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OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

Refer to: I-27097/73

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting between SecDef and Generals Jones and Eade (U)

Participants:

- James R. Schlesinger, Secretary of Defense
- Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, Chairman, JCS
- General David C. Jones, USAF, Commander USAFE
- General George G. Eade, USAF, Deputy CINC, USCINCEUR
- Mr. Robert J. Murray, Assistant to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary
- MG John A. Wickham, USA, Military Assistant to SecDef
- Mr. Harry E. Bergold, Deputy Assistant Secretary for European and NATO Affairs (ISA)
- BG H. Lobdell, Jr., USAF, Director, European Region, OASD/ISA

Time: 1600, 6 December 1973

Place: Brussels Hilton, Brussels, Belgium

1. ~~(S)~~ Conventional Balance

General Eade said that EUCOM's view of the conventional balance was no different from that expressed by SecDef. The NATO capability for conventional defense was ragged, but improvements will be made. The Middle East war has demonstrated that NATO does not have to match the Warsaw Pact tube-for-tube, tank-for-tank. Many are eager to jump to conclusions about these lessons; therefore, it is to our advantage to make our views known early.

In his view three deficiencies exist:

- (1) Land and air munitions,
- (2) Allied differences in war reserve stocks, and
- (3) No uniform Allied perception of the threat or what is required to meet that threat.

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Improvements can best be made by making our organization and procedures more effective. We also lack flexibility in force dispositions. For example, army groups, supported by national logistics systems, cannot move without that support. Munitions are deficient, both in total amounts and their location. We lack interoperability. Planning and programming in SHAPE does not include forces and logistics of friendly nations. In other words, we cannot measure our total force capability. The military are not hindering forward movement on these issues, rather most resistance comes from the political level. Eade urged that we pound on traditional attitudes of not disclosing logistics information. We need it for planning.

Eade proposed two initiatives:

[REDACTED] The advantages: (1) improved credibility for our view of the balance, (2) decreased costs through cost sharing, [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] (3) improved effectiveness of Allied forces. [REDACTED]

- To overcome difficulties encountered in obtaining basing and over-flight rights during the Mideast crisis, buy or build an island for an airport, depot, port and amphibious forces. Possibly a Greek Island in the Med would be useful.

2. ~~AS~~ 2/4 ATAF. General Jones commented that Allied preceptions of capabilities required to deter or fight a war were different than ours. We perceive deterrence stemming from a war fighting capability. Europeans do not necessarily agree. European military are also extremely force-structure oriented. They want aircraft, ships, tanks and are willing to forego capabilities - electronics, ECM, armaments, etc. - to make a complete weapons system. They do not want to identify weaknesses in enemy capabilities or their own which might have a negative impact on force structures.

Jones then briefed the Secretary on an analysis conducted by 4 ATAF for presentation at an AFCENT meeting of air and ground military commanders. He was interested in presenting a contrasting view to that of doom and gloom expected from 2 ATAF. He reviewed a series of charts for the Secretary:

- NATO and Warsaw Pact aircraft available to Europe for a NATO war.
- Range of Warsaw Pact aircraft. For example, he demonstrated that 800 aircraft stationed in Poland cannot operate west of the East German border.
- Range of NATO aircraft. The sum of these two charts is that the Warsaw Pact has difficulty conducting offensive air operations against NATO, while NATO can hit the Warsaw Pact.

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- Margin of NATO superiority in direct support missions. Although an equal number of aircraft on both sides can reach the FEBA with bombs, NATO has a margin in total weight. Aircraft augmentation of NATO improves this margin.
- Deep interdiction and counter-air missions. In low altitude penetration, NATO has a margin of about four to one in bombs delivered. The margin exists even with some Warsaw Pact bomber forces included. Only with unbalanced assumptions can Warsaw Pact air be judged superior.
- Warsaw Pact and NATO pilot comparison. By any standard the NATO pilot is much better. The Warsaw Pact pilot, unless a high time pilot, does not get much flying. The Warsaw Pact is using WWII vintage simulators. Warsaw Pact pilots get little all-weather training. Jones' conclusions: Warsaw Pact air forces are stronger when operating over their own territory; outside of radar control, they can't perform well.
- Night All-Weather Requirements. On the average only 12% of each 24 hours is good weather. The remaining is night or poor weather. NATO has a large margin in capability to operate in these conditions. NATO also has a large margin in reconnaissance, high resolution radar and photography, side-looking radar, and all-weather bombing capabilities (F-111).
- Munitions Effectiveness. NATO and the Warsaw Pact are equivalent in free-fall bomb and rocket capability. NATO has an order of magnitude margin in new munitions such as ROCKEYE and MAVERICK.

