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ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

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In reply refer to:
I-22176/84

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

THROUGH: UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY

SUBJECT: Approval of Report to Congress on Improving NATO's Conventional Capabilities — ACTION MEMORANDUM

The attached report (Tab A) is forwarded for your approval and transmittal to Congress. Attached for your signature (Tab B) are letters to the Chairmen of the appropriate Congressional Committees, Senator Nunn, who actually is the author of this requirement, the Secretary of State, and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.

This report results from a rather massive effort over the past eight months to respond to a requirement in the FY 1984 Defense Authorization Act to report on NATO's aggregate conventional defense requirements and to provide your recommendations and plan for substantially improving the chances of a successful conventional defense of Europe. An extract from the legislation identifying the details of the requirement is at Tab C.

The requirement for this report results in part from a perception by many in Congress that the United States and its NATO allies rely too heavily on nuclear weapons for deterrence and defense, that the popular and Congressional consensus essential for continued support of the strong U.S. role in the Alliance is being undercut by that dependence, and that new technologies offer the potential for radically improved conventional defense capabilities if only the Department of Defense and its European counterparts can be convinced to invest in them. Accordingly, the detailed requirements for this report focus on new technology for conventional defense and what both we and our European partners are doing over the next five years to apply it, especially for attack of follow-on forces, an area of particular emphasis by General Rogers.

The attached report meets these and associated issues head on. The report reexamines NATO's strategy of Flexible Response and concludes that it continues to provide a sound basis for meeting the Alliance's security objectives. The report also examines the issue of improved conventional defense from both strategic and programmatic perspectives and concludes that, while effective deterrence and defense must continue to be based on balanced strategic and non-strategic nuclear and conventional capabilities, substantial improvements are necessary if conventional forces are to become fully able to perform their role within the strategy of Flexible Response. It examines the potential offered by new technologies and by a variety of other approaches to improving conventional capabilities and concludes that the great promise which

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technology offers does not obviate the need for balanced programs to meet the requirements of readiness, sustainability, modernization, and force structure. Finally, the report recommends a number of U.S. and Alliance efforts that can lead to substantially improved conventional capabilities in the long run without unrealistic increases in resources committed to defense. A summary of the 57 recommendations contained in the report is at Tab D.

Preparation of this report inspired considerable debate within DoD on a number of fundamental questions regarding, for example, the proper role of conventional forces within the strategy of Flexible Response, the duration of conventional conflict for which it is appropriate to plan, and the extent to which it is appropriate to rely on technological solutions to enduring problems of conventional defense. The report reflects a certain degree of compromise on these issues among the parties involved. While there may be no one, therefore, totally satisfied with this draft, I believe that all will acknowledge that it fairly represents the consensus achieved while preserving their freedom to pursue these important questions appropriately in the future. This draft has also been coordinated with the Department of State and we have incorporated that Department's suggestions.

Two additional actions related to this report are yet to be completed. The legislation requires that "SACEUR" submit as an addendum his views and recommendations on the subject. Our information is that General Rogers plans to submit his "addendum" directly to the Congressional Committees concerned. The other requirement is for the President to submit his views and recommendations on this subject by 1 June. That action has been delayed pending your approval and transmission of this report to Congress.

Recommendation:

That you approve the report attached at Tab A and sign the transmitting letters at Tab B.

Stephen R. Hamm
for Richard Perle

Attachments:
- Tab A - Report on Improving NATO Conventional Defense
- Tab B - Letters transmitting copies of report
- Tab C - Extract of pertinent legislation
- Tab D - Summary of Report recommendations

Concurrences: (Attached, next under. Requested changes have been incorporated.)

Prepared by:
Boyd D. Sutton
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x 70809

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IMPROVING NATO'S CONVENTIONAL CAPABILITIES

JUNE 1984



A REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS

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CASPAR W. WEINBERGER
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

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IMPROVING NATO'S CONVENTIONAL CAPABILITIES

Executive Summary

(U) This report responds to the mandate in the FY 1984 Defense Authorization Act requiring the Secretary of Defense to submit to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and House of Representatives a "comprehensive report and plan for improving the conventional defense capabilities of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization."

(U) FOUNDATIONS OF ALLIANCE SECURITY

(U) NATO's continued vitality turns on both the military capabilities fielded by the Alliance and the cohesion and determination of its members. NATO's military capabilities comprise a balanced triad of conventional, non-strategic nuclear, and strategic nuclear forces whose first objective is to deter an attack by persuading a potential aggressor that his military objectives cannot be attained at an acceptable risk or cost. If this deterrence fails, NATO's military capabilities must ensure that the aggressor fails to achieve his objectives and that NATO's political integrity and territorial boundaries are restored with the lowest possible damage to Alliance population, territory, and interests.

(U) Alliance defense policy and military strategy posit a sharing among the Allies of both the risks and the burdens of deterrence and defense, and this requirement imposes important constraints on the strategy, plans, and programs that underlie Alliance goals. The success of the Alliance in preserving peace and freedom for its members over the past 35 years testifies to the sense of common purpose and interdependence which links the nations of Western Europe to each other and to North America. Recognizing that this sense of mutual commitment is by far the most critical ingredient of security, NATO governments have been careful to adjust their defense programs to certain overriding political and economic imperatives.

