



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

S/S: 8200267

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January 6, 1982

MEMORANDUM TO: Col. John Stanford  
Acting Executive Secretary  
Department of Defense

FROM : L. Paul Bremer, II  
Executive Secretary  
Department of State

Attached are the two memoranda on Middle East Nuclear Weapons Free Zone that you requested. For your information I have cleared our provision of the Rostow memorandum to you with ACDA.

Attachments:

As stated

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Authority: EO 13526

Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS

Date: MAY 16 2019

Office of the Secretary of Defense

Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS

+S U.S.C § 552

Date: 11/16/2019 Authority: EO 13526

Declassify: \_\_\_\_\_ Deny in Full: \_\_\_\_\_

Declassify in Part: X

Reason: 3.3(b)(1), (6)

MDR: 14 -M- 1284

14M-1284

See Def Cont Nr. X-17765



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UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY  
WASHINGTON

OFFICE OF  
THE DIRECTOR

LEB

November 6, 1981

Dear Al,

After some reflection, I decided that I should not leave the MENWFE controversy where it stood a few days ago. Hence the enclosed memo to the President. I hope it helps to clarify our policy.

Yours, as ever,

*Gene*

Enclosure:

Memo to the President

The Honorable  
Alexander M. Haig, Jr.,  
Secretary of State.

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Date: MAY 16 2019



UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY  
WASHINGTON

OFFICE OF  
THE DIRECTOR

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November 5, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Arms Control Issues Affecting the Middle East

ISSUES:

1. A number of current problems on ACDA's agenda have raised questions which require a clarification of our Middle Eastern policy in certain particulars. The most recent is a controversy between ACDA and the State Department over instructions to our UN Mission for consultations with Egypt about an Egyptian draft General Assembly Resolution on Establishing a Middle East Nuclear Weapons Free Zone.

OSD 3.3(b)(6)  
[REDACTED] Last year's Resolution on the subject, which the United States approved, balanced these two ideas -- peace and signing the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The State Department would now drop the reference to peace in the Resolution. ACDA believes it would be wrong in principle to do so, and a profound mistake under present circumstances.

There could hardly be a worse time for us to fail in persuading Egypt to sponsor a MENWFPZ Resolution which Israel could support. To let things drift in the present pattern could well lead to a serious outbreak of violence in the region.

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Class by: \_\_\_\_\_  
Check one: ( ) Declass on: ( )  
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2.

The MENWIZ episode is not taking place in a vacuum. It is one of a series of major occurrences, each one of which has deepened Israeli fears and suspicions -- always near the surface in any event. There were good reasons why Israel was surprised by the intensity of our reaction to its raid on the nuclear reactor in Iraq.

[REDACTED]

Then came the Security Council Resolution on the subject, which we supported, although the Resolution repudiates the legal theory justifying our behavior in the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. The Security Council Resolution led straight to the fuss in Vienna at the meeting of the International Atomic Energy Agency in September. At that meeting, a last minute American effort barely succeeded in blocking a resolution calling for the suspension of Israel from the Agency because of its June 7 air attack on the Iraqi nuclear reactor.

This chronicle of cumulative and self-reinforcing trouble goes even further. It includes AWACS, of course; the slowness and ambiguity of our plans for establishing our military presence in the area; qualitative and quantitative changes in the military balance; the disturbing shut-off of arms sales to Israel; and our various statements on Prince Fahd's peace proposals, which never tie those proposals back to Resolution 338 and peace.

The impact of this cycle of events on Israeli opinion has been disastrous. Careful and experienced students of Israeli affairs have advised me with great concern that a sizeable and influential bipartisan group in Israel (and in the Israeli Knesset and Cabinet) perceives United States policy as a complete reversal of alliances -- a sell-out of Israeli interests in order to truckle favor with Saudi Arabia. These observers tell me they "cannot over-emphasize or exaggerate" the gravity of this development. A mood of something close to hysteria is building up.

[REDACTED]

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3.

Developments of this kind could obviously have the most adverse impact on our national interests in the area.

Under these circumstances, it is essential that we seek to reassure the Israeli Government about our real motivations and intentions, in action as well as in words, so as to keep the peace process moving forward, and not to take any steps, however minor, which will increase Israeli concerns. We are dealing here with extremely sensitive and explosive perceptions. We should treat them with great care.

