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CJCS
NOTES

#16

MX/CSB - NSC Meeting

- 18 Nov 1982

Background. JCS believe US military strength and arms control policies are integral parts of national security policy. Stability comes from mutual deterrence. Deterrence for us comes from creating a great deal of uncertainty in minds of Soviets that war aims could be achieved. From military point of view, the entire range of US and Allied strategic nuclear, theater nuclear, conventional forces contribute to deterrence. Strategic nuclear forces are an important part of deterrence, but in today's world you can't buy deterrence with strategic nuclear forces alone. Therefore, whatever decision you make should be made in the light of its impact on deterrence, war-fighting (because that's what must be done if deterrence fails), and arms control.

When JCS supported your START initiatives (large reductions in missile warheads), it was with the understanding that all strategic nuclear forces (bomber, submarine, and ICBM) would be modernized. It is my duty by law to inform you of views of JCS and of disagreements when there are disagreements. All JCS support fielding MX. However, on MX basing issue there is not agreement. All except the CSAF believe you have been forced into a final basing decision prematurely and that you are being asked to make a decision on a matter in which there is considerable technical uncertainty and consequently cost uncertainty.

The CSA and the CWO are concerned about the uncertainty in future survivability of MX in CSB, our ability to solve the hardness problems and the C³ problems for CSB. They believe that fixed land-based systems, no matter what basing mode, cannot be made invulnerable for long and in the case of MX/CSB, we should plan now to move our time urgent hard target kill capability to the

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sea-based system, the TRIDENT/D5 which is planned for 1990 introduction to the force. They recommend fielding MX in some numbers in MN silos and that we continue to accept the vulnerability of the time urgent BFK capability until the D5 is fielded. The CNO believes that if you adopt his position you do so by "taking the high ground" in arms control. Tell the world that you are putting MX into relatively vulnerable basing, while awaiting Soviet response to your suggestion for major reductions. In the meantime, you will go ahead with R&D on secure basing for MX and will use it if arms reductions don't come about.

CSA believes that, if you do go ahead with CSB, you need to plan to field BMD ^{from} for outset; he also supports MX in CSB if you believe it necessary to bring progress in arms reduction.

The CCAF, recognizing uncertainties, supports fielding MX in CSB.

The CMC is concerned about the technical and cost uncertainties of CSB and about its vulnerabilities to Soviet countermeasures. He believes that those uncertainties coupled with complicated explanation of how CSB works (with or without uncertainties) will make approval by Congress and people very doubtful and thus jeopardize the other parts of defense build-up which are absolutely necessary.

My views are somewhat different from my colleagues, but I do share all their concerns. Soviet war aims are quite clear:

1. Continuity of control by Party over the government, the military and the people.
2. Continuity of Party - government in control of military and economic functions during war.

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3. Dominance (probably occupation) of NATO countries.
4. Neutralization of US and PRC through destruction of their military forces.
5. All while minimizing losses to economy and population.
6. Dominate post-war world.

Soviets have built forces, conventional and nuclear, to carry out objectives. I don't believe Soviets want a nuclear war, but they have, in fact, built the forces and the hardened command structure to attain objectives if nuclear war comes about. If US and Allies don't have the counter to the capability--forces or arms control or both--the world is not stable.

Last fall you signed NSDD-13, Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy. In it you told us to plan attack options against the Soviets (in priority):

1. Nuclear forces and C³
2. Leadership
3. Other military forces and C³
4. Industrial facilities which provide immediate support to military
5. Lastly, industrial base

Those are the right priorities to upset war aims.



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OSD 3.3(b)(2)(4)(5)(8) + Section 6.2(a)

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I, therefore, believe that we must add the modern time-urgent hard target kill capability of the MX as soon as possible, and continue to develop and field the D5 Trident. I believe that we need to add some measure of survivability to the ICBM force. By doing so, we take some of the steam out of the allegation that we are building a first-strike only capability, but more importantly we are complicating the Soviet attack problem and reducing his confidence of achieving war aims. CSB, if built successfully, complicates the Soviet attack problem severely. The "counters" we can envision now drive the Soviets to reduce the effectiveness of their present force in attacking our present target base.

Your first decision to field MX in MM silos while resolving uncertainties of a survivable basing mode was a good one. If the Congress has taken that away, I recommend you go ahead with fielding MX in CSB. I also recommend you go ahead with R&D for BMD, tell us to resolve technical uncertainties of CSB quickly, and to monitor Soviets and prepare to counter attempts they make to defeat CSB. CSB is difficult to explain, but must be explained in terms of deterrence, arms and control and contribution to stability in the world.

JCS recommend that you continue policy of no undercut of existing strategic arms agreements. Whatever decision you make on CSB, I am confident that JCS will support implementing the decision.

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