(U) Political Imperatives. The most important political requirement is the fundamental commitment to deterrence as the overriding objective of Alliance strategy and force posture. Efforts to improve NATO's military capabilities must be disciplined by a clear understanding that the principal objective of the military forces is not to fight and win a war in Europe, but rather to help insure that such a war never begins. Consequently, proposals to improve NATO's military capabilities must be measured not solely by their contribution to Alliance military strength, but also by their effect on the cohesion and determination of the Alliance. A second key political requirement is that any aggression, however limited, must engage a significant number of NATO's members from the outset. Thus, for example, the so-called "layer cake" distribution of national forces in NATO's Central Region performs a crucial strategic function in providing unmistakable evidence of the solidarity of the Alliance.

(U) Economic Imperatives. Members of the Alliance have neither the flexibility to transfer resources easily from one sector to another nor the relative immunity from social pressures characteristic of the Soviet Union and its satellites. The frequent complaint that the Warsaw Pact is able to field larger military forces at less cost ignores the human price of that apparently greater efficiency. Likewise, criticism of NATO's failure to achieve the same level of equipment standardization and division of defense production responsibilities as the Warsaw Pact ignores the fundamental differences between the free market, competitive economies of NATO nations and the Warsaw Pact's centrally-controlled command economies. Finally, efforts to improve NATO's military posture cannot be insulated from its members' economic circumstances. All of these factors limit what is possible in terms of the size and composition of military forces against a potential adversary that is not similarly constrained.

(U) NATO'S STRATEGY

(U) The mandate from the Congress implies that NATO strategy requires revision and suggests "a successful conventional defense of Europe" as the appropriate objective. Accordingly, this report examines the origins and purpose of the current strategy and the conditions that prevailed when it was adopted and considers whether changed conditions warrant alterations in the strategy. The report concludes that NATO's strategy of Flexible Response continues to provide a sound basis for meeting the Alliance's security objectives. The strategy was adopted following an extended debate in which every issue raised in recent months was then also a matter of serious discussion: the effect of the changing balance of forces and the reliability of U.S. nuclear guarantees, the benefits and risks of nuclear first use, and the implications for deterrence and defense of greater reliance on conventional forces. Flexible Response has withstood the test of time, due in part to the ambiguity that was (and remains) both a virtue of the strategy's design and a necessity for achieving the consensus essential to its adoption. It is important, therefore, to keep in mind the underlying principles upon which Flexible Response is based.

(U) First, Flexible Response firmly establishes deterrence as the overriding objective of Alliance strategy and force posture.

(U) Second, it maintains that successful deterrence requires confronting the Soviet Union with risks as open ended as those threatening the Alliance. It rejects the notion that deliberate aggression can be deterred solely by denying the Soviet Union confidence in operational success in a war fought largely on other people's territory. Instead, the strategy is designed to confront the Soviet Union with an inability to predict NATO's response to aggression, and thus to calculate with confidence the risks of such aggression.

(U) Third, Flexible Response recognizes that NATO requires a credible capability and determination to use nuclear weapons, if necessary, to raise the risks and force an aggressor to reconsider his objectives. It thus clearly affirms the nuclear threat as the ultimate sanction against military attack and the ultimate foundation of deterrence.

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(U) At the same time, Flexible Response requires that, if deterrence fails, NATO should not be left with only the alternatives of early recourse to nuclear escalation or capitulation. Indeed, the requirement for NATO to improve its conventional capabilities proceeds from the recognition that an inability to respond in a measured way to aggression would undermine the credibility of deterrence.

(U) Finally, recognizing that the commitment to a measured response requires the risk of regional military operations for some period of time, Flexible Response commits NATO to a forward conventional defense strong enough to defeat a limited conventional attack without recourse to nuclear weapons and to frustrate the success of even a massive Warsaw Pact invasion at least long enough to convince Warsaw Pact to break off the attack and withdraw or face the prospect of nuclear escalation. The duration of this direct conventional defense prior to deliberate escalation cannot be specified without undermining the incalculability of risk essential to deterrence. But it is clear that both a high confidence initial conventional defense and a credible capability for nuclear escalation are required elements of the strategy.

(U) As these central premises clearly reveal, NATO's strategy of Flexible Response requires a force posture embodying sufficient nuclear risk to deter deliberate aggression and conventional forces sufficiently robust that nuclear escalation is not inevitable. It requires that deterrence dominate our planning, and seeks a response to the failure of deterrence that will neither concede Western Europe as a conventional battlefield nor hazard nuclear war against any but the most serious threat.

