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ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, DC 20301



INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

20 October 1982 OCT 21 1982

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Debriefing for ASD/ISA by Lebanon Survey Team Chief, BG Bartlett, 20 October 1982

(S) In a one-hour informal briefing and discussion with ASD/ISA, DASD(NEASA), Dir, DSAA and staffs, BG Gerald Bartlett provided the following observations and preliminary conclusions, based on the Survey Team's two-week examination of Lebanon's army and police:

(S) 1. In the minds of many Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) officers, the present situation is the LAF's "last chance" to perform as a credible army. If the LAF sits on the sidelines now, as it did throughout the civil war, the LAF will never recover; many will quit.

(S) 2. The US should give the LAF M48A5 tanks immediately, to provide a clear promise, for all Lebanese to see, that the LAF is going to be built into a respectable force. Gemayel and all LAF officers interviewed want US to take lead in rebuilding LAF.

(S) 3. Of the 8-9 LAF battalions now in Beirut, only 3 are needed. There are 600 troops tied up in the LAF UNIFIL battalion. This leaves 4 workable brigades, currently at 50% personnel and equipment strength. US should build these to 70% by February 1983, and then begin to organize, train and equip a fifth brigade, beginning in June 1983.

(S) 4. The 4 brigades could and should be used now, for psychological reasons, as an interposition force in the first step of Phase II. The LAF cannot be of any use in step II (southern Leb) until summer 1984.

(S) 5. Present LAF recruiting of 3,000 per year keeps levels even at 22,000 (15-17 thousand effective). Officer-enlisted ranks are overaged; organization is extremely top-heavy.

(S) 6. LAF recruits' pay must be increased from 1,200 Leb Pounds (1-23 cents) per month to 1,500; Phalange pays 2,000, Murabitun 1,500. Better compensation would increase recruiting to 5,000 per year.

(S) 7. Amin Gemayel has said he will enforce the conscription law. Tour should be extended from present 18 months to at least two years. LAF cannot absorb more than 12,000 per year. If present conscriptional formulas were disregarded, quotas could be met within a year; Gemayel has not ruled this out.

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DIA 3.3(b)(1) + FOIA 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(3); 10 U.S.C. § 424
OSD 3.3(b)(1) + FOIA 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(3); 10 U.S.C. § 424

- (S) 8. US plan should be in four stages: first (Nov 82-Feb 83), upgrade present four brigades to 70% strength; second (June 83-84), create fifth brigade for southern Lebanon; third (June 84-?), form, train and equip 6th and 7th brigades for Tripoli, and northern Bekaa; and fourth (long-term), aim for 10-12 brigades. The 7-brigade force would meet the 1978 Survey Team goal of a 45,000-man army which could handle a national role, keeping out PLO and deterring Syrians (not IDF). Long-term 12-brigade goal should be reassessed once 5th brigade training is well under way.
- (S) 9. LAF has no training center -- a major deficiency. One would require a cadre of 400 officers. Perhaps non-commissioned officers could be recalled and paid increased retirement benefits.
- (S) 10. Lebanon's mountainous terrain is an asset -- very defensible.
- (S) 11. The IDF deliberately destroyed many LAF assets this summer, and took some valuable items, including a few M113 APCs.
- (S) 12. [REDACTED] the security assistance program to the LAF has no inventory and shipment records.
- (S) 13. The LAF is not currently organized in brigade configuration. Four brigade HQs are needed, to get leadership up on the mountain-tops, where the security risks are.
- (S) 14. The LAF is able to maintain its equipment fairly well; they are innovative, e.g., using mortar carriers to transport personnel.
- (S) 15. The ISF is unable to handle the internal security role; the LAF will have to handle it.
- (S) 16. The Lebanese Forces (Phalangist) are extremely developed, with computerized recruiting files and advanced training facilities. LF leaders say they will do "whatever the President says" -- but never give up the illegal ports (their source of finance). The LF will sit on their hands, but not disband unless or until an acceptable successor to Amin Gemayel is groomed and in place, and there is no chance of a Franjiyeh resurgence in Beirut.
- (S) 17. US should immediately take following actions:
 - prepare 6-7 man operational planning team to help advise the 4 existing brigades;
 - US Army prepare LOAs for equipment to upgrade the 4 brigades;
 - get Lebanon to sign LOAs for logistics and technical teams to set up inventory system, and for M113 mechanic training;
 - pull together FMS unobligated credits, LAF unobligated funds, French and Saudi assistance offers.

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18. In Bartlett's current estimate, it will be more than a year before the LAF can control effectively either southern Lebanon or root any resisting hard-core PLO units out of northern Lebanon.



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(INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS)

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