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9/17/75

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL WICKHAM

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: JUN 03 2019

#19

SUBJECT: Post-SCM Actions

The Secretary in his various meetings in Seoul surfaced a number of issues which require action on the part of DOD and/or other agencies of the Executive Branch. Among other things, ^(a) the Secretary called for an intensive examination of the strategy for the defense of Korea and the necessary intelligence and logistics ^{backup (b)} support. ^(a) Proposed that ROK planning be premised on a continued longer term U.S. military presence in Korea, and ^(a) reordered the priorities of major elements of our security assistance program. We feel that we should now better identify the elements of these issues, determine which parts of the bureaucracy have primary action, and ^(We know of course that) make certain that there is effective follow through. The ROKs will go over the record with a fine tooth comb and will be certain to raise any of the unresolved issues at next year's meeting.)

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The primary action required is the implementation of the Secretary's guidance on strategy and planning. The concept of the Short War Strategy is generally understood; however, the forces and ^{IT Source} national needed to implement it are still being evaluated in Korea.

JS 3.3(b)(5)

~~If normal procedures are followed, OSD would review the requirements only if changes in the service programs were required.~~

After reviewing preliminary estimates of requirements, we believe that some important policy issues may arise which should be decided by SecDef. For example, we are concerned that the SW strategy ^{may} require full U.S. mobilization in order to

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provide the necessary airlift support ~~and~~ the immediate commitment of CONUS
leased B-52's, and ^{THE NECESSARY LARGE NUMBER OF} tactical aircraft ~~in large numbers~~. Consequently, we
believe that SecDef should inform the JCS that he wants to review the pro-
jected NK attack scenario ~~and~~ U.S. force deployments and logistic support
requirements for defense of Korea and the underlying rationale. The re-
view should be ~~made early next year so that approval (or modification) can~~
~~be given prior to the next SCM.~~ *before the end of this year.*

ISA will also ask the JCS for a review of the Korean Force Improve-
ment Plan (FIP) in relation to the new strategy. It seems to me that we
must connect the two. Major General Street stressed that the FIP is a
joint U.S.-ROK document and that he cannot unilaterally make changes in
the assigned priorities. I agree that since the FIP is primarily a ROK
plan, a hard nosed position by our side would bring meaningful, joint
discussion and planning to an abrupt halt; however, important issues
can be discussed within the SAOC and if unresolved, can be handled as SCM
issues. Moreover, we have a legitimate interest in how the ROKs spend
their funds as long as we contribute so materially to the defense of Korea.

~~I am not sure how this can be handled but~~ I am certain that we cannot (as

suggested by General Street) wait for next spring's POM cycle to try to
integrate our planning with that of the ROKs. *I propose we get a technical level
review and dialogue going on the FIP
in November by suggesting to Fish*

Certain of the Secretary's observations at the SCM seemed to run
counter to NSDM 227. The NSDM calls for emphasizing air defense in our
assistance program to Korea, while the Secretary expressed the view that
the outcome of the ground war will be determining and therefore ground
sufficiency to include CAS, armor and antiarmor, and WRM should be given
priority. I believe the difference may be more apparent than real. The

*Gaylor that CMCAC make this the central subject of General
Street's presentation at the fifth coming MAJ Chiefs Conference.
General Fish - I will follow up on this together*

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
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study which lead to the NSDM concluded that the ROK Army was large enough (with modernization) to defend against North Korea but that the ROK Air Force was too small to meet requirements including CAS. These conclusions are still generally accepted. Use of the term "air defense" in the NSSM was unfortunate since the study reorganized^{equipped} the limited deep strike capability of the NKAFF and did not base ROKAF requirements on "air defense" in the classic sense. We could seek a modification of the existing NSDM guidance, but I think this would be a waste of time. Most people agree with the Secretary and the ongoing program does not, in fact, emphasize "air defense" items.

There are also several more specific matters which must be adequately covered before the next SCM. Some of them are related closely to the issues listed above, but I feel they deserve special treatment. They are:

INTELLIGENCE AND
A. Defense Planning: The Secretary stressed that the vulnerabilities and limitations of North Korea be assessed, with the aim of exploiting these areas to keep North Korea off balance. Similarly the vulnerabilities and weaknesses of the ROK should be assessed so that effective counter-measures can be planned. These assessments would appear to be a DIA/COMUS Korea joint responsibility. ^{We will write} ~~propose~~ a memo to DIA/JCS info, CINCPAC, and COMUS Korea, ^{ASKING} ~~requiring~~ completion of the assessments at a relatively early date.

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subject in relation to the strategy developed for the defense of Korea.

