

JOINT STAFF ACTION PROCESSING FORM

TO CJCS

CLASSIFICATION

ACTION NUMBER

JSA 04117.93 10 AUG 1993

THRU DJS

#21

ORIG SUSP

10 AUG 9

SJS SUSPE

SUBJECT REVISED STRATEGY FOR UNOSOM II (U)

ACTION

APPROVAL

SIGNATURE

X INFORMATION

J SUSPENS

ACTION SUMMARY

1. (U) **PURPOSE.** To provide update and seek CJCS guidance on joint OSD/JCS effort to design an appropriate strategy for UNOSOM II.

2. (U) **DISCUSSION.**

a. (U) At TAB A is an updated OSD/Joint Staff strategy paper on Somalia, revised in accordance with SECDEF's annotations on original package submitted on 6 August (the revisions are in italics). This version will be sent to the SECDEF this afternoon, 10 August.

b. (U) A copy of the original package with SECDEF markup is at TAB

c. (U) An interagency working group is refining the strategy paper, and expects to go final by Friday, 13 August, in anticipation of an upcoming Deputies meeting.

d. (U) Joint Staff has been informed that the SECDEF may want to meet again with DOD members of the Somalia Assessment Team on 11-12 August. COL Baltimore is the Joint Staff representative. LTC McCaffrey and RADM Bowman have also been invited to attend.

3. (U) **RECOMMENDATION.** None. Paper is provided for information only and to seek CJCS guidance.

Attachment

paper OK - remark - see me
10/8

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
 Authority: EO 13526
 Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
 Date: DEC 09 2019

COORDINATION/APPROVAL

OFFICE	NAME & DATE	EXT	OFFICE	NAME & DATE	EXT
J-5	<i>11/2 JH</i> 10 Aug 71857 J-5 Maj Gen J. H. ADRIE, USMC		J-3	<i>copy provided</i>	

ACTION OFFICER/DIV/PHONE COL Perry Baltimo

DATE PREPARED
10 AUG 93

CLASSIFICATION

~~SECRET~~

16-M-1538

Per RADM Bowman, original

package (TAB A) was

coordinated w J-3.

21

JCS Papers (Powers/10-5)

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL

Authority: EO 13526

Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS

Date: DEC 09 2019

~~SECRET~~

Next Steps in Somalia

I. UN STRATEGY:

PUTTING SOMALIA PEACE ENFORCEMENT IN PERSPECTIVE:

(U) Operations Restore Hope and Continue Hope have been successful. There are problems, some serious, which need fixing in order to ensure the long term success of the Somalia peace enforcement operation. But no one should forget where Somalia was on December 9, 1992, the day coalition forces landed in Mogadishu. The country had been engaged in a civil war for two years; an estimated 500,000 Somalis died of starvation and as a direct result of the war. Banditry was endemic. There were no governmental structures. The national economy had ceased to exist. Somalia was in chaos.

(U) Today, the civil war is over. Banditry is significantly reduced throughout Somalia and virtually eliminated in some areas. With the exception of south Mogadishu, Somalia is generally peaceful. On the humanitarian front, the food emergency which characterized the African nation prior to the deployment of UN forces is now effectively over. In the days immediately preceding UNOSOM, an estimated 2 million Somalis were at grave risk of starvation. As a direct consequence of the UN humanitarian effort, catastrophic mass starvation was averted. Today, Somalis are no longer starving. This year's agricultural crop was good; there is more than enough food to feed the Somali people. Consequently, the emergency UN food supply effort is in the process of closing; specifically, a total of 22 emergency feeding centers will be closing on August 15, and emergency food deliveries are scheduled to cease by month's end. On the political front, although there still remains much to be done towards recreating political structures and rehabilitating the economy, encouraging signs of progress are beginning to appear. In a first step toward reestablishing a stable governmental structure at the local level, a number (>20) of district councils have been established. Another positive step on the political front occurred on August 6 when over 150 faction elders representing some 20 Somali clans attended a signing ceremony in Kismayo for a UN-brokered peace accord. The accord specifically urged the militaries to disarm and cooperate for peace. Finally, the Somali economy is slowly exhibiting signs of revival. Across the country small shops are reopening. Some schools and orphanages have reopened, supported by Somali volunteers and NGOs. In Belet Weyne, central Somalia, former Somali employees of the ministries of health and education are back on the job either as unpaid volunteers or receiving modest salaries provided by NGOs. There is virtually no dispute that without the U.S.-led UNITAF effort, none of this would have happened. Only that effort broke the hold of the warlords on the country, made it possible for relief to flow again and opened up the possibility of political and economic reconstruction, because only that effort could have provided the necessary security for those steps to happen.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ DASD RSA RPL

~~DECLASSIFICATION~~

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL

Authority: EO 13526

Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS

Date:

DEC 09 2019

~~SECRET~~

(C) In summary, the violence in south Mogadishu continues to be the one major setback for UNOSOM and has drawn attention away from the very considerable progress otherwise being accomplished nationwide.

PROBLEMS:

(C) Despite the significant progress made to date, recent events have revealed major problems in the UNOSOM II operation. A significant overriding problem is the apparent division of opinion among troop-contributing nations about the proper UN strategy for further success in Somalia. All argue that improved security is critical, but there are differences about how to obtain it. Some major troop contributors such as Italy believe that the UN should focus less on using force, and more on negotiations, to address security problems. Moreover, many contributors feel they have not been consulted adequately on policy formulation, and this has exacerbated tensions within UNOSOM. Another key set of problems is obtaining adequate financial resources and staff to fully pursue the economic, political, and security elements leading to a viable UN strategy.

(C) Negotiations are, of course, the preferred course of action. The conflict in Somalia is essentially a political problem susceptible to resolution if all the principal parties are willing to settle their differences through good faith negotiations. This is, fundamentally, what the political reconciliation process attempts to accomplish. However, a key player, Mohamed Farrah Aideed, has not shown any inclination to achieve his objective through means other than intimidation and force, including the killing of U.S. and Pakistani UNOSOM forces. Thus, until we remove Aideed from the Somali operation, in one fashion or another, and prove to his lieutenants and others who might be tempted to follow his example that brute force will not achieve their aims, negotiated political solutions to Somalia's problems would, at best, appear problematical. Further, direct UN negotiations with Aideed would appear to condone his killing of UN personnel and establish a very damaging precedent for future UN operations and for other Somali clan leaders who we want to commit to the political process.