As you know I have had some experience in handling Middle Eastern problems in the past. I am a convinced advocate of what is sometimes called an "even-handed" policy in the Middle East. Some of the steadiest and most far-sighted leaders of opinion in Israel -- and many Americans as well -- are wondering whether we have abandoned this wise rule in recent months.

I therefore recommend that you call a meeting of the National Security Council to review the policy issues necessarily involved in our approaches to these ACDA problems, so that your detailed guidance will be available to us on the considerable list of arms control, arms transfer, non-proliferation, and related matters we face every day involving the Middle East.

APPROVE \_\_\_\_\_

DISAPPROVE \_\_\_\_\_

2. Pending the outcome of this review, I recommend also that you instruct us to press, in the UN and elsewhere, for a policy which would link Israeli adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty or the equivalent to Arab compliance with Resolutions 338 and 242. The immediate background of the controversy on this question appears at Tab A. In the context of the consultations with Egypt about its draft MENWFZ Resolution, the language ACDA wants included is as follows:

"Considering that an agreement establishing a MENWFZ would be an important element in the achievement of a just and lasting peace in the area."

APPROVE \_\_\_\_\_

DISAPPROVE \_\_\_\_\_

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Date: MAY 16 2019



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4.

DISCUSSION:

The clearest and most current instances of unresolved conflict in our Middle Eastern policy is illustrated in the history of our efforts to work with Egypt and Israel on the Middle East Nuclear Weapons Free Zone project, particularly at the UN.

OSD 3.3(b)(6)

Shortly after the Iranian and Israeli raids on the Iraqi nuclear research reactor (Tammuz) in Tuwaitha last spring, ACDA began actively to explore the practical feasibility of the project for establishing a Middle East Nuclear Weapons Free Zone. The notion was discussed affirmatively at an NSC meeting on Non-Proliferation Policy which you attended, and later with Secretary Haig and Richard Allen, both of whom approved my sounding out a number of interested countries on the subject. In those early discussions, we all viewed the possibility as a no-lose venture for the United States. If it succeeded, as the Treaty of Tlatelolco did, it would be a massive and effective check to the tendency of nuclear weapons to proliferate in the Middle East and Southern Asia. It could not succeed, we all agreed, unless the Arab states other than Egypt made peace with Israel in accordance with Security Council Resolutions 338 and 242, as Egypt had done. Peace between Israel and its neighbors has of course been a major goal of American policy in the Middle East since 1948. If peace were made, it was fair to assume that Israel would accept the Non-Proliferation Treaty and an approved system of international safeguards [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] On this issue I was officially informed that "all things would be possible in a condition of peace." If we failed, we should be no worse off than we were when we started.

Our preliminary conversations with Israel, Egypt, and a number of other countries were favorable; we held several interdepartmental meetings; and we took the position described in the attached passage from a

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speech of mine at the UN (Tab B). That position was discussed in advance with the Egyptian Ambassador to the UN, and modified to meet his advice. He said he was very pleased with our statement, and undertook to consult with us -- and only with us -- in advance of filing an Egyptian Resolution for consideration by the General Assembly.

On October 25, the Egyptian Ambassador showed Ambassador Fields the Egyptian draft at USUN. It violated all the assurances he had given me in the preliminary conversation a few days earlier. Nonetheless, we sent Ambassador Fields instructions, fully approved by the State Department (Tab C), which suggested modifications in the Egyptian draft. Those modifications dealt with the two points we had discussed earlier -- (1) peace as the quid pro quo for NPT; and (2) the broad principle that the Nuclear Weapons Free Zone could only come into being on the basis of agreements freely negotiated by the states of the region. The Egyptians were putting forward a resolution that purported to "establish" a NWFZ by a Declaration of the General Assembly and thus obviate the need for direct negotiations and a Treaty. The United States has always regarded such boot-strap "Declarations" as beyond the constitutional powers of the General Assembly, which is confined by the Charter (with a few exceptions not relevant here) to making "recommendations."

After another talk with the Egyptians, our people in New York came back and suggested further changes in the instructions. At that point, the Middle Eastern Bureau of the State Department (NEA) reversed itself, and the other bureaus followed NEA's lead. The "peace" sentence in the telegram at Tab C was abandoned, although the Resolution approved at the General Assembly last year referred approvingly to "peace" twice.

