCLANT.

4. ~~(S)~~ Commander Naval Air Force, U. S. Atlantic Fleet was designated as the agent for delivery of the ferried aircraft, and their operation was nicknamed TRANSLANT NICKEL GRASS.

B. ~~(S)~~ AIRCRAFT DELIVERED BY SURFACE SHIPS (U)

1. ~~(S)~~ Of the 12 A-4 aircraft delivered by surface ships, four A-4M's, which had been previously ordered under contract, were shipped on the Israeli freighter AVIMAR, departing NORVA on 15 October 1973. BUENO's (Bureau Numbers) of these aircraft were 159046, 159047, 159048, and 159049. JCS msg 151700Z Oct 73 refers.

2. ~~(S)~~ The remaining eight A-4 aircraft were shipped from NORVA in accordance with the following summary:

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AIRCRAFT TYPE AND BU NO	SHIPMENT DATE	SHIP
A-4E 151163	30 Oct 73	HMAS ROG
A-4E 150127	30 Oct 73	HMAS ROG
A-4E 150138	30 Oct 73	HMAS ROG
A-4E 149647	30 Oct 73	HMAS ROG
A-4E 151028	30 Oct 73	HMAS ROG
A-4E 151120	2 Nov 73	"LIMA CORE"
A-4F 155040	2 Nov 73	"LIMA CORE"
A-4F 154191	2 Nov 73	"LIMA CORE"

* JSC msg 270215Z Oct 73 refers

C. ~~107~~ NARRATIVE SUMMARY OF TRANSFERRED NICKEL GRASS (U)

1. (4) On 16 October 1973 COMVAIRLANT received CNO msg 152218Z Oct 73 directing TRANSMILIT of 24 A-4 aircraft to Israel. Subsequently, the total number of A-4's to be furnished was increased to 38. CINCLANTFLT msg 171328Z Oct 73 designated COMVAIRLANT as the agent for TRANSFERRED NICKEL GRASS.

2. (4) Upon receipt of the CNO message, immediate preparations were begun to organize and coordinate the operations. A Command Post Management Team was established 16 October and around-the-clock operations commenced until the final aircraft was delivered on 28 October.

3. (4) COMVAIRLANT, COMVAIRPAC, and CNOF were tasked to provide A-4 carrier qualified ferry pilots. Most of the designated pilots were current in the A-4J. However, the aircraft to be transferred were A-4E/F models, which created a monumental refresher/recertification requirement. Immediate liaison and extensive coordination were required to quickly transport the designated pilots to Norfolk and qualify them in the A-4E/F. The commanding officer of VF-43 was tasked to prepare and administer a refresher syllabus for the pilots. Between 17 October and 21 October, a total of 47 pilots were refreshed/recertified in the A-4E/F, which included serial tanking from Marine HC-110's operating from Cherry Point, North Carolina and Air Force HC-135's operating out of Seymour-Johnson AFB, North Carolina.

4. (4) Immediate liaison was also commenced with COMVAIRPAC and CNOF to identify the A-4E/F aircraft so they could be quickly delivered to NARF (Naval Air Rework Facility) Mokuleia for modifications prior to COMUS departure. This also necessitated around-the-clock operations for the NARF to meet the demanding schedule.

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5. (S) Since the Navy owns no large aerial tankers, immediate liaison began with COMNAVAIRLANT for KA-3 pathfinders/tankers, with NMFLANT for KC-130 tankers, and with the Air Force for KC-135 tankers. Through superb inter-service support and cooperation, all three types of tankers were utilized in addition to the carrier-based KA-6D tankers in the Mediterranean. Air Force, Marine, and Reserve liaison officers were provided to COMNAVAIRLANT to assist and coordinate the tanking evolutions.

6. (S) Because of the political implication and possible third party involvement Air Base Lajes was the only land base along the entire route of flight which could be utilized. Having three carriers in the Mediterranean permitted utilization of the carriers for divert bases, pathfinder and fuel services, plus a planned fuel stop.