(C) In the short term, there is an urgent need to address the issue of security in south Mogadishu, particularly with reference to Aideed. In addition, little progress has been made in creating alternative Somali security structures (police, military, judiciary) that would allow withdrawal of UNOSOM forces. These remain key problems, particularly since the security situation affects other efforts and has a direct impact upon the U.S. ability to withdraw its military assets from the region.

(C) The economic situation remains dire. While food is readily available virtually everywhere in the country, there is a shortage of money in circulation and many Somalis find it difficult to purchase basic necessities. Many steps must be taken, including

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

the repair of infrastructure, creation of jobs, and establishment of a banking system, to restore a modicum of economic stability.

(U) Progress toward political reconciliation has been stalled by the deteriorating security situation in the capital. Progress is being made in the countryside, but a much greater effort must be devoted to pushing this along. In addition, the issue of raising revenues for local councils has been largely ignored. It is worth reiterating that while all three aspects of this strategy are mutually reinforcing, addressing the security situation probably is a prerequisite for significant progress on the political and economic fronts.

UN OBJECTIVES:

(U) The UN's objectives in Somalia are vague and ambitious (see extract from UNSC Resolution 814, at Tab A). In essence, they can be boiled down to the following four goals:

- 1) Help provide relief and economic rehabilitation.
- 2) Help restore peace and stability, and law and order.
- 3) Promote political reconciliation and re-establishment of institutions and civil administration.
- 4) Help repatriate displaced people and refugees.

(U) While the actual UNSC Resolution words commit UNOSOM to promoting these goals (economic rehabilitation, peace, political reconciliation), the UN's objectives are usually interpreted to be the attainment of these goals.

(U) The crux of the challenge facing the UN is to be more specific about its objectives, to outline discrete steps -- tasks -- to be taken toward meeting these objectives, and to establish a timetable for the steps and therefore, by definition, the accomplishment of UN objectives (and the end of the UNOSOM mandate).

(U) It is worth noting that achieving the U.S. objective of adhering to our stated timetable for the withdrawal of U.S. forces does not hinge upon the successful completion of the UN's mission. The continuing withdrawal of U.S. forces hinges largely on progress towards the creation of an alternative UN or an indigenous Somali force to ensure security. Thus, from a U.S. perspective, it is particularly important to get the security situation under control. (See Section III)

(U) We believe that the United States should help the UN redefine its objectives and establish specific steps on the path toward ending its involvement in Somalia. We believe that the UNSC members and participating nations must establish a commonly shared understanding of what the UNSC language means. Specifically, we recommend that consultations lead to agreement that the UN intends

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: E.O. 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: DEC 09 2019

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

only to help Somalia achieve the goals outlined in the Resolution -- not achieve them -- and that it would define UNOSOM as a success once it had completed an agreed-upon set of steps. Those steps should be defined, as suggested below, and the UNSC and proposed core group (see Section II) should agree on a timetable for taking those steps.

(U) Attached at Tab B is a schematic diagram of the UN's current strategy in Somalia. At Tab C is our diagram of a proposed future UN strategy. At Tab D you will find the proposed short-term steps for UNOSOM II, juxtaposed against a proposed timetable. Longer term steps are diagrammed at Tab E.

TASKS TO BE COMPLETED:

A) HUMANITARIAN/ECONOMIC (U). The humanitarian and economic objectives of relief and rehabilitation are to lead to basic Somali self-sufficiency. Emergency relief is essentially over and feeding centers will stop operation by mid-August. Now is the time to get on with economic development. NGOs who have fled because of the security situation must return. There is no plan for economic development. One may be published in the upcoming SYG report. A strategy with timetables must be clearly established by 15 September 93. Such a strategy would identify plans for creating conditions conducive to private investment, livestock export and agricultural production. It would remove constraints relating to reliable financial services, communications, roads, ports, utilities, transports and markets. It would identify plans to create jobs through economic growth, particularly in agricultural and livestock sectors. Donors are needed to provide funds for essential services until Somali resource-generating mechanisms are re-established. Small project funds should be established to create jobs in regions which achieve a satisfactory level of political reconciliation and disarmament. UNOSOM must also prepare a plan of action for the resettlement of Somali refugees and displaced persons.

B) MILITARY/SECURITY (U). The international effort in Somalia has provided a secure environment to allow completion of emergency relief. While the countryside is now generally stable, south Mogadishu is nearly paralyzed in the confrontation with Aideed. The UN attempted to co-opt the warlords into the political process, but Aideed felt he was losing power in this process. U.S. estimates consequently considered armed conflict with him as inevitable. The current crisis started because his power base was successfully being marginalized -- both militarily and politically -- by UNOSOM. By attacking the Pakistani patrol he hoped to cow the UN as he so successfully did before UNITAF arrived. He miscalculated the UN's resolve and now is an outlaw. Initially removing Aideed will likely increase the level of violence directed against UNOSOM, but should lead to stability in south Mogadishu and force any replacement of Aideed to deal with UNOSOM from a weakened position. Hopefully, the pragmatic Somalis

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: DEC 09 2019

~~SECRET~~

will turn away from their support for non-traditional warlords/leaders and seek cooperation, rather than violent confrontation, with the UN.

(C) Not dealing with Aideed could have dire consequences for UNOSOM. As long as Aideed remains at large, he remains a dangerous and disruptive presence. He may begin to receive support from other nations, such as Iraq, who would relish a UN/US failure. UNOSOM would be weakened and other warlords could be tempted to challenge its authority.

(C) We are currently studying several options for dealing with Aideed. First he could be snatched, from the streets of Mogadishu or one of his meeting places, by UNOSOM forces or the QRF. This option could involve considerable violence and casualties on both sides. Second, his own people could be influenced to remove him from the scene. These options should be pursued in tandem. Third, a simultaneous cordon and search operation could be undertaken, specifically targeting Aideed-controlled sections of the city. This would be an expansion of current UN operations in Mogadishu. The Italian version of this option suggests that all of Mogadishu be done simultaneously, rather than as a follow on to clearing out the Aideed sections first. In any case, at no time should the UN be seen as going soft on Aideed. Whether the UN could try Aideed as a criminal, once caught is a secondary issue (and one on which the international lawyers are uncertain). Our concern is to get him out of circulation, not convict him.

