

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

#4

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

1-26-93

MEMORANDUM TO: SOMALIA CORE GROUP

FROM: NSC - Richard A. Clarke

SUBJECT: Draft Paper for Principals Committee

Attached is a first draft of the paper tasked by the January 25th Deputies. Please do NOT broadly disseminate it. We will be putting it in final Wednesday morning and will take into account agency line-in/line-out comments received by OOB.

Distribution:

State: TF - Amb. Shinn (for AF, IO, PM, AID)

DOD: ISA/AF - DAS Woods

JCS/J-5 - LTG Leland

216-06-0035 Box 1

Office of the Secretary of Defense
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS

Date: 06 Sept 2019 Authority: EO 13526 15 U.S.C. 552

Declassify: X Deny in Full: _____

Declassify in Part: _____

Reason: _____

MDR: 16 -M- 1522

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL

Authority: EO 13526

Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS

Date: SEP 06 2019

SECRET

16-M-1522

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL

Authority: EO 13526

Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS

Date:

SEP 06 2019

SOMALIA POLICY: NEAR-TERM DECISIONS

This Paper is intended to review the status of Operation Restore Hope and identify near-term decisions that are required prior to Secretary Christopher's meeting with UN Secretary General Boutros Ghali next Monday.

BACKGROUND

o Military Situation: Approximately 24,000 US and 13,000 non-US coalition troops (comprising the Unified Task Force or UNITAF) are on the ground in south and central Somalia. UNITAF forces have secured nine cities and are providing convoy security to them. Recently, they have begun to fan out into smaller towns (see map Tab 1). Although the UNITAF forces have been the subject of frequent sniper fire and harassment, the opposition appears not to be from organized political or military groups. Outside of the area of UNITAF control, some factional fighting continues. Stepped up disarming has, however, soured relations with some groups. Intelligence reports of planned terrorist attacks are becoming more frequent, but are still unsubstantiated.

With the assumption of control of Baidoa by Australian units, the US Marine battalion in that city was withdrawn from Somalia to California. Additional non-US forces will continue to arrive over the next month (see chart Tab 2) and US forces will continue to do a de facto handover to forces that will eventually be UNOSOM.

o Political Developments: All major clans and factions have welcomed the UNITAF deployment and are cooperating with us. A UN sponsored conference in Ethiopia drew all major factions and resulted in a cease-fire and weapons cantonment agreement, which has not yet been implemented. The conference failed to agree on details for a follow-on meeting, but established a committee to continue preparations. The talks were most successful after UN representatives left and Ethiopian authorities began brokering agreements. UN Representative Kittani left Somalia due to his health. He has not yet returned and no successor has been identified by the UN.

o Relief Operations: The arrival of UNITAF forces did not result in an immediate improvement in the starvation death rate, but the situation is now improving. Relief organizations continue to be harassed and their workers killed, even in cities where UNITAF forces are present. The mass distribution of relief food has depressed prices for indigenous crops and may be providing a disincentive to plant crops in the upcoming March seeding period. Refugees have generally not yet left camps in Somalia, Ethiopia, and Kenya to return to villages. Significant infrastructure reconstruction has not begun.

~~SECRET~~Declassify on: ~~OADR~~~~SECRET~~

Ambassador Oakley's detailed situation report is at Tab 3.

NEAR-TERM DECISIONS

The cluster of decisions needed concern the negotiation with the UN of the hand-off of the peacemaking operation to a UN led force. A key element of that negotiation is what the nature of the on-going US role will be.

The Hand-off: The operational concept envisioned by the US at the time of the intervention was that American led forces would intervene, provide security for relief operations, and hand the situation back to UNOSOM (which, by then, would have been able to deploy to Somalia in large numbers). The US Representative, Ambassador Oakley, and the US Commander, LTG Johnston, believe that the time has come to begin a sector-by-sector hand off to UN commanded forces. Many of the forces that will make up UNOSOM are already in place, as part of UNITAF, allowing a relatively seamless web between the two operations as the US forces drawdown.

What is needed for the hand-off to begin is a new UN Security Council resolution that would:

- expand UNOSOM from its current authorized ceiling of 4200 to a force of 20,000;
- clarify that UNOSOM may act aggressively to insure security, by stating that it is operating under the enforcement power of Chapter VII of the UN Charter;
- authorize the UNOSOM commander to start taking control of areas from UNITAF.

Negotiations with Boutros Ghali: The UN Secretary General has dragged his feet on a new resolution, saying at one point that if the Bush Administration introduced a resolution itself, he would oppose it. Ghali's reluctance had at least three origins. The Secretary General:

- believed (correctly) that the UN is not staffed or equipped to manage the 14 peacekeeping forces it has around the world and could not successfully assume the logistical burden of a large force in Somalia;
- did not think that the country was sufficiently pacified and would like UNITAF to do more to establish security before the UN assumes command,
- wanted commitments of on-going support from the new US administration, not from a lame-duck. (Ghali believes that promises made to him as an Egyptian official by the Carter Administration were not implemented by Reagan.)

On-going US Role: In the past administration, the US had discussions with the UN about possible US roles in the follow-on UN force. Among the things discussed were:

- a US planning team to help the UN size the force that is needed and identify other countries to fill specific roles (that process is on-going);
- provision by the US of support units to help deal with some of the short-fall between what is needed and what other countries can provide.
- an on-call US combat force, which would initially be in Somalia and later, as the situation calms down, could move outside of the country.