(U) THE PARAMETERS OF NATO CONVENTIONAL DEFENSE PLANNING

(U) The continued growth of Soviet and Warsaw Pact nuclear and conventional capabilities has reinforced the Alliance's requirement for a flexible and measured response to aggression and thus for an appropriately broad spectrum of military capabilities. At the same time, despite major improvements in NATO's capabilities, the Warsaw Pact has continued to increase its already substantial advantage in most conventional force areas. The consequence of the shifting balance has been to place an even heavier burden on Alliance conventional forces.

(U) NATO's conventional forces must meet the following minimum requirements of Flexible Response:

(U) First, they must help deter premeditated aggression by denying the Warsaw Pact confidence in its ability to achieve a strategic success by conventional means alone. Conventional forces must be sufficiently robust that Soviet planners contemplating deliberate attack will doubt their chances of rapid success and will clearly see that a major conventional attack risks the possibility of escalation. Second, should deterrence fail, NATO's conventional forces must be capable of defending forward successfully against an unreinforced conventional attack without being forced to the use of nuclear weapons; and of restoring the status quo ante. Finally, they must be capable of sustaining a cohesive forward defense that will frustrate the success

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of a reinforced attack and cause the cessation of aggression and withdrawal from NATO territory, or afford NATO the time to consider and, if necessary, execute deliberate escalation and take whatever further action is required to cause the aggressor to cease his attack and withdraw. In order to preserve the incalculability that is a key element of NATO's strategy, the duration of a conventional defense cannot and should not be stated unambiguously. At the same time, the longer the duration of successful conventional defense, the greater the flexibility in options open to NATO.

(U) AGGREGATE CONVENTIONAL FORCE REQUIREMENTS AND PROGRAMMED IMPROVEMENTS

(S) Over the past several years, the United States and its NATO allies have made important improvements in the capabilities of their conventional forces; yet there is reason to doubt whether NATO's current conventional military capabilities can meet the requirements of the flexible response envisioned by NATO's strategy. If faced with a reinforced conventional attack, NATO would face fairly quickly the agonizing decision of escalation in order to try to convince an aggressor to halt his advance.

(S) Readiness, survivability, and reinforcement measures all require attention and the current low level of sustainment in all NATO regions is particularly critical. Moreover, it is vital that NATO's limited interdiction capability be enhanced to prevent enemy reinforcing echelons from overwhelming NATO's forward combat forces. Such improvements must be undertaken, however, in a balanced program that does not lose sight of the need to maintain--and improve upon--the Alliance's hard-won gains, especially in naval forces and in the close combat capabilities of ground and tactical air forces.

(U) Current plans generally reflect these priorities and the required balance but, despite substantial recent gains and anticipated improvements over the next five years, critical deficiencies will persist in several important areas. This situation is summarized below according to the five operational tasks judged by the NATO Military Authorities to be key to meeting NATO's military objectives in the face of aggression. Each of these operational tasks include such key functional requirements as command and control, sustainability, mobility, and so on, which are highlighted as appropriate in the discussion.

(1) Preparing for War
(2) Defeating Forward Enemy Forces
(3) Attacking Follow-on Forces
(4) Maintaining a Favorable Air Situation
(5) Controlling Vital Ocean Areas

(U) Preparing for War. The overall objective of this task is to make full preparations for hostilities before they begin. It includes obtaining and reacting to warning; alert, deployment, and

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organization for combat of in-place ground air, and naval forces; execution of barrier plans; dispersal and preparation for operation of key supporting facilities, including command and control, communications, logistical, and nuclear assets; activation of Wartime Host Nation Support agreements; and protection, reception, reconstitution, and deployment of rapid reinforcements.

(S) Anticipated short warning times and the possibility that ambiguous indicators will delay appropriate Allied decisions to mobilize and reinforce place a premium on the readiness and capabilities of in-place forces, timely mobilization of reserves, and rapid movement of early reinforcements into position. Major improvements have been made in host nation support and NATO's Infrastructure Program continues to fund command and control improvements and the construction of facilities to support reinforcements. Nonetheless, serious shortfalls will remain even after the current U.S. and Allied five-year programs are completed and will jeopardize NATO's initial defense capabilities.

(S) Malpositioning will continue to inhibit the timely redeployment of in-place forces and there is reason to doubt the timely arrival of many of the early reinforcing forces. The Canadians, for example, have not programmed adequate lift to meet commitments in the Northern and Central Regions simultaneously and the United States is not able to meet fully its commitment to have 10 divisions, 60 tactical fighter squadrons, and associated support units in place by M+10. The timely arrival of the Dutch and Belgian reinforcements that comprise more than 70 percent of their forward ground force commitment also is questionable.

(S) The support structure in Europe is not currently adequate to support in-place U.S. combat forces or to provide for the survivability and effective operation of reinforcements. Inadequacies in sheltering and Minimum Essential Facilities at Colocated Operating Bases to support U.S. reinforcing aircraft persist, particularly in the Northern and Southern Regions. Command and control capabilities are limited by inadequate survivability of command centers and communication nodes, inadequate capacity to handle the high volumes of communication and data anticipated, and by lack of interoperability.

