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RESEARCH AND
ENGINEERING

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OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

22 July 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, RESEARCH &
ENGINEERING

SUBJECT: Strategic Forces Modernization Plan

The Strategic Forces Modernization Plan that you requested is attached. Changes from the version that you received last night are:

1. Program costs, incremental to the POM figures, are in Section V.
2. The ICBM discussion in Section IV did not indicate how we would integrate the options into a schedule and did not provide a basing mode for the second 100 MX missiles. We have added a decision sequence to Section IV and in Section V have included a budget for an unspecified basing mode for the last 100 MX missiles.
3. At PA&E request we deleted mention of a new small submarine to follow Trident.

Office of the Secretary of Defense

Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS

Date: 25 SEP 2019 Authority: EO 13526 + 5 w/ 5552

Declassify: _____ Deny in Full: _____

Declassify in Part: _____

Reason: 3.3(b)(5)(C)

MDR: 18-M-1854

R. E. Jones
Deputy Under Secretary
Strategic & Space Systems

330.2 Strategic

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Date: SEP 25 2019

18-M-1854


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I. Strategic Situation Inherited by the Reagan Administration

The need to strengthen the nation's defenses was a major issue in the 1980 election. The new Administration, having promised to improve America's defense posture, was, upon taking office, faced with a most serious situation in the strategic forces area.



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The data of Figure 1. also shows graphically the instability of the strategic relationship (the incentive to strike first in a crisis and the incentive for a Soviet surprise attack).

It is this situation that the Reagan Administration intends to redress.

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II. Steps Taken to Develop an Improvement Plan

A number of steps have been taken to develop an integrated strategic forces plan.

A major revision to the Defense Guidance was issued by the Secretary of Defense on 10 June 1981. This direction was a result of contributions by the DoD leadership and subsequent spirited dialog by members of the Defense Resources Board. The Defense Guidance is the design handbook for this strategic forces plan.

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Because of concerns regarding the viability of the MX-MPS basing concept, the Secretary of Defense chartered an advisory panel to examine a broad range of alternatives. Perhaps the most significant finding of the panel was that the solution to the

The continuing Soviet emphasis on strategic defenses (civil, air, and ABM systems) have made it clear that they do not accept the notion put forth in SALT that there is strength in being vulnerable. The Soviet strategic defense preparations, taken in combination with the size and tactical flexibility being built into their offensive forces, has undermined the concept of deterrence through mutual assured destruction. In seeking a less simplistic concept of deterrence, the Secretary of Defense has directed a full review of strategic defense issues. An OSD/Army study is seeking improved options for defense of strategic forces and the JASON panel is examining the future of high-altitude defenses. The Defense Science Board has been asked to examine the synergisms between civil, air, and ABM defenses and recommend an appropriate combination of these for the U.S.

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
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III. Principles Guiding the Reagan Administration's Program


The Defense Guidance sets forth the principles to be followed in developing the strategic forces program. The more influential of these are summarized here.

The priority mission of the U.S. nuclear forces is to deter a nuclear attack on the United States and its Allies. A secondary mission is to minimize the extent to which Soviet nuclear threats could be used to coerce the United States or its Allies.

In the event that deterrence fails, an important mission is to limit damage to the U.S. population and economic assets.




The force structure intended to meet these objectives must be designed to eliminate any Soviet incentive to strike first in a crisis.



It is specifically directed that force planning should seek to redress the current strategic imbalances and that this takes priority in arms control matters. Consequently, arms control policy is to be framed to support national security needs while at the same time permitting a cautious and pragmatic search for effective approaches to arms control.

In designing a strategic forces program and analyzing the available alternatives, several factors have become apparent:




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IV. Content and Rationale of the Reagan Administration's Strategic Forces Program


C³I

We have ongoing an effort that will develop a C³I architecture capable of meeting the defense guidance and the Townes Panel recommendation with the principal focus on survivability and endurance of these assets. Objectives which we expect to meet with added FY83-87 funding include:

- Enduring survival of the National Command Authority and the systems and staffs needed to manage surviving strategic assets.
- Provisions to reconstitute intelligence capability after an initial attack.
- Provisions to inhibit or deny Soviet post-attack reconnaissance of the United States.
- Improvements to reduce the fragility of the U.S. warning systems and to increase the risk to the Soviets of a precursor attack on the bomber force and C³ system.

ICBM Forces

Following the recommendations of the Townes Panel, we propose the following program:



We will pursue three alternatives for a more permanent basing mode:



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Our planned decision path, which integrates the above elements into a sequenced program and deals with the Minuteman and Titan assets, is as follows:



We will decide now to proceed with:

- Inform




- Dismantling of the Titan II ICBMs.

Following the DSB review of strategic defense this summer we will decide whether to proceed with development



The options include:




- Transition into one of the other basing modes if selected in the 1983 decision.

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Bomber Forces



We will undertake a rapidly-paced development of an Advanced Technology Bomber, protecting an option of IOC in the 1989 time period.

SLBM Forces

We will build the more-capable Trident II (D5) missile since that course moves the U.S. [redacted] than any of the other SLBM options under consideration. Trident submarine construction should proceed at about one per year, a reasonable rate for Electric Boat Division capability.


We will also take the actions necessary to [redacted] and investigate the possibility [redacted]

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Strategic Defense

The Defense Science Board is in their Summer Study addressing strategic defenses. The thrust of their work is to determine the synergistic or multiplying effects of combinations of civil, air, and ABM defenses and to recommend an appropriate mix of these systems for the United States. Supporting this effort is an OSD/Army design study to devise a BMD concept that will provide leverage against large numbers of Soviet warheads attacking our ICBM systems.

As a minimum we expect to follow the recommendation of the Townes Panel to increase the level of research on the BMD program and, in the likely event that a suitable configuration is endorsed by the DSB, intend to work toward a 1988 deployment date.



This program is now in the concept formulation state, the principal problem being to [redacted]

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V. Assessment of Utility and Cost

Preliminary assessment of the improvements to the U.S. strategic posture that will accrue from this plan are illustrated in Figure 2. We can by 1990 [REDACTED] that, under the previous Administration's plan, would have persisted for the foreseeable future. Of equal importance, the "crisis instability" (incentive to strike first in a crisis) can be almost entirely eliminated and the potential Soviet gain from a surprise attack reduced to such a small value that this tactic would be unattractive.

The ratio of [REDACTED] from the previous Administration's program can be cut in half and, by emphasis on enduring survival of forces backed by civil and air defenses, can be tolerated.

Two factors are not reflected in the data of Figure 2. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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MODERNIZATION COSTS (LESS ICBMs)

(FY82 \$B - A TO POM)

	<u>FY 83-87</u>	<u>TO COMPLETION</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
[REDACTED]	18.1	8.0	26.1
[REDACTED]	3.0	0.5	3.5
<u>BOMBERS</u>			
<u>B-1V</u>	0	0	0
[REDACTED]	2.0	TBD	TBD
[REDACTED]	3.0	1.0	4.0
[REDACTED]	1.0	0.8	1.8
<u>ATB</u>	0	0	0
<u>SLBMs</u>			
<u>TRIDENT II/TRIDENT SUBMARINE</u>	4.3	TBD	TBD
<u>AIR DEFENSE</u>	6.8	3.0	9.8

ICBM MODERNIZATION

(FY 82 \$B - to FYDP)

	<u>FY 83-87</u>	<u>TO COMPLETE</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Alternative Program [REDACTED]	4.0	10.0	14.0
Alternative Program [REDACTED]	16.0	24.0	40.0

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