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COPY NUMBER 7

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FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2235 ~~SECRET WASHDC PRIORITY~~

INFO NATO COLLECTIVE PRIORITY AMEMBASSY ANMAN PRIORITY 2232  
USINT BAGHDAD PRIORITY 1061 AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 4055  
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AMEMBASSY JEDDA PRIORITY 1525 AMEMBASSY KUWAIT PRIORITY 1084  
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 4794  
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RECALLED HIS MEETING WITH SECRETARY WEINBERGER. AS A FORMER CALIFORNIAN, PAPANDEOU FOUND HE HAD SOME THINGS IN COMMON WITH THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE AND HAD GOTTEN ON WITH HIM WELL.

5. DEPUTY SECRETARY CARLUCCI THEN PROVIDED A THIRDMAIL SKETCH OF SOVIET STRATEGY IN THE MEDITERRANEAN. IT WAS CLEAR, HE SAID, THAT EARLY SEIZURE OF THE MEDITERRANEAN WAS A PRIME SOVIET OBJECTIVE IN THE EVENT OF WAR. THEY CONSIDERED THIS REGION VITAL AND AIMED AT TOTAL CONTROL. THIS MEANT OUR FLEET PRESENCE IN THE MEDITERRANEAN WAS CRUCIALLY IMPORTANT. IT WAS MAIN OBSTACLE TO SOVIET STRATEGIC AXIS IN THIS REGION. CONGESTION DEMANDS IN THE PERSIAN GULF LEFT US WITH A NAVAL PRESENCE OF ONE AND ONE-HALF BATTLE GROUPS IN THE RED AND MEDITERRANEAN OCEAN. HE WOULD LIKE TO DO BETTER THAN THAT. OUR POSITION WOULD BE STRONGER IF THE EGYPTIAN GOVERNMENT PERMITTED NUCLEAR POWERED NAVAL VESSELS TO TRANSIT THE SUEZ CANAL, BUT SO FAR THEY HAD BEEN UNWILLING TO DO THIS. DEPUTY SECRETARY SAID THAT AGAINST FOREGOING BACKGROUND IT WAS CLEAR WHY GREECE HAD CONSIDERABLE GEO-STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE FOR NATO IN THE DEFENSE OF THE MEDITERRANEAN.

6. IN THIS CONNECTION, CARLUCCI EXPRESSED SATISFACTION THAT DECA NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BEGIN ON OCTOBER 27, RECALLING THAT IN THE LAST PHASE OF THE 1981 DECA NEGOTIATIONS HE AND OTHERS AT THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT HAD SPENT A GREAT DEAL OF TIME TRYING TO RESPOND TO LAST-MINUTE GREEK DEMANDS FOR AIRCRAFT AND OTHER HARD-TO-OBTAIN ITEMS OF MILITARY HARDWARE. CARLUCCI SAID HE THOUGHT THIS WAS THE WRONG WAY TO NEGOTIATE THE DECA. HE PREFERRED THE APPROACH ADOPTED THIS TIME IN WHICH A

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MILITARY ADDRESSEES TREAT AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

E.O. 12308: ~~SECRET~~  
TAGS: OVIP (CARLUCCI, FRANK) GR, NATO, RAND, MILI, US, IF  
SUBJECT: DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER PAPANDEOU

1. (ENTIRE TEXT)  
2. BEGIN SUMMARY: PRIME MINISTER PAPANDEOU INFORMED DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE CARLUCCI THAT GREECE WAS ENTERING THE DECA NEGOTIATIONS WITH A POSITIVE ATTITUDE AND THE INTENTION TO BE AS FLEXIBLE AND FORTHCOMING AS POSSIBLE. HE AND CARLUCCI AGREED THAT PRELIMINARY EXCHANGE OF VIEWS BETWEEN U.S. AND GREEK NEGOTIATORS WAS A SENSIBLE WAY TO START NEGOTIATIONS. AFTER HEARING DEPUTY SECRETARY GIVE SHORT ANALYSIS OF SOVIET STRATEGY IN THE MEDITERRANEAN, PAPANDEOU SAID HE WOULD WELCOME MORE DETAILED BRIEFING ON SOVIET THREAT BY WASHINGTON SPECIALISTS. TIMING WILL BE WORKED OUT LATER WITH EMBASSY. IN DISCUSSING MIDDLE EAST, PAPANDEOU MADE STRONG DEFENSE OF ARAFAT AS MODERATE PLO LEADER WITH WHOM HE COULD WORK AND WITHOUT WHOM PLO WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY REVERT TO TERRORISM. COMMENTING ON IRAN-IRAQ WAR, PRIME MINISTER NOTED THERE WAS GENERAL FEAR THAT IRONINEI VICTORY OVER IRAQ WOULD BE CATASTROPHY FOR ARAB WORLD. HE DID NOT, HOWEVER, APPEAR TO DISAGREE WHEN DEPUTY SECRETARY COMMENTED THIS WAS WAR NEITHER SIDE SHOULD WIN. REGARDING GREEK-TURKISH RELATIONS, PAPANDEOU EXPRESSED SATISFACTION WITH IMPROVED ATMOSPHERE AND DESIRE TO CONTINUE IT.  
END SUMMARY

3. DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE CARLUCCI'S MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER PAPANDEOU TOOK PLACE AT PAPANDEOU'S SUBURBAN RESIDENCE JUST BEFORE THE PRIME MINISTER WAS SCHEDULED TO DEPART ON OFFICIAL VISIT TO KUWAIT. THE MEETING LASTED ONE HOUR. ALSO PRESENT WERE AMBASSADOR STEPHANOS AND CHRISTOS MACHERITSAS, DIRECTOR OF PAPANDEOU'S DIPLOMATIC OFFICE.

4. DEPUTY SECRETARY CARLUCCI OPENED MEETING BY SAYING SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WEINBERGER, AFTER MEETING THE PRIME MINISTER IN BRUSSELS LAST YEAR, HAD HIMSELF HOPED TO VISIT GREECE. SINCE THIS HAD SO FAR PROVED IMPOSSIBLE, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE HAD BEEN PARTICULARLY GLAD THAT CARLUCCI WAS ABLE TO MAKE THE TRIP. PAPANDEOU

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MCN=82288/02550 TOR=82288/1535Z TAD=82288/1541Z CDSN=MAK077

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Office of the Secretary of Defense  
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS  
Date: 22 Jul 2019 Authority: EO 13526  
Declassify: X Deny in Full: \_\_\_\_\_  
Reason: \_\_\_\_\_  
MDR: 18-M-1094

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HE BELIEVED TO BE THE INDISPENSABLE THRESHOLD FOR THE PALESTINIANS. THE PLO LEADER WAS A MAN WHO COULD BE REASONED WITH, PAPANDEOU ARGUED, NOT A VISIONARY OR A MILITANT: "HE LIVES IN THIS WORLD."

FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2230 SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY  
INFO NATO COLLECTIVE PRIORITY AMEMBASSY ANMAN PRIORITY 2230  
USINT BAHRAIN PRIORITY 1082 AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 4080  
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY 2030 AMEMBASSY JMWAT PRIORITY 1085  
AMEMBASSY JYBA PRIORITY 1820 AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 4790  
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10. DEPUTY SECRETARY CARLUCCI OBSERVED THAT RECOGNITION OF ISRAEL WAS AT THE PRESENT TIME THE ONLY THING ARAFAT HAD TO SELL AND IT WAS OBVIOUS HE WANTED THE HIGHEST POSSIBLE PRICE. PAPANDEOU AGREED WITH THIS, BUT SAID HE WAS CONVINCED ARAFAT WOULD SETTLE FOR LESS THAN THE PROPOSED PLO PROGRAM. THIS WAS OF THE ESSENCE. PAPANDEOU BELIEVED, BECAUSE IF ARAFAT FELT THE PLO WOULD BE TAKEN OVER BY THE MILITANTS AND WOULD REVERT TO TERRORISM.

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PRELIMINARY ROUND WOULD PERMIT THE NEGOTIATORS TO FORMULATE AN AGREED FRAMEWORK. IN THIS CONNECTION, DEPUTY SECRETARY COMMENDED QUALIFICATIONS OF U.S. NEGOTIATOR BARTHOLOMEW AND SAID HE WAS SURE THE GREEK SIDE WOULD FIND BARTHOLOMEW WAS NOT ONLY AN ABLE NEGOTIATOR BUT THAT HE WAS APPROACHING FORTHCOMING TALKS IN A CONSTRUCTIVE SPIRIT.