(C) Resolving this problem and restoring security will require better coordination with all coalition members at all levels. The UN must immediately begin consultations among donor countries in New York and in Mogadishu to establish a common approach to this problem and gain consensus for immediate action.

(C) In particular, UNOSOM II must work toward comprehensive disarmament to reduce the local capacity for unwarranted violence and must better establish local police forces to handle residual threats to public peace. Disarmament is essential to the success of UNOSOM. The majority of the population, outside of Mogadishu, have offered to disarm but they want some sort of assurance that they will be safe from well armed bandits. The assurance they seek could be provided in several forms. They could be under the general protection of UN forces -- not entirely credible or feasible -- or they could be protected by their own police forces. The latter is optimum because it permits UNOSOM to disengage. For the Somali police to be effective, however, crew served weapons must have been removed and the police must be as well armed as the bandits. Once this equality has been reached, the Somali police can gradually remove the small arms from the general population. Disarmament is a multitiered process that must be started by UNOSOM by removing the large weapons of destruction and leveling the playing field so that the police can do a credible follow-on job.

(C) Disarming the Aideed faction has begun and should be completed by September 93. Disarming the main militias should follow in the fall. UNOSOM must, in conjunction with Somali

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: DEC 09 2019

~~SECRET~~

police, establish a consistent weapons control policy throughout the country. Implementation of this policy can begin in regions where militias are disarmed; the process should be completed by the spring of 94.

(C) Additional efforts to set up a police force must begin immediately. UNOSOM must: 1) devise a structure that emphasizes a professional, neutral orientation for the force and 2) identify donors who can fund, equip, organize, and train the force. There are now approximately 4,000 Somali police, with a UN goal of 10,000 by October 93, and 28,000 by May 94. Immediate resources are required for this critical action. Disarmament of major militias and establishment of Somali police forces in the major population centers should permit the withdrawal of the US QRF within three to six months.

(C) Once the population is sufficiently disarmed (May 94) and the local police are on the beat, UNOSOM should begin a major push to establish a security force nationwide (December 94). This force would be able to provide domestic peace and guard borders.

(C) POLITICAL (C). UNOSOM is promoting political reconciliation and the re-establishment of constitutions and civil administration, but must more actively involve Somalis in this process. Efforts are beginning to bear fruit. Dozens of district councils have been established, but only vague guidelines for moving from local councils to governments have been developed. Guidelines and timetables are needed for the restoration of political constitutions. District councils must lead to the establishment of regional councils and eventually a Transitional National Council. Duties, responsibilities, authorities and accountability of the councils must be delineated. UNOSOM policy decisions must also be communicated clearly to the field. UNOSOM should establish a goal of October 93 for establishment of all district councils, and February 94 for regional councils. Regional organizations must become active in the re-establishment of Somali society. UNOSOM must properly staff its zone offices. A judicial/penal system must be developed. A Transitional National Council should be formed once regional councils are widely established, and should operate until a national government is created through free elections by the summer of 95.

FINANCIAL/PERSONNEL CONSTRAINTS:

(C) An important caveat to the above recommendations is that many of them assume adequate funding. In March, the UN estimated a year's operation in Somalia would cost them roughly \$1.5 billion. We are still seeking the most recent detailed budget data from the United Nations, but it is clear that the UN currently lacks adequate resources to accomplish its political and economic objectives in Somalia. Already there have been complaints by UN staff members that almost all of the resources in Somalia have been dedicated to the security problem, at the expense of economic and political efforts. Yet even to address the security situation, significantly more funding will be required. For

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: DEC 09 2019

~~SECRET~~

example, the current estimate for establishing a nationwide police force is about \$50 million. The UN had budgeted \$9 million. There is no money currently available to accomplish this task, and the UN does not have money to pay the police budget beyond August 93.

(C) The UN must address this issue if UNOSOM is to have an opportunity to succeed. The UN should immediately prepare detailed estimates of the costs of achieving its three-pronged strategy in Somalia and should undertake a broad-based campaign to raise the requisite resources. UNOSOM is in the process of preparing its budget and detailed cost estimates are not currently available. Financial accountability in the field has been poor and UNOSOM does not seem to have a good handle on its requirements. If it proves impossible to obtain adequate funding, UN objectives must be scaled back.

(D) The UN must identify a full staff for its humanitarian and political division in Mogadishu and the regions. Staffing is now woefully inadequate (< 50%). Specific personnel figures for full UNOSOM staffing are still pending from the UN. The Administrative Section has about 60-70 vacancies in Supply, Transportation, Finance, and Personnel. The Political Section is short 23 personnel who will arrive by September 7th. The Humanitarian Section is currently understaffed by 55 people, although 30 people will arrive by the end of September. UNOSOM must mount a worldwide program to recruit the required employees. The UN should also launch a special effort to recruit professional Somalis. A special effort must be made to increase the staff and expand the activities of the UN's public relations efforts, both in New York and in Mogadishu.

(E) Finally the UNSC should recognize that developments on the ground or a lack of resources may require a reassessment of UNOSOM objectives. It is also important that the UNOSOM supporters and the Somali people understand that the UN's abilities and resources are not limitless.

II. CREATION OF A SOMALIA CORE GROUP:

(F) The peacekeeping operation in Somalia is perceived by participants and outsiders alike as an American-led and American-run activity. This should come as no surprise. The Secretary General's special representative and one of his senior assistants are American. Two of the four most senior officers in force command are Americans. Finally, there remains a residue of American control from the UNITAF operation, which was under our leadership. It is in the interest of the US and the UN to increase the involvement, real and perceived, of other countries in Operation Continue Hope. This could be accomplished by creating a consultative mechanism (possibly along the lines of the core group which guides policy on Cambodia) to help guide policy and "internationalize" the UNOSOM operation.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: DEC 09 2019

~~SECRET~~

(U) The Cambodian Core Group evolved into an ad hoc support group following the Paris Conference on Cambodia. It consists of the perm five, Thailand, Australia, Indonesia, Canada, Japan and Germany. (Some major troop contributors such as Bulgaria, Pakistan and India are not included in the core group.) The Group has been particularly important in mobilizing support for the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), soliciting rapid response to UNTAC requests for material assistance, intervening to accelerate the process of soliciting assistance from donor countries, firmly supporting the Security Council's resolutions imposing sanctions on the Khmer Rouge, and stiffening the resolve of the three other Cambodian factions to stick with the specific provisions of the Paris accords (the timetable for the election, the drafting of the constitution, and the formation of the new government). The Core Group has also been essential in sustaining attention to the reconstruction and redevelopment needs of Cambodia, and actively soliciting contributions from various donors to the development fund created by the Paris Accords. It extended the Secretary General's political capacity beyond anything his office would normally have permitted, and gave the Security Council a concrete presence on the ground. In so doing, the core group gave the United States a mechanism to share the burdens of Cambodia; and it gave the international community a sense of partnership and a forum for consultations. The absence of such a forum lies at the heart of the French, Italian and other complaints that they are carrying burdens without the opportunity to consult at the political level.

