

#1

551 STATE

Dep State/NSC  
Breakfast

Office of the Secretary of Defense  
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS  
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28NOV90

**BREAKFAST WITH STATE AND NSC**  
**WEDNESDAY, 28 November 1990**

**DOD ITEMS**

- |  |       |
|--|-------|
| - Gulf Crisis Update                                     | Tab A |
| - Turkish Support for Desert Shield and Turkish Requests | Tab B |

**INFORMAL ITEMS**

- |                                    |       |
|------------------------------------|-------|
| - Liberia Update                   | Tab C |
| - CW Retaliation Policy            | Tab D |
| - Crotona Status                   | Tab E |
| - Polish Ship Visits to U.S. Ports | Tab F |
| - Low-Level Flying                 | Tab G |
| - Nicaragua's Rural Violence       | Tab H |
| - Presidential/NSC Brief           | Tab I |

**STATE ITEM**

- None

**NSC ITEM**

- None

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Breakfast Item  
28 November 1990

USDP HAS SEEN

IRAQ-KUWAIT CRISIS UPDATE:

Topic: U.S. Civil Affairs Assistance to Kuwait (U)

Background: On October 9, 1990, Kuwait asked for assistance in a joint US-Kuwait planning process that would lead to the quickest possible restoration of government services upon Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait. DoD drafted Terms of Reference that outline the planning process. Experts from the Army's 352nd Civil Affairs command (a reserve unit) will begin meeting with Kuwaiti counterparts the week of 26 November. The Joint Staff is concerned that DoD will be saddled with the responsibility for civil affairs without any involvement from other agencies; OSD and the JCS agreed to solicit broader interagency participation.

- In early October, the Kuwaitis asked for our assistance in planning for the restoration of their government.
- Civil Affairs experts in DoD will begin meeting with Kuwaiti counterparts this week. We will be looking for assistance from other government agencies to meet the needs of the Kuwaitis.
- During operations in Panama last year, DoD asked other government agencies to assist in recovery efforts. Unfortunately, we never received much assistance.
- We need to broaden this effort, to include other agencies that have expertise that could assist the Kuwaitis.

Topic: Drawdowns of US Embassies in Kuwait and Baghdad and US Presence Throughout the Region (U)

Background: We estimate that Embassy Kuwait will not be able to sustain itself beyond early January. A Deputies Committee agreed that our objective is to keep the embassies open as long as possible and not give Saddam Hussein something he can portray as a victory. Concerning the embassy in Kuwait, Bob Gates recommended that we wait until after a UNSC resolution permitting military force and then press Saddam to allow replenishing the embassy; Saddam may be agreeable to avoid a cause for war. On drawing down other embassies in the region, the Deputies agreed to continue prudent planning and drawdown non-essential personnel, with due concern for private citizens supporting Desert Shield and oil production.

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TALKING PAPER  
FOR SECDEF BREAKFAST

WOSP HAS SEEN

28 November 1990

(U) ISSUE: Fulfilling Promises made to Turkey

05D 3.36Y(6)  
(E) **BACKGROUND:** President Özal has gone to great political and economic risks supporting the US in the Gulf crisis. He is under fire from all sides, even from members of his own party, for getting out in front and getting little in return. Many Turks say he should have done what the Egyptians did, i.e., negotiate up front for what Turkey wanted and only after getting commitments, agreeing to support our position.

(E) When Özal met President Bush in September and in Paris last week, President Bush said we would 1) do our best to increase Turkey's US textile quota. (Negotiations were just concluded and the Turks are pleased with the results); 2) work with the Turks to see if financing for a follow-on buy of F-16s for Turkey can be found; 3) offer the Turks 5 Cobra helicopters; (We have now offered them a better model than they requested.) 4) Support an Egyptian buy of Turkish-assembled F-16s.

(E) Other countries such as Saudi Arabia, Japan, the UAE, and the EC countries also have promised aid. The aid has been trickling in slowly. [REDACTED]

Since the Baker trip, the Saudis seem to have become much more persuaded of the importance of Turkish participation, but we need to keep pressing.

(E) The Turks are now really beginning to feel the economic effects of supporting us in the Gulf. Özal will probably suffer politically if we and the other countries do not fulfill our promises to Turkey.

(E) **POSITION:** We must do all we can to help Özal who has gone out on a limb to support us in the Gulf. Our plan should include:

1) leaning on the Saudis, Kuwaitis, and the UAE to give more aid to Turkey. Pledges that have been made by the Saudis and UAE must be fulfilled as a starter. Both can give more. All three need to commit for the next tranche. Particularly appropriate would be some commitment to Turkey's long-term security needs through support for a follow on buy of F-16s.

2) "De-Ob Re-Ob" - i.e., de-obligating unused funds the Congress earmarked for other countries which have not spent them, and reassigning the unused amounts to countries such as Turkey which could use the funds. This would allow an increase in Turkish Military Assistance from the \$500m voted by the Congress back towards the Administration's original request of \$545 million

3) Begin discussions about the possibility of creating a US-Turkish Free Trade Zone Treaty as we have with Canada. We need not be specific; rather a commitment to try is adequate at this time.