(U) Defeating Forward Enemy Forces. The overall objective of this task is to defeat enemy forces in contact in the main battle area. This requires the early identification of major axes of attack; rapid concentration of forces at critical points; engagement of attacking formations with synchronized close combat, fire support, close air support, and battlefield air interdiction to break the momentum of the attack, inflict high loss rates, and create opportunities for friendly maneuver; rapid concentration of ground and air-mobile reserves against the flanks and rear of isolated Warsaw Pact formations; ground counter-attack supported by concentrated artillery and air support to fragment and destroy those formations; execution of air assault and amphibious operations against forward Warsaw Pact battle support centers; and prevention of interference by Pact air and naval forces.

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(S) Substantial improvements in NATO's ground and tactical air forces have been achieved in the past few years through widespread modernization and increased readiness. Significant gains will continue through additional modernization, the use of new operational concepts and tactical doctrines, improved command and control, and better battlefield intelligence collection, processing, and dissemination. Combat force structure in active forces will remain relatively constant over the program period, but important gains will be made in better use of reserve and territorial forces, especially in Germany and Denmark. However, significant weaknesses in initial defense capability will remain. In addition to malpositioning and reinforcement shortfalls, successful initial defense is severely inhibited by the lack of adequate mobile reserves, which limits NATO's ability to concentrate forces or to respond to a breakthrough of its forward forces. This problem is especially severe in north Norway, the LANDJUT area of AFNORTH, the Northern Army Group area of AFCENT, and northern Greece/Turkish Thrace. The ability even to contain initial attacks in these areas, let alone deal with follow-on attacks, is far from certain.

(S) A contingency outside Europe could have a significant adverse effect on NATO's defensive capability and increase the pressure for early escalation. The United States might be required to divert up to one-fourth of ground and tactical air reinforcements, an aircraft carrier battle group, and much of its strategic lift capability in order to respond to Soviet aggression in Southwest Asia.

(S) Enemy use of chemical weapons also would raise pressures for escalation. NATO is improving its defenses against chemical weapons, but no conceivable level of defensive capability would eliminate the severe loss of capability resulting from a massive offensive use of chemicals by the Warsaw Pact, on NATO's support infrastructure whose effective operation is inherently more vulnerable to chemical attack. An effective chemical retaliatory capability is essential to deter the Warsaw Pact from using chemical weapons.

(S) Defensive endurance throughout all NATO regions is limited by inadequate support structure, manpower, and stocks of munitions and materiel to replace battlefield consumption and losses. Currently, sustainment in each region can be measured in terms of less than two weeks (in some areas, less than a week). Although some countries will improve their munitions stocks over the next five years, only the United States will meet NATO's 30 day guideline and most will be struggling to meet half of that. The survivability of command and control will improve somewhat due to completion of hardened wartime headquarters for major NATO commands, but the development and implementation of a comprehensive, integrated plan for NATO's theater-wide command and control system is just now getting off the ground.

(U) Attacking Follow-on Forces. The overall objective of this task is to prevent the rupture of NATO's forward defense through attacks that delay, disrupt, and destroy enemy follow-on forces at varying depths beyond the main battle area. Such attacks must be synchronized with NATO's own scheme of ground maneuver. This requires the ability to gain and make timely use of information on enemy forces and installations

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well be ind the main battle area, and systems that are survivable and accurat , have the required range, and employ munitions producing the require terminal effects. Finally, these systems and munitions must be avai able in sufficient numbers to achieve the operational objectives on the cale required.

(S) In the past few years NATO has made modest improvements in its apability to attack follow-on forces through deployment of U.S. F-16s, he European Tornado, and improved conventional munitions. These improve ents notwithstanding, NATO's ability to prevent enemy follow-on forces rom overwhelming NATO's forward defenses is very limited. In the Nor hern and Southern Regions such capability as exists is almost totally dependent on U.S. reinforcing aircraft. The lack of adequate sensors and modern munitions, and of adequate Minimum Essential Facilities and she ters at the Colocated Operating Bases, limits their effectiveness and su ivability of even these forces. In the Central Region, both U.S. d Allied aircraft have reasonably good interdiction capability at sha ow ranges, though only the U.S. F-111 is capable of interdicting target much beyond the Polish-East German border. Forces in the Central Region ack adequate long-range sensors, intelligence processing capabilit modern munitions, and adequate stocks of even older munitions to per rm this mission effectively or sustain it for long. Programmed improv ents will help somewhat in the Northern and Central Regions, but si ificant increases in capability to attack follow-on forces effect ely and at long ranges are unlikely to be available until into t 1990s.

(Maintaining a Favorable Air Situation. To preserve Allied capabi ties in the face of enemy air and missile attack and support friend operations, NATO must pursue three complementary approaches: passiv protection, active defense, and offensive counter-air. Performance o this mission requires protection of operating bases (including those w at which NATO's nuclear delivery aircraft are concentrated), the ab ity to achieve local air superiority over major avenues of Warsaw act ground pressure, and the conduct of sustained attacks on enemy r bases and missile launchers or associated units. A special premiu will be placed on the rapid repair and replenishment of NATO air ba s and surface-to-air missile units to assure sustainment of the ai effort.