11. COMMENTING ON THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR, THE PRIME MINISTER SAID HE HAD BEEN IMPRESSED BY FEARS IN THE ARAB WORLD ABOUT KHOMEINI. IN HIS VISIT TO ALGERIA A FEW MONTHS AGO, EVEN PRESIDENT CHADLI BEHDJEDJ—WHICH PAPANDEOU REFERRED TO IN ADDRESSING TEMA<sup>23</sup> SAID AN ISRAELI VICTORY OVER IRAQ WOULD BE CATASTROPHIC. PAPANDEOU WAS SURE HE WOULD HEAR THE SAME SENTIMENTS EXPRESSED BY THE KEMITTIS WHO WERE MUCH CLOSER TO THE PROBLEM. THINGS WERE CERTAINLY NOT GOING WELL FOR SARHAD HUSAYN, WHO WAS A HARSH DICTATOR BUT, IN PAPANDEOU'S VIEW, HAD BEEN RESPONSIBLE FOR PROGRESSIVE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC REFORMS IN IRAQ. IT HAD BEEN EVIDENT FOR SOME TIME THAT SARHAD HUSAYN WAS DISCONTENTED WITH HIS RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SOVIETS. PAPANDEOU HAD VISITED HIM IN BAHRAIN TWO YEARS AGO AND HE WAS ALREADY TALKING ABOUT HOW LITTLE THE SOVIET UNION WAS PREPARED TO DO FOR IRAQ.

7. PRIME MINISTER EXPRESSED CONFIDENCE THAT PRELIMINARY DECA EXCHANGES BETWEEN GREEK AND U.S. NEGOTIATORS SERVED INTERESTS OF BOTH SIDES. HE ASSURED DEPUTY SECRETARY THAT GREEK GOVERNMENT WAS APPROACHING THESE NEGOTIATIONS WITH A POSITIVE ATTITUDE AND THE EXPECTATION THAT A NEW AGREEMENT COULD BE REACHED. REFERRING TO CARLUCCI'S REMARKS ABOUT SOVIET STRATEGY IN THE MEO, PAPANDEOU SAID THIS WAS AN IMPORTANT SUBJECT ON WHICH LITTLE OR NO INFORMATION WAS AVAILABLE TO THE GREEK GOVERNMENT. HE HIMSELF WOULD WELCOME A SPECIAL BRIEFING ON SOVIET STRATEGY AND ORDER OF BATTLE WITH SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO NATO'S SOUTHERN FLANK. DEPUTY SECRETARY CARLUCCI SAID THIS COULD EASILY BE ARRANGED AND AMBASSADOR STEARNS AGREED TO CONSULT FURTHER WITH PAPANDEOU, AS WELL AS WITH WASHINGTON AGENCIES CONCERNED, ABOUT TITING AND FORMAT. PRIME MINISTER COMMENTED HE WAS SURE THAT OTHER GREEK OFFICIALS, MILITARY AND CIVILIAN, WOULD ALSO BE DISCUSSING THEM THINED TO KIBBLE EAST. PRIME MINISTER SAID THAT AS BLACK AS THE SITUATION LOOKED IN LEBANON, IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO ACHIEVE LASTING PROGRESS OUT OF LEBANON'S DISASTER. EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN ATTENTION HAD, FOR THE FIRST TIME, BEEN SERIOUSLY DIRECTED TO THE PROBLEM OF THE PALESTINIANS. THE MASSACRE OF THE PALESTINIANS IN THE CAMPS HAD EVEN GENERATED PRESSURES ON BEHIN FROM MODERATE ISRAELI PUBLIC OPINION. THERE WERE 400,000 PALESTINIANS STILL IN LEBANON AND SOMETHING HAD TO BE DONE FOR THEM. PAPANDEOU BELIEVED ARAFAT WAS THE KEY TO THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM.