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SECDEF/SECSTATE/NSA BREAKFAST ITEM  
28 November 1990

USDP HAS SEEN

Topic: Liberia Update (U)

Background: (U) ECOMOG's offensive in Monrovia has succeeded in driving Charles Taylor's NPFL out of artillery range of the city center and port area. ECOMOG, in conjunction with Prince Johnson's INPFL forces, continues to push to more outlying points, but Taylor's forces are putting up stiffer resistance and, when using unconventional tactics, have proved troublesome. An ECOWAS Summit dealing with the Liberia crisis is scheduled for 27-28 November in Bamako, Mali. The goals set for this summit are: 1) Establish a ceasefire, 2) Examine the current mission for ECOMOG, and 3) Reestablish a government recognized by all parties to the conflict. The outlook for the success of the Summit is problematic.

Discussion: (U) The Interim Government of National Unity (IGNU) of Liberia was installed in Monrovia on 22 Nov. Interim President Amos Sawyer received pledges of support from both Prince Johnson's INPFL and the remnants of ex-President Doe's AFL. On 7 Nov, a Hank Cohen-chaired PCC endorsed the DCINC/Joint Staff proposal to implement a phased disengagement of the MARG, since the security situation in Monrovia appears to be stabilizing. State and the Joint Staff are finishing up a plan defining the size and makeup of the Marine security augmentation force which would remain during the first phase of this four phase disengagement. The Joint Staff hopes to have a coordinated position (Execute Order) to you by 29 Nov on modifications to the mission of JTF Sharp Edge.

Talking Points:

- (U) I continue to support active diplomatic efforts in search of peace.

-- (U) It is obvious that all the parties to this conflict credit the USG with having a special role to play in the peace process. We should continue to push vigorously to bring peace to Liberia.

- (U) I am pleased that we have agreed on an overall plan for the phased disengagement of our MARG contingent.

-- (U) I am pleased that the details of Phase I seem to be nearly worked out. I look forward to implementing that plan by the end of the week.

- (U) We also need to intensify interagency consideration of mid- and long-term USG interests in Liberia.

Prepared by: [REDACTED] 11-26-90:OASD/ISA/AFR:x79755

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28 NOVEMBER SECDEF/SECSTATE BREAKFAST MEETING  
CHEMICAL WEAPONS (CW) RETALIATION -- DECLARATORY POLICY

BACKGROUND

USDP HAS SEEN

Current U.S. CW policy, as stated in DoD Directive S-3145.2, maintains the right to retaliate with CW against the use of chemical, toxin, or biological weapons against the U.S. or our allies.

This is consistent with the U.S. reservation to the 1925 Geneva Protocol, and we have been careful to protect this right in international fora, particularly in the CW negotiations in Geneva.

TALKING POINTS

- In the context of the current situation in the Middle East, the U.S. has not publicly stated its CW retaliation policy at a high level.
- Without a public U.S. statement on the issue, the perception may grow in Husayn's mind that we are unlikely to retaliate with CW if it or BW are used against us.
- In combination with our conventional capability, an explicit public reference to the possibility of a U.S. CW response might contribute to deterrence of Iraqi CW/BW use.
- On the other hand, such a public statement could be met with criticism from Arab and Western allies, as well as the Soviet Union.
- Furthermore, the question of our actual capability to respond with CW would come under closer scrutiny and could be found to be limited.
- I would appreciate your views on this issue.

Prepared by: SRBuckley, Dir.MN/CF&ACP-MN, z55819, 21 Nov 90

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AGENDA ITEM

FOR

DOD/DOS/NSC BREAKFAST NOV 28, 1990

**ISSUE:** How to proceed with the relocation of the 401st Tactical Fighter Wing to Crotona, Italy in view of FY 91 MilCon Act prohibitions on the obligation or expenditure of NATO infrastructure funds to build the base.

USDP HAS SEEN

**BACKGROUND:** The Defense Authorization Act restricts funding for Crotona until SECDEF certifies to Congress that the NAC has considered four questions concerning Crotona and endorsed continuing the construction of the base. The MilCon Appropriations Act prohibits funding for FY 91. We have developed a game plan on how to keep Crotona going without US funding for FY 91 by having NATO fund the project. After a favorable NAC resolution, the law provides that previously obligated FY 90 US funds can be expended on the Crotona project.

TALKING POINTS:

- With the restrictive language of the Defense Authorization Act and MilCon Appropriations Act, we have entered a difficult phase in our attempt to relocate the 401 TFW to Crotona.
- Keeping the project alive will depend on allied, and especially Italian, willingness to risk continuing construction without US funding in FY 91 and an uncertain future in getting support in Congress for FY 92.
- Congress also wants reaffirmation by NATO of the importance of Crotona. Congressional law required the US to place four questions on the NAC agenda and report back to Congress the NAC decisions. The difficult question is whether Crotona could be used for out-of-area purposes.
- I believe we can find language to satisfy the out-of-area requirements without offending Italian sovereignty. For example, I suggested to MOD Rognoni last week that we could say that consistent with agreements elsewhere, use of Crotona for non-NATO missions would have to be considered on a case-by-case basis, but deployment of the aircraft elsewhere would be a unilateral US decision. MOD Rognoni seemed to believe this issue could be resolved.
- In light of this situation, I have proposed the following approach to SYG Woerner and MOD Rognoni.
- That Crotona be added to the agenda for the DPC and NAC (this has been done) to discuss four questions raised by Congress.
  - Whether retention of the 401st in the Southern Region is necessary.
  - Whether construction of Crotona is still desirable in light of the changing threat.
  - Whether there is an existing base elsewhere that could substitute.
  - Whether the US would be authorized use for missions outside of Europe.
- I would intend to circulate the questions before the meeting and afterwards, provide a summary of the discussion to Congress. We are also working on a brief reaffirmation in the DPC communique. You will need to do the same at the NAC.
- With this reaffirmation, previously obligated US infrastructure funds could be used, and I would intend to discuss the subject privately with individual US Congressional leaders to garner support for next year's funding.
- This is, of course, an uncertain process, and I may have to find a way to provide a more "austere" basing mode to reduce costs, but if the allies are willing, I am prepared to do my best with Congress.



