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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

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OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

JCSM-192-83

27 June 1983

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Short-Range Nuclear Forces Issues (U)

1. (U) This memorandum provides JCS advice on essential actions required to correct existing and potential problems with US and NATO short-range nuclear forces (SNF).

2. (S) The Soviets are continuing an aggressive expansion and improvement of their SNF. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] approximately [REDACTED] warheads could be made available for these systems. These forces are tailored for offensive operations, but the full implications of the Soviet expansion are not yet fully known.

3. (S) The effectiveness of the existing US/NATO SNF stockpile is becoming increasingly questionable, partly because of age. [REDACTED]

4. (S) Pressures are increasing for near-term unilateral reductions in the deployed US SNF stockpile. Recently, Senator Biden and 14 colleagues made such a proposal to the President. Additionally, some allied members of NATO's High Level Group have made similar proposals. National Security Decision Directive 32 and National Security Study Directive 1 affirmed US support for

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the MC 14/3 strategy, which calls for NATO to possess a credible deterrent across the entire spectrum of forces as well as the capability to use nuclear weapons for direct defense or deliberate escalation. Unilateral reductions in US or NATO SNF for political reasons would therefore undermine the concepts of extended deterrence, flexible response, and direct defense.

If significant reductions were made without fully weighing the military ramifications, the United States and its allies might irrevocably lose a key element of their deterrent strength.


5. ~~67~~ Currently, NATO's High Level Group is focusing on the required level of SNF and shorter range intermediate-range nuclear forces (SRINF). The group is increasingly aware of requests to identify warhead reductions concurrent with deployments of PERSHING II and GLCM. A net reduction of warheads will occur in the next few years with the withdrawal of older systems such as NIKE-HERCULES and atomic demolition munitions. PERSHING II and GLCM will replace other systems on a one-for-one basis. Further minor reductions may be possible if the SNF and SRINF stockpile is modernized. However, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that any significant further reductions be resisted until the full implications of the Soviet SNF expansion are determined.

6. ~~67~~ Regardless of the ultimate size of the deployed stockpile, the Joint Chiefs of Staff also recommend that the following actions to correct the two most critical SNF modernization problems be given high priority:

a. Insure that the Department of Energy (DOE) funds the modernized W82 155mm projectile, which is now dependent on the DOE FY 1984 budget request.

b. Deploy the modernized W79 8-inch projectile, which is in production. Deployment has been delayed pending a statutory determination on the release of technical data to allies and reevaluation of the Presidential directive prior to deployment, even in support of US forces.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:



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Lieutenant General, USAF
Director, Joint Staff

Office of the Secretary of Defense 5 U.S.C. § 552
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS

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