C. Augmentation of Exercises: The Secretary noted that we should expand joint military exercises ^{WITH THE KOREANS} and not cancel exercises except for good reason. He also proposed that we be prepared to carry on a suitable exercise involving air ^{or Falls}, should we lose the vote in the UNGA this year. (I personally think we should stick to military reasons for exercises and let State worry about political ones.) A memo to the JCS, and quickly, is indicated. We should also review previous difficulties encountered with State and the NSC staff and plan a DOD initiative to overcome some of their trepidations.

D. M-60 Tanks: The ROKs, as you will recall, asked that the 54 M-60 tanks now in storage in Korea not be removed from Korea, and it was agreed that the whole armor ^(M-60s, M-48s, hull mobility, etc) and anti-armor question would be restudied. While related to an evaluation of the Short War Strategy, a separate action is warranted. An ISA memo to the JCS should levy the requirement. General Stilwell does not support provision of an additional type of tank to the Koreans and hopes to sweet talk them out of their adamant position, in time, on the grounds that the tanks need rebuild ^{and} maintenance which is beyond the capability of Korean installations. The ROKs meantime are considering co-production of M-60s. The question is complex and we need expert opinion. (I personally don't see the utility of heavier tanks in the Korean environment which consists of tortuous roads over mountains, numerous swift flowing streams spanned by frail bridges, and rich paddies in which heavy equipment can bog down.)

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M60
about
same weight
as M48

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E. Defense of the North West Islands: The Secretary, in commenting on the issue, followed the general thrust of a joint State/Defense message, which has been awaiting NSC clearance for some time. *The NSC staff is actually addressing the issue and I am convinced we will have a suitable cleared cable so you should call Scowcroft to get the cable dispatched.* Joint planning can then continue in Korea and in due course we can request the JCS to brief the Secretary on the results. I think we should let the ROK request to station a liaison team of U.S. personnel on the islands just lie for the moment or kill it if necessary.

F. Quick Trip: Subsequent to the review of the strategy, the Army should be directed to rescind Quick Trip and replace it with a more realistic logistics support plan. We should also assure that the ROK is duly notified. This has been a troublesome issue and apparently will not "just go away".

G. Re Section 514 of the FAA: This is an on-going action, with Legislative Affairs having primary coordinating responsibility with support for I&L, PA&E, ISA and DSAA. We will monitor progress and be prepared to assist in developing the required rationale for use with the Congress. *We will notify LA AND I&L and I&L will be notified of SecDef interest in the matter as it relates to Korea. Success or failure on this matter impinges heavily, of course, on the WRM issue.*

H. Overall Cost Effectiveness of Providing F-5s, Vice A-7s or A-10s: PA&E participated in the preparation for the meetings and we will request them to make such an evaluation.

I. Provision of Experts to the ROK to Discuss Anti-Submarine Warfare and Missile Technology: A memo will be sent to the JCS, signed by Mr. Ellsworth, tasking them to identify and dispatch the appropriate team

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or teams and to coordinate their trip(s) with ISA. As you know, General Stilwell is sensitive about this issue. President Park has, according to a recent Embassy report, directed that acquisition of submarines no longer be considered and that alternative methods of anti-submarine warfare, including use of P-3s, be explored. This is a concrete result of the Secretary's talks. We should therefore move quickly in this area and not permit the momentum provided by the Secretary to be slowed. The ASW team should, in my view, be dispatched shortly for exploratory talks with the ROKs and its departure need not be dependent upon completion of a

in this proposal or a going broad to discuss the entire problem with high level ROK's.

full scale study. *A missile team should be dispatched after NSC permission & discuss the proposed Hawk transfer is received & should*

J. Credit Support for the FIP: No specific action *is appropriate* suggests itself.

not mwr.

At the proper times in the planning cycle we should reflect the Secretary's views and seek a high level of FMS credit.

K. Rotation of F-111s: There is, I understand, a plan for the periodic rotation of F-111s into Korea. The most recent deployment was cancelled due to the UNGA debate. ISA will reassess the program from a political point of view and make suitable recommendations.

L. F-15s and AWACS: The Secretary specifically mentioned the deployment in a future contingency of F-15s and AWACS as example of how the U.S. could complement the ROK forces. We should obtain from JCS an assessment of the role the F-15s and AWACS could play in our future planning for the defense of Korea and an indication of when, from a practical point of view, we could plan on utilizing the two systems for that purpose. We should also obtain from the Air Force a plan for the early demonstration of the AWACS in Korea.

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We are prepared to proceed immediately with the implementation of the actions that are outlined above and would appreciate your comments on these actions and your suggestions regarding additional measures to be undertaken.

Equipment

F-4 12

F-5 12

Nike Hercules

Hawk

PGMs

Vietnam related

Defense Industries

Office of the Secretary of Defense
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS

Date: 03 Jun 2019 Authority: EO 13526 + 5 U.S.C. § 552

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