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INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL Authority: EO 13526 Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS Date: JUN 05 2019

*Folder "Angola 092 (Jan) 1976" Box 6F, 79-0049*

18 JAN 1976

In reply refer to: I-35011/76

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: U.S. Options to Reduce Cuban Intervention in Angola -- INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

AM-6-02-A 092

(TS) The purpose of this paper is to provide options for your consideration for use by the United States in order to:

- Reduce the impact of the Cuban military effort in Angola.
- Increase both the political and financial cost to Cuba of continuing its support of the MPLA.
- Impose higher cost on the USSR for its involvement in Angola.

(TS) At Tab A are military options developed by the OJCS, listed in order of increased severity, which might exert leverage on Cuba. The pros and cons of each are listed. Existing contingency plans are available to support all of the military options.

(TS) At Tab B are political options which might be useful in exerting long term leverage over Cuba. These options could either be adopted in conjunction with identified military options or used independently.

(TS) Recommendations:

- Approve military option #1. Take no action at this time which could be branded interventionism or meddling in the affairs of another state. To do so would make the U.S. susceptible to charges of adopting the same tactics we condemn in Cuba's situation. Moreover, such action would undoubtedly serve to stem an already strong, and still growing resentment against Cuba's actions within the Latin American community.

13 JAN 76

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

See Def Has Sec 3

Classified by Acting Director, IA(ISA)  
SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652, AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED AT TWO-YEAR INTERVALS. DECLASSIFIED ON 31 DEC 1988



(W) (TS)

See Def Cont Nr. X-0128

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Concern to a greater or lesser degree has already been expressed over Cuba's Interventionism by Colombia, Venezuela, Nicaragua, Trinidad and Tobago, Costa Rica, the Bahamas and Barbados. Any provocation or public show of force would almost certainly be counterproductive.

Domestically, a Caribbean show of force would substantially increase the public and press attacks on the Administration. In summary, in view of the anti-Cuban resentment which is already developing, our interests would be better served to avoid any accusation of interventionism and avoid any domestic conflict.

- If other considerations dictate some military action should be taken, military option #2 is recommended.

- It is recommended that political options #1 through #7 be considered either singly or in concert with others. Political options #8 or #9 are considered extreme at this time. In general, any actions we can take to keep our Latin American neighbors well informed on Cuban initiatives and any low-key diplomatic moves designed to demonstrate our continuing interest in the Cuban situation would be helpful.

This memorandum has been coordinated with the Department of State. Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor of the Department of State, and George Vest, Director of the Politico-Military Bureau, support military option #1--do nothing--and are reluctant to go beyond the political actions already being taken.

*A.A. Jordan*  
Amos A. Jordan  
Acting Assistant Secretary

Attachments  
a/s

Coordination:

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff *J.B. ...* concurs.

*J.B. ...*  
11/13/76

Office of the Secretary of Defense § U.S.C. § 552  
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS  
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