(U) It should be possible to form a somewhat similar core group for Somalia; if so, we believe it could play a number of useful functions, generally along the lines which have applied in Cambodia. It should be of manageable size, have a strong international -- including African -- coloration, and include several key contributors of troops and money. Its precise membership should be developed in consultation with the United Nations, but one approach might be: the 5 PermReps of the Security Council, two from the European Community, two from the Organization of African Unity (including one representative of the Horn of Africa subgroup of the OAU), one each from the Arab League and Organization of the Islamic Conference, and two from Asia (Japan? India?). The core group should be in New York, to emphasize its relationship to UN Headquarters and the Secretary General. In time it might also be present on the ground in Mogadishu, after member nations have established diplomatic representation there.

(U) The core group's main purpose would be to foster a cohesive common approach to all important aspects of the UN's planning and operational efforts in Somalia. While this is mainly a matter of psychology, the practical payoff of developing a cohesive international team approach should be considerable, as would be the side effects of less bickering and carrying of dissent to the media.

(U) It will not be practical to include in the core group all nations that contribute significant numbers of troops. For this reason, we should recommend that a Somalia troop contributors

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass. Div, WHS
Date: DEC 09 2019

~~SECRET~~

meeting -- now being conducted on an ad hoc basis by Kofi Annan in New York -- be institutionalized and conducted in Mogadishu as well. This group could be connected as an adjunct to the core group, and serve as a source for input on the phasing (in and out) of forces, definition of support requirements, and suggestions for specific improvements in military planning and operations.

(C) It will probably not be practical to include a substantial number of African nations in the core group proper. But we do wish to help increase the level of African involvement and contribution to the Somalia operation, as well as to head off a chorus of criticism about the current direction of events. Thus, we should also consider recommending immediate establishment of a group of African states, again as an adjunct to the core group, to provide policy advice and assistance to the UN in negotiating with the Somali factions and in devising a new system of government for the country. Presumably, their views would be made known through the OAU/Horn of Africa members of the core group.

(S) We should push hard to sell this idea even though we know it would not solve all of our problems. Properly adapted to the circumstances of the Somalia intervention, the core group would be a major step forward in addressing at least the diplomatic and political aspects, and likely to yield a number of practical suggestions on the military and economic fronts as well. It would also give the world a clear signal that this is an international responsibility and not simply an American one. We therefore propose it be pursued vigorously. We should send to the UN for this purpose a senior diplomat who would be able to engage the Secretary General personally and obtain his agreement; this implies, at a minimum, an Under Secretary level mission.

III. U.S. ENDGAME:

(S) 1. Help make sure that UNOSOM II Chapter VII is a UN success. In order to accomplish this, we must continue to provide strong diplomatic and financial support -- and military support in the short term -- while taking steps to demonstrate that the UN is in charge. The following should be initiated immediately:

- The U.S. should assist in developing and urging implementation of a comprehensive UN plan linking the three humanitarian, security and political components of the overall strategy.
- The U.S. should recommend to the UN that it should begin replacing U.S. senior level staff in UNOSOM with personnel of other participating countries. The U.S. should be prepared to provide both the UN and UNOSOM staffs with mid-grade and technical personnel and press other participating nations to do the same.
- The U.S. should urge UNOSOM to launch an aggressive public information campaign. The U.S. should support with PSYOP advisors, technical assistance, and equipment.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: DEC 09 2019

~~SECRET~~

- The U.S. should encourage UNOSOM to identify necessary costs for completion of its mission and immediately begin working to ensure adequate financing is available.

(C) 2. Reduce U.S. troop commitments as soon as possible.

(C) A key step is to withdraw the U.S. ORF. The PDD calls for this to occur by late summer. The current situation on the ground makes this unlikely. However, following the UN strategy outlined above, the ORF can withdraw within six months. Four events must occur: 1) the Aided problem is resolved; 2) the major factions are disarmed; 3) a credible police force is established in major population centers; and (4) effective replacement reaction elements are in place.

(C) Gradually reduce the number of U.S. logistics and support personnel (to 1400 by January 94). To do this, we must accelerate the transition of support functions to civilian contractors (this also requires a more secure environment), and assist in developing Somali support infrastructure. As other nations assume prominent roles in UNOSOM II we will transfer support functions when appropriate.

(C) 3. End Game for the U.S.

The U.S. can disengage militarily from Somalia within a reasonable time frame (ORF in six months; logistics forces to 1,400 by January 94 and out by 95) IF the UN takes forceful steps to address the security situation. Strong U.S. support is required to ensure that this occurs.

Even after the U.S. military involvement has concluded, continued U.S. diplomatic and financial support will be needed to sustain international resources and energy in support of UNOSOM II. The steps outlined earlier provide measurable guideposts for working toward a successful conclusion of a more realistic UN strategy.

