

#53

~~SECRET~~

16 OCT 1981 11 09



THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL  
Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: JUL 22 2019

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

In reply refer to:  
I-24292/81

16 OCT 1981

OCT 16 1981

POLICY

REP. SEC HAS SEEN

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: US-Spanish Negotiations: Your Meeting with Ambassador Todman, 1630, Friday, 16 October (U)--INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

SPAIN

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL  
Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: JUL 22 2019

(U) Ambassador Todman came to Washington to participate in this week's visit by King Juan Carlos. He asked for this meeting as a follow-up to his discussion on US-Spanish negotiations with you on 12 August.

(S) Since August, the Spaniards have agreed to extend the present Treaty from 21 September 1981 to 21 May 1982 and have initiated internal steps leading to an application for Spanish entry into NATO. We have had another round of formal negotiations and several sessions of the various working groups in Madrid and Washington. Few fundamental issues have been resolved and we are now in that frustrating but necessary stage of exploring the details of each other's positions. The Spaniards are taking a tough line on most questions associated with the nitty gritty of the U.S. military presence in Spain. They clearly intend to exert close control over our operations, particularly those associated with activities not directly related to NATO. (As a current example, the Spaniards denied our initial request to use Spanish bases in support of BRIGHT STAR 82 and have not answered our subsequent request.)

(S) The Spaniards are unhappy that we have not responded definitively to their request for over \$4 billion in security assistance over the next five years, about half of which they want in the form of equipment grants, loans and leases. This is a tactical problem for the US negotiator who has in his hands the USG positions: (1) as was the case with Turkey and Greece, we cannot undertake a specific multi-year security assistance commitment but are willing to make a "best efforts" pledge to do what we can to help the Spanish Armed Forces; (2) specific security assistance programs must be subject to the annual legislative process; (3) even if grants, leases and loans were feasible, and they are not, the items of equipment the Spaniards want, or suitable substitutes, are not available for transfer from the Service inventories. These positions have been outlined to the Spaniards but have not yet been reinforced by the tabling of our draft supplementary agreement on this subject.

(S) We appreciate Ambassador Todman's desire to delay providing the Spaniards with a firmer response until it could be wrapped in our FY 1983 security assistance proposals. It now appears that these

Classified by: [redacted] per [redacted] NATO Policy  
Declassify on: [redacted] Oct 1987

(16 OCT 81)

Spec. And. has seen  
Eidet.

~~SECRET~~

18-M-1077

~~SECRET~~

2

proposals will not be ready in time to relate them to the Spaniards during the 2 November round. (The program for Spain has not been settled but is likely to be \$400 million regular FMS credits, \$3.5 to 5 million IMBT and \$7-15 million ESF.) Our concern is that a continuing delay in reinforcing our positions and convincing the Spaniards of the realities underlying these positions will merely feed Spanish false expectations and lead to recriminations later.

(S) Todman may mention a request he made last week in a message from Madrid that we reconsider the possibility of the Air Force making a cost contribution to expansion of the Spanish air defense system (Combat Grande) and early delivery to Spain of four C-130 aircraft. Our preliminary review indicates that (1) a new contribution to Combat Grande would be difficult to justify to Congress because the improvements planned by the Spaniards would not benefit the Air Force; but that (2) four C-130 aircraft would be available to Spain in 1982 from new production if the order was placed soon.

(S) We recognize that our ability to satisfy Spanish security assistance aspirations would make the negotiations easier and probably result in more flexibility in operations we carry out within Spain, such as greater use of training ranges. However, we doubt that even complete satisfaction of Spanish desires would produce Spanish assurances of our ability to use Spanish bases for non-NATO contingencies or reduce Spanish efforts to exert greater cognizance and control over the U.S. military presence in Spain.

(S) No doubt, these negotiations will be protracted and difficult. However, we would not share an opinion that the Spaniards would forego the renewal of their bilateral security relationship with the U.S. or relinquish the prospect of substantial FMS credits and IMBT and ESF grants because we were unable to satisfy their demands for free equipment. Pending Spanish entry into NATO also augurs the eventual conclusion of a new agreement although its terms may be short of present Spanish expectations.

(S) In August you approved Todman's request for a military-to-military meeting with the Spaniards to discuss modernization of the Spanish Armed Forces, provided the meeting was in Spain and the Spaniards clearly understood our side would not be authorized to negotiate equipment issues. This meeting took place in late September and went well. Todman can be expected to express his appreciation to you and indicate that the psychological impact of the meeting made it worthwhile.

Office of the Secretary of Defense 5046552  
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS  
Date: 22 Jul 2019 Authority: EO 13526  
Declassify: X Deny in Full: \_\_\_\_\_  
Declassify in Part: \_\_\_\_\_  
Reason: \_\_\_\_\_  
MDR: 18 -M- 1077

*R. G. Stillwell*  
Richard G. Stillwell  
General, USA (Ret.)  
Acting

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL  
Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: JUL 22 2019

~~SECRET~~