(S) Warsaw Pact air and missile weapons represent the gravest immedi e threat to the integrity of NATO's conventional defenses. Substa ial improvements are needed, especially in the Northern and Southe Regions. Both regions suffer from inadequacies in shelters, number of aircraft, surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) for point defense of air ields, and stocks of air defense munitions of all types, and have n in-place offensive counter-air capability. Reinforcing aircraft will i prove both air defense and offensive counter-air capabilities, but la adequate Minimum Essential Facilities at the Colocated Operat g Bases that will receive the bulk of U.S. air reinforcements. There e virtually no shelters for these aircraft and in-place munitions stocks are inadequate for more than a few days of operation.

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(S) NATO's air capabilities are somewhat better in the Central Region, but the air and missile threat there is substantially worse. There are shelters for many in-place aircraft and a program due to begin next year will provide some protection to those not sheltered. Most nations have begun programs to modernize their aircraft, but overall numbers of aircraft continue to decline. Current SAM defenses are inadequate and point defenses of airfields are particularly poor. Munition stocks for air-to-air and offensive counter-air missions are very low. Programmed improvements will provide a substantial increase in overall air defense capability in the Central Region. SAM defenses are being upgraded through the introduction of PATRIOT and other systems. Additional U.S., Belgian, and Dutch air defense aircraft and increased stocks of modern air-to-air munitions also will help. Additional U.S. German, British, and Canadian ground attack aircraft will increase close air support and provide some improvement in offensive counter-air capabilities. Additional shelters, rear area security measures, and rapid airfield repair capabilities will improve NATO's ability to sustain counter-air operations in general.

(S) There also will be substantial improvements in defensive counter-air capability in the Northern and Southern Regions. Modern aircraft equipped for air defense will be introduced, and many countries will add stocks of modern air-to-air munitions, although none will reach adequate levels. Additional SAMs also will be deployed. However, significant gaps in radar coverage will remain, as will substantial shortfalls in Minimum Essential Facilities and shelters for reinforcing aircraft. U.S. reinforcing aircraft will continue to provide the bulk of any offensive counter-air capability in both regions.

(S) By the end of the five-year program period NATO will have achieved major increases in active and passive air defense capabilities and some improvements in offensive counter-air capabilities and will be on the verge of further significant improvements. At the same time, however, the Soviets will have achieved a major increase in their own counter-air capabilities through the introduction of new aircraft and improved tactical missile systems. If unmatched by improvements in NATO's counter-air capabilities, Warsaw Pact improvements will increasingly deprive the Alliance of one of its most potent conventional equalizers. Part of this task lies in the continued improvement of NATO's air defenses, and much is being done in this regard. Far less is being done, however, to permit destruction of the air and missile threat at its source, and greater efforts in this area are needed.

(U) Controlling Vital Ocean Areas. The overall objectives of this task are to protect the air and sea lines of communication vital to reinforcement and resupply, to insure that Warsaw Pact naval forces do not interfere with Allied ground and air operations, and to provide direct support to such operations. This requires operations against Warsaw Pact naval forces in the Norwegian, Baltic, and Black Seas, the defeat of Soviet naval forces in the Mediterranean, the security of ports of embarkation and reception and the intermediate SLOCs against attack by enemy naval and naval air forces, naval air support of land operations, the conduct of amphibious operations and, in conjunction with land and air forces, the security of coastal

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areas and key islands against amphibious attack.

(S) NATO's naval forces continue to enjoy substantial qualitative and operational advantages over those of the Warsaw Pact, and improvements programmed over the next five years will enhance NATO's ability to control vital ocean areas. United States surface combatants will increase by more than 10 percent and U.S. and Allied submarine availability by about 15 percent by the end of the program period. Substantial advances in maritime anti-air warfare capabilities will be fielded and there will be major improvements in anti-surface warfare capabilities. New programs also will result in substantial improvements to ASW capabilities.

(S) Currently, the most critical overall deficiency in NATO's naval capability is inadequate numbers of key force elements. Current numbers of carrier battle groups are not sufficient to conduct simultaneous operations against Soviet naval forces in the North Atlantic-Norwegian Sea, the Baltic approaches, and the Eastern Mediterranean. This shortfall will cause pre-hostilities decisions regarding naval force deployments to be crucial and will limit NATO maritime commanders to sequential operations. Likewise, if anti-submarine warfare (ASW) forces are heavily committed in a protective role in the aforementioned campaign areas, they will not be adequate to defeat a determined large-scale submarine assault on the Atlantic SLOCs despite NATO's qualitative lead over the Soviets in ASW. Coastal defense and mine warfare capabilities in ocean areas and shallow seas are inadequate throughout the Alliance. Despite some modernization, particularly by the Germans, Dutch, and Belgians, the area of mine countermeasures remains the least adequately resourced, with serious potential impact on NATO's ability to control the coastal waters through which external reinforcements must flow.

(U) A PLAN FOR IMPROVING NATO'S CONVENTIONAL CAPABILITIES.