Jones described his priorities for improvements as: organization, command and control, collocated operating bases, munitions, and survival.

- Organization. He reviewed the history of the 2/4 ATAF reorganization. The British are comfortable with the current organization and consider that a US air commander on top of a US SACEUR would mean complete US domination. Jones believes original proposal of AFCEM/ATAF collocation at Ramstein the best reorganization concept. Two political compromises - retention of Brunssum at an O&M cost of \$3 million for AFCEM, and of the two ATAFs - reduced the overall reorganization effectiveness. He recognized that moving AFCEM was unpalatable to the Dutch. Nevertheless, moving it to Ramstein, where it could be most effective, is the most important organizational move possible in the Center Region. Jones has made inroads to this end by inviting General Farber to establish an office and a small staff at Ramstein

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- Command and Control. Jones reviewed the NATO communications setup, pointing out that the NATO-wide communications system, FRG communications, and US unilateral communications, developed in complete isolation, were not integrated and overmanned with approximately 60,000 people total.
- Collocated Operating Bases. He reviewed the COB situation describing his efforts to obtain permission to use eight additional bases in the FRG and some in the UK. He estimated \$6 million would fix-up all of the COBs adequately for dispersal bases.
- Survivability. Jones said the Soviets have not started a shelter since 1971. Furthermore, their shelters house only one aircraft each. The US-NATO shelters are larger and can possibly shelter more than one aircraft. If so this would improve our shelter picture significantly.

Jones then compared US and allied aircraft bomb capacity and sortie rates. He said that the allied high sortie rate and high attrition assumptions resulted in reduced need for reserve stocks. He hoped to get agreement among the Allies on a common attrition rate which would fall more in line with US assumptions and thus result in a larger munitions stockage level.

Jones said that the 4/ATAF is about to sign an Accord with the French Allied Technical Air Command. The Accord would provide for interface and cross training between 4/ATAF and FATAF. He expected also that he would be able to survey French bases for 4/ATAF wartime use, and expected the French to agree to operate under 4/ATAF in conventional war.

Jones urged that we get away from the "go it alone" syndrome. He hoped some day there would be no US bases in Europe; that they would all be joint bases. He expected to discuss this concept with General Rall, FRG Air Force, with a view ultimately to sharing a base. He hoped also to discuss this concept with the RAF and possibly combine RAF Strike Command with the Third Air Force.

Jones said the Allies have little exposure to ADP, new operational techniques, and intelligence. SecDef responded we are moving in that direction but are inclined to use these as quid pro quo.

SecDef asked if Jones was satisfied with the progress on 2/4 ATAF. Jones replied not completely. Two political decisions - to retain 2 and 4 ATAF and not insisting upon the move of AFCENT - have resulted in less than optimum reorganization. SecDef said he would hit up Vredeling; the Dutch talk about specialization, then resist organizational efficiencies. SecDef then asked how had Leber reacted to his briefing. Jones said pretty well. The Germans had taken another look at their stockage, and where it was formerly two to three days, it is now up to eight days using US assumptions. Jones said that German attrition-aircraft are not being considered

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in the development of their stock levels. Air attrition of the active force is used to establish stock levels, leaving few stocks for use by attrition fillers.

Jones said NATO needed a way to analyze problems and suggested the establishment of a RAND office at 4/ATAF to produce studies which would filter up through the system, get the allied officers involved, and make AFGENT deal with them.

3. ~~(S)~~ Army Views

In response to a SecDef question about how the US Army people felt, Eade listed their concerns: inadequate stockage of munitions, inadequate FRC stockage in CENTAG, lack of flexibility/interoperability, and inability to preposition necessary munitions forward. SecDef suggested that a five-day meeting of MODs be convened to settle these kinds of problems and shovel away the debris. Jones and Eade said this should be done by Region; NATO-wide conferences only lead to disagreements between flank and center region nations.

Prepared by: BGen H. Lobdell, Jr.

Approved by:

Date:

H. B. ...
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- Gen Jones/Eade
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