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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

April 22, 1982

DIRECTOR
PROGRAM ANALYSIS
AND EVALUATION

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: SEP 10 2019

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Closely Spaced Basing for MX - INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

(U) This memorandum summarizes our initial observations on the new "Closely Spaced Basing" concept, also called "Densepack," for MX basing. It responds to the request of the Deputy Secretary and the Under Secretary for Research and Engineering. A summary is presented first, followed by a more detailed discussion of how the system might work and the technical uncertainties that exist at present.

MIX

Summary


(U) If effective, Closely Spaced Basing would be a promising first step in a permanent, survivable MX basing mode, combining the attributes of a small deployment area and early IOC.

(U) Existing technical analysis, however, is insufficient to support a judgment as to the effectiveness of Closely Spaced Basing in withstanding a Soviet attack in the late 1980s. A firmer, though still tentative, indication of the concept's effectiveness is at least a month away, and comprehensive analysis could well take until the end of the year. This time is required because of the complexity of the nuclear effects involved. The Under Secretary for Research and Engineering has drafted a study plan that addresses the key issues; results are called for by mid-summer.

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(U) We have not yet analyzed the costs of an initial deployment or possible follow-on measures, but we will be doing so shortly.



~~Classified by DepDir(SD)PAAS~~
~~Review on 22 April 1988~~

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
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(S) Among the many possible effects that might disrupt an attack, the most important appear to be:



OSD 3.3(b)(2)(4)(8)

Sources of Uncertainty

(S) The effectiveness of Closely Spaced Basing depends on very complex phenomena involving multiple nuclear detonations. It is therefore natural that the small number of analyses performed to date are tentative, and even

contradictory in some points.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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Long-Term Perspective

[REDACTED]

(b) Two growth options could follow rather naturally from an initial Closely Spaced Basing deployment: deception and ballistic missile defense. Deception would increase the number of aimpoints that would need to be attacked, incidentally intensifying the severity of the fratricide effects.

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Closely Spaced Basing creates both new constraints and new opportunities for ballistic missile defense, an interaction requiring further analysis. Growth options for MX basing that would not make explicit use of Closely Spaced Basing as a point of departure include Deep Underground Basing and Continuous Patrol Aircraft.

(S) Our uncertain knowledge regarding the feasibility and technical characteristics of Closely Spaced Basing, combined with the usual uncertainties about future Soviet programs, make it difficult to predict when a follow-on to Closely Spaced Basing would be required.



DAVID S. C. CHU
Director
Program Analysis and Evaluation

Attachment
a/s

cc: Dr. DeLauer
Dr. Wade

Office of the Secretary of Defense
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS

Date: 10 SEP 2019 Authority: EO 13526

Declassify: _____ Deny in Full: _____

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Reason: 3.3(b)(2)(4)(8)


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Tab A