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SECDEF/SECSTATE WEDNESDAY BREAKFAST ISSUE PAPER

SUBJECT: PORT ACCESS FOR POLISH VESSELS (U)

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USDP HAS STAFF

(S) DISCUSSION:

- At the last breakfast meeting, Secretary Baker raised the issue of Polish ship access to U.S. ports.
- State and NSC staff are anxious to get the Poles and other East Europeans access to U.S. ports. They cite a growing inconsistency between the current ban on Polish ships and the more liberal treatment of Polish diplomats and Polish-crewed ships of third country flags.
- Pursuant to the National Security Advisor's decision to assign the issue of port security review to the Defense PCC, OUSDP has established a working group to examine all relevant issues and will make its recommendations in January.
- (S) Earlier, the Defense PCC had begun a review of Polish flag vessel access to the port at Hampton Roads, Virginia. Part of the pressure behind this issue are inquiries from the Virginia Congressional delegation seeking Polish commercial access to the port. There are no diplomatic issues involved as the Poles have never raised the issue. Defense PCC meetings held on August 14 and September 19 had no quarrel with State's goal to open the port, provided it could also accommodate legitimate security concerns. However, there is not yet a record from which the PCC could legitimately conclude that remaining security concerns are unjustified. To address domestic political concerns, we have proposed a Scowcroft letter to the Congress, which is attached next under.

(S) RECOMMENDED TALKING POINTS:

- The Defense PCC is presently reviewing U.S. port security policy and hopes to make recommendations to the NSC by mid-January.
- I am aware that there is keen Virginia Congressional interest to open the port at Hampton Roads to the Poles, and that the Defense PCC has met twice to consider opening it before a security review is finished. We have prepared a proposed draft Scowcroft letter to send to the Congress explaining the work in progress.

Let's allow the Navy to complete its security review at Hampton Roads and the Defense PCC to make its recommendations for overall changes to the entire port security policy before deciding whether or not to open this particular port. Both are due to be completed by mid-January.



DRAFT

Dear Congressman/Senator X:

In view of the significant changes in Eastern Europe and elsewhere, I want to inform you that there is broad executive branch agreement that the time has come to review the question of port access for these newly democratic states. Taking into account your letter of June 18, 1990, on this subject, I have directed the Department of Defense to lead an interagency review of our current policies on port security and port access that affect not only East Europeans but other countries as well. This still on-going effort is seeking to establish the best access regime possible for vessels and crews that balances foreign policy, national security, and economic concerns. It will seek to differentiate among countries as to the security threat posed, including any continuing intelligence relationships with other countries. The end result will be to recommend updated policies and practices consistent with the review process. In view of the scope of the effort and the demands of current Middle East operations, I set a goal of a final options paper for decision by mid-January. At that time, I hope to have a basis upon which to make solid recommendations to the President about our overall strategy.

I must, however, be equally candid in informing you that while our new democratic friends in Eastern Europe are making great progress in asserting control over their intelligence services and are severing or restricting intelligence relationships with other nations, we have concluded that their work is not yet finished.

Given the significant security risks associated with our port at Hampton Roads, which was the principal concern of your June 18 letter, I believe that it is not prudent to make a final decision about its status until we have had a chance to complete a port vulnerability assessment and consider protective measures that might be necessary to maintain security for sensitive military operations and port activities. That assessment is in progress and should be complete about mid-January as well. I cannot guarantee you at this time that the decision to open Hampton Roads will be favorable. I can assure you that every effort will be made to evaluate the question in terms of continuing realities and shared aspirations, and to seek the best combination of protective measures that may be obtained without sacrificing the security of our fleet.

Sincerely,

Brent Scowcroft

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
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POLISH INTELLIGENCE SERVICES' THREAT IN THE UNITED STATES  
KEY JUDGMENTS  
(August 31, 1990)

The State of Virginia's Congressional delegation has recently requested that Polish merchant ships be granted access to the Port of Hampton Roads, Virginia. Listed below are key judgements based on U.S. Intelligence Community reporting concerning the threat posed by the Polish intelligence services to U.S. national security.



o The U.S. Navy is scheduled to conduct a port security vulnerability study for Hampton Roads, to be completed in December 1990 or January 1991, and recommends any decision to grant access to Hampton Roads be delayed until completion of the study.


o Should access to Hampton Roads be granted to the Poles, other Warsaw Pact countries, including the Soviet Union, may request similar access, further amplifying the security problem.

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**TALKING PAPER**

**FOR**

**USDP HAS SEEN**

**SECDEF-SECSTATE BREAKFAST**

**28 OCTOBER 1991**

**(S) ISSUE:** Need for low-level flying in the FRG to prepare our pilots for deployment to the Middle East.

**(S) BACKGROUND:** A chronology of US concessions on low-level flying in the FRG is attached. The most recent event was the President's agreement with Chancellor Kohl on 23 August to raise to 300 meters the floor for low-level flying in the FRG. Since 300 meters is not considered low-level, the USAF cannot rate aircrews combat ready. The aircrews are deployed to Saudi Arabia at a lower state of readiness than acceptable.

