



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

29

August 5, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Secretary Schlesinger
 From: Ambassador James D. Hodgson
 Subject: Briefing Paper

This was prepared to be of some help for your forthcoming visit, Jim. I believe it will turn out to be a worthwhile occasion. I'll be here in town until Thursday morning in connection with the Prime Minister's visit. If there is anything you like to discuss with me I can be reached through the Japan desk until then.

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TO: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE SCHLESINGER
SUBJECT: YOUR VISIT TO JAPAN AUGUST 28-30, 1975

SETTING FOR THE VISIT

The Japanese people have been exposed to public discussion of security matters in recent months more than ever before in the postwar period. The subject is not only no longer taboo, it appears on the way to becoming accepted as a proper and necessary national interest for public consideration. In this light, your visit is opportune.

Public attention to security has been prompted by the fall of Vietnam, which raised concerns about implications for Japan's security, particularly in relation to Korea. It also has been furthered by the nuclear weapons controversy triggered by retired Rear Admiral La Rocque's testimony before Congress last year; by the advent of the Miki Administration, with its characteristic style of public discussion, flexibility, and compromise in achieving consensus for national policies; and by the NPT debate in the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and Diet this spring.

Defense Minister Sakata has taken the lead in encouraging a more realistic public understanding of Japan's security and of the need for closer consultations with the U.S. Minister Sakata has impressed me with the clear-headed, cautious yet forceful way in which he has tackled problems of morale, public opinion and policy precedent that have blocked previous ministers. He has a reputation as a "dove" -- as does Miki himself -- and that political identity may be important in permitting him to move as he has. He has the strong support of his military leaders, much of the press and the professional bureaucracy appears to consider him unusually sagacious in his political instincts.

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Section 3.1(b)(1)

E.O. 12958

Declassification

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Against this background, your visit is important to Miki and his Government in rounding out an agenda of high-level visits which began with Foreign Minister Miyazawa's visit to Washington in April. All of these visits have highlighted the intention of the Miki Government to continue close cooperative relations with the U.S. as the central pillar of Japan's foreign policy. Your visit is of special significance in this context, since it relates to the area of the U.S.-Japan relationship which in the past has been the most politically sensitive and in which the disparity in our positions has been most evident.

SAKATA'S OBJECTIVES

✓ The Defense Minister hopes to accomplish the following:

1. To establish a confident personal rapport with you, as a basis for a consultative relationship in the security field that will parallel that which has evolved in our political and economic relationships. He conceives that such a personal relationship is essential to set the tone for more productive lower level consultations here and in Washington. Personal relationships of this nature are basic for Japanese officialdom.
2. To further the education of the Japanese public to the realities of Japanese security interests. For all our long-standing security ties and the prominence of the security factors in our public rhetoric, the Japanese people have never been brought to accept the necessity of thinking seriously about Japanese security interests -- and the significance for those interests of the U.S. presence in this part of the world.
3. To obtain from the U.S. broad assurances of our determination to maintain a security presence in Asia, most especially in Korea, and to continue to work with Japan over the longer term. These assurances, of course, will be keyed to those expected to emerge from the Miki visit.
4. To bring our limited uniformed staff planning activities into the open and "legitimize" them with the stamp of civilian policy approval by both Governments.

5. To lay a basis for a sharpened and more meaningful defense planning effort within the GOJ against the background of your description of U.S. strategic thinking and military deployment plans.

ATTITUDES TOWARD YOUR VISIT

The first visit by a Secretary of Defense in over four years is considered a major event by virtually everyone in Japan. Prime Minister Miki, in his conversation with me July 15, wove in references to the expected benefits of your visit with his general discussion of the significance of his visit to Washington and the work he hopes to accomplish during his administration. The Foreign Office has expressed also the hope that your talks with Miyazawa and Sakata will go a long way toward providing reassurances and background on U.S. thinking as an essential context in GOJ policy planning during the coming period. The Foreign Minister also tells me he favors your visit. Several senior Japanese military officers have urged us to ensure that your talk with Sakata will probe deeply into the common security interests of the two countries. There has been very little editorial comment on your visit as yet, but there has been full coverage of the announcement and numerous references to the visit as part of the on-going scenario of major policy events that are shaping Japan's direction and actions in the coming period.

AREAS FOR EMPHASIS

1. Our intention to maintain a credible deterrent posture in the Western Pacific in support of treaty commitments.
2. The importance we attach to the maintenance of a stable situation on the Korean peninsula.
3. The essentiality of close cooperation with Japan for both of these purposes.

AREAS TO AVOID

We do not feel that the question of transit through Japanese territorial waters and airspace is ready for discussion with the Japanese Government at this time. Recent policy statements by the Miki Government have obviously shifted the public position of the GOJ, making the U.S. more vulnerable

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should this problem be exposed by an unforeseen event. The Government, however, cannot for fundamental domestic political reasons move on this problem for the foreseeable future.

SPECIAL SENSITIVITIES

The domestic opposition and the press will be alert and sensitive to:


1. Any indication that the U.S. is pressing Japan to increase its military capabilities substantially, or to take on defense responsibilities beyond the home islands.
2. Any suggestion that the U.S. is attempting to forge a closer military security relationship between the U.S., Japan and Korea.

IMPRESSION WE WOULD HOPE TO LEAVE

We hope that your visit will make clear the value we place on our relationship with Japan as embodied in the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security. We recognize the political and constitutional limits on Japan's efforts to insure its own security. Within those limits and considering security in a broader context, to include efforts to promote political stability and economic progress in the region, we believe there is much room for constructive cooperation.

We welcome and are prepared to respond favorably to the desire of the GOJ for closer, frank consultations in the area of security as in other areas of common concern, at a pace and in ways that conform to Japan's real interests as well as our own.

Office of the Secretary of Defense ~~SECRET~~
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James D. Hodgson
Ambassador

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