(S) NATO's conventional capabilities currently fall short of being able to assure the successful implementation of NATO's strategy of Flexible Response. Full execution of U.S. and Allied five-year defense plans would add significantly to NATO's ability to carry out the strategy, but even then critical deficiencies will remain. Thus, the Alliance is not currently able to reduce its substantial reliance on nuclear weapons as the principal basis of deterrence. At the same time, it is absolutely necessary to do so, both to make deterrence more credible and to give the Alliance the truly flexible capability it desires should deterrence fail.

(U) The problem is manageable. NATO is a defensive alliance, and defense offers significant advantages in military operations. NATO enjoys important advantages in technology and has greater aggregate economic, industrial, and manpower resources than the Warsaw Pact. But these advantages must be mobilized and focused, without unrealistic expectations of massive increases in the resources devoted to defense, social or political dislocation, or changing the fundamental structure of the Alliance or its strategy.

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(U) Two interrelated sets of actions are required in order to develop NATO's conventional capabilities so that they can meet the requirements expected of them. First, members of the Alliance must work together to achieve substantially greater efficiency from their collective resources. Second, we and our allies must focus more effectively on what matters most and adjust our priorities accordingly. NATO's agreement this April to work together and give special priority to an initial set of 11 projects in response to our emerging technologies initiative is particularly encouraging in this regard.

(U) The main requirements for improved conventional defenses can be characterized under three headings: improving initial defenses, neutralizing enemy follow-on forces, and improving sustained conventional defense.

(U) Improving Initial Defenses. The principal risks to NATO's initial defenses, whether from an unreinforced attack or the early stages of a reinforced attack, currently reside in a combination of weaknesses of in-place force structure, heavy dependence on uncertain rapid external reinforcement, and the early tactical advantage enjoyed by an aggressor. Most of these shortcomings can be ameliorated without major increases in standing forces.

(S) The first requirement is to ensure the maximum readiness of in-place forces. Readiness is diminished by malpositioning and by inadequate training, equipment and stocks of materiel. To overcome these deficiencies, NATO must correct the malpositioning of in-place forces, make better use of reserves, examine the potential for permanent barriers to complement initial defensive capability, and procure additional munitions. This last item is especially significant. In some areas stocks are not adequate to meet the requirements of pre-hostilities barrier plans and generally are insufficient for more than the first few days of combat.

(S) NATO's initial defense capabilities also are critically dependent on mobilized reserves and reinforcements whose timely availability is questionable. The United States must follow through on efforts to meet its M+10 commitment. Congress' authorization to fill POMCUS sets 5 and 6 was a critical prerequisite, as will be procurement of the air and sealift capabilities planned in the current five-year program. Because of shortfalls in service support units for in-place forces, however, it will be necessary to increase the prepositioning program with additional equipment and warehousing. Our allies also must improve their reinforcement capability.

(S) The United States, Canada, and other allies also must follow through on programs to improve naval forces and to complete the prepositioning for reinforcements scheduled for early arrival in Norway. The timely arrival of reinforcements there in turn requires the security of Iceland and successful naval operations in the Norwegian Sea. There is a high degree of interdependence among these requirements; loss of north Norway also would jeopardize the success of naval operations in the Norwegain Sea and these operations could be decisive for successful defense of the North Atlantic SLOCs.

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(S) The structure that supports reinforcements also requires improvement. In this regard, expansion of the Wartime Host Nation Support agreements should be concluded with all nations receiving external reinforcements. Use of the civil infrastructure to support reinforcements and their onward movement needs to be expanded. The NATO Infrastructure Program also needs to be expanded significantly to provide for earlier completion of construction critical to reinforcement support structure and other needs, such as command and control. Without improvements in the reliability, security, and survivability of the European Theater command and control system, the full potential of other improvements cannot be realized. Effective design and implementation requires centralized management of a comprehensive and functionally integrated command and control improvement plan.

(S) Perhaps the most critical requirement to improve NATO's initial defense capabilities is the need to improve the operational effectiveness and survivability of NATO's in-place reinforcing forces. This requires not only that NATO members follow through on the improvements already programmed for the next five years, especially in air defense and general modernization, but also that they consider acceleration of other efforts and the initiation of new ones. Even at the end of the current planning period, aggregate munitions stocks in all regions will continue to fall far short of NATO's 30 day stockpile planning guideline. Such shortages could force commanders to curtail operations to avoid running out of critical items, and the price of such rationing would be measurable in lives and kilometers lost and in pressure to use nuclear weapons.

(U) Implementation of the Allied Command Europe (ACE) Concept of Operations, embodying SACEUR's Follow-on Force Attack (FOFA) concept (treated in the next section), and AirLand Battle doctrine offer potentially important advances in the employment of NATO's fielded forces. Through the synchronization of all available combat power throughout the depth of the battle area, the U.S. Army's AirLand Battle doctrine creates the opportunity for friendly maneuver to destroy the coherence of the enemy's operational plan and deprive uncommitted enemy forces of the freedom of action they need to take advantage of their superior numbers.