• The British were disappointed that the President agreed to raise the floor to 300 meters without advance consultations. They have attempted to get relief from the 300 meter restriction for their aircrews about to be deployed to the Middle East. MOD King's effort with MOD Stoltenberg was rebuffed. King thereafter wrote you to explain that he was under pressure to reduce by 20 percent the volume of USAF low-level flying in the UK to compensate for additional range time required for FRG-based British aircraft. He will also tell the Germans that they will face height restrictions on their training in the UK, a restriction he has not stated to the US.

• We should make an additional effort to gain some relief from the German 300 meter restriction for our aircrews about to deploy to Desert Shield.

• Timing is a problem given the 2 December German national elections. The President assented to Kohl's proposal after much pleading from the Chancellor, and Kohl viewed the 300 meter concession as a major political victory. There will be real reluctance to modify the restriction for the time being.

• Nevertheless, given German inactivity in the Gulf, we should pressure the Germans to provide our deploying forces the opportunity to train. You should telephone King and tell him of your plan to make a request for exception to the 300 meter ban when you meet with Stoltenberg at the Brussels ministerial, which is subsequent to the German elections.

• Proposed talking points for your call to MOD King are attached.

**(S) POSITION:** I propose to telephone UK Minister of Defense King to inform him that I will approach German Minister of Defense Stoltenberg to gain exemption from the 300 meter low-level flying ban for our aircrews deploying to Saudi Arabia.

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**PROPOSED TALKING POINTS**

**FOR**

**TELEPHONE CALL TO UK MINISTER OF DEFENSE KING**

- I received your letter of November 9 in which you addressed the problem of low-level flying in the FRG. I will be addressing your points about flying in the UK separately.
- However, I share your concern that the restrictions in the FRG will impact the readiness of our aircrews deploying to the Middle East and will have negative political repercussions in both of our countries.
- The 300 meter restriction reduces combat readiness of aircrews. Low-level flying skills and habit patterns are degraded, air defense intercept training is negatively affected, and air defense/associated radar system operator proficiency will decay.
- I intend to approach Minister of Defense Stoltenberg during the upcoming NATO ministerial to seek waivers from these restrictions for our aircrews who will be moving to the Middle East. We cannot afford the danger of their deployment in a lower state of readiness.
- I will stay in contact with you as I seek to gain relief from this restriction.

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## CHRONOLOGY

### LOW-LEVEL FLYING RESTRICTIONS IN THE FRG

#### 1985 AGREEMENTS

- Agreed to limit all jets, except A-10s, to a maximum of 50 minutes at low-level.
- No flying below 1500 feet from 1230 to 1330 hours daily, May through October.

#### 1989 AGREEMENTS

- SecDef agreed to MOD Stoltenberg proposal to reduce low-level flying time to an average of 15 minutes per sortie, and to support an ADP low-level flight management system. We also assisted the Germans by persuading the UK MOD to go along with the proposal, the British voicing strong objections to any concessions.
- Previously, the USAF, in a spirit of cooperation, had agreed to numerous concessions in an effort to reduce the negative impact of low level flying on the German public. These included establishing speed limits for low-level flights, which resulted in a noise reduction of up to 25 percent, and raising the altitude for interception exercises.

#### GAO STUDY ON LOW-LEVEL RESTRICTIONS IN THE FRG

A GAO study submitted in July 1990 concluded that restrictions on low-level flights in West Germany have reduced the readiness training of USAF crews, beginning with the 1985 concessions. The 1989 agreement was viewed by the GAO as a reasonable effort to solve a sensitive, political issue and did not measurably affect unit readiness.

#### 1990 PROPOSAL

- You agreed on 17 July 1990 to MOD Stoltenberg's proposal to eliminate the seven geographical areas where the Air Force is now permitted to fly at 250 feet, and to raise the minimum level for low-level flying to 600 feet. Currently, we are permitted to fly above 300 feet in all other areas. Again, you assisted the German effort by persuading the British to go along with the proposal.

#### 1990 300 METER FLOOR

- On 23 August, President Bush agreed to a Chancellor Kohl proposal to raise the minimum level for low-level flying to 300 meters.



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**BREAKFAST TOPICS  
INTER-AMERICAN REGION  
23 November 1990**

USDP HAS BEEN

**TOPIC: (U) Nicaragua's Rural Violence**

**ISSUE: (U)** For nearly two months, violent encounters between ex-Resistance and Sandinista Cooperative Workers in Southern Nicaragua have steadily increased, resulting in many deaths and injuries. This violence began around Matagalpa in Central Region VI and has now spread along the Rama road in Southern Region V. The violence evolved from demonstrations over the Chamorro government's failure to meet promises to the demobilized Resistance members. However, protests are also fueled by fear and frustration caused by the arming of civilian supporters by the lame-duck FSLN government. In addition, the ex-Resistance members are angered over President Chamorro's inability to end Sandinista control of the military and police and to protect the ex-Resistance members from harassment by the police and armed Sandinista Cooperative members. Negotiations between the Government and local mayors have failed to produce a solution. There is widespread concern that the Government's use of force to quell the protests could lead to civil war.

The unrest probably will increase over the next six months straining Managua's tenuous control over the countryside.

**KEY POINTS: (U)** The Chamorro government must take charge and override Sandinista influence. In addition, they must satisfy their promises to the demobilized Resistance members, act quickly to settle the land distribution issues and disarm the countryside. What has happened to the U.S. assistance earmarked for resettlement of the Resistance? Should we support extensions to CIAV and ONUCA operations? How credible are coup rumors? What are State's and NSC's views on this?

