



POLICY

OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

#24

In reply refer to:
I-20246/81

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: (U) Long-Range Theater Nuclear Forces (LRTNF) Status --
INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

(U) This memo outlines the status of implementing the modernization and arms control tracks of NATO's December 1979 LRTNF decision.

(S) NATO's LRTNF Decision - Modernization Track

- Deploy 464 Ground-Launched Cruise Missiles (GLCMs) and 108 Pershing II ballistic missiles in Western Europe. (Belgian government joined LRTNF decision but basing on its territory was to be confirmed by Belgian government in May 1980. Netherlands postponed decision of GLCMs based on its territory until December 1981.)

(S) Basing Status

United Kingdom (10 GLCM flights - 160 missiles) - Initial Operational Capability (IOC) December 1983

- US and UK agreed in June 1980 to base 6 flights at Grechham Common and 4 flights at Molesworth. The UK publicly announced GLCM base selection in June 1980. Construction began early this year. We see no major problems that would jeopardize meeting the December 1983 IOC.

Italy (7 GLCM flights - 112 missiles) - IOC March 1984

- US agreed to base GLCMs at Comiso in August 1980. Site was suggested by Italians in part to minimize local political resistance. Comiso is very austere (abandoned World War II airfield), and thus US asked for offsets to defray added costs for facilities construction attributed to accommodating Italian political concerns. US and Italy agreed to some offsets but not nearly the amount we wanted. Further offset discussions were deferred until public announcement of the base location.
- For several months Italians have been reluctant to allow preparations for GLCM deployments. They want to first announce publicly Comiso as location of the base. This

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announcement was delayed for a series of reasons (e.g., fall of Cossiga government, a failure of Germans to make a similar announcement, earthquake in December, change in US government).

- We do not feel strongly whether the Italians announce the GLCM site location, as long as preparations proceed without delay. Italians are at the moment stalling on two items we need for forward movement: (1) ~~transmittal of paperwork from Italian MOD to NATO Headquarters which requests funding for design and engineering work,~~ (2) approval by the Italian MOD of a visit by US technicians in early April to begin site work at Comiso.
- If Italians do not move quickly, we will miss the planned March 1984 IOC. The Germans have insisted that Pershing II deployments in their country occur nearly "simultaneously" with Italian GLCM deployments. Thus a slip in Italy will (if FRG position is sustained) slip Pershing II deployments too.

Federal Republic of Germany (6 GLCM flights - 96 missiles, 3 US Pershing II battalions - 108 missiles) - Pershing IOC December 1983, GLCM IOC March 1986

- US and FRG agreed informally to base GLCMs at Wueschheim. We requested formal FRG agreement to this on 8 November 1980, but received no reply. FRG does not intend to announce publicly the location for GLCM basing. Pershing II will replace Pershing IA missiles on a one-for-one basis at existing US based in Germany. No new facilities construction for Pershing II is necessary.

Belgium (5 GLCM flights - 48 missiles) - IOC March 1985

- Belgians said in December 1979 they would confirm in May 1980 their decision to deploy GLCMs on Belgian soil after reviewing Soviet reply to NATO's arms control proposal.
- Because Belgian Government had fallen several times since December 1979, it was not until September 1980 before contingent (somewhat ambiguous) decision was made linking acceptance of GLCM deployments to progress in arms control.
- We are discreetly going ahead with preparations for basing in Belgium in cooperation with the Belgian Government. It will take another month to determine if the principal candidate base -- Florennes -- is acceptable.
- Belgians appear setting the stage for a Spring public announcement to proceed with more concrete implementation measures (e.g., announcing a base location), but recent fall of the Belgian Government could cause more delays. Definitive Cabinet decision on commitment to LRTNF basing this year is unlikely.

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Netherlands (3 GLCM flights - 48 missiles) - IOC December 1986

- Dutch postponed GLCM basing decision until December 1981. No preparations for GLCM basing have been initiated but we plan for a December 1986 IOC.
- TNF will be a major campaign issue in May Dutch elections. No practical coalition in Netherlands Parliament appears possible which could deliver a positive LRTNF decision in 1981.

(S) Funding LRTNF

NATO Funding

- 1979 TKF decision included provisions for NATO Infrastructure funding of certain GLCM facilities. NATO bureaucracy needs to approve specific details -- facilities design, GLCM concept of operations -- before the funds become available.
- Approval of one type of facility is bogged down -- the hardened shelter to protect GLCM launchers from conventional air attack before they are dispersed into the field. (Allied arguments against shelters are that they are an unnecessary expense, that we are creating "Minute Man Silos" in Europe.). At the moment, we have beaten down most opponents, but have yet to gain final approval.

US Military Construction Funding

- Not all GLCM facilities are eligible for NATO funding (i.e., those not used for operational purposes in wartime). To this point, Congress has approved funds. Because of large sums involved and long-standing resistance on the Hill to spending US construction dollars overseas, we will need to lobby for continued Congressional support.

(U) Technical Status of LRTNF Development Programs

GLCM

- The GLCM development and test program remains on schedule. The next critical step is a design review of the Common Weapons Control System scheduled for April 1981. (This control system previously caused six-month delay in the GLCM test program due to computer program development problems.)

Pershing II

- The Army is continuing its major component testing of the Pershing II missile, all of which have been successful.

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(S) Arms Control Track

- Following 12 December 1979 NATO decision, US formally proposed preliminary exchanges to the Soviets.
- Until July 1980 Soviets refused to begin negotiations unless NATO rescinded its modernization decision. Soviets altered their position in July 1980 during Schmidt visit to Moscow. Talks began in Geneva on October 17, 1980, and lasted for one month. In these exploratory exchanges, both sides presented views and approaches but without altering positions (position differences attached). Both sides agreed that the date for resumption "next year will be determined subsequently by mutual consultations."
- The NATO Special Consultative Group (SCG) was briefed on the results of the talks in November. SCG met 31 March in Brussels to take stock of where we now are and where we want to go. US stated that we intend to continue TNF arms control talks with Soviets but take no position on timing of resumption of talks. We emphasized need to implement the modernization decision as essential for constructive arms control. We suggested that the SCG review its past work on key analytic issues.

(S) (Comment - An issue which has emerged in preparing for the SCG is what forum we should use for TNF negotiations, The formulation previously used (per the attached) was the "SALT III framework." With the demise of SALT II, we've settled for the time being on using the phrase "SALT framework." This construction is ambiguous with respect to the precise relationship between future negotiations involving TNF and those involving central strategic systems. While we may want to keep this ambiguity in dealing with Allies, I believe we should internally in the US adopt an approach that negotiations involving these two classes of weapons should be conducted separately. Otherwise Allied pressure for movement on TNF talks may cause some in the US to want to rush forward with strategic systems negotiations before we have fully formulated a sound position.)

- A copy of this paper is included in your NPG Back-up Book.

Richard Perle
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Attachment
As stated

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