The discussions with the UN did not evolve to a point at which the US gave the UN a formal commitment of participation, but the UN clearly believed that there would be some on-going US role. Boutros Ghali will now be looking for that specific commitment as he prepares to bring to the Security Council the resolution authorizing the hand-off to the UN. Ghali will be looking for commitments during Secretary Christopher's meeting with him next Monday.

The following four issues need to be reviewed and decided as a package. Only after reviewing them all can we make the underlying decision of whether or not the US should participate in the follow-on UN force.

o Issue 1: If the US were to leave some forces in Somalia as part of the UN operation, what would be their exit criteria?

The first element of a decision to include some US forces in the follow-on UN force is an understanding of the purpose of that force and its duration. The purpose of the UN force is primarily the same as that of the coalition force, i.e., to provide a secure environment for the delivery of relief. Secondly, it is to provide an atmosphere in which the political reconciliation process might work. For without some political process, the warring factions would recreate anarchy as soon as the UN force left. However, we do not want to allow the UN force to be hostage to the pace of the Somali political process.

As much as one would like to have a finite and immutable deadline for withdrawal, in reality we will need to revisit the issue as a target deadline approaches. During that revisit, we would need to take into account what the Somalis are themselves doing to achieve stability.

The way in which we recommend addressing this problem is three-fold:

- have a finite timeframe for the mandate of the UN force (e.g. 24 months), recognizing that it can be renewed;

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: SEP 06 2019

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: SEP 06 2019

- energize the UN to move vigorously on a political reconciliation process, but avoid having the UN resolution link the termination of the UN force to the achievement of ideal goals for Somalia (democracy, national reconstruction, etc.);
- issue a national statement the US plans a contribution to insure that the new UN force gets well established with a smooth transition from UNITAF, and that the US roles will gradually diminish as others assume our roles; we do not believe that either we or the UN should stay indefinitely; the Somali people must take advantage of the time that we and the UN are present to make their nation work again, because we cannot make their system work for them if they do not do so themselves.

o Issue 2: If the US were to participate in the UN force, what should the size of the US contribution be and what roles should we assume?

Many nations can provide infantry forces. Indeed, about 20 nations have offered to do so. What the US brings to a UN force that is relatively unique are the following types of capability:

- command/control/communications
- intelligence
- supply system logistics
- mobility and airlift

It is these types of services that the UN seeks from the US.

The figures used below are not intended to be precise, but to provide an order of magnitude which could be reviewed later as planning with the UN progresses. Nor are the figures below intended to be used with the UN now, but rather to instruct US negotiators in what their ultimate bottom-line might be.

To provide those kinds of services to a UN force of 15,000 in Somalia in the nearterm, the US could need to deploy on the order of 4000 support forces. Some of those functions could, however, be gradually assumed by specialized US civilian contractors. Thus, the US support component could probably drop by roughly half, to about 2000 within the year.

In addition to the support forces, the UN seeks a quick reaction, highly mobile combat force with high firepower to deter the Somali factions which still have tanks and artillery. To provide such a capability, the US could maintain a reinforced infantry battalion with attack helicopter capability (800-1000 personnel). As the UN force stabilizes over the next six months, we could withdraw the unit and continue to perform the reserve force role by having units outside Somalia on an on-call basis.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Thus, after the bulk of the US force withdrew and the UN force took over, the US might stabilize its residual level at about 5000 for six months. It would then drop to about 2000 for the remaining 18 months that the UN forces was authorized.

o Issue 3: What would the command relationship be for any US forces that we might leave behind after the UN assumes control?

Of the 60,000 UN forces around the world, about 600 are US. The United States has historically resisted placing its troops under UN command. The notable exception, Korea, is a dual-hatted US commander as a UN commander. The bulk of the 600 US forces committed to the UN are an Army MASH unit in Croatia.

The US has pledged its willingness to strengthen UN peacekeeping capability. Many nations and private Americans have urged us to begin placing US troops under UN command. Somalia may provide the first opportunity to do so in a major way.

Legally, the UN Participation Act of 1945 places a limit of 1000 on the US forces that can be committed to the UN and all must be non-combat personnel (support forces), if the UN action is under Chapter VI (peacekeeping). There is no legal limit if the action is under Chapter VII (enforcement), as our current force is and we believe the follow-on UN force should be.

There is an interagency consensus that to strength our support of UN peacekeeping, we should offer to place the US logistics/support forces under UN command and should offer to provide a senior officer to serve as deputy or chief of staff of the UN force, acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.

A question remains about the US combat unit. The residual combat force could be maintained under US command, to insure our freedom of action with that unit and to give us greater flexibility in determining when it could depart.

o Issue 4: What would the US ask of the UN in any negotiation about a US role in the UN force?

If the US were to make an additional expenditure for Somalia, it should do so only if it believed that we were part of a UN operation that had a chance of succeeding. To date, the UN's role in Somalia has shown every indication of failing. Thus, the US should extract commitments from the Secretary General on the following:

- Military: An active role in recruiting a sufficiently large follow-on force and putting a competent commander in place early on;
- Diplomatic: The selection of a new, high level UN envoy to lead the national reconciliation negotiations (someone with the stature of former Australian Prime Minister Frasure) as soon as possible.

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & DeClass Div, WHS
Date: SEP 06 2019

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- Humanitarian: The staffing of the civilian relief and reconstruction component of UNOSOM with a large and highly qualified staff in the near term.
- Police: The assumption of the role of establishing a non-partisan indigenous police immediately.

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: SEP 06 2019

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~