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**Presidential/NSC Brief**

- A reminder to bring up this topic
- Points for consideration:
  - DOD-JCS joint brief
  - Discuss Base Force
  - New Strategy to include:
    - Preposition vs. Lift
    - Heavy vs. Light
    - Reserve vs. Active
  - Budget Constraints
  - Hollow vs. Viable Force
- Recommended scheduling: About Dec 12

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BREAKFAST ITEM  
13 NOV 90

TOPIC: Request for DoD Support for DOS Security Team (U)

(U) BACKGROUND/DISCUSSION:

On 6 November 1990, DOS formally requested DoD support in connection with the return of the United States Mission to Beirut. In conjunction with this initiative, DoD will participate in an initial assessment of the security situation, assist in protecting Ambassador Crocker while he presents his credentials to the President of Lebanon, and assist in reestablishing a permanent (albeit limited) official U. S. presence in Lebanon. Defense has been specifically asked to: (1) provide at least two JMWG contingents for the security assessment and personal protection team, and (2) reestablish the linkages between Cyprus and Beirut. The Joint Staff has taken this request for action and will work the air bridge issue.

Among the factors which will be addressed by planners is the initial point or path of entry into Lebanon, (i.e., direct or via Damascus), and the mode(s) of transportation.

(U) TALKING POINTS:

- The current interagency intelligence assessment advises against reentry under existing security conditions.

- Currently list five high threat embassies; I do not recommend that we create a sixth.

- The commitment of forces to DESERT SHIELD reduces, to some extent, our capability to respond to emergencies like those that have occurred in Beirut in the past.

- The approach of sending an initial security assessment team prior to any other entry into Lebanon is prudent. Its recommendations, when reviewed in concert with an up-to-date interagency threat assessment, should dictate the nature of further action.

COORDINATION: \_\_\_\_\_ (ISA)

Prepared by \_\_\_\_\_ OASD(SO/LIC)CT X32898

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~~SecDef/SecState/NSA Breakfast~~  
14 November 1990

Topic: Coordination of Military Exercises in the Persian Gulf (U)

Discussion: ~~(S)~~ IMMINENT THUNDER is a training exercise to be executed as part of DESERT SHIELD, 15-21 Nov. Forces from USCENTAF, USNAVCENT, USMACCENT, USARCENT and SOCCENT, in conjunction with forces from Saudi Arabia, will participate. Exercise will emphasize D-Day through D+2 air operations with full ~~naval~~ and allied participation; ~~naval~~ operations in support of amphibious operations, including simulated naval supporting gunfire, carrier operations, and close air support.

~~(S)~~ State Department/FM has questioned the process for approving such exercises and, as a minimum, wants to have advance notice on them. We maintain this type of training is not a part of the JCS exercise program (requiring interagency review/approval), but rather is under the CinC's purview as an integral part of DESERT SHIELD (should not be micromanaged). State Department has a representative on the JCS Crisis Action Team, as well as a POLAD with USCINCCENT, and should have adequate access to information pertaining to such training exercises.

Talking Points: ~~(S)~~

- We consider IMMINENT THUNDER and other DESERT SHIELD related training to be part of the overall responsibility of USCINCCENT to keep his forces in a high state of combat readiness.
- We do not consider this part of the JCS exercise program, and therefore does not require prior interagency policy approval.
- Readiness training by the CinC is an operational matter. Efforts to micromanage the CinC's operational prerogatives (by State/FM or others) should be avoided.
- State representation on the JCS Crisis Action Team should be sufficient to keep you informed of the CinC's activities.
- If necessary: We can include State Department as an info addressee on all such exercise message traffic.

Prepared By: ISANESA, 13 Nov 90

Classified by: DABD/HBGR  
Declassify by: OADR

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL  
Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: AUG 26 2019

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JOINT STAFF  
INFO SERVICE CENTER

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TO COMUSCENTAF//  
COMUSMACV//  
COMUSCENT NAJN//  
INFO JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//  
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//  
CSAF WASHINGTON DC//  
CSA WASHINGTON DC//  
CINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI//  
COMUSMACV HANOI//  
CTG ONE FIVE ZERO PT TWO//  
CTG ONE FIVE ZERO PT FOUR//  
CTG ONE FIVE ZERO PT SIX//  
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CTG ONE FIVE ZERO PT SIX//  
CTG ONE FIVE ZERO PT EIGHT//