7. (U) The planned flight profile was as follows:

a. (S) Each day one cell consisting of approximately five A-4 aircraft would depart NAS MORVA at 1200Z hours and a second cell would depart 40 minutes later. Each cell would rendezvous with a KC-135 tanker east of MORVA, and the tanker would pathfind and provide fuel for the A-4's as far as Lajes.

b. (S) At Lajes, the pilots would receive a second and more detailed mission briefing, spend the night and depart the following morning by cells at 0800Z and 0830Z respectively. They would be escorted by two KA-3 pathfinders until rendezvousing with four KC-130's approximately 500 miles east of Lajes. After refueling, the A-4's from the KC-130's, the KA-3's and KC-130's would return to Lajes and the A-4's would continue onward to the mid-ocean carrier (JKF) while overtaking the third carrier at 0800Z (JKF) (during the operation one A-4 did land on board the JKF with an electrical failure and was subsequently delivered in the final cell.) JKF's KA-6 aircraft provided escort/pathfinder/refueling for the A-4's as they proceeded to PDR.

c. (S) On board the PDR, the pilots received a final briefing, spent the night, and launched the following morning in two cells at 0740Z and 0830Z respectively. PDR's KA-6 aircraft provided escort/pathfinder/refueling services as the A-4's departed, and INDEPMARINE's KA-6's provided the same services as the A-4's overflew the third carrier.

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d. (4) Approximately 200 miles from Israel, the A-4's were met by Israeli F-4's and escorted to NIMON field. The pilots were on the ground for a short period of time with U. S. Government officials, and departed on board Air Force C-141's or C-5's for the return trip to CONUS.

e. (4) Upon their return, the majority of the pilots were debriefed by Intelligence Officers in Lajes, and COMNAVAIRLANT. Two pilots returned via Washington and briefed COMNAVAIRLANT on their completed mission. The first aircraft departed NIMON on 19 October and 36 aircraft were delivered by 24 October. The final two were delivered on 28 October after a delay in the disposition decision of the final two aircraft.

f. (U) The entire operation was extremely successful from all aspects. Particularly rewarding was the spirit of cooperation and "Can-Do" attitude evidenced throughout the entire spectrum of all services. All of the A-4 ferry pilots have been recently recommended by COMNAVAIRLANT for the Navy Commendation Medal.

g. (U) A summary of aircraft delivered is on the following page.

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062 FOIA 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3); 10 U.S.C. § 1300
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D. ~~(S)~~ NARRATIVE SUMMARY BY 1605TH AIR BASE WING, LAJES,
~~AMORSE~~ (U)

1. (U) 1605th ABW (Air Base Wing) encountered no major problems that were detrimental to the operation. The following areas were noted during Operation MICHAEL GRASS/9DD. Most were resolved once discovered.

2. ~~(C)~~ MAC (Military Airlift Command) PAD (Programming Action Document) 70-40 designates PPR (Prior Permission Required) for Bajes. During the first 14 days of operation, many USAF, Navy, and Marine fighter and cargo aircraft arrived without prior coordination. This inability to plan caused saturation of ramp space. An emergency runway was utilized for the overflow. Basing spaces became critical, partially because of these unplanned arrivals. Four unused dormitories were reopened. Hospital wards, the base swimming pool locker room, and the base gym were pressed into service. Beds and bedding were requested and received from CONUS. All personnel were housed with very few delays.

3. ~~(C)~~ Minor problems were encountered with Santa Maria Center. Aircraft used the same routing for arrivals and departures necessitating the climb to assigned altitude within Lajes PARCON (radar Approach Control) area (45 nautical miles). This was expending reserve fuel on each departure. Close coordination resulted in different routing for outbound aircraft. Neither 1605th nor MAC ALCE (Airlift Control Element) were informed on altitude reservations requested by MSG CSD (Contingency Support Staff) from Lajes to IAD (International Airport, Tel Aviv). This is required for coordination with Santa Maria Center.

4. ~~(C)~~ There was some increase in airfield deterioration, namely cracks in end of runway 34 and taxiway 3 which were repaired because of increased use of airfield requiring closing of first 1,000 feet of runway for over 24 hours. Airlift operations were not interrupted. Some repaving and additional grounding rods were required to provide parking spaces.

