

Office of the Secretary of Defense 5 U.S.C. § 552  
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS  
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MDR: 17 -M- 0517

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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

9 June 71

Memo For Col. Furlong

Ray -


Here are Aldrich's comments on  
Unified Strategic Command, <sup>which I support</sup> and  
a memo to Sec Def on one of his the  
proposed initial steps.

I would be happy to convert Pete's  
memo to me into a memo from me to Mr. Pashed,  
or to prepare an implementing memo  
requesting a SCS plan for integrating C<sup>3</sup>  
and surveillance, or discuss the whole  
matter with Erachko.

What do you suggest is the next  
step?

Concussion

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| Copy No.    | R-6 RPOD                       |
| Case No.    | 96-F-1596                      |
| T.S. No.    | 97-TS-107                      |
| Excerpt No. | 1                              |



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OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

SYSTEMS ANALYSIS  
(Strategic Programs)

June 7, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. TUCKER

SUBJECT: Unified Strategic Command

I have reviewed Mr. Froehlke's memo and backup material on the proposed Unified Strategic Command.

- I concur with the basic thrust of the memo that a Unified Strategic Command is a good idea and that we should take steps now to establish such a command.
- I believe, however, there are better reasons for a Unified Strategic Command than those presented in the memorandum and backup material. These are discussed in a memo that I sent you on May 27 (copy attached).
- I believe we should move somewhat slower than Mr. Froehlke suggests. We need to better understand the problems and we need to gather some more information before we make a decision.
- There are several items in the background material that I disagree with, but my views on these items do not affect the overall thrust of Mr. Froehlke's memo or the recommendation.

I believe there are two initial steps we should take now:

1. Data Gathering

- Request the JCS submit a plan on how they would integrate C<sup>3</sup> and surveillance under a single commander.
- Request the JCS submit a plan on how maximum flexibility can be achieved (through changes in plans and procedures) with existing strategic forces (including those under command of CINCEUR, CINCPAC, and CINCLANT). I have submitted a memo for your signature requesting Mr. Packard to ask the JCS to develop such a plan.

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- Study internally how a possible SAL agreement may affect the utility and capability of a Unified Strategic Command.

This step should provide us with information on which to judge the problems of strategic force unification and give us some initial views of the JCS on strategic force unification.

2. Initial Implementation

If problems are not major we could then:

- implement unification of strategic C<sup>3</sup> and surveillance systems under CINCSAC or CINCNORAD.
- implement an interim flexible response capability for existing strategic forces (prior to introduction of new systems such as AABNCP, Minuteman Command Data Buffer, etc.). We are doing work now that addresses the long term flexible response capability.
- request JCS comments on further unification of strategic forces.

I would estimate the second step could be completed no earlier than December 1971, as opposed to 30 days indicated in the Recommendation section of Mr. Froehke's memo.



E. C. Aldridge, Jr.  
Director

Strategic Defensive Division

Attachment

cc: Cdr. Martin  
Mr. Wood

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OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

SYSTEMS ANALYSIS  
(Strategic Programs)

May 27, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. TUCKER

SUBJECT: Strategic Command

Attached is a revised paper on the Strategic Command issue. I believe the organizational charts on page 3 highlight the real problem with the existing command structure and what might be done with a new command structure.

Mr. Froehlke has sent a memo to Mr. Packard on this subject stating that strategic command integration appears to be a good idea and that we should ask the JCS for their views.

I have outlined three immediate actions (pages 5-6) we should take related to this subject: the first and second should be dependent upon Mr. Packard's review of this subject. The third action is our responsibility and we should have a memo for Mr. Packard's signature ready the first of next week.

E. C. Aldridge, Jr.  
Director  
Strategic Defensive Division

Attachment

Cdr. Martin  
cc: Mr. Wood

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Strategic Force Command Integration

The resolution of the issue on the integration of U.S. strategic forces and operations is driven by four key problems:

- the need for consolidation of strategic command, control, communication, and surveillance systems into a single integrated system to effectively support strategic operations. As it now stands, the Navy controls the communications to the SSEN forces; the Air Force controls communications to the bombers and Minuteman forces; and the Air Force and Army control communications to strategic defensive and surveillance units. In addition, the Air Force operates the SAC, NORAD and NMCS centers.
- the need to provide more flexibility for our strategic forces so that they may be able to be used over a wider range of contingencies and for limited strategic operations. More force flexibility requires more coordination, integration, and communication with theater commanders, CINCEUR, CINCPAC, and CINCLANT, and the strategic (SIOP) forces under their control.
- the need for better planning to ensure that strategic forces meet the strategic objectives assigned to them and to ensure that maximum efficiency and minimum cost is being achieved. This is especially true for offensive and defensive forces since defensive forces (including surveillance and warning) are becoming more and more oriented toward protecting offensive forces. Currently the commanders of the Unified and Specified Commands have little impact on fiscal or force planning.
- the lack of an adequate staff, established by law, between the Secretary of Defense and the Unified and Specified Commands, that can support the Secretary on strategic military operations. Strategic force operation is now spread through five commands -- SAC, NORAD, EUCOM, LANTCOM, and PACOM.


According to the National Security Act, the Secretary of Defense is responsible for operational and administrative control of the Unified and Specified Commands as shown in the organizational chart below:

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Revised 27 May 1971




The four issues noted above lead to special problems for the Secretary of Defense in ensuring that proper force planning and efficient force integration, operation and utilization is achieved.