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: DEC 09 2019

~~SECRET~~

2. Expresses its appreciation to the Secretary-General for convening the Conference on National Reconciliation for Somalia in accordance with the agreements reached during the Informal Preparatory Meeting on Somali Political Reconciliation in Addis Ababa in January 1993 and for the progress achieved towards political reconciliation in Somalia, and also for his efforts to ensure that, as appropriate, all Somalis, including movements, factions, community leaders, women, professionals, intellectuals, elders and other representative groups are suitably represented at such conferences;

3. Welcomes the convening of the Third United Nations Coordination Meeting for Humanitarian Assistance for Somalia in Addis Ababa from 11 to 13 March 1993 and the willingness expressed by Governments through this process to contribute to relief and rehabilitation efforts in Somalia, where and when possible;

4. Requests the Secretary-General, through his Special Representative, and with assistance, as appropriate, from all relevant United Nations entities, offices and specialized agencies, to provide humanitarian and other assistance to the people of Somalia in rehabilitating their political institutions and economy and promoting political settlement and national reconciliation, in accordance with the recommendations contained in his report of 3 March 1993, including in particular:

(a) To assist in the provision of relief and in the economic rehabilitation of Somalia, based on an assessment of clear, prioritized needs, and taking into account, as appropriate, the 1993 Relief and Rehabilitation Programme for Somalia prepared by the United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs;

(b) To assist in the repatriation of refugees and displaced persons within Somalia;

(c) To assist the people of Somalia to promote and advance political reconciliation, through broad participation by all sectors of Somali society, and the re-establishment of national and regional institutions and civil administration in the entire country;

(d) To assist in the re-establishment of Somali police, as appropriate, at the local, regional or national level, to assist in the restoration and maintenance of peace, stability and law and order, including in the investigation and facilitating the prosecution of serious violations of international humanitarian law;

(e) To assist the people of Somalia in the development of a coherent and integrated programme for the removal of mines throughout Somalia;

(f) To develop appropriate public information activities in support of the United Nations activities in Somalia;


(g) To create conditions under which Somali civil society may have a role, at every level, in the process of political reconciliation and in the formulation and realization of rehabilitation and reconstruction programmes;

In Progress

UNOSOM II Strategy


Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: DEC 09 2019

Decision Points / Follow On Actions





Proposed UNOSOM II Strategy

Decision Points / Follow On Actions



Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: DEC 09 2019

UN GOALS / Phased US Withdrawal (proposed short term)

 Phased US withdrawal
 Has an impact on phased US withdrawal
UMANITARIAN

Regional NGO Assessments
 Humanitarian Div coord.

**ILITARY /
 ECURITY**

"Team Building" - Commanders Conferences - Consultations - Exercise

Recognize Reconciled Areas

OLITICAL

Internationalize/
 Africanize UN effort

Establish
 Judicial/Penal system

Regional Councils

District Councils

TNC

Aug 93

Sen

Oct

Nov

UN GOALS (proposed)

CRISIS RESPONSE


REHABILITATION

STABILITY

MILITARY /
SECURITY

POLITICAL

HUMANITARIAN



Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: DEC 09 2019

1993 (April - Jan)

1994

1995



INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY AFFAIRS

~~SECRET~~
THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-2400

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: DEC 09 2019

I-93/07622

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

THROUGH: UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY *PW* AUG -6 1993
FROM: ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (RSA) *Q. L. Smith for*
SUBJECT: Somalia Policy Development -- DECISION MEMO (U)

PURPOSE: ACTION-- To seek SECDEF approval of our approach (TAB) to next steps in Somalia.

(S) Last month we began a process of interactive review with you of the situation in Somalia, focused on the adequacy of UN policy and planning, and our proper role therein. That process has now been greatly enhanced by the excellent report by and productive discussion with our Assessment Team to Somalia, and by the following group discussion with the assembled senior experts on Somalia. On Wednesday, the Deputies Committee met to address Somalia, and after careful review of the evolving situation and the Assessment Team's recommendations, decided on a 3-part strategy:

1. To prepare and to seek to influence the UN to accept a revised, more realistic strategy and plan for Somalia. That document would reflect the evolving situation and our own appreciation of necessary changes to the UN's security-political-economic strategy, including incorporation of Assessment Team recommendations as appropriate. It would emphasize realistic objectives, milestones, key decision points, and exit criteria, projected against a firm timeline.

2. Following UN acceptance of such a new strategy and plan, we would make appropriate revisions to our own plans and actions in support of the UNOSOM effort.

3. In parallel, we would seek to persuade the UN to form and stand up a "Core Group" of senior representatives of concerned, influential governments, to provide advice and oversight to the UN effort. Such a group would change the current appearance of a largely "American" UNOSOM operation.

(S) The Deputies Committee requested DoD to undertake preparation of the first draft of the proposed new UN strategy, for use by the interagency as a working document. That first

~~CLASSIFIED BY: DABU RSA MFR~~
~~DECLASSIFY ON: OADR~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

draft is appended for your review and approval or other guidance. A copy has also been forwarded to the Chairman for his review and subsequent discussion with you. Peter Tarnoff provided an expert to help us draft this. Frank Wisner talked to Peter personally and made clear that this is a first draft and that the DoD position on all aspects is "reserved" pending receipt of your guidance after you have had an opportunity to review and to discuss with the Chairman.

(C) It is our estimate that in about a week (Friday, 13 August) we will produce a much more refined draft, reflecting the input of your guidance, further consultations between the assessment team and UN officials, and review of the Secretary General's report on Somalia (due out next week). We would then provide that revised draft to you and the Chairman for further review, prior to heading into the next Deputies Committee meeting early the following week.

(C) The following is therefore presented for your review and approval (or other guidance) as a working document and basis for planning in the interagency..

RECOMMENDATION: Approve the approach just described

Approve _____

Other _____

COORDINATION: D&P _____
SO/LIC _____

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: DEC 09 2019

COPY FURNISHED: CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Prepared by LTC Johnson, OASD(RSA) AFR, x79753

~~SECRET~~

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: DEC 09 2019

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL

Authority: EO 13526

Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS

Date: DEC 09 2019

~~SECRET~~

Next Steps in Somalia

I. UN STRATEGY:

PUTTING SOMALIA PEACE ENFORCEMENT IN PERSPECTIVE:

(U) Operations Restore Hope and Continue Hope have been successful. There are problems, some serious, which need fixing in order to ensure the long term success of the Somalia peace enforcement operation. But no one should forget where Somalia was on December 9, 1992, the day coalition forces landed in Mogadishu. The country had been engaged in a civil war for two years; an estimated 500,000 Somalis died of starvation and as a direct result of the war. Banditry was endemic. There were no governmental structures. The national economy had ceased to exist. Somalia was in chaos.