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SECTION 1 OF 3  
OPER/DESENT SHIELD//  
NORAD/OPS.NAW/USCINCPAC//  
NUPP/SHS: EXERCISE IMMINENT THUNDER CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS (U)//  
REF/NA/USCINCPAC/EXERCISE/SHS//  
NUPP/SHS: EXERCISE IMMINENT THUNDER (U)//  
REF/NA/USCINCPAC/EXERCISE/SHS//  
NUPP/SHS: MONTHLY 14/15-3/00 CONFERENCE (U)//  
REF/NA/USCINCPAC/EXERCISE/SHS//  
NUPP/SHS: INITIAL PLANNING CONFERENCE (SPC) (U)//  
REF/NA/USCINCPAC/EXERCISE/SHS//  
NUPP/SHS: IMMINENT THUNDER EXERCISE PLANNING DIRECTIVE (U)//  
REF/NA/USCINCPAC/EXERCISE/SHS//  
NUPP/SHS: FINAL PLANNING CONFERENCE (FPC) (U)//  
REF/NA/USCINCPAC/EXERCISE/SHS//  
NUPP/SHS: EXERCISE IMMINENT THUNDER PLANNING GUIDANCE (U)//  
NUPP/SHS: JAN REF 3 AND 4, THE FOLLOWING CONSOLIDATED USCINCPAC  
CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS IS PROVIDED. THIS CONOPS ALSO SUPPLEMENTS  
INFORMATION CONTAINED IN REF 1.  
1. (U) COMMANDER'S INTENT. USCINCPAC WILL EMPLOY USCENTAF,  
USMACV, USMACV, USCENTAF AND USCENTAF FORCES IN AN INTEGRATED,  
COORDINATED JOINT/COMBINED EXERCISE. THE EXERCISE WILL EMPHASIZE:  
D-DAY THROUGH D+2 AIR OPERATIONS WITH FULL BATTLE AND ALLIED  
PARTICIPATION; GROUND OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF AIRBORNE OPERATIONS  
TO INCLUDE GROUND SUPPORTING BATTAL (SIMULATED); COMBAT OPERATIONS  
AND CLOSE AIR SUPPORT; MARINE OPERATIONS FOCUSING ON FIRE SUPPORT  
COORDINATION, LINK UP OPERATIONS AND REINFORCEMENT OF AIRBORNE  
AND GROUND FORCES. SPECIAL OPERATIONS WILL CONDUCT SNA/CSAR AS  
DIRECTED AND AIR FORCES WILL CONDUCT AND DEVELOP COMMAND AND  
CONTROL FUNCTIONS FOR INTEGRATED AIR/GROUND OPERATIONS USING THE  
DEEP OPERATIONS AND TARGETING SYSTEM.  
2. (U) EXERCISE OVERVIEW/STRUCTURE. IMMINENT THUNDER IS A FIVE  
PHASE EXERCISE WITH EACH PHASE FOCUSING ON SPECIFIC AREAS OF  
OPERATIONS; ALL COMPONENTS WILL PARTICIPATE IN EACH PHASE TO SOME  
DEGREE. THE EXERCISE WILL COMMENCE 19 NOV AND END 21 NOV.

- A. (U) PHASES.
- (1) (U) OFFENSIVE AIR OPERATIONS.
  - (2) (U) AIRBORNE OPERATIONS.
  - (3) (U) LINK UP AND REINFORCEMENT.
  - (4) (U) REINFORCEMENT REINFORCEMENT/CROSS TRAINING.
  - (5) (U) RETURN AND REDEPLOYMENT OF FORCES.
- B. (U) STRUCTURES.
- (1) (U) OVERALL USCENTAF/USMACV/USMACV.
  - (2) (U) ENHANCE JOINT/COMBINED TRAINING.
  - (3) (U) PROMOTE INTEROPERABILITY OF FRIENDLY FORCES.
  - (4) (U) SUPPORTING EXERCISE OBJECTIVES ARE:

\*\*\*\*\*DESENT SHIELD TRAFFIC\*\*\*\*\*  
\*\*\*\*\*SPECIFIC TRAFFIC LOADED ON FORM 8\*\*\*\*\*

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- PROCESS. (3) (4) CONDUCT DEEP BATTLE PLANNING.  
(4) (4) REFINE THE TARGET DEVELOPMENT
- PROCEDURES. (5) (4) EXERCISE COMB LINKS.  
(6) (4) REFINE TARGET MONITORING
- PROCESS. (7) (4) CONFIRM/REFINE TARGET VALIDATION
- SYSTEM AND TECH DATA SUPPORT PROCEDURES. (8) (4) EXERCISE EN MISSION REQUEST  
(9) (4) EXERCISE TARGET DIVERSITY
- PROCEDURES. (10) (4) PRACTICE BDA REPORTING
- PROCEDURES. (11) (4) EXERCISE THE DCE.  
(12) (4) REFINE ARMY/AIR FORCE
- COORDINATION. (13) (4) ATO PROCESS.  
(14) (4) EXERCISE TACAIR SUPPORT SYSTEM.  
(15) (4) PRACTICE ASOC/ABCCC/TACF C2
- PROCEDURES. (16) (4) IMMEDIATE CAS REQUESTS.  
(17) (4) IMMEDIATE ECM REQUESTS.  
(18) (4) EXERCISE COMB LINKS.  
(19) (4) ASOC/ABCCC/TACF LINK.  
(20) (4) SHAD/ANALCO/ABCCC LINK.

3. (4) CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS. IN CONJUNCTION WITH USCENTAF EXECUTION OF THE D-DAY ATO (TO GAIN AIR SUPERIORITY AND SEVERELY IMPAIR THE ENEMY'S MANEUVERING CAPABILITY), USCENTAF INTRODUCES BATTLE FORCES TO CONDUCT AN AMPHIBIOUS OPERATION IN THE VICINITY OF BAS AL GHAIR (272000N041E) TO REINFORCE EXISTING SHAD FORCES. THE AMPHIBIOUS FORCES WILL HOLD THIS AREA WHILE BOMBARDMENT FORCES ADVANCE AND CONDUCT LINK-UP OPERATIONS WITH THE AMPHIBIOUS LANDING FORCE. (A PASSAGE OF LINES BETWEEN U.S. MARINES AND ELEMENTS OF THE 2D SHAD ONE WILL STILL OCCUR IN THE BAS AL GHAIR AREA FOR TRAINING PURPOSES). USCENTAF, ON THE WESTERN FLANK, WILL CONDUCT DEEP OPERATIONS (SIMULATED) IN CONJUNCTION WITH SUPPORTING AIR FORCE/MARINE/ARMY AIR. USCENTAF WILL ALLOCATE SUFFICIENT FORCES TO PROVIDE SHAD/ENAM SUPPORT IN THE OPERATIONS AREA. SPECIFIC COMPONENT COMPS FOLLOW:

