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ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

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WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301



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MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

THROUGH: UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY 718 1 OCT 83

SUBJECT: Office Call With Saudi Ambassador Prince Bandar, Tuesday, 1600 hrs, 1 November 1983 (U) -- ACTION MEMORANDUM

(U) You have agreed to see Prince Bandar, based on his request made at Friday's meeting between him and Major General Tixier.

(S) The purpose of Friday's meeting was to provide Prince Bandar an update on the Saudi request to purchase the I-Chaparral MIM-72C. He was informed that although a final decision had not yet been made, it was most unlikely that the recommendation of the Joint Chiefs not to sell the MIM-72C version would be rejected. Prince Bandar had no problem with this, primarily because the U.S. Mid-Level Air Defense Survey conducted in July found that both the Chaparral and the French developed Shahine could do the job. As Bandar pointed out, Saudi Arabia has invested considerable sums in the Shahine project and several batteries are already in the Saudi inventory.

(S) Prince Bandar has requested appointments with you and General Vessey in order to explore further means of joint consultation and planning in regard to the Arab Gulf situation, and to obtain an update of our contingency plans for the region. In view of the fact that the NSC has not yet taken action on SIG recommendations of October 24 (Tab A), we are somewhat restrained in our responses to Prince Bandar. Specific questions Prince Bandar may raise are:

- What are USG plans should Iran attempt to block the Strait of Hormuz or conduct operations either against shipping in the Gulf and/or against GCC members?

-- As the President has stated on several occasions, we are committed to take appropriate action to maintain freedom of navigation in the Persian Gulf and to ensure the security and territorial integrity of the Gulf States should Iran attempt to close the Strait or attack Gulf oil facilities.

-- At the highest level, we are in the process of examining the Iranian threat and determining what specific actions we should take in the event of escalation. We have briefed the Kingdom

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in the past on US contingency planning for such threats to the Gulf and believe continued and expanded consultations are essential in light of heightened indications of possible escalation.

- We are looking at numerous scenarios, to include: 1) Iranian mining; 2) Iranian threats or attacks on the territory or facilities of non-belligerent Gulf States; and 3) Iranian interdiction of neutral commercial shipping.
- We believe any response to an Iranian attempt to close the Gulf or block Gulf State exports should be multinational, if possible. We have had some low level discussions with our Allies on the possibility of escalation.
- Reopening Iraq's oil pipeline through Syria could alleviate some of the pressure on Iraq to stop Iranian oil exports. Does Saudi Arabia see any possibility of gaining Syrian agreement to open the pipeline?
- The UN passed last night a resolution calling for measures to prevent the escalation of the war in the Gulf. We hope Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states will use their influence with Iraq and Iran to support the UN Security Council resolution.
- What would be the USG attitude towards a GCC request to establish a low-level consultation forum to explore joint action involving GCC members and other interested parties?
- We would welcome such a move. As I have noted previously, expanded consultations addressing all aspects of joint contingency operations would save precious time when we need to act.
- What are your ideas in regard to the composition and functioning of such a group?
- Do you concur with the recommendation of the Joint Chiefs not to sell the I-Chaparral MIM-72C to Saudi Arabia?
- Having reviewed the recommendations, I concur with that recommendation.
- I directed a very careful analysis of this matter. Based on the fact that the MIM-72F version of the Chaparral exceeds any threat in the region, plus the fact that no country outside the US (including NATO and other allies) presently possess this system, we concluded that a sale of this system is not appropriate.

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You may wish to raise the following points with Prince Bandar:

- The USG is deeply grateful for your brilliant efforts in bringing about a cease-fire in Lebanon.

-- We remain firm in continuing to push for national reconciliation.

-- We will continue to support the MNF and we will honor our security assistance commitments to that beleaguered country.

- How do you assess prospects of the ongoing National Reconciliation Talks?

- What additional measures is the SAG contemplating in support of Lebanon?

(U) General Vessey's schedule is such that he could see Prince Bandar at the earliest next week. Recommend that he attend the meeting, together with Major General Tixier. The ISA Saudi Desk Officer, COL Hofmann, is available as note-taker.

Approve 7 1 NOV 1983

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

*Already  
Arranged  
CJ*

*Noel G. Koch*  
NOEL G. KOCH

Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense  
International Security Affairs

*Bandar in  
Sunday to  
Monday  
Good*

*Any withdrawal v. Iran for Beirut should be O help  
Iraq. Will also be in Syria  
Iranian unpredictable*

Office of the Secretary of Defense 5 U.S.C. § 552  
Chief, RDD, ESD, WIIS  
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