5. ~~(C)~~ Dangerous cargo information was not provided on flight plans. At time of contact with aircraft, they could not provide desired information.

6. (U) Demineralized water was in short supply at beginning, and total requirements unknown from day to day. Demineralizer was operated on 24-hour basis, two trailers were converted for storage, and all requirements met the hard way.

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7. (U) Additional demands were placed on all utilities because of buildup and 24-hour operation. All demands were met. 21st LRC (Logistics Readiness Center) provided timely assistance on NOR-G (Non-Operationally Ready-Grounded) parts. Some cannibalisation was required. Twenty refueling pits, 15 R-5 refuelers, and 22 hose carts were pressed into service. Mobil Oil contract was expanded to provide for increased dispensing of fuels.

8. (U) Recreational, Base Exchange, and laundry facilities were expanded to 24-hour operation. Movie and T. V. showings were increased to provide additional entertainment. Food service was expanded to 24 hours a day. Commissary was able to provide all essential requirements. A few crew transportation delays were encountered in peak operation. Centralized control and U. S. direct supervision relieved most of the problem.

9. (U) In-commission rate of vehicles during the exercise remained high at 94 per cent.

10. (S) Problems in explosive storage could have presented themselves. However, high reliability rate of aircraft precluded this. Security was expanded to include total area on north end of field. Eighty-eight augmentees plus the main force of 48 provided area and perimeter security. Heavier weapons were required and used. A quick response force was available 24 hours per day. Some augmentees arrived with no QDR weapons, no line badges, no ear plugs or rain gear, and some with no orders.

11. (S) Communication traffic was tripled, with most of transmissions in the high precedence category. The primary air terminal in the COM Center failed. Portable air communications were placed on line but soon broke. It was necessary to shut down 50 per cent of the message handling capability. The three HF voice circuits were augmented by a single circuit satellite COM System dedicated primarily to 21st AF and MAC. There are no secure voice circuits out of Japan. All classified communications had to be sent by teletype. Control tower and RAPCON had to perform some duties outside their area of responsibility because of lack of radar in Santa Maria Center. Close coordination with the Center provided necessary information for this increased area.

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12. A manpower pool was established from non-essential personnel to include Army, Navy, and Marines. Seventy-two temporary civilian overhires were made to facilitate a 24-hour operation. At the peak of the operation, 1,522 beds were available—all but 34 of these were in use by aircrews and augmentees. DOD personnel at one point equated 19 officers and 470 enlisted personnel. After initial surge the work schedule was 12 hours on and 12 hours off, establishing a six-day work week after the tenth day. Very few minor complaints were voiced and the entire base was keenly aware of the urgency of this operation. Dependent wives provided sandwiches and cakes at minimum cost to aircrew personnel and shift workers in the Operations Center. The success of this operation can be directly attributed to the entire population of Lajes as well as the augmentees. The cooperation of the Portuguese was outstanding. From this location, the operation appeared to be highly successful with only minor problems which were quickly overcome.

**E. (U) BRIEFING STATISTICS ON OPERATION NICKEL GRASS AT LAJES,
AIRCRAFT**

1. The following statistics were extracted from the Historical Report inputs by various supporting units of the 1605th ABW:

a. STATION OPERATION: DOD aircraft departures from Lajes began to rise on 14 October from 36 to a high of 98 departures on 22 October. Departures averaged 64 per day for the 14-31 October period and 33 per day for the 1-15 November period.

b. One of the main factors contributing to the great number of DOD departures during the 14-31 October period was the number of SAC, TAC, Navy and Marine departures:

SAC Departures

RC-135 54

Navy Departures

P-3 112

C-118 4

A-3 27

A-4 40

C-130 2

C-1 4

TAC Departures

F-4 39

C-130 18

C-118 5

RC-97 8

Marine Departures

RC-130 50

CH-53 2

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The total was 365 departures in addition to 189 C-5A's, 590 C-141's and seven other MAC departures during the 14-31 October period.