The NEA memo on the basis of which the State Department reversed itself (Tab A) argues that it would "overload" the peace process to link it to the NWFZ.

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project. The NEA memo seems to be drafted as if "the peace process" in the Middle East consisted entirely of Camp David. If this reading is correct, the memo is quite wrong. The framework for the "peace process" is Security Council Resolution 338, which makes Resolution 242 mandatory and orders the states of the region to sit down "immediately" and negotiate peace in accordance with all the provisions and principles of Resolution 242. The "peace process" in the Middle East is our effort to get the Arabs to carry out their legal obligation to obey 242. Camp David deals with one aspect of that process -- the making of peace between Israel and Egypt. In addition, Camp David contemplates the possibility of five-year transitional arrangements for the West Bank and the Gaza Strip -- unallocated parts of the British Mandate not under the sovereignty of any state since the time of the Turks -- until Jordan makes peace. Under Resolution 242, Israel is not obliged to make changes in the administration of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip until Jordan does make peace.

Pressing other Arab states to comply with Resolutions 338 and 242 cannot interfere with the effort to go forward with the Camp David agreements. It would complement that effort. While ACDA accepted changes in the language which Ambassador Fields thought he could then persuade the Egyptians to accept, it stood firm -- and still insists -- on the principle that it would be undesirable and will in any event be impossible to get a MENWFZ save through the procedure used for the Latin American NWFZ -- direct negotiations between the parties resulting in a Treaty. In addition there must also be full Arab compliance with Resolution 338, and Israeli acceptance of NPT or an equivalent system of safeguards.

Because the State Department has changed its position, we are in great danger of missing the boat altogether.



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7.

A few days ago, the Egyptians told us they would go it alone, on the basis of their own Resolution. For the moment, we have pulled them back from the brink. But the odds remain high that they will slip away. This would mean a great risk that we should be left isolated with the Israelis in the end, unless we could persuade the Europeans, the Australians and New Zealanders, and a number of other countries to join us in blocking something close to the original Egyptian Resolution. That, however, is not a very promising prospect.

Does the Egyptian position mean that Egypt is moving away from us, perhaps because it feels we are being too attentive to the Saudis? Is it trying to edge closer to extreme Arab opinion?

## II.

This could hardly be a worse time for us to fail in persuading Egypt to sponsor a MENWFZ Resolution which Israel could co-sponsor or support. To let things drift now would be a serious mistake which could lead to another outbreak of violence in the region.

This episode is not taking place in a vacuum. It is one of a series of major occurrences, each one of which has deepened Israeli fears and suspicions -- always near the surface in any event. There were good reasons why Israel was surprised by the intensity of our reactions to its raid on the nuclear reactor in Iraq.

Then came the Security Council Resolution on the subject, which we supported, although the Resolution repudiates the legal theory justifying our behavior in the Cuban Crisis of 1962. The Security Council Resolution led straight to the fuss in Vienna at the meeting of the International Atomic Energy Agency in September. At that meeting, a last minute American effort barely succeeded in blocking a resolution calling for the suspension of Israel from the Agency because of its June 7 air attack on the Iraqi nuclear reactor.

But the Conference adopted, 51 to 8, with 27 abstentions, a resolution cutting off the technical


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assistance that Israel normally would receive. If Israel does not agree to submit all of its nuclear installations to Agency inspection, it faces another vote of expulsion next year. As a result, the Israelis are furious with IAEA and more disillusioned than ever with NPT although they do understand and appreciate the all-out effort we made at IAEA. And we shall have a long hard diplomatic battle to solve the problem before and at the next meeting.



NSC 3.3(b)(6)  
OSD 3.3(b)(6)

If we can succeed in having a UN General Assembly Resolution that proposes the establishment of a nuclear weapons free zone in the Middle East also recognize the significant relevance of the "peace process" to such a zone, we shall succeed in reinforcing the peace process and at the same time facilitate Israeli willingness to enter into a nuclear free zone agreement.

If we fail to seize this opportunity we risk Israeli reactions that will increase the possibility of its expulsion from the International Atomic Energy Agency next year, gravely weaken IAEA as an institution and endanger our non-proliferation objectives in the Middle East.



This chronicle of cumulative and self-reinforcing trouble goes even further. It includes AWACS, of course; the slowness of our plans for establishing our military presence in the area; qualitative and quantitative changes in the military balance; and our various statements on Prince Fahd's peace proposals, which never tie those proposals back to Resolution 338 and peace.