(S) NATO should give high priority to the development of an improved NATO-wide interoperable and survivable system to detect, identify, target, and assess damage inflicted on enemy forces, including those not under direct observation. Similarly, NATO needs to increase the rapidity with which its field commanders can identify and react to the flow of battle. These twin requirements for better battlefield intelligence and command and control capability will be met partially by NATO's Battlefield Information Collection and Exploitation System (BICES), and the US Joint Tactical Fusion Program (JTFP).

(S) NATO must seek to exploit the potential offered by advanced conventional munitions, which in the near term could strip armored formations of their supporting forces--making surviving armored units more vulnerable to NATO's direct defenses--and in the long term could destroy armored formations directly. NATO also should explore the potential for fixed barriers to aid in this regard by

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slowing or canalizing an attacking enemy and increasing his exposure to attack by the more lethal munitions now or soon to be available.

(S) NATO must also develop a substantially greater capability for offensive counter-air (OCA) operations, which will be critically important in the first few days of a conventional conflict. An essential preliminary requirement is for the Alliance to press ahead with the development of an agreed OCA concept which establishes both the priorities to be accorded various elements of the OCA target set and the preferred combination of air and surface-to-surface attack and electronic warfare systems associated with these priorities as the basis for national planning for OCA systems development and acquisition. Several nations, including the United States, are developing terminal munitions optimized for airfield attack. Concurrently, the United States will continue R&D on a wide range of advanced munitions and delivery systems for this mission and give consideration to a variety of OCA concepts, including "Counter-Air 90."

(S) The United States must also acquire a modern and effective chemical retaliatory capability to deter Warsaw Pact use of chemical weapons. no feasible defense can compensate adequately for the lack of a retaliatory capability which would impose the same operational risks to the Warsaw Pact with which it currently confronts NATO. Providing an adequate and appropriate capability is vital to NATO's overall objective of deterrence. Congress is urged to support the rapid acquisition of such a capability and to assist in broadening public understanding of its fundamentally preventive function.

(U) Neutralizing Enemy Follow-on Forces. Even if NATO's defenses are successful in defeating enemy forces committed to the initial assault, the Warsaw Pact enjoys a considerable advantage in reinforcement capability. For example, an initial assault of 30-40 divisions in the Central Region about two weeks after Warsaw Pact mobilization begins can be reinforced by more than twice that many in a buildup that within another two weeks would comprise more than 100 divisions. If not delayed, disrupted, or destroyed, Warsaw Pact reinforcements eventually would overwhelm NATO's forward defenses.

(U) To accomplish this difficult and essential task, NATO requires improved reconnaissance, surveillance, target acquisition, and intelligence fusion capabilities; more responsive command and control; weapons delivery systems that can reliably penetrate to the depths required for follow-on force attack; and conventional munitions able to achieve the desired damage on mobile enemy forces and fixed targets. Weapons and munitions must be available in sufficient number to sustain such attacks on the scale and for the duration required, and the entire structure, from command and control to stockpiles, must be survivable.

(S) There is general agreement within NATO regarding the need to attack follow-on forces and meeting that need is the centerpiece of the ACE Concept of Operations, recently published as a directive by SHAPE. The directive specifies how forces assigned to ACE will fight. It can only be an indirect guide, however, for Alliance and national force

structure and weapons development planning. There is substantial disagreement among several nations regarding what priority should be accorded to acquisition of follow-on force attack capabilities, which targets should be attacked, at what ranges, by what means, and by whom. Currently, virtually all of NATO's capability to perform this mission resides in air forces, principally U.S. NATO has yet to resolve the issues surrounding definition of the requirement for and subsequent acquisition of a long-range standoff missile despite a statement by the SACEUR that acquisition of such a capability is one of his most pressing needs. In such an environment, exploitation of emerging technologies for deep attack is restriced to unilateral efforts or agreements between two or three nations.

(S) One of the most urgent requirements, therefore, is for NATO to reach agreement on the operational and programmatic issues involved. We endorse the general concept of follow-on force attack and the ACE Concept of Operations and will press vigorously for an Alliance plan and seek early acquisition of the desired capability. In the interim, the United States will press forward with several programs designed to enhance survivable standoff interdiction capability within the decade. The two principal programs designed to meet this need are the Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) and the Joint Tactical Missile System (JTACMS). The need for better integration of intelligence information will be met in part by the Joint Tactical Fusion Program and the implementation of a limited operational capability at a NATO facility in Europe.

(U) It is important to keep in mind, however, that Alliance priorities must be designed to help NATO's forward defense succeed, not to replace it. Current U.S. priorities emphasize near-term deployment of the interdiction capabilities that contribute most directly to the initial defense and close battle. Indeed, much of the near-term importance of deep attack resides in its contribution to the more effective tactical employment of NATO's outnumbered armored and mechanized forces. Similarly, the immediate importance of counter-air and missile attack is to reduce enemy interference with both friendly ground combat capabilities and our own battlefield air support systems. Neither result would be furthered by acquiring interdiction capabilities at the expense of the air and ground force structure critical to initial defense.