c. Aircraft departures after the end of October dropped to nearly zero for all aircraft except for C-141, C-5A and P-3 aircraft. MAC NICKEL GRASS departures for the period of 14 October 1973 through 15 November 1973 were as follows:

14 - 31 October 1973

1 - 15 November 1973

C-5A Eastbound	93	54
C-5A Westbound	93	58
C-5A Total	186	112
C-141 Eastbound	276	146
C-141 Westbound	260	97
C-141 Total	536	243

d. Normal channel missions and Reforger V were as follows:

14 - 31 October 1973

1 - 15 November 1973

C-141 Normal Channel Mission	33	17
C-141 Reforger V	15	6
C-5A Normal Channel Mission	1	1
C-5A Reforger V	0	7

e. DOD total departures were as follows:

14 - 31 October 1973

1 - 15 November 1973

1152 593

f. The logistics departure reliability rate was:

	C-5	C-141
Total departures	312	545
Total logistics delays	16	34
Rate	94.9	95.0
Maintenance delays	8	16
Rate	97.4	98.1

2. The following statistics are from Transportation Squadrons

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a. STATION TRAFFIC:

(1) Passengers:
Originating: 1083
Terminating: 850
Through: 1765
Total: 3698

(2) Cargo/Mail:
Originating: 698 14 Tons
Terminating: 803 41 Tons
Rehandled: 1671 0
Total: 3172 55 Tons

(3) Total man days worked 2,349.

b. VEHICLE OPERATIONS/VEHICLES

(1) <u>Vehicle Type</u>	<u>Local</u>	<u>Augmentation</u>	<u>Total</u>
General Purpose	86	0	86
Refueling	33	19	52
463L/MHE	14	5	19
Crash/Rescue	13	0	13
Other:			
U-30		1	1
Trac/Trail		2	2
Calivair		1	1
4 X 4 HOD Truck		1	1

GRAND TOTAL

178

(2) Vehicle in-commission rates ranged from a low of 89.6 per cent to a high of 97.1 per cent.

3. The summary of fuels activities during operation NICKEL GRASS from the Fuels Management Branch is as follows:

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a. Fuels Activity

- (1) Beginning JP-4 inventory - 30, 107, 999
- (2) Receipts - 29, 053, 761
- (3) Issues - 23, 224, 284
- (4) Ending inventory - 35, 645, 526
- (5) Dollar value of issues - \$3,460,418.32
- (6) Average daily issues - 725, 750
- (7) Hydrant Utilization - 68 percent
- (8) Maximum crw day is...e - 1,252,098
- (9) Beginning LOX (liquid oxygen) inventory - 1,670 gals.
- (10) Production - 1,935 gals.
- (11) Issues - 1,255 gals.
- (12) Ending Inventory - 2,320 gals.

b. Equipment

- (1) Beginning of operation - 9 ea. R-5 refuelers
9 ea. MH2/2A hose carts
- (2) Augmentee equipment - 6 ea. R-5 refuelers
13 ea. MH2/2A hose carts
- (3) Total - 15 ea. R-5 refuelers
22 ea. MH2/2A hose carts
- (4) Average in-commission rate - 95 percent

4. The following is the cost data from the Base Comptroller:

a. Initially, a cost collection code was established to record extraordinary expenses associated with the airlift. Through 15 November 1973, Operation and Maintenance obligations (expenses) associated with support this station amounted to \$244,600. Major areas of cost accumulations in support of the airlift are as follows:

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\$94,400	CE Supplies
\$69,500	General Base Supplies
\$51,500	POL Into-plane Refueling Contract Costs
<hr/> <u>\$17,000</u>	Civilian Pay Overtime and costs associated with seven part-time U. S. employees

5. COMMUNICATIONS OPERATIONS: During the 31-day operation, the Telecommunication Center sent and received the following messages:

<u>Messages Sent</u>	<u>Messages Received</u>
17,801	26,686

The message traffic represented an increase of 322 percent in transmittals and 215 percent in messages received.

a. The Lajes Aeronautical Station totalled 67,904 radio contacts with an additional completion of 955 phone patches. This represented an increase of 251 percent over the normal traffic.

b. Telephone operation amounted to a daily total of 2,637 local, autovon and toll calls.

c. An AN/FRT-157 Satellite Communication Van was installed and made operational the same day (10 Oct 73) it arrived.

d. In Weather Communications over 21,000 messages were transmitted and 46,900 were received.

e. The Military Affiliate Radio System (MARS) was on 24-hour standby throughout the operation.

f. Air Traffic Control Operations handled 4,039 IFR arrivals and departures. This represented an increase of 461 percent.