12. DEPUTY SECRETARY CARLUCCI COMMENTED THAT THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR WAS PROBABLY ONE OF THE WORST WARS. PAPANDEOU HAD REFERRED TO ARAB FEARS OF A KHOMEINI VICTORY, NOT AN BT

9. ALTHOUGH MILITANTS LIKE GEORGE HIRASHI EXERTED PRESSURE ON ARAFAT, THE PLO LEADER, SAID PAPANDEOU, WAS BASICALLY A MODERATE WHO WANTED TO FIND A SOLUTION. AT THE "RIGHT TIME," PAPANDEOU WAS CONVINCED ARAFAT WOULD RECOGNIZE ISRAEL BUT HE HAD TO GET SOMETHING IN EXCHANGE-- SOMETHING LIKE "DEVELOPMENT TOWARD A STATE ENTITY." ARAFAT HAD CONSIDERED PRESIDENT REAGAN'S SEPTEMBER 1 PROPOSALS TO BE POSITIVE. WHAT HE REALLY WANTED, EMPHASIZED PAPANDEOU, WAS RECOGNITION BY THE U.S., WHICH

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MCN=82288/02541 TOR=82288/1593Z TAD=82288/1547Z CDSN=MAK881

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2237	SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO NATO COLLECTIVE PRIORITY	AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY 2234
USINT BAGHDAD PRIORITY 1053	AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 4057
AMEMBASSY BAHAMAS PRIORITY 2034	
AMEMBASSY JIDDA PRIORITY 1527	AMEMBASSY KUWAIT PRIORITY 1088
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IRAQI TRIUMPH WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY REVIVE SAIDAN HUSAYN'S AMBITION FOR IRAQI HEGEMONY IN THE REGION. IF THE MILITARY STALEMATE CONTINUED, HOWEVER, CARLUCCI THOUGHT IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO BEGIN A DIALOGUE WITH IRAQ. JORDAN AND KING HUSSEIN WERE IN A KEY POSITION IN THIS AND OTHER RESPECTS AND THE U.S. INTENDED TO HELP KING HUSSEIN TO THE BEST OF OUR ABILITY TO MEET HIS JUSTIFIABLE SECURITY NEEDS.

13. AMBASSADOR STEARNS ASKED PAPANDEOU WHY IRAQ HAD DECIDED TO RAISE THE QUESTION OF ISRAELI CREDENTIALS IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY THIS FALL. SUCH A MOVE, IF SUCCESSFUL, WOULD HAVE A DISASTROUS AFFECT ON THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND WOULD ULTIMATELY BE VERY DAMAGING TO IRAQI INTERESTS. PAPANDEOU SAID ESSENTIALLY THE IRAQIS HAD DONE LITTLE OR NOTHING TO ASSIST THE PLO AGAINST THE ISRAELIS. HE THOUGHT THEREFORE THAT A MILITANT POSITION IN THE UN WAS THEIR WAY OF SATISFYING IRAQI PUBLIC OPINION. HE COMMENTED IN PASSING THAT IT WAS INTERESTING TO CONTRAST THE IRAQI AND SYRIAN APPROACHES TO THE PLO. THE IRAQIS DID NOTHING AND THE SYRIANS TRIED TO CONTROL THE PALESTINIAN MOVEMENT. NEITHER APPROACH HELPED THE PLO.

14. IN CONCLUSION THE DISCUSSION REVERTED TO THE DECA. DEPUTY SECRETARY CARLUCCI STATED THE U.S. WOULD ENTER NEGOTIATIONS WITH A FORTHCOMING ATTITUDE. HE VALUED OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH GREECE AND WISHED TO PRESERVE AND STRENGTHEN IT. THE PRIME MINISTER REPLIED THAT THE GREEK GOVERNMENT WOULD ALSO SEEK TO BE AS FLEXIBLE AND FORTHCOMING AS POSSIBLE AND HOPED RESULTS OF THE UP-COMING NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BE BENEFICIAL FOR BOTH COUNTRIES. HE REGRETTED THAT THE BREVITY OF CARLUCCI'S VISIT AND HIS OWN DEPARTURE FOR KUWAIT HAD PREVENTED THEM FROM HAVING A LONGER DISCUSSION. HE WOULD, FOR EXAMPLE, HAVE WELCOMED THE OPPORTUNITY TO TALK ABOUT GREEK VIEWS ON THE AEGEAN SITUATION. DEPUTY SECRETARY CARLUCCI SAID HE WERE GLAD THE "MORATORIUM" IN GREEK-TURKISH RELATIONS WAS CONTINUING AND CONSIDERED THIS A POSITIVE DEVELOPMENT. THE PRIME MINISTER AGREED AND SAID HE HOPED THIS FAVORABLE ATROSPHERE WOULD CONTINUE.  
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