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UNITED STATES EUROPEAN COMMAND
Office of the Commander-in-Chief.
APO NEW YORK NY 09055

IN REPLY REFER TO

ECCC

27 January 1981

The Honorable Caspar W. Weinberger
Secretary of Defense
The Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301

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Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: JUL 22 2019

Dear Mr. Secretary:

Following our meeting with the President on 24 January, you asked that I provide you some further thoughts concerning:

- a. The President's injecting himself into the matter of the ability-- or lack thereof--of the U.S. to mobilize for a major contingency.
- b. The timing of the proposal that the enhanced radiation/reduced blast (ER/RB) warhead be produced and deployed to Europe.

Mobilization: Both interagency mobilization exercises, NIFTY NUGGET (1978) and PROUD SPIRIT (1980), revealed that under current conditions we cannot fully mobilize because of major deficiencies within most Federal Agencies involved. Frankly, all the President needs to do is to request that he be briefed by the external team which evaluated both the exercises. In my opinion, that briefing will be disturbing enough to cause him to direct that someone be placed "in charge" of mobilization at the Executive level; that mobilization be institutionalized; that a single, comprehensive plan be developed; that mobilization be recognized as a process and not an event; and that he will call for periodic reports as to progress being made. (General Walter "Dutch" Kerwin, U.S. Army, Retired, is the key man on the evaluation team for both NIFTY NUGGET and PROUD SPIRIT.)

ER/RB Warhead: As I indicated, I believe this warhead should be produced and deployed to Europe. However, as we discussed, there are deep political sensitivities related to this matter among West European Allies as a result of the previous Administration's handling of it. Further, the NATO decision of December 1979 to modernize the long range theater nuclear force (LRINF) with PERSHING II (PII) and ground launched cruise missiles (GLCM) on the soil of continental countries is not yet firm. Belgium and The Netherlands still equivocate. It is doubtful that the latter will

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decide to accept them and political reasons may preclude an affirmative decision in Belgium. This could cause the decision to modernize LRTNF to unravel. The deployment of PII and GLCM should, in my opinion, have a higher priority than the production and deployment of the ER/RB warhead. Placing the ER/RB warhead issue on our Allies plate at the same time they are still trying to consume, once and for all, the LRTNF modernization issue, may be detrimental to both. Therefore, my suggestion is that:

- we continue to modernize the LANCE and 8-inch warheads so that they can receive the ER/RB component;
- we manufacture the components and store them in the U.S.;
- after the deployment of the PII/GLCM has become firm, we consult with our Allies about placing the ER/RB components in our deployed, modern 8-inch and LANCE warheads.

I enjoyed our meeting; thanks for your time.

Sincerely,

BERNARD W. ROGERS
General, U.S. Army
Commander in Chief

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