6. SERVICES DIVISION: Billeting and Food Service statistics for Operation NICKEL GRASS are as follows:

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14 Oct 73
540 beds available

22 Oct - 13 Nov 73
1532 beds available

Peak TDY Personnel
1489

Average TDY Personnel
1110

Meals Served
32,743

Lunches Served
8,206

1. TDY personnel in a long duration status
equaled:

19 Officers

470 Enlisted

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NORTH
AMERICA

NORFOLK

#1
REFUELING AREA
KC-135

#1 DUCKBUTT

#2

#3

#4

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
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
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Tab A to Appendix I
Map Showing Route of Ferried Aircraft



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APPENDIX II

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ATLANTIC COMMAND ELECTRONIC INTELLIGENCE CENTER HISTORICAL
REPORT 1973

1. (S) During 1973, continued Command emphasis was placed on improving the analysis and tactical support capabilities of the Atlantic Command Electronic Intelligence Center (LEC). The National Security Agency and the Naval Intelligence Support Center provided increased levels of technical liaison to LEC in the areas of analytic techniques and analysis equipment recommendations. Continued liaison with other ELINT processing centers allowed LEC to continue to upgrade its capabilities.
2. (U) In November, a change of command ceremony was held, during which Commander [REDACTED] was relieved by Major Loren A. Weishaar, USAF. Major Weishaar continued to serve as interim Commander for the remainder of 1973.
3. (U) A significant event occurred when LEC was authorized funding which will allow much needed upgrading of analysis equipment. After operating with zero OPN funding for several years, the state of LEC's precision analysis equipment was nearing the critical point. New equipment was screened and tested and will be purchased during fiscal year 1975, thereby improving LEC technical capabilities.
4. (S) The Data Processing Division was primarily concerned with system analysis and conversion to the Honeywell 6060 Worldwide Military Command and Control System (WMCCS) Intelligence Data Handling System (IDHS) computer. CINCLANT J202 funded a functional analysis of the Center's data flow to be performed by the Naval Electronics Laboratory Center (NELC). Upon completion of the functional analysis, a subsystem design for an interactive system for all LEC processing on the IDHS computer was commenced by NELC. This project was still in progress at the end of the year. To reflect design development, the Data Processing Division was divided into two branches under the overall control of the LEC Data Processing Officer. The NSA data processing liaison technician was given the WMCCS System Branch, which is responsible for developing and implementing all software for that computer system. This branch worked on conversion of, batch programs for the Consolidated Analysis Report, Final (CARF) program system and attained 70 percent completion by

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Index: AFM 36-2000-1, AFM 36-2000-2

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the end of the year. Three terminals to the IDHS computer were installed in the center, but Tempest and encryption problems prevented them from being operationally connected with the computer. The IBM 360 Production Division was charged with responsibility for all production and development of programs on the IBM 360 computer. This branch attained 98 percent completion of program conversion from the IBM 1410 to the IBM 360/40 computer by the end of the year. Negotiations were opened with NSA to obtain an excess IBM 360/30 computer for processing at the center, but were suspended since the hardware was not compatible with the CINCLANT computer network.

