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October 29, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: Alexander M. Haig, Jr. *Q*
SUBJECT: Visit of King Hussein of Jordan

I. SETTING

Rightly or wrongly, King Hussein feels that he has been taken for granted or, worse still, discounted by the U.S. Ambassador Viets' meetings with the King have highlighted both his desire to find a basis for closer relations and his disappointments with our policy. Hussein's relationship with the Carter Administration went up and down, and was clouded by personal and policy differences. Our efforts to support Jordan in the face of Syria's mobilization on its border in December 1980 were tentative and unreassuring to the Jordanians. These memories, and the suspicion that we have written off Jordan in our Middle East strategy, form the backdrop to Hussein's present attitudes and behavior, including his unhelpful letter to you and the anti-U.S. slant in the Jordanian media. Dick Viets, who has been helped by your constructive messages to Hussein, has begun to put our relations back on track; your meeting with Hussein can greatly encourage the positive trend and set the stage for a future productive relationship.

Hussein has held high hopes for your Administration. A man prone to wide swings of mood, he was severely jolted by Israel's raid on Iraq and by Begin's re-election. Hussein's approach is unlike Sadat's or Begin's because while Hussein shares our long-range goals, he does not accept our tactics. Hussein sees himself as a pragmatic leader willing to live in peace with Israel—although he continues to reject Camp David—and willing to take risks to support shared U.S.-Jordanian security concerns—such as training Sudanese military personnel on U.S. equipment—so long as he feels protected.

II. OBJECTIVES

1. Establish a strong personal relationship.
2. Reaffirm that your Administration does not seek a solution to the Palestinian problem at Jordan's expense.

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3. Tell the King that we remain committed to a just, lasting and comprehensive peace through the Camp David process, the autonomy negotiations and Resolution 242, and that we look to the King to play a positive role.

4. Encourage the King to be helpful in areas in which we share a common strategic concern about regional security, and tell him you are aware of the Syrian threat to his country.

III. ISSUES

1. Personal Relationship

Hussein is very nervous about this visit. His previous Ambassador to the U.S. badly misinterpreted your meeting with Arab Ambassadors after Israel's raid on Iraq. Even after our attempts to clear the air, Hussein wonders about the future of his relationship with us. Hussein will seek to learn whether you and your Administration are committed to addressing the issues he sees as paramount: (1) the Palestinians, (2) Soviet inroads through radical states such as Syria and the Palestinian Marxists, (3) Israel's occupation policies on the West Bank and in Jerusalem, and (4) Israel's proposed Mediterranean-Dead Sea Canal. He will want to hear that you remain committed to a just, lasting and comprehensive peace in the Middle East and that the U.S. remains willing and able to play an "honest broker's" role in Arab-Israeli questions.

Your objective is to convince Hussein that we value his opinion and his perspective, that we continue to look to Jordan to play a positive role in area developments, including the peace process and that we remain committed to finding a just and lasting peace in the area. You want Hussein to leave the meeting convinced that you are someone with whom he can talk about his problems and concerns.

2. Palestinian Solution at Jordan's Expense

Hussein fears that we accept Israeli Minister of Defense Sharon's and Israeli Minister of Foreign Affairs Shamir's thesis that Jordan is the "Palestinians' state", and that the Hashemite Kingdom is an anachronism which should cease to exist. Shamir October 26 went so far as to say that he does not care who rules in Amman--"Arafat or Hussein". This idea is anathema to the Hashemites and to the indigenous non-Palestinian population of

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Jordan. The Soviets have also begun to exploit the Sharon theme, using it to drive a wedge between the U.S. and moderate Arabs. Hussein will seek your confirmation that we reject this idea.

While this may seem a debator's point, it is in many ways the crux of our problem with Jordan. You should tell Hussein that we completely reject the thesis—I told Hussein's brother the Crown Prince last month that Sharon's idea is "hogwash". Jordan is a longstanding friend with a unique and enduring character which we support. Your success on this objective will go a long way toward building a good relationship with Hussein.

3. Resolution 242

Crown Prince Hassan told me last month that the King will ask about our commitment to UNSC Resolution 242, which lays out the essential equation we have worked with since 1967 in Middle East peace-making; Israel's trade of occupied territory for peace, recognition, and secure borders. At issue for Hussein is not the desirability of peace but the basis for it. The U.S. has consistently taken the position with him and with other moderate Arab governments that Resolution 242 embodies a basic philosophy—real peace for Israeli withdrawal from territories occupied in 1967. We have also consistently maintained that this outcome can be achieved only as the result of a negotiating process involving Israel and its Arab neighbors. This position has been consistent both prior to and since the conclusion of the Camp David Agreement, which itself reaffirmed that Resolution 242 should guide the search for peace and remains the "agreed basis" for a settlement between Israel and its neighbors.

You should reconfirm to King Hussein that this Administration continues to regard Resolution 242 "in all its parts" as the basis for the Camp David framework and a comprehensive Arab-Israeli settlement involving "full peace for withdrawal" but that the terms and details of a settlement based on 242 can be worked out only through a process of negotiation between Israel and its neighbors. I have sent you separately a fuller exposition of this issue.

Hussein will report on your talks to other moderate Arabs at Rabat in two weeks. If the King is convinced that we remain committed to the principles of 242 and Camp David, we stand a chance of engaging him in a constructive dialogue on the peace process.

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4. Encourage Action on Shared Security Concerns

Jordan shares broadly our assessment of a Soviet threat to the region. The King thinks in regional and strategic terms. Hussein faces a serious threat from a well-armed Soviet-backed Syria. The King has also kept his border with Israel almost completely free from terrorist activity, no small feat given the infiltration efforts by radical Palestinian groups backed by Syria. Hussein has shown a willingness over the years to take risks for goals which we share--his military support for countries in the Gulf and his military's training in the Sudan are good examples. Hussein will seek from you an evaluation of our regional security strategy (and will ask about U.S.-Israeli strategic cooperation) and seek your recognition and approval for Jordan's role in regional security.

You need to encourage Jordan to continue to act with us on those issues on which we share a perception of a threat to the region. You should tell him U.S.-Israeli strategic co-operation is not aimed at Jordan or other Arab states. You should praise (privately) his efforts to stop terrorism and take risks (as in the Sudan) to support our shared interests.

Office of the Secretary of Defense *5050552*
Chief, RDD, ESD, WIIS .
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