



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

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SECDEF EYES ONLY FILE

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Haig Breakfast, 16 April 1981

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Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: NOV 18 2019

Participants: State

Secretary Haig
Deputy Secretary Clark
Bud McFarlane
Richard Burt

Defense

Secretary Weinberger
Deputy Secretary Carlucci
Fred Ikle
Jay Rixse
Carl Smith

1. (S/NF) Secretary Weinberger opened the discussion by mentioning the recent pressure he had been receiving from the Japanese for an apology with regard to the collision between the U.S. submarine and a Japanese fishing vessel. He indicated that on Tuesday the Japanese Ambassador had called about 4 o'clock and asked to see him about 5 o'clock on an urgent basis in order to express his government's concern (he added that the Ambassador brought along about 8 or 9 people with him to the meeting). He noted that as of last night he had received a memorandum from the Acting Secretary of the Navy suggesting that the United States admit liability for the collision but make no mention with regard to indemnification or for liability with regard to post-collision actions. He indicated that he was hesitant to make any such statements until the results of the investigation became known and that this would not begin until after the submarine arrived in port (Guam) Friday evening Washington time.

Secretary Haig responded that State had sent a message to the Japanese expressing regrets for the deaths of the Japanese and commented he believed that the Secretary of the Navy had done the same. He did note, however, that the Japanese press had a full head of steam and there was a lot of pressure on Suzuki with regard to this matter. He indicated that the Japanese were likely to raise this during their upcoming visit.

(Mr. Carlucci commented that on this visit we must hit Suzuki hard with regard to their contribution to overall free world security interests. Secretary Haig agreed and noted that with their electronic and defense potential the Japanese were not doing nearly enough. All agreed that the Japanese contribution to free world security interests was woeful by comparison with many other countries and even more

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though, so long as Khomeini lived, he would be able to exercise some control over events. Nevertheless, his death was not all that unlikely, and in the meantime various sides were jockeying for power and the situation was becoming more unstable. Further, the best organized of the groups was the Tudeh party and if any sudden demise of Khomeini or other significant event which caused him to lose control took place, the Tudeh was going to be the likely gainer.

Burt commented that there was an IG that was working on Iran, but it was not really the appropriate forum to get into such things that Mr. Carlucci was suggesting. It was agreed that a small group, similar to the one on Saudi Arabia, should undertake this effort. Mr. Carlucci said that only so much could be done at the staff level and that this was something that, as in the case of Saudi Arabia, should be addressed by a restricted high-level group.

Secretary Haig then commented that a similar approach needed to be taken with regard to Egypt; Secretary Weinberger said that Libya should be included also.

14. ~~(S/NF)~~ The question was raised as to where things stood regarding the draft memo to the President on Libya. Mr. Carlucci recalled that at the last breakfast we had provided Judge Clark with our comments as to why we thought the original draft was not too good; he specifically cited that the strategy suggested would only serve to prick Qaddafi and we were likely to be the ones who would suffer from that proposed approach. Haig agreed with this and said that we needed to take a look at the comprehensive situation and we needed to do it soon because we might be preempted by actions on the part of Sadat supported by others. State then asked where things stood and Mr. Carlucci commented that we were in the process of redrafting the memo to the President on Libya but that this too, as in the case of Iran, etc., might have to be handled on a two-track approach (one group which dealt with a more overt strategy and one, on a smaller, restricted basis, which dealt with a more comprehensive pulling together of an overall interagency program).

15. ~~(S/NF)~~ Mr. Carlucci then raised the subject that it would be worthwhile to urge on the President the need for a policy on who is authorized to release information. He cited recent leaks, including one at Defense which unfortunately disclosed a lot of sensitive collection capability, as indication of the problem. He noted that he had prepared such a plan for consideration at the close of the last Administration, but it had gotten nowhere, but Bill Casey was thinking of raising it again. He asked that State support such a proposal when raised and Haig indicated his general concurrence.



J. H. Rixse
The Special Assistant