5. ~~457~~ A minor reorganization within IDC resulted in the Intelligence Production Division assuming responsibility for the Radar Fingerprint Listing of Selected Soviet Naval Ships. The Radar Fingerprint Listing identifies various characteristics of electronic signals with a specific platform. This document was updated and distributed twice during the year. Two issues of Volume 6 and Volume 7 of the USA Worldwide Electronic Order of Battle were produced and disseminated, along with 12 message updates to Volume 6 and one update to Volume 7. In addition, an Exercise Electronic Order of Battle was published to support Exercise EXOTIC FANTASIE VI. Four ELINT Operational Reports (ELT's) were promulgated. Twelve ELINT Technical Guidance Messages were initiated and dissemination of the monthly Ops Plots/Equipment Listing to both operational units and intelligence collectors was continued. Volume III of the Atlantic Fleet Naval Sources Intelligence Collection Manual (AFNICK) was completely revised and promulgated to consumers. Twenty-four ELINT support packages were provided to ships transiting the Cuban area while twenty-two pre-deployment briefings were presented to potential ELINT collectors. Nineteen ELINT support packages were provided ships transiting the South American, African, and Northern European littorals. Specifically tailored support materials for NM training and intelligence collection in the form of acetate N.O. chart overlays and ELINT Parameter Lists continued to be prepared for CINCLANT/CINCLANTFLT, Joint Service, and NATO exercises.

6. ~~457~~ The Signal Analysis Division processed 5200 signals and issued ten ELINT Technical Reports (ELT's). A total of 22 Special Interest Signal Analysis Reports (SISAR's) were

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originated from 13 Special Missions. A current Electronic Parameter Limits (EPL) Listing continued to be produced and maintained by the Signal Analysis Division to serve as a working aid for CINCLANT and LANTCOMINTCEN Personnel, as well as for selected collection and analysis activities. Because of its simplicity and the fact that it contains comprehensive and timely intelligence, this EPL has become an invaluable working aid. Distribution, at consumer request, has been made to several external agencies including Second Marine Air Wing, Strategic Aerospace Command, and Fleet Combat Systems Direction Support Center. The EPL was updated and reprinted eight times during the year. In response to collected ESM/ELINT material forwarded to the LANTCOMINTCEN for processing and analysis, 107 feedback reports were provided to collectors. These feedback reports contain identification/confirmation of collected signals, a critique of the technical aspects of the collection, and a statement as to the value of ELINT collected in terms of satisfaction of collection requirements. The purpose of the feedback report is twofold; to point up the value of the collectors' efforts, and to recommend techniques and constructive action that can be taken to improve product utility. Forwarding of feedback reports through the CINCLANT/ELINT Technical Guidance Unit continues as initiated in 1971. This is done so that the operational commander can provide his assessment of the collector's electronic warfare readiness and adherence to correct ELINT reporting procedures.

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APPENDIX III

Developments Concerning the Atlantic Fleet Weapons Range,
Inner Range, Culebra, Puerto Rico.

A. Background and Summary.

1. In late 1972 the Culebra Study was completed by the engineering firm of Tippettts, Abbott, McCarthy and Stan顿 (TAMS) of New York City and adopted as the Navy position concerning the alternatives related to the relocation of the Culebra Inner Range activities. The findings which were developed, adopted, and forwarded to Congress by Secretary of Defense follow:

a. Analyses of operational requirements, costs, socio-economic and environmental factors for continuing the use of the Culebra Weapons Range, supplemented during periods of peak activity by the use of ranges at the Vieques Training Complex.

b. If the Department of the Navy is directed to relocate the ranges at Culebra, use of the Vieques Training Complex with certain improvements would be recommended.

c. As a third choice, development of the required ranges at Mona and Monito would be recommended, along with command and control facilities and equipment.

d. Use of the Island of Desecheo, construction of an artificial island and movement of the entire AFWR complex were considered but not recommended.

2. In mid-1972, residents of Vieques filed suit in the U. S. District Court against the U. S. Government and the Navy complaining that the use and military presence on Vieques had permanently depressed their real estate values.

B. Significant Events.

1. January 1973. The U. S. District Court, San Juan, dismissed the suit against the U. S. Government and U. S. Navy filed by Viequian residents.

2. May 1973. In a 24 May letter to the Chairman, Senate Armed Services Committee, the Secretary of Defense announced his decision to move current Navy training activities from

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Culebra to the uninhabited islands of Desecheo and Monito/Mona, off the western coast of Puerto Rico by 1 July 1975 with two provisions:

a. That the Congress authorizes and appropriates the funds required.

b. That a satisfactory overall agreement can be worked out with the Government of Puerto Rico for carrying out the proposed move and for ensuring the long-term continuation of the Atlantic Fleet Weapons Range and the Fleet Marine Force training area.