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9.

The impact of this cycle of events on Israeli opinion has been disastrous. Careful and experienced students of Israeli affairs have advised me with great concern that a sizeable and influential bipartisan group in Israel (and in the Israeli Knesset and Cabinet) perceives the United States policy as a complete reversal of alliances -- a sell-out of Israeli interests in order to truckle favor with Saudi Arabia. These observers tell me they "cannot over-emphasize or exaggerate" the gravity of this development. A mood of something close to hysteria is building up.



Developments of this kind could obviously have the most adverse impact on our national interests in the area.

Under these circumstances, it is essential that we seek to reassure the Israeli Government, in action as well as in words, about our real motivations and intentions so as to keep the peace process moving forward, and not take any steps, however minor, which will increase Israeli concerns. We are dealing here with extremely sensitive and explosive perceptions. We should treat them with great care.

This is not a narrow issue, affecting the text of a General Assembly Resolution. It would be a catastrophe for our diplomacy to condone an international effort to press Israel to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty before its neighbors make peace. Yet that would be the effect if anything like the Egyptian Resolution should emerge from the UN mill.

Its passage without strong American and Western opposition would feed the fires of hysteria in Israel, and encourage those who think we are favoring Arab interests and ignoring legitimate Israel concerns. As a general principle, I do not believe that we should support UN resolutions which do not make sense, and I recommend that our people in New York be authorized

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10.

to negotiate changes in the proposed Egyptian draft which could both make it acceptable to us and realistic. Hopefully, it is not too late to put Egypt and Israel back into harness together in the UN -- a result worth a great deal to our diplomacy and the cause of peace.

Unless this is done, I recommend that we treat the situation on a full crisis basis. I for one would be most reluctant to recommend additional arms sales to moderate Arab states until we change these Israeli perceptions and restore our relations with Israel. When Israel feels abandoned, it strikes. It is all too easy to understand what lies behind this syndrome.

*Eugene V. Rostow*

Director, Arms Control  
and Disarmament Agency

**Attachments:**

- Tab A - NEA Memorandum
- Tab B - Excerpts from UN Speech
- Tab C - State 28432





DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ACTION MEMORANDUM

81 NOV -3 P6:10

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81 OCT 31 P3:20

October 31, 1981

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TO : The Secretary  
FROM : KEA - Nicholas A. Velietes  
PM - Richard Burt  
SUBJECT: Linking the Middle East Nuclear Weapons  
Free Zone to the Middle East Peace Process

ISSUE FOR DECISION

Whether the Middle East Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (MENWFZ) should be linked to the Middle East Peace Process, as Gene Rostow would like.

ESSENTIAL FACTS

Gene Rostow has sent you a personal memorandum - ATTACHED detailing his reasons for including a reference to the Middle East Peace Process as a preamble in this year's Egyptian draft resolution on the MENWFZ to be put before the UNGA soon. The Egyptians have resisted this.

ACDA believes such a reference will strengthen our insistence that the MENWFZ must be reached through "agreement" of the parties, as Israel wants.

KEA and PM agree that we must insist on a reference to "agreement" in the Egyptian resolution. We also have no objection to general references to peace and security in the Middle East and elsewhere. However, we believe there should be no linkage, explicit or implied, between the MENWFZ and the Peace Process. Our language, however innocuous on the surface, will be closely scrutinized for the intentions thought to lie underneath. Any such

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connection risks suggesting to the Egyptians and others that the MENKPFZ has become an ingredient of the Peace Process, along with autonomy talks, the Palestinian problem, etc; this would clearly overburden the already fragile Peace Process. At the same time, other Arab governments are likely to react against any linkage of MENKPFZ with a Peace Process they are on record as opposing; thus it builds another impediment to consideration of MENKPFZ by a wider audience in the Middle East region.

RECOMMENDATION (also favored by IO)

That we avoid any suggestion of a linkage between MENKPFZ and the Middle East Peace Process in our instructions to USUN.

Approve 17-11/11 Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_  
11/3

*GRK*  
Drafted: NEA/RA:GBLambrakis:pw  
10/31/81 x21154

Clearances: NEA:PDConstable *GRK*  
IO:NPlatt *GRK*

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