The existing and proposed command structures for strategic forces under the Secretary of Defense are shown on the following page.


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Existing



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 Date: NOV 06 2019

Proposed Concept <sup>a/</sup>



<sup>a/</sup> This is a conceptual approach to a Strategic Command. Other approaches may be possible wherein all SIOP forces could be brought into a single strategic offensive forces group and C<sup>3</sup> and surveillance integrated into a single group.


To solve the problems posed by the existing arrangement, the establishment of a single Strategic Command, combining SAC, NORAD, and the SIOP elements of EUCOM, LANTCOM, and PACOM, would provide:

- better command and control system integration;
- more flexible utilization of strategic forces; and
- more efficient force planning.

The establishment of such a command would also permit the consideration of a highly survivable single strategic commander in an advanced airborne command post that could ensure timely, and effective execution of the SIOP or limited strategic options for our world-wide strategic forces and could in addition ensure effective coordination and utilization of strategic defensive forces. This survivable command element could eliminate the need for airborne command posts for each Unified and Specified Commander and could reduce the span of control required by the SecDef in crisis situations.

The JCS may take a negative position on this plan and could present some reasonable arguments against its implementation. Over time, mainly because of peacetime operations, the operational control of the Unified and Specified Commands has been assumed by the JCS and Joint Staff. Thus the organizational arrangement existing in practice looks like the one below:

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Thus with the existing arrangements (even though contrary to existing law) the JCS could claim that a combined Strategic Command

- would add another (and unnecessary) command element to the existing chain of command between the JCS and the Unified and Specified Commands. The JCS could note that they in fact serve the role of the advisor to Sec Def and the integrator of strategic force operations and with the establishment of a Strategic Command, CINCSAC and CINCNOBUD would be simply reporting to another commander.
- is not necessary for command and control integration because that task is effectively done now by the Joint Staff (especially J-3). Integration of command and control systems operation could be brought under a single command now by SecDef direction and without a change in organization.
- would not improve the force planning job because that task is done effectively now by the Joint Staff (specifically J-5) assisted by the Unified and Specified Command staffs and Military Departments. In addition, joint targeting of the strategic forces is now effectively accomplished by the JSTPS which takes into account integration of all SIOP forces.

In summary, the issue seems to involve interpretation of the National Security Act and the need to establish by law an appropriate single military command which reports directly to the Secretary of Defense and is responsible for all strategic force operations. This problem is not unique to strategic forces but is equally shared by tactical forces and logistics.

With establishment of a Strategic Command, the Secretary of Defense could obtain advice on strategic force operations and planning directly from the commander tasked with that responsibility rather than having this information filtered through the JCS and Joint Staff. The JCS would certainly present their independent views on military operations and advise the SecDef according to their charter established by the National Security Act.

Actions Now

To obtain further information on which to base a decision on establishing a new Strategic Command we should immediately:

- Request the JCS to comment on the utility of a single integrated Strategic Command.
- Request the JCS, supported by the Services and the Unified and Specified Commands, to develop a plan on how we would consolidate our command, control, communication (and possibly surveillance) systems under a single command.

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
- Ask the JCS to prepare a plan on how they would maximize the flexibility of the existing strategic forces (all SIOP forces including those in PACOM, EUCOM, and LANTCOM) without major changes in equipment and within the shortest possible timeframe.

We are already doing longer term studies (Strategic Posture Study, SIOP Analysis, etc., ) which could give us additional information on this subject.

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It is imperative for the credibility of our strategic nuclear forces that they be brought under a Unified Strategic Command. At the present time we do not have a workable summable command for these forces. The summable command ~~concept~~ <sup>plan</sup> is fragmented with responsibility ~~and~~ <sup>divided</sup> ~~provided~~ by the Navy, ~~and~~ by the Air Force and ~~not~~ by the Army. The Air Force command post has good

JS 3.3(b)(5)



We had SIOF committed forces  
throughout our world wide

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Commands get there in no way  
 those are so contracted especially  
 on any specific matter.  
 O Unified Air Force Command should  
 control the future element of  
 Air Force Jones  
 1. The United Air Force structure  
 for all Air Force forces including  
 centers and personnel for future  
 meeting and decision execution by  
 the highest authority  
 & intelligence related to  
 Air Force matters, in the order of

battle etc

3. Operational control of all strategic forces including land based missile, SAC, ICBM, Polaris, Poseidon, submarines and strategic weapons all under control of other commands.

4. Planning responsibility for future strategic forces. This is a responsibility shared with other OSD elements involved in planning and budgeting.

The main argument for a  
strategic command is that ~~at~~  
~~this time~~ there is no single point of  
~~no one has~~ responsibility  
for the big elements of US  
strategic forces below the Secretary  
and many important matters either  
fall between the chains or are  
done independently by the Service.  
SAC does an excellent job in  
designing, commanding and exercising  
the strategic forces under its  
control. While NORAD leaves  
much to be desired in the

design of the forces it does  
a good job in command, and  
maneuvering. The Navy does a  
good job in designing and command,  
intrusion, its strategic submarine attacks  
something as to be discussed in the  
communication system. The Army  
has done a good job in designing  
the safeguard but ~~it~~ is still  
to be determined how the command  
and control as to is worked  
out under SAC and NORAD.

The measures in the forces



as that they are not integrated together  
in an acceptable way. One command  
responsible for all Strategic forces  
would bring the quality and  
professionalism. That is the kind  
of SAC to our entire Strategic  
capability. It's quality can  
improve a lot.