CNO directed that CINCLANTWLF prepare and forward to CNO a plan to relocate the training facilities from the Culebra complex to the islands of Desecheo and Monito/Mona.

3. June 1973. CINCLANTWLF submitted to CNO a time-phased plan for relocation of training activities from the Culebra complex to the islands of Desecheo and Monito/Mona. The plan identified relocation costs as being from 16 to over 19 million dollars depending on which MILCON option is selected.

4. September 1973. CNO message 242240Z September 1973 directed CINCLANTWLF to relocate the Culebra range complex in accordance with specific milestones and an implementation tracking plan. In absence of other guidance, the same Culebra Study was used as a base for facilities and equipment requirements.

5. October 1973. A planning conference was held 10-12 October at Atlantic Fleet Weapons Range, Roosevelt Roads, Puerto Rico, to review tasks, milestones, scope, facility/equipment requirements, and coordination of facility/equipment removal. From a technical and safety point of view it was determined that certain modifications of the previously submitted plan were required. Later that month CNO approved the plan modifications and requested more detailed implementation and facilitation information. NAVFLEXPSCOM was tasked to provide the requested information.

6. November 1973. The Chairman of the NSC Interagency Task Force on the Law of the Sea, Mr. John Norton Moore, requested that the Department of Defense reconsider the proposed relocation of the Naval Weapons Range in the Mona Passage. The NSC Interagency Task Force was concerned that the issue was very controversial and could be seriously disruptive to achievement of its overall objectives.

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7. December 1973. The FY-74 Military Appropriations Bill authorized for appropriation \$12,000,000 to facilitate relocation of the ship-to-shore gunfire range and bombing targets from the Island of Culebra to a location negotiated by the Secretary of the Navy with the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. The requirement to negotiate the relocation in accordance with this legislation halted all action in the CNO Culebra Relocation Plan until the negotiation could be satisfactorily concluded.

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APPENDIX IV

EXOTIC DANGER VI

1. Geographic Area. Joint Exercise EXOTIC DANGER VI was conducted during 2 - 10 April 1973 in the mythical country BLUE which comprised the States of North and South Carolina. Land operations were conducted in the Camp Lejeune, Croatan National Forest areas, and over terrain for which maneuver rights had been acquired in that general area. Air operations were conducted within restricted exercise airspace over North Carolina and adjacent waters. Naval operations were conducted on the high seas and waters contiguous to the objective area.
2. Brief Outline. Operations were conducted by all Services as components of CINCLANT. Unconventional forces provided the initial support to country BLUE. Subsequent operations included: a U. S. show of force, conduct of an air campaign, blockade/quarantine operations, air interdiction, close air support operations, ASW operations, and coordinated amphibious and airborne assaults.
3. Forces. 41,000 Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps and Coast Guard personnel including members of the Reserves and National Guard participated in the exercise. Types of units and forces participating in the exercise included Army airborne units, submarines, destroyers, an aircraft carrier, amphibious and support ships of the Atlantic Fleet; squadrons of the Tactical Air Command; and Marines of the Fleet Marine Force Atlantic.
4. Summary. The exercise was considered to be an overall success since all operational training objectives were attained. The extensive and fully integrated participation of Reserve and National Guard units during the exercise was especially noteworthy and demonstrated the merits of the total force concept in action. Also increased exercise play for Department of State/Embassy matters resulted in a greater exposure for the major commands to the politico/military aspects of introducing U.S. forces into a friendly country. The upgrading and use of Oak Grove Airfield as a tactical assault airstrip was a major achievement and provided considerable joint training benefits to both Army and Air Force personnel in operating an airfield in a tactical environment. Exercise ground maneuver area and airspace were doubled over previous exercises. The closure of Albert J. Ellis Airport, which is located approximately in

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the center of the maneuver area, for five days enabled realistic Army/Air Force close support operations during a vital portion of the exercise. Major improvements were made in communications this year to include the use of secure equipment.

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