*Success?
Did we
fix it?*

(U) Today, the civil war is over. Banditry is significantly reduced throughout Somalia and virtually eliminated in some areas. Except for south Mogadishu, Somalia is generally peaceful. The entire country, including south Mogadishu, is safer than it was on December 9. Somalis are no longer starving. The crop this year is good; emergency food deliveries will end in August because there is no longer any need for them. Although there is a long way to go in recreating political structures and rehabilitating the economy, encouraging signs of progress are beginning to appear. UNOSOM, working with Somalis, has created a couple of dozen district councils. Some schools and orphanages have opened, supported by Somali volunteers and NGOs. In Belet Weyne, in central Somalia, former Somali employees of the ministries of health and education are back on the job as either unpaid volunteers or receiving modest salaries provided by NGOs. Across the country small shops have reopened and repairs are being made. While the media focuses on the continuing violence in south Mogadishu, one should not forget the tremendous progress accomplished by UNITAF and UNOSOM in Somalia, to include Mogadishu.

PROBLEMS:

3

(U) Despite the significant progress made to date, recent events have revealed major problems in the UNOSOM II operation. The most significant overriding problem is the apparent division of opinion among troop-contributing nations about the proper UN strategy for success in Somalia. In short, major troop contributors such as Italy believe that the UN should focus less on using force, and more on negotiations, to address security problems. Moreover, many contributors feel they have not been consulted adequately on policy formulation, and this has exacerbated tensions within UNOSOM. Another key set of problems is obtaining adequate financial resources and staff to fully pursue the economic, political, and security elements of the UN strategy.

DECLASSIFIED BY: [REDACTED]
DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

(C) In the short term, there is an urgent need to address the issue of security in south Mogadishu, particularly with reference to Aideed. In addition, little progress has been made in creating alternative Somali structures (police, military, judiciary) to replace UNOSOM forces. This remains a key problem, particularly since the security situation affects other efforts and has a direct impact upon the U.S. ability to withdraw its military assets from the region.

(C) The economic situation remains dire. While food is readily available virtually everywhere in the country, there is a shortage of money in circulation and many Somalis find it difficult to purchase basic necessities. Many steps must be taken, including the repair of infrastructure, creation of jobs, and establishment of a banking system, to restore a modicum of economic stability.

(U) Progress toward political reconciliation has been stalled by the deteriorating security situation in the capital. Progress is being made in the countryside, but a much greater effort must be devoted to pushing this along. In addition, the issue of raising revenues for local councils has been largely ignored. It is worth reiterating that while all three aspects of this strategy are mutually reinforcing, addressing the security situation probably is a prerequisite for significant progress on the political and economic fronts.

UN OBJECTIVES:

(C) The UN's objectives in Somalia are vague and ambitious (see extract from UNSC Resolution 814, at Tab A). In essence, they can be boiled down to the following four goals:

- 1) Help provide relief and economic rehabilitation.
- 2) Help restore peace and stability, and law and order.
- 3) - Promote political reconciliation and re-establishment of institutions and civil administration.
- 4) Help repatriate displaced people and refugees.

(U) While the actual UNSC Resolution words commit UNOSOM to promoting these goals (economic rehabilitation, peace, political reconciliation), the UN's objectives are usually interpreted to be the attainment of these goals.

(U) The crux of the challenge facing the UN is to be more specific about its objectives, to outline discrete steps -- tasks -- to be taken toward meeting these objectives, and to establish a timetable for the steps and therefore, by definition, the accomplishment of UN objectives (and the end of the UNOSOM mandate).

(C) It is worth noting that achieving the U.S. objective of adhering to our stated timetable for the withdrawal of U.S. forces

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: DEC 09 2019

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

does not hinge upon the successful completion of the UN's mission. The continuing withdrawal of U.S. forces hinges largely on progress towards the creation of an alternative UN or an indigenous Somali force to ensure security. Thus, from a U.S. perspective, it is particularly important to get the security situation under control. (See Section III)

(C) We believe that the United States should help the UN redefine its objectives and establish specific steps on the path toward ending its involvement in Somalia. We believe that the UNSC members and participating nations must establish a commonly shared understanding of what the UNSC language means. Specifically, we recommend that consultations lead to agreement that the UN intends only to help Somalia achieve the goals outlined in the Resolution -- not achieve them -- and that it would define UNOSOM as a success once it had completed an agreed-upon set of steps. Those steps should be defined, as suggested below, and the UNSC and proposed core group (see Section II) should agree on a timetable for taking those steps.

(U) Attached at Tab B is a schematic diagram of the UN's current strategy in Somalia. At Tab C is our diagram of a proposed future UN strategy. At Tab D you will find the proposed short-term steps for UNOSOM II, juxtaposed against a proposed timetable. Longer term steps are diagrammed at Tab E.

TASKS TO BE COMPLETED:

A) HUMANITARIAN/ECONOMIC (U). The humanitarian and economic objectives of relief and rehabilitation are to lead to basic Somali self-sufficiency. Emergency relief is essentially over and feeding centers will stop operation by mid-August. Now is the time to get on with economic development. NGOs who have fled because of the security situation must return. There is no plan for economic development. One may be published in the upcoming SYG report. A strategy with timetables must be clearly established by 15 September 93. Such a strategy would identify plans for creating conditions conducive to private investment, livestock export and agricultural production. It would remove constraints relating to reliable financial services, communications, roads, ports, utilities, transports and markets. It would identify plans to create jobs through economic growth, particularly in agricultural and livestock sectors. Donors are needed to provide funds for essential services until Somali resource-generating mechanisms are re-established. Small project funds should be established to create jobs in regions which achieve a satisfactory level of political reconciliation and disarmament. UNOSOM must also prepare a plan of action for the resettlement of Somali refugees and displaced persons.

B) MILITARY/SECURITY (C). The international effort in Somalia has provided a secure environment to allow completion of emergency relief. While the countryside is now generally stable,

What about Italian ~~2000~~ that we should negotiate more

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: DEC 09 2019

~~SECRET~~

Specifically Aided?

4

South Mogadishu is nearly paralyzed in the confrontation with Aided. Resolving this problem and restoring security will require better coordination with all coalition members at all levels. The UN must immediately begin consultations among donor countries in New York and in Mogadishu to establish a common approach to this problem and gain consensus for immediate action.

7 | In particular, UNOSOM II must work toward comprehensive disarmament to reduce the local capacity for unwarranted violence and must better establish local police forces to handle residual threats to public peace. Disarming the Aided faction has begun and should be completed by September 93. Disarming the main militias should follow in the fall. UNOSOM must, in conjunction with Somali police, establish a consistent weapons control policy throughout the country. Implementation of this policy can begin in regions where militias are disarmed; the process should be completed by the spring of 94.