A. (4) USCENTAF COMPS. USCENTAF WILL PROVIDE NOTICE AND GENERATION OF FORCES TO FLY D-DAY, D+1, AND D+2 ATO'S. THE ATO'S WILL BE SCALED DOWN FROM ACTUAL BUT WILL STILL INVOLVE SIGNIFICANT SORTIES (APPROXIMATELY 2400, 25-27 NOV). MISSIONS WILL FOCUS ON PACKAGE TRAINING UTILIZING MISSION EMERGENCY OF IMMEDIATE IN TRAINING AREAS. SPECIFIC AREAS OF INTEREST WILL BE AIRFIELD ATTACKS, OPLAN, AND CLOSE AIR SUPPORT (CAS)/AIR INTERDICTION (AI). CAS/AI COMPS INCLUDES EXERCISING TACS C2, INTERDICTION AC-119 AND A-10 NIGHT ADON OPS, USE OF "KILL ZONES" AND AC-119 NIGHT AREA SECURITY OPS.

B. (4) USCENTAF COMPS. USCENTAF WILL PROVIDE AN AMPHIBIOUS ASSEMBLY FORCE (MCT) TO SECURE A LOUPOUNT AT BAS AL GHAIR, SECURE A LOUPOUNT FOR INTRODUCTION OF FOLLOW-ON FORCES AND PROVIDE A POINT FOR LINK-UP WITH 1 INF FORCES ADVANCING FROM THE SOUTH. THE ASSEMBLY FORCE WILL CONSIST OF A BTL, REFLA COMPANY, ARTILLERY BATTERY, TANK PLATOON (SIMULATED), AND COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT BATTALION. LANDING OPERATIONS WILL UTILIZE LCM, LCU (SIMULATED), AND HELICOPTERS. IN DEFENSIVE SUPPORT OF THE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE A SIZEABLE SURFACE SHIP TASK FORCE WILL BE ESTABLISHED WTC 20 NOV 00 IN THE ARABIAN GULF. ADDITIONALLY, FIGHTER/STRIKE COMPS WILL BE ESTABLISHED IN CONJUNCTION WITH SURFACE SHIP TASK FORCE. CTS 100.1/100.4/USCENTAF WILL PROVIDE ASSETS FOR AM, ARMY, ON, AND CAS. BOLD ASSEMBLY SUPPORT WILL BE PROVIDED BY CTS 100.4. BOLD GUN FINE SUPPORT (SIMULATED) WILL BE COORDINATED WITH CTF. ANTICIPATE PARTICIPATION OF THE BATTLESHIP VISCOUNT.

C. (4) USCENTAF COMPS. 3D INF WILL PROVIDE REINFORCED SUPPORT FOR THE D-DAY ATO. DURING THE AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS, FORCES WILL BE ON DECOMPLETION PROCEDURES OF BOMBARDMENT FORCES IN SUPPORT OF THE AMPHIBIOUS ASSEMBLY. PRIMARY INTEREST OF BOMBARDMENT FORCES DURING LINK-UP OPERATIONS WILL BE FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION, PARTICULARLY CLOSE AIR SUPPORT (CAS), AND THE CONDUCT OF COMBATTING TRAINING WITH SHAD FORCES TO PRACTICE LINK-UP, REINFORCEMENT, AND PASSAGE OF LINES.

D. (4) USCENTAF COMPS. THE FOCUS OF ARMY PARTICIPATION WILL BE ON COMBAT AND CONTROL PROCEDURES RELATING TO INTRODUCING THE DEEP OPERATIONS AND TARGETING SYSTEM INTO AIR/GROUND OPERATIONS. ALL BATTLEFIELD COMMUNICATION ELEMENT (DCE) FUNCTIONS IN THE TAC WILL

PARTICIPATE TO MONITOR ATO, INTEL, AIRSPACE, AIR DEFENSE, AND AIRLIFT ISSUES. THE TACAIR SUPPORT SYSTEM WILL REFINE TAC C2 FOR CAS AND EXERCISE COMB LINKS. ECHELONS ABOVE COMPS INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION (EACIC) SUPPORT TO TARGETING WILL BE PROVIDED.

E. (4) USCENTAF COMPS. ASSIGNED FORCES WILL CONDUCT COMBAT SEARCH AND RESCUE TO RECOVER SURVIVORS OF SIMULATED BOMBED AIRCRAFT. OPERATIONS WILL BE SELECTED/COORDINATED IN PORTIONS OF TRAINING AREA 10 AND VCTV BAS AL GHAIR AND AL JOUEF, SA. ALL OPERATIONS WILL BE UNANNOUNCED TO EXERCISE RESPONSE, PLANNING, AND EXECUTION TIMES.