(U) Improving Sustained Conventional Defenses. The ability to conduct a sustained conventional defense requires a combination of in-theater and rapidly deployable reinforcements, support forces, and stocks to support conventional operations at the required intensity until mobilization, training, and industrial production can provide added reinforcements and supplies. At the same time, the burden on friendly forces will also be affected by the enemy's staying power. Successful defense could take a higher toll on enemy personnel, equipment, and materiel than he had planned and lead to changes in his operations and the overall intensity of combat. Thus, it is difficult to predict confidently the specific requirements of sustained conventional defense.

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(U) It is essential, however, that the Alliance come to grips with the need for sustained conventional defense. NATO's current inability to sustain its forces for long with the manpower, materiel, and war reserve equipment to replace early battlefield losses will force the Alliance fairly quickly to consider escalation. If NATO is to place--and keep--the burden of escalation on the aggressor, it is essential to be able to sustain conventional conflict for an extended period. The Alliance cannot allow itself simply to be outlasted by superior Warsaw Pact staying power.

(U) Given the realities of limited resources for defense programs, any effort to improve NATO's ability to fight successfully with conventional forces beyond the immediate needs of the initial defense requires that priorities be strictly governed by strategic objectives and operational requirements. NATO must have balance in all elements of its combat and support posture. Sustainability must be balanced so that the stocks of various commodities (munitions, spare parts, fuel) and items within commodity classes (such as types of munitions) provide roughly equal staying power, and balanced in the sense that these stockpiles and NATO's support forces from all nations should be designed to provide consistant periods of combat sustainment. And, combat capabilities must be advanced at a balanced pace with due consideration to temporal, functional, and regional requirements. A weakness in any key area (e.g., NORTHAG) or function (e.g., air operations) that undermined prospects for successful conventional defense during the early days of combat, for example, could largely negate the value of costly efforts to improve conventional capabilities to fight successfully for extended periods. It is in part for this reason that this report places such emphasis on urging the Allies to meet minimum standards for munitions stockage and on substantial expansion of Infrastructure Program funding to speed completion of shelters for reinforcing aircraft and for critical command and control improvements.

(U) Achieving these kinds of balance and coherence are particularly difficult for NATO, where the Alliance's military posture is the result of the individual national defense programs formulated by sovereign nations, each contending in its own way with conflicting political, social, and economic pressures. This, and the increasing need to make more efficient use of defense resources, argues for more effective integration of national and Alliance defense planning. For this reason, we urge formal alignment of national and NATO force planning cycles and more direct involvement of the Major NATO Commanders in the process.

(U) Some efforts undertaken to improve NATO's initial defenses and to neutralize enemy follow-on forces also add to sustained defensive capabilities. These include improvements to the survivability of command and control, rear area security measures, better counter-air capabilities (especially offensive counter-air, which diminishes the enemy's ability to continue inflicting damage on NATO's forces and supporting infrastructure), better use of reserve and territorial forces, and more effective mobilization of the civil infrastructure. Focused additional efforts are also required. Many of these programs cannot be implemented in the near term, but if they are to be achieved

at all NATO must begin now to pursue them.

(S) The Alliance should improve its use of common funding such as the Infrastructure Program and establish other pooled funding mechanisms to meet Alliance needs. Better armaments cooperation incorporating prudent specialization in families of weapons, more effective interoperability standards, and better sharing of technology would help significantly in meeting the long-term needs of sustained conventional defense. More effective management techniques, would also be helpful. Techniques of proven effectiveness, such as the functional approach to integrated development of the Air Command and Control System (ACCS), should be expanded. Prudent multinational integration of functions which are currently regarded as national responsibilities should also be explored. It is essential that all members of the Alliance recognize and act on the principle that any problem that undermines the Alliance's deterrent or defense affects the Alliance as a whole and requires the whole Alliance to seek its resolution.

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(U) Collectively, the efforts described above to improve NATO's initial conventional defense capabilities, to neutralize enemy follow-on forces, and to conduct a sustained conventional defense can lead to improved deterrence and less reliance on the early use of nuclear weapons to compensate for conventional weakness. But no level of improvement to NATO's conventional capabilities can replace the escalatory threat altogether so long as the Warsaw Pact retains a substantial conventional advantage and nuclear weapons of its own. NATO's problem, in short, is not an unsound strategy, it is to sustain a fundamentally sound one by fielding balanced conventional and nuclear capabilities adequate to its design and by maintaining the cohesion and will essential to its success. The required improvements to NATO's conventional capabilities will require sustained attention by the entire Alliance over a considerable period of time and major changes cannot reasonably be expected in the short term. But, given the determination to do so, the members of NATO unquestionably possess the aggregate human and materiel wherewithall to meet this task and, consequently, to provide the basis for deterrence and peace in the years to come.

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COMPARISON OF SNF SYSTEMS IN EUROPE

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

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COMPARISON OF SNF SYSTEMS IN EUROPE

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

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