Additional efforts to set up a police force must begin immediately. UNOSOM must: 1) devise a structure that emphasizes a professional, neutral orientation for the force and 2) identify donors who can fund, equip, organize, and train the force. There are now approximately 4,000 Somali police, with a UN goal of 10,000 by October 93, and 28,000 by May 94. Immediate resources are required for this critical action. Disarmament of major militias and establishment of Somali police forces in the major population centers should permit the withdrawal of the US QRF within three to six months.

Once the population is sufficiently disarmed (May 94) and the local police are on the beat, UNOSOM should begin a major push to establish a security force nationwide (December 94). This force would be able to provide domestic peace and guard borders.

~~SECRET~~ **POLITICAL** ~~SECRET~~. UNOSOM is promoting political reconciliation and the re-establishment of constitutions and civil administration, but must more actively involve Somalis in this process. Efforts are beginning to bear fruit. Dozens of district councils have been established, but only vague guidelines for moving from local councils to governments have been developed. Guidelines and timetables are needed for the restoration of political constitutions. District councils must lead to the establishment of regional councils and eventually a Transitional National Council. Duties, responsibilities, authorities and accountability of the councils must be delineated. UNOSOM policy decisions must also be communicated clearly to the field. UNOSOM should establish a goal of October 93 for establishment of all district councils, and February 94 for regional councils. Regional organizations must become active in the re-establishment of Somali society. UNOSOM must properly staff its zone offices. A judicial/penal system must be developed. A Transitional National Council should be formed once regional councils are widely established, and should operate until a national government is created through free elections by the summer of 95.

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL

Authority: EO 13526

Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS

Date: DEC 09 2019

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

FINANCIAL/PERSONNEL CONSTRAINTS:

what roughly are we talking about

✓ (C) An important caveat to the above recommendations is that many of them assume adequate funding. We are still seeking the most recent data from the United Nations, but it is clear that the UN currently lacks adequate resources to accomplish its political and economic objectives in Somalia. Already there have been complaints that almost all of the resources in Somalia have been dedicated to the security problem, at the expense of economic and political efforts. Yet even to address the security situation, significantly more funding will be required. For example, the current estimate for establishing a nationwide police force is about \$50 million. The UN had budgeted \$9 million. There is no money currently available to accomplish this task.

(C) The UN must address this issue if UNOSOM is to have an opportunity to succeed. The UN should immediately prepare detailed estimates of the costs of achieving its three-pronged strategy in Somalia and should undertake a broad-based campaign to raise the requisite resources.* If it proves impossible to obtain adequate funding, UN objectives must be scaled back.

✓ (C) The UN must identify a full staff for its humanitarian and political division in Mogadishu and the regions. Staffing is now woefully inadequate.* UNOSOM must mount a worldwide program to recruit the required employees. The UN should also launch a special effort to recruit professional Somalis. A special effort must be made to increase the staff and expand the activities of the UN's public relations efforts, both in New York and in Mogadishu.

(C) Finally the UNSC should recognize that developments on the ground or a lack of resources may require a reassessment of UNOSOM objectives. It is also important that the UNOSOM supporters and the Somali people understand that the UN's abilities and resources are not limitless.

II. CREATION OF A SOMALIA CORE GROUP:

To do what?

✓ (C) The peace enforcement operation in Somalia is perceived by participants and outsiders alike as an American-led and American-run activity. This should come as no surprise. The Secretary General's special representative and one of his senior assistants are American. Two of the four most senior officers in force command are Americans. Finally, there remains a residue of American control from the UNITAF operation, which was under our leadership. It is in the interest of the U.S. and the UN to increase the involvement, real and perceived, of other countries in Operation Continue Hope. This could be accomplished by creating a consultative mechanism (along the lines of the core group which guides policy on Cambodia) to help guide policy and "internationalize" the UNOSOM operation.

(U) The Cambodian core group consists of the Perm Five, Thailand, Australia, Indonesia, Canada, Japan and Germany. Some major troop

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: DEC 09 2019

~~SECRET~~

contributors such as Bulgaria, Pakistan and India are not included in the core group.

① (U) A UN-led core group for Somalia should be of manageable size, have a strong international--including African--coloration, and include several key contributors of troops and money. The U.S. should urge the UN to establish such a body. The core group should be in New York, to emphasize its relationship to UN Headquarters and the Secretary General.

② However, it will not be possible to include in the core group all nations that contribute significant numbers of troops. For this reason, we might recommend that a Somalia troop contributors meeting -- now being conducted on an ad hoc basis by Kofi Annan in New York -- be institutionalized and conducted in Mogadishu. This group could be connected -- perhaps be an adjunct -- to the core group.

③ If it is not possible to include an adequate number of African nations in the core group, we might consider recommending establishment of a group of African states to provide policy input on UNOSOM operations. Again, it could be an adjunct to the core group.

III. U.S. ENDGAME:

Good
↓
① 1. Help make sure that UNOSOM II Chapter VII is a UN success. In order to accomplish this, we must continue to provide strong diplomatic and financial support -- and military support in the short term -- while taking steps to demonstrate that the UN is in charge. The following should be initiated immediately:

- The U.S. should assist in developing a comprehensive UN plan linking the three humanitarian, security and political components of the overall strategy.

- The UN should begin replacing U.S. senior level staff in UNOSOM with personnel of other participating countries. The U.S. should be prepared to provide both the UN and UNOSOM staffs with mid-grade and technical personnel and press other participating nations to do the same.

- UNOSOM needs to launch an aggressive public information campaign. The U.S. should support with PSYOP advisors, technical assistance, and equipment.

- UNOSOM must identify necessary costs for completion of its mission and immediately begin working to ensure adequate financing is available.

② 2. Reduce U.S. troop commitments as soon as possible.

③ A key step is to withdraw the U.S. ORF. The PDD calls for this to occur by late summer. The current situation on the ground makes this unlikely. However, following the UN strategy

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: DEC 09 2019

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

7

outlined above, the QRF can withdraw within six months. Four events must occur: 1) the Aideed problem is resolved; 2) the major factions are disarmed; 3) a credible police force is established in major population centers; and (4) effective replacement reaction elements are in place.

~~NS~~ Gradually reduce the number of U.S. logistics and support personnel (to 1400 by January 94). To do this, we must accelerate the transition of support functions to civilian contractors (this also requires a more secure environment), and assist in developing Somali support infrastructure. As other nations assume prominent roles in UNOSOM II we will transfer support functions when appropriate.