F. (4) SUPPORTING COMPS.  
(1) (4) USCENTAF/CCJ3 COMBAT CAMERA PERSONNEL WILL DEPLOY TO RELEVANT AREAS OF THE EXERCISE THUNDER EXERCISE AREA. ALL PARTICIPATION WILL BE FULLY COORDINATED TO PRECLUDE DISRUPTING ACCOMPLISHMENT OF COMPONENT OBJECTIVES. ANTICIPATE SIX TEAMS TO BE DEPLOYED AS FOLLOWS:

(A) (4) TEAMS WILL BE EMERGED WITH LFM, LSO, GROUND FORCES AND AIR FORCES.

(B) (4) ONE TEAM WILL MONITOR D-DAY ATO SORTIE GENERATION.

(C) (4) ONE SUPPORT TEAM WILL MONITOR LFM PHOTO LAB.  
(D) (4) COMBAT CAMERA WILL BE REQUESTING VIA SEPCOR TO USE USS MIDWAY PHOTO DIVISION TO DOCUMENT CARRIER OPERATIONS DURING THE EXERCISE. STILL AND VIDEO PRODUCTS SHOULD BE FORWARDED TO THE LFM SUPPORT TEAM FOR INTEGRATION IN THE TOTAL PACKAGE.

(E) (4) PRODUCTS WILL BE PROVIDED AT THE HOTWASH ON 21 NOV 00.

(2) (4) USCENTAF PUBLIC AFFAIRS.

(A) (4) FOCUS ON LANDING AND ASSAULT FORCES.

(B) (4) MEDIA POOLS WILL BE AFLOAT AND WITH FORCES

ASHORE.

(C) (4) COORDINATION WILL BE MADE WITH COMPONENTS AS REQUIRED.

(D) (4) PUBLIC AFFAIRS RELEASE PROGRAMMED FOR 14 NOV

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FINAL SECTION OF 3

(E) (4) DETAILED PLAN TOP UNDER SEPCOR.

(3) JOINT VISITORS DURING

(A) (4) DISTRIBUTE VISITORS (OV) HANDLED IN SAME MANNER AS THE USCENTAF SHIELD D-1'S.

(B) (4) USCENTAF PROTOCOL WILL COORDINATE VISITS WITH APPLICABLE COMPONENT HEADQUARTERS.

4. (4) ENDER. THE END OF THE EXERCISE WILL BE DECLARED BY USCENTAF CMT. DECLARATION WILL BE VIA MESSAGE AND VOICE TRAFFIC TO ALL COMPONENT COMMAND CENTERS AND CCJ3/SEC AND WILL CONTACT THE CJC TO CLOSE OUT SHAD NOTIFICATION. IN THE EVENT OF A SIGNIFICANT HOSTILE EVENT SUCH AS A WEAPONS RELEASE OR AIRCRAFT SHOOT DOWN, USCENTAF/CCJ3 WILL BE NOTIFIED IMMEDIATELY. CCJ3 WILL ESTABLISH ENDER AND TRANSMIT SAME VIA USCENTAF COMPONENT NET AND BACKUP VIA TELECOM TO ALL COMPONENT HQ. UPON NOTIFICATION OF A HOSTILE EVENT, ALL EXERCISE PARTICIPANTS WILL TERMINATE EXERCISE ACTIVITIES AND ASSUME DEFENSIVE POSTURE. USCENTAF WILL BE THE ACTING ON SCENE COMMANDER FOR EXERCISE FORCES IN THE BAS AL GHAIR AREA. USCENTAF WILL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR PROVIDING STATUS UPDATES TO ALL PARTICIPANTS. COMMANDERS WILL REMAIN THAT FORCE PROTECTION/SAFETY REMAINS THE PRIMARY CONCERN IN ALL INSTANCES.

5. (4) COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS.

A. (4) RELEVANT AGENCIES FOR PLANNING/COORDINATION PURPOSES.

B. (4) RELEVANT AGENCIES FROM COMPONENT COMPS AND EXERCISE OBJECTIVES ARE AUTHORIZED, IF COORDINATED: INFO VIA TELCOM CCJ3-E.

C. (4) D-DAY/A-DAY: 15 NOV 00/0000 (START/EXT).

D. (4) 1-DAY: 16 NOV 00 (AMPHIBIOUS ASSEMBLY DAY).

E. (4) REPORTING PROCEDURES: NORMAL OPERATIONS REPORTING AS PRESCRIBED IN JCS PUB 1-04.2 (JOINT REPORTING STRUCTURE (JRS) SITUATION MONITORING) AND USCENTAF'S U.S. CONTROL COMMAND OPERATIONS SITUATION REPORTING PROCEDURES (OSR-1). EXERCISE EXERCISE THUNDER OPERATIONS SHOULD BE RECAPPED IN DAILY SITREPS.

F. (4) HOTWASH.

(1) (4) PURPOSE IS TO CONDUCT AFTER ACTION REVIEW OF KEY EVENTS CONDUCTED DURING THE EXERCISE.

(2) (4) PARTICIPANTS SHOULD BE LIMITED TO THE PLANNING GROUP LEVEL. GO/VO ATTENDANCE IS NOT ANTICIPATED.

(3) (4) USCENTAF RESPONSIBLE FOR LOCATION AND SUPPORT. TENTATIVE LOCATION IS 2000 ARMY ALEX ARMY BASE ON 21 NOV, 1000(C). SPECIFIC DETAILS PUBLISHED BY USCENTAF UNDER SEPCOR.

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G. (S) OBSERVER SUPPORT: COORDINATED VIA TELCOM/SEPCOR AS  
TIME PERMITS.  
H. (S) EXECUTE ORDER TWP 14 NOV 80.//  
DECL/ONDR// BT

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