~~NS~~ 3. End Game for the U.S.

The U.S. can disengage militarily from Somalia within a reasonable time frame (QRF in six months; logistics forces to 1,400 by January 94 and out by 95) IF the UN takes forceful steps to address the security situation. Strong U.S. support is required to ensure that this occurs.

Even after the U.S. military involvement has concluded, continued U.S. diplomatic and financial support will be needed to sustain international resources and energy in support of UNOSOM II. The steps outlined earlier provide measurable guideposts for working toward a successful conclusion of a more realistic UN strategy.

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: DEC 09 2019

~~SECRET~~

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: DEC 09 2019

1. Approves the report of the Secretary-General of 3 March 1993;
2. Expresses its appreciation to the Secretary-General for convening the Conference on National Reconciliation for Somalia in accordance with the agreements reached during the Informal Preparatory Meeting on Somali Political Reconciliation in Addis Ababa in January 1993 and for the progress achieved towards political reconciliation in Somalia, and also for his efforts to ensure that, as appropriate, all Somalis, including movements, factions, community leaders, women, professionals, intellectuals, elders and other representative groups are suitably represented at such conferences;
3. Welcomes the convening of the Third United Nations Coordination Meeting for Humanitarian Assistance for Somalia in Addis Ababa from 11 to 13 March 1993 and the willingness expressed by Governments through this process to contribute to relief and rehabilitation efforts in Somalia, where and when possible;
4. Requests the Secretary-General, through his Special Representative, and with assistance, as appropriate, from all relevant United Nations entities, offices and specialized agencies, to provide humanitarian and other assistance to the people of Somalia in rehabilitating their political institutions and economy and promoting political settlement and national reconciliation, in accordance with the recommendations contained in his report of 3 March 1993, including in particular:
 - (a) To assist in the provision of relief and in the economic rehabilitation of Somalia, based on an assessment of clear, prioritized needs, and taking into account, as appropriate, the 1993 Relief and Rehabilitation Programme for Somalia prepared by the United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs;
 - (b) To assist in the repatriation of refugees and displaced persons within Somalia;
 - (c) To assist the people of Somalia to promote and advance political reconciliation, through broad participation by all sectors of Somali society, and the re-establishment of national and regional institutions and civil administration in the entire country;
 - (d) To assist in the re-establishment of Somali police, as appropriate, at the local, regional or national level, to assist in the restoration and maintenance of peace, stability and law and order, including in the investigation and facilitating the prosecution of serious violations of international humanitarian law;
 - (e) To assist the people of Somalia in the development of a coherent and integrated programme for the removal of mines throughout Somalia;
 - (f) To develop appropriate public information activities in support of the United Nations activities in Somalia;
 - (g) To create conditions under which Somali civil society may have a role, at every level, in the process of political reconciliation and in the formulation and realization of rehabilitation and reconstruction programmes;


Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: DEC 09 2019

 Accomplished
 In Progress

UNOSOM II Strategy

Page determined to be Unclassified
 Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
 IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
 Date: DEC 09 2019

Decision Points / Follow On Actions




Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: DEC 09 2019

Proposed UNOSOM II Strategy



Decision Points / Follow On Actions

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDO, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: DEC 09 2019



Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: DEC 09 2019

UN GOALS / Phased US Withdrawal (proposed short term)

 Phased US withdrawal
 Has an impact on phased US withdrawal
HUMANITARIAN

Regional NGO Assessments

Humanitarian Div coord.

MILITARY / SECURITY

"Team Building" - Commanders Conferences - Consultations - Exercise

ACORN
SOLID

Regional Command
Log capability
Security forces (GRF)

Actual on the ground
Log capability
Security forces (GRF)

Recognize Reconciled Areas

Agreement Public Law 104-107

GRF redploys (?)

US Log Force (-)

POLITICAL

Internationalize/
Africanize UN effort

Establish
Judicial/Penal system

United Nations Security Council

United Nations Security Council


Regional Councils

District Councils

TNC

Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: DEC 09 2019

UN GOALS (proposed)



Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: DEC 09 2019

ROUTING & COORDINATION COVER SHEET

CONTROL NUMBER

J-5A 04117-93

RETURN TO: ADMIN SUPPORT BRANCH, SJS, 2E829, THE PENTAGON

Jamie M.

DATE RECEIVED

10 August 1993

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

DATE OF DOCUMENT

SUBJECT

Revised Strategy for UNOSOM II (U) CJS HAS SEEN

AUG 11 1993

CJCS INFO

CIRCULATION OF THIS DOCUMENT WILL BE TO INDIVIDUALS INDICATED BELOW. THE DOCUMENT WILL BE RETURNED TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE FOR DISPATCH OR FILING. THIS FORM SHOULD NOT BE REMOVED FROM SUBJECT DOCUMENT.

TO	NAME	INITIAL	COMMENTS
	CHAIRMAN OF THE JCS	00	
	EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT	001	
4	DEPUTY EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT	001A	
	VICE CHAIRMAN OF THE JCS	01	
Cy	EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT TO VICE CHAIRMAN OF THE JCS	011	
Cy	ASSISTANT TO THE CJCS	02	
	EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT	021	
	ACJCS SPECIAL ASSISTANTS		
	LEGAL COUNSEL	02E	
	LEGISLATIVE ASST	02F	
	PROTOCOL	003	
	CIVILIAN SPECIAL ASSISTANT	004	
	SPECIAL ASSISTANT PUBLIC AFFAIRS	005	
	COMMUNICATIONS ADVISOR	006	
3	DIRECTOR, JT STAFF	03	
	EA TO THE DJS	031	
2	VICE DIRECTOR, JT STAFF	04	
	EA TO THE VJCS	041	
1	SECRETARY, JT STAFF	05	
5	ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT BR	051	

OK BUT
THANK THE
STARTUP IN
IS OPTIMISTIC.
UNDERSTAND
WEEK AS THOUT
NEW POW TEAM
STANDARD

CH

Office of the Secretary of Defense
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS
Date: 09 DEC 2009 Authority: EO 13526
Declassify: 8 Deny in Full: _____
Declassify in Part: _____
Reason: _____
MDR: 16-M-1538

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: DEC 09 2019

AD
ACB